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Introduction
In 1954, the famous American sociologist Edward Shils (1910-1995) in a 
talk in Italy proclaimed that the only possible form of government was a 
democratic welfare state and that, effectively, ideology had ended, because, in 
principle, both Western and Eastern Blocs agreed to a state-led development 
strategy.1 In the early nineties, Francis Fukuyama would proclaim the 
same with an even more boastful pronouncement: the end of history.2 Of 
course, Shils and Fukuyama were talking about very different ideas; Shils 
was promoting the ideology of state-led, technocratic modernization, while 
Fukuyama was celebrating the return of liberal ideas and the market place. 
Both cases show the importance of the reigning paradigm of their respective 
period. The rise of such international paradigms that traverse ideological 
and geographical boundaries is related to the inherently interrelated and 
international connections that have been bonding states and societies together 
since the advent of the modern world.3
The present dissertation intends to analyze and locate one of the most 
perplexing occurrences in the modern history of Indonesia: the rather abrupt 
transformation from a weak, incapable, liberal-democratic state in statu 
nascendi that failed to develop into a strong corporatist and development-
oriented ‘New Order’ state with a military-technocratic elite at the helm. 
1 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of Modernity Modernization Theory in Cold War America, (Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 58.
2 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1992).
3 Christopher Bailey, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 
p. 1-21.
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This transformation occurred between 1957 and 1965. About the question 
by Herbert Feith in his 1962 magnum opus4 why Indonesia failed its first 
liberal democratic experiment, the Yale historian Harry Benda said that the 
question was put in the wrong order. There was no reason to believe that 
the Indonesian had the tradition to support democracy. The question was 
why would Indonesia develop a liberal democratic society in the first place?5 
Nonetheless, a democratic society did appear after the end of the New Order 
regime in 1998 and by all accounts, it seems to be rather successful. Looking 
from a Post-Soeharto perspective, the pressing question now is how the New 
Order project could ever successfully start in the first place. 
The purpose of the thesis is to locate the roots of the New Order state 
by looking at the development of its managerial elite and the institutions 
that allowed its emergence. The changing ideas and ideology of the elite 
concerning the relationship between the state and the society forms an 
important component in the analysis. When the Dutch after four years of 
struggle acceded to Indonesian demands and acknowledged Indonesian 
independence by late 1949, they left behind a feeble state with grave 
deficiencies in manpower and expertise.  The leading question then is: 
how did a state with such little colonial endowment and even institutional 
damage,6 succeed in joining the ranks of what the World Bank has termed 
‘the East Asian miracle economies with sustained and equitable growth?’7 At 
the same time, how did it also become a violent state, whose relationship with 
its people was developed within a discourse that put the managing apparatus 
above and beyond the control of the feeble rule of law?8 How, in fact, did 
the rule of law become so lax, even in comparison to its colonial version?9 
Are both these questions connected and, if so, in what way?
4 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1962).
5 Harry Benda, “Democracy in Indonesia. Review Article” in The Journal of Asian Studies, 
Vol. 23, No. 3, May 1964, p. 449-456.
6 Daan Marks, “The Economic Consequences of Decolonization. The ‘special’ case of 
Indonesia” in Thomas Lindblad (ed.), Indonesian Economic Decolonization in Regional and 
International Perspectives, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009), p. 157-174.
7 The East Asian Miracle. Economic Growth and Public Policy, (Washington: World Bank, 1993).
8 Ariel Heryanto, State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia. Fatally Belonging, (London: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 106-134.
9 Daniel Lev, “The Politics of Judicial Development in Indonesia” in Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, Vol. 7, No.2, January 1965, p. 173-199.
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In order to start trying to answer these questions, I shall focus on the 
period that has been steadfastly shunned by the official historians of the 
New Order: the Old Order and its two distinct forms of state-society 
relations: Parliamentary Democracy (1946-1957) and Guided Democracy 
(1957-1965). Significantly, the series of constitutional and institutional 
experiments that were conducted after 1957 during the Guided Democracy 
had lasting effects for Indonesian state-society relations in the second half 
of the twentieth century. The story of the post-colonial Indonesian state 
has been primarily about the shift from a ‘liberal’ colonial state toward a 
corporatist;10 military-technocratic Developmental State called the New 
Order. New Order historiography delineates that post-colonial Indonesian 
history into two periods; the Old Order (1945 to 1965) and the New Order 
(1965/66 to 1998).11 The Old Order is depicted as morally and economically 
bankrupt and its liberal character is seen as the root of the problem: an active 
society with too many rather ineffective political parties diminished the 
state’s capacity to project its power and implement development policies. 
In addition to this a laissez faire economic system allowed the continuation 
of a large percentage of the economy to remain under foreign domination. 
This portrayal ignores that the Old Order contained two successive quite 
distinct regimes. By lumping together the Parliamentary Democracy and 
the Guided Democracy period the historians of the New Order have sought 
to distance themselves from President Sukarno’s political experiments. By 
contrast, the New Order represent a cadre of elite Indonesian managers, a 
strong and capable state and robust economic growth and thus seems to fit 
the theory of the Princeton political scientists Atul Kohli who has stressed that 
“…the creation of effective states within the developing world has generally 
preceded the emergence of industrializing economies.”12 The question then 
10 David Reeve “The corporatist state: the case of Golkar” in State and civil society in 
Indonesia (1990): 151-176, Dwight King, Authoritarian Rule and State Corporatism in 
Indonesia, (S.l.: s.n., 1977).
11 Gerry van Klinken, “The Battle of History after Soeharto” in Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 33, 
No. 3 July 2001, p. 323-350.
12 The image of the New Order as a corporate/technocratic state or bureaucratic polity stand 
in contrast to those who view its powers as highly dispersed with the image of the patron-
client. For more on the variety of ways specialist view the New Order state, see Donald 
K. Emmerson, “Understanding the New Order. Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia” in 
Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 11, November 1983, p. 1220-1241. Atul Kohli, State-directed 
development, Political power and industrialization in the global periphery, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 2.
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poses itself whether the relatively effective state that quite suddenly appeared 
in the form of the New Order, could it also have developed the way it did 
without the Guided Democracy state as precursor?
The economist Douglass North has explained that the performance of 
an institution is heavily dependent on the way its actors perceive its function 
and use.13 Economic growth is determined by the type of ideology and its 
institutional expression that reduce the transaction costs in the economy. 
Thus the ideology that encapsulates the institution and its participating actors 
is portrayed as central toward its effectiveness. 
In response to these arguments this dissertation will seek to embed 
Indonesian development during the period concerned in an international 
context. By this I mean to say that the prevailing ideologies and institutions 
in the post war period were part and parcel of a shift away from classical 
liberalism of the early twentieth century and of the revolution that heralded 
the abandonment of the Gold Standard, the rise of the Five Year Plan, 
the New Deal and Corporate Fascism.14 The post-colonial rise of the 
developmental state should be seen in the context of the rise, in the West, 
of the Welfare State. The notion of efficiency, coordination and national 
planning as a natural human striving had become reality as such. For much 
of the twentieth century, the developmental model that reigned supreme 
focused on state-led collectivist incorporation, which often times brushed 
aside individual freedom.15 The post Second World War period witnessed 
the rise of both the post-colonial International aid structure and the higher 
educational system, led by the United States of America. These developments 
deeply influenced the native elites of the various newly created nations who 
went to study abroad or welcomed Western consultants at home. 
In relation to the rise of state-led developmentalism in Indonesia, this 
thesis furthermore argues that the ideological differences of the Cold War 
lay not between the formal Blocs led by the United States of America and 
13 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 3-10.
14 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 20-30.
15 Daniel Lerner had to point out that social science does not jeopardize democracy and 
individualism to his American audience. “Nothing in the social sciences increases the capacity 
to manipulate an individual against his will.” Daniel Lerner, “Social Science: Whence and 
Whither” in Daniel Lerner (ed.), The Meaning of the Social Sciences, (Cleveland: The World 
Publishing Company, 1959), p. 13-39.
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the Soviet Union, but between the ideologies of state-corporatism and a 
non-centralized political participation.16 As Shils remarked, American social 
scientists acknowledged the “end of ideology” by the mid-1950s pointing 
out that democratic welfare state represented the only way to organize 
society, which signified that “the ideological battle against Communism was 
therefore essentially over.”17 American Third World foreign policy, especially 
under Kennedy, sought a primarily military solution to the problems of 
Third World18 and saw military officers as leaders of modernization.19 The 
Cold War offered basically two alternatives as to how elites could control 
the people. The two alternatives eerily resembled one another: managerial 
control and military cooptation of the masses.
The Indonesian effort to create a broad-based democratic and participatory 
society during the 1950s was tragically hampered by the established elite’s 
inherent distrust of the liberal institutions meant to safeguard individual 
liberty from state tyranny: the rule of law and the court system, the limitation 
of executive power or triaspolitica and a relatively open economy. Both the 
older nationalist generation and the newer managerial/expert generation 
grew up in a milieu that was hostile, or at least indifferent, to liberal ideas 
and institutions. Those who championed non-state participation did so 
through corporatist means by prying open the state and the economy, i.e. 
government bodies and company boards, to non-state actors, usually labour 
or other forms of social organization.
16 James Burnham pointed out the pan-ideological character of the managerial revolution in 
the early years of World War II: “Fascism-Nazism and Leninism-Stalinism are types of earlier 
managerial ideologies which have been given organized expression and have already had 
great success. In this country, Technocracy and the much more important New Dealism are 
embryonic and less-developed types of primitive, native-American managerial ideologies.” 
James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution. What is happening in this world, (New York: 
John Day Co., 1941), p. 191-192.
17 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future. Modernization Theory in Cold War America, p. 58.
18 His Third World strategy was economic development, political reform and military 
assistance. He recruited social scientists from American universities in order to employ social 
engineering to various Third World locations. Andrew Brittle, US Army Counterinsurgency 
and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976, (Washington: Center of Military History, 
2006), p. 223-278. For more detailed account on the ideas of social scientists like Walt 
Rostow on this idea of bringing forth modernization, often through military means, see Nils 
Gilman, Mandarins of the Future. Modernization Theory in Cold War America, p. 155-202.
19 Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945-1965. A study of an 
intervention, (Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, 1978), p. 14-17.
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 The significant growth of an Americanized managerial elites and 
their cadre of international consultants during the 1950s, exemplified by 
the economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, was an important development 
for it challenged the primacy of the nationalists. Herbert Feith has alluded 
to this by his description of the schism between the solidarity maker and the 
administrator group, but because his thesis focus on politician and stop by the 
end of the 1950s,20 he did not analyze the important changes that occurred 
later on when Indonesians started to return home after graduating from 
higher education in the United States of America. The Guided Democracy 
should be seen as an effort by the old, nationalist elite to control both the 
dangerous rise of upstart managers, whose expansion into the army gave rise 
to a hybrid army-managerial elite and to control the rise of a raucous civil 
society, under the control of the Communist party, the PKI. A constitutional 
revamping was carried out that allowed for the rise of a corporatist state under 
the control of nationalist politicians. These institutional changes resulted in 
several things; the rising primacy of the executive as main holder of power to 
the detriment of the other power holders within the triaspolitica. The entire 
institution of triaspolitica itself came under attack and the legal framework 
of society would be replaced with the pressing need of managerial efficiency. 
Decomposition of the institution of the rule of law was conducted by both 
pure neglect and an ideological hostility toward the law itself.21
 As we will see, an earnest effort was made to create corporatist 
institutions, one in which participatory organizations (karyas) were allowed 
access to such state institutions as the institution for national planning 
(Depernas). The failure of this project, the success of the military in uniting 
and controlling the national territory by military means and the rise of a 
new generation of American-trained managers and economists meant that 
by 1962 there would be an institutional shift away from corporatism toward 
increasing centralization under the authority of the new managerial elite. 
At the same time, the effort to increase the participation of non-state actors 
was strengthened through the efforts of the Sukarnoist and Communists 
to push for greater participation. The tension between these two groups 
20 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 113-122.
21 Sebastiaan Pompe, The Indonesian Supreme Court. A Study of Institutional Collapse, (Ithaca: 
Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2005), p. 35-76, Daniel Lev, “Judicial Authority and 
the Struggle for an Indonesian Rechtstaat” in Law and Society Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, (Fall, 
1978), p. 37-71.
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increased during the final Sukarno regime and led up to a spectacular and 
bloody conclusion in 1965. 
In order to understand these phenomenon, this dissertation will first of all 
consult the writings of prominent actors of the period whether nationalists, 
communists or new experts/managers. Secondly we shall look at the 
institutional developments in national planning and scientific management/
public administration that occurred during the period in connection to 
the state and its apparatus. These institutions dealt with the state problem 
of coordination, management, efficiency and corruption. I will focus on 
institutions that are pertinent to my research such as the military, the national 
planning board and the expanding higher education system, especially those 
that specifically produced managers, like the State Administrative Institution 
(Lembaga Administrasi Negara) or the Economics Faculty of the University 
of Indonesia (Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia).
Indologist Karl T. Jackson has formulated Indonesian bureaucratic polity 
as: “a political system in which power and participation in national decisions 
are limited almost entirely to the employees of the state.”22 He argued this 
polity started in 1957 and continued on into the New Order.23 In his study 
of the Golkar party, Australian Indonesianist David Reeve has described the 
ideological roots of Indonesian corporatism during the colonial period.24 This 
technocratic model of the elite is very often used to understand the New 
Order state.25 It is my intention to further develop this idea by analyzing its 
ideological and institutional development within an international context. 
I would like to suggest that the transformation of Indonesia from a ‘liberal’ 
state into a ‘corporatist’ Developmental State was possible as a result of the 
international aid institution and the Weltanschauung of state-centered ideas 
of economic planning and efficiency that were imported into the nation 
in a new and institutionalized form of elite production: the production of 
managers/military managers.
22 Karl Jackson, “Bureaucratic Polity: a Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and 
Communications in Indonesia” in Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye (eds.), Political Power and 
Communications in Indonesia, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 3.
23 Ibid.
24 David Reeve, The Golkar of Indonesia. An alternative to the party system, (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1985).
25 John MacDougall, Technocrats as Modernizers. The Economists of Indonesia’s New Order, 
(PhD Dissertation University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1975), p. 1-17. He pointed out 
term ‘expert’ to denote the new non-political generation. 
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Because of the focus on the elite, non-elite actors hardly come to the 
foreground of this thesis. In fact, their presence is mostly in the form of elite 
ideas of non-elite: the masses or the people. The Cornell anthropologist James 
Siegel brilliantly discussed the strategy of the New Order for the control of 
the people through counter-revolutionary measures and the ideology of the 
criminality of the masses.26 Yet there can be no doubt about it that the ideas 
of mass control started during Old Order period. 
Finally, a few remarks on managerial efficiency. Administrators and 
managers who did not get managerial education were not necessarily 
inefficient and the fact that the economy faltered during the Guided 
Democracy despite having newly educated managers in government 
companies and offices point to this problem. The New Order state was 
however a lot more efficient than the Guided Democracy, but this was rather 
the result of the creation of institutions of control that allowed the state and 
its technocracy greater power, than because of the quality of managerial 
production. In any case, corruption was rampant during the New Order.
The End of Liberalism and Elite Control 
The New Order regime fell in 1998 under the weight of political and social 
chaos and economic collapse. A series of legislative measures was produced 
in order to reinstate a liberal state and society.27 Parliament was given greater 
power vis a vis the executive and a new constitutional court was created 
to control the output of both the legislature and the government.28 The 
centralized nature of the managerial state was replaced with an ambitious 
decentralization program, which effectively transferred authority to the 
second tier of regional government, the regencies. In effect, Indonesia 
became a decentralized state composed of over five hundred political units.29 
26 James T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta. Counter-Revolution Today, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1998), p. 11-29. 
27 Tim Lindsey, “Indonesian Institutional Reforms: Muddling toward Democracy” in Singapore 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, no. 6, 2002, p. 244-301.
28 Marcus Mietzner, “Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: 
The Role of the Constitutional Court” in Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, 
September-December 2010, p. 397-242.
29 M. Ryaas Rashid, “The policy of decentralization in Indonesia” in James Alm, Jorge 
Martinez-Vazquez and Sri Mulyani Indrawati (eds.), Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations and the Rebuilding of Indonesia. The Big Bang Program and its Economic Consequences, 
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Yet, this was all conducted without a strong political discourse in favour of 
liberal ideas. Liberalism was still seen as anathema and efforts to push forth 
liberal ideas on their own weight within the national discourse were treated 
with suspicion. Ideas like human rights and less government control were 
argued piecemeal, without them being incorporated into the liberal label. 
Even today one of the most deadly insults that an Indonesian politician can 
be subjected to is to call him a neoliberal.30
In the West, the shift away from state-based collectivist ideas was 
conducted by reviving the traditions of classical liberal thoughts in the works 
of enlightenment philosophers and more recent works by the neoliberal 
schools of the University of Chicago following on the heels of Austrian 
economists.31 Indonesia has no liberal tradition to fall back on. There was 
very little place for liberalism within the national discourse. Sukarno used 
liberalism as a bogey man to attack the rise of the economists and managers 
of the 1950s, yet these people were social democrats and Fabian socialists who 
believed in greater state control over society. Similarly odd, the only real anti-
state positions during the Guided Democracy came from the communists. 
One may argue that this was the result of their effective position as non-
state actors. In either case, all of them were quite hostile with liberal ideas. 
As a result, there has been kind of schizophrenic condition in the political 
discourse of the post-New Order period. 
Classical liberalism was the product of bourgeois control of European 
society after the French Revolution. Its ideology was based on the values 
of the enlightenment; individualism, free-trade, rationalism and a great 
faith to science and a suspicion of the state as an oppressive institution. Its 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004), p. 65-76 and Widjajanti I. Suharyo, Indonesia’s 
transition to decentralized government: an evolution at the local level, (Yogyakarta: Smeru, 
2003), Indonesia effectively became a federal state in all but name, see Gabriele Ferazzi, 
“Using the “F” word: Federalism in Indonesia’s decentralization discourse” in The Journal 
of Federalism, Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring 2000, p. 63-85.
30 Neoliberal is also one of those adjective that is used to hurl criticism from a variety of political 
positions; from political Islam to leftist and nationalists. Similar to the adjective ‘liberal’ 
during the 1950s and 1960s, neoliberal vaguely describes the control and machination of 
a global capitalist order. For instance, see the attack against Vice President Boediono as 
being a neoliberal in Ismantoro Dwi Yuwono, Boediono dan (neolib)eralisme, (Yogyakarta: 
Biopustaka, 2009).
31 In fact there is a long tradition of valuing individual liberty even when collectivist ideas 
ran supreme. See Rachel S. Turner, Neo-Liberal Ideology. History, Concepts and Policies, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), p. 47-79.
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humanist position created an activist society that used the state to push forth 
humanitarian agendas, first and chief among them were the success of the 
abolition of slavery. The expansion of suffrage was another humanitarian 
value that had resulted in an expanding participation amongst Europeans. 
The rise of democratic participation by the end of the nineteenth century 
resulted in developments that would end liberal control over society. First, 
the rise of the state as purveyor of public goods pushed forth the rise of the 
Welfare State, which shifted emphasis away from society toward the state as 
the ultimate wielder of authority. Second, democratic participation shifted 
society from bourgeois toward populist values that favoured the collective 
against the individual. Nationalism grew to a frenzy and resulted in the rise 
of late nineteenth century imperialism and conversely the rise of nationalist 
aspirations and national secessionist movements. Irrationalism grew into 
prominent legitimate movements that had significant effect on the wider 
society,32 for instance, theosophy was very prominent in the Indian nationalist 
movement33 and the early rise of Javanese nationalism.34 Fascism had one of 
its roots also in this rise of irrational thought.35
The expansion of participation became a question of control. The 
bourgeois liberal elites with their enlightened, individualist notions were 
totally unprepared to deal with this. One may see the shift away from 
liberalism as an institutional problem of control. The rise of nationalism and 
other irrational collectivist thoughts were meant to control people’s opinion 
and channel them as political movements. Votes became collectivized within 
political ideologies, whose populist strength was under the command of a 
new breed of populist politicians. These politicians deftly manage ‘the people’ 
under them through the manipulation of collectivist notions, using primeval 
32 In fact, mysticism was part of modernity. Crooke Williams, Mysticism as Modernity. 
Nationalism and the Irrational in Hermann Hesse, Robert Musil and Max Frisch, (Oxford: 
Peter Lang, 2008), p. 17-27.
33 Mark Bevir, “Theosophy and the Origins of the Indian National Congress” in International 
Journal of Hindu Studies, Vol. 7, 2003, p. 99-115. 
34 Farabi Fakih, “Political Java in Modern Times. The Political Thoughts of Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo and Noto Soeroto, 1908-1930,” Masters Thesis Leiden University, 
Leiden, 2009.
35 Roger Griffin, Modernism and Fascism. The Sense of Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler, 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 116 and David F. Lindeman, “The prevalence 
of irrational thinking in the Third Reich: notes toward the reconstruction of modern value 
rationality” in Central European History, Vol. 30, Year 1997, p. 365-385.
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sentiments of kinship. This resulted, among others, in problematizing the 
‘multicultural’ society that had been either a long part of society or were 
created during the liberal period. Especially in Central and Eastern Europe, 
this resulted in massive ethnic cleansing and ‘purification’ of national 
boundaries with a mono-ethnic majority.36 It also gave rise to the nationalist 
movements within the colonial empires of Europe.
Scientific Management 
The rise of industrial capitalism resulted in another institutional means of 
control: scientific management. Initially developed in Europe, scientific 
management was adopted and developed extensively in the United States 
by the end of the nineteenth century by the American mechanical engineer 
Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915). The Taylorist approach to control 
focused primarily on that of labour.37 It was predicated on the goal of 
industrial efficiency and the creation of an expanding white-collar managerial 
class that was a counterweight to the radicalization of blue-collar workers. 
This new middle class had different values and ideology from the older 
bourgeois elite. An expanding white-collar middle class worker provided a 
safety valve in which participation could be controlled by a new elite whose 
claim to authority lay in a rational and logical foundation of managerial 
capability.38 Class conflict was controlled through two strategies: first, the 
‘American dream’ allowed people to hope to become incorporated into the 
expanding elites. In fact the massive economic expansion of the US made 
such dreams an attainable prospect to millions of people who were willing 
to put their children through the education mill. This de-radicalized the 
general populace and created a strong popular appeal for the state.39 Second, 
such economic expansion was only possible as a result of an expanding 
workload. The question of a job inflation was pushed as a result of the 
expanding industrial economy but importantly also, through the creation 
36 Mark Mazower, The Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, (London: Penguin Books, 
1998), p. 40-76.
37 Harry Braverman, Labor and monopoly of capital. The degradation of work in the twentieth 
century, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 85-121.
38 James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution: what is happening in the world, p. 173-174.
39 Judith Merkle, Management and Ideology. The Legacy of the International Scientific 
Management Movement, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 92.
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of jobs to service the Welfare State. Not only were people primed to support 
the industrial economy, they came to unequivocally support the expanding 
managerial state. 
The incorporation of the population into a managerial hierarchy 
delineated an ideology that was subservient to logical and rational ordering40 
but which shared some similarity with the irrational ideology of nationalism 
by its collectivist ideas. Management was an ideology that resulted in the 
individual loss of liberty, the reduction of democracy and a dislike toward the 
judiciary and the rule of law which it want toreplace with the greater good 
of efficiency and economic development.41 One of the most transformative 
episodes in the evolution of the managerial state came during the Second 
World War when entire nations were re-designed in the service of the war.
Total War subsumed society under the goals of the state in a fight to 
the death struggle against other non-liberal forms of state-society relations. 
Although populist ideologies like Fascism, Communism and the Welfare 
Statism of Western Democracies had inherent differences concerning race 
relations, private enterprise or parliament, these were often differences of 
degrees not of kind. The difference in kind was found between that of 
Taylorism or scientific management against non-liberal political ideologies 
in general. These non-liberal ideologies had similar basic characteristics: the 
primacy of the state, the incorporation of the economy and nationalism as a 
rallying cry for national solidarity and unity. As a result, scientific management 
easily traversed differing ideologies. During the 1920s, there was a wave of 
American influence overwhelming European (and Japanese)42 society as 
the tools and techniques of scientific management were appropriated and 
used in Fascist and Communist states. Total war occurred between differing 
non-liberal ideologies but among the same scientific managerial states. This 
similarity was strengthened by the fact that few people understood what 
40 Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State; a Study of the Political Theory of American Public 
Administration, (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1948), p. 50-51.
41 Dwight Waldo pointed out that for democracy to survive against the appeal to fascism 
and communism, an efficient rule by the administrator/manager was necessary. In fact, he 
called administrators as a democratic ruling class. Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State; 
a Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration, p. 89-94. The tension 
between bureaucracy and democracy remains a problem discussed in public administration 
science. See Kenneth J. Meier and Laurence J. O’Toole Jr., Bureaucracy in a Democratic 
State, (Baltimore: the John Hopkins University Press, 2006), p. 3-9.
42 James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution: what is happening in the World, p. 122-144.
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classical liberalism actually entailed anymore. In the United States, liberalism 
itself underwent a significant change in concept, which transformed it into 
a form of socialism.43
Total War was a concept that integrated and incorporated society within 
the guidance of the state elites; which were broadly divided between the 
two camps of twentieth century modernist: the populist politicians and the 
managers/engineers experts or technocrats. World War II emphasized the 
necessity to bring forth these forms of state-society relations in practically 
all states that were affected by the war. Post-War forms of state-society 
relations thus had a corpus of examples to choose from varying from the 
Western efforts at total war to the militarized ideologies of China, Vietnam 
or Yugoslavia in their effort to use society in order to repel a stronger enemy. 
After the war, the playing field shifted to the Third World.
American Modernism and National Planning
The expansion of a specific managerial ideology successfully traversed the 
political ideologies that divided the Cold War, for the simple reason that 
both sides were “industrializing countries.”44 But the export of post-war 
American scientific management was mostly intended for the pre-industrial 
Third World states that had recently gained independence.45 As a result, the 
expansion of American social science with its emphasis on modernization 
and development had to conform to the needs of these client states and 
especially the client elites of these new states. There were two distinct periods 
in American aid during the 1950s, the first period focused on technical 
assistance, economic development and the expansion of the managerial 
class of client states.46 The second period started at the end of the 1950s 
with the rise of the Kennedy Administration and shifted its focus toward 
the creation of a strong state and the rise of military-managerial elite. The 
43 Paul Edward Gottfried, After Liberalism. Mass Democracy in a Managerial State, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 3-29.
44 Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, p. 16. 
45 This is not fully true. The expansion of US ideas of civil society and its codes of democracy, 
efficiency, good governance and best practices were also exported to Europe. See Giles 
Scott Smith, Networks of Empire: The US State Department’s Foreign Leader Program in the 
Netherlands, France and Britain, 1950-1970, (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008), p. 29.
46 Nan Wiegersma and Joseph E. Medley, US Economic Development Policies toward the Pacific 
Rim, (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 2000), p. 1-4.
14 THE RISE OF THE MANAGERIAL STATE IN INDONESIA
social scientists and theorists behind the shift were often composed of the 
same people within America’s most prestigious universities. They became 
the mandarins of modernity.47
Khrushchev’s change in policy toward supporting Third World 
nationalism had shifted American thoughts on aid to the developing world. 
Increasingly, aid became part of a broader militarized policy of counter-
insurgency and Third World military began to take the place as modernizing 
elites. A new relationship was being forged in which new client elites were 
produced through American education. The goals of America was to win the 
war with the Soviet Union, not to create legitimately working developmental 
states, although a number of East Asian states came to profit from American 
aid in order to propel a sustainable growth path.48
The shift from populist toward managerial elites entailed the destruction 
or at least cooptation of the populist elites by the managerial ones within, 
using the Marxist term, a means of production that favoured their existence. 
One can argue that populist elites were there as a stop-gap measure of the 
state in its jump from the stable nineteenth century liberal state, toward 
another stable state, the twentieth century managerial/welfare state. For 
Indonesia, this was a jump from a colonial toward a developmental state. 
Of course, it would be too easy to dismiss the fate of the populist politicians 
as foregone. As we will see, they contributed important institutional means 
that allowed for the shift toward the developmental state. Their rule was 
the bridge that made possible the rise of a new means of production that 
became the primary relationship between elites and mass, state and society 
for a long time to come. 
The rise of the manager as legitimate heir to nationalist states and the 
military as the protector as well as benefactor of that type of elite-controlled 
state is one of the most important stories of the Third World in the second 
half of the twentieth century. For many Third World state, sometimes coming 
47 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of Modernity. Modernization Theory in Cold War America, p. 155-200.
48 According to Wiegersma and Medley, the success of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
reside in the different doctrine of aid they received from the United States of America. 
The Truman years of the 1950s truly focused on the promotion of equitable development, 
with land-reform as a significant part of the development model. East Asian economies got 
‘lucky’ because of their position as forefront of the Cold War occurred during the height of 
the Truman doctrine, while many other countries received their aid later during the more 
military-oriented Kennedy doctrine. Nan Wiegersma and Joseph E. Medley, US Economic 
Development Policies toward the Pacific Rim, p. 1-4.
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out of protracted independence struggle with their former colonial rulers, 
the new nation-state was under a leadership that had gained their authority 
through the usage of populist notions of nationalism and other kinship 
strategies. The purpose of this study is to locate the Indonesian story within 
this general narrative and to explain how the shift in elites occured from 
nationalists to managers/experts? How did the latter obtain their authority 
and legitimacy, and in fact, did they ever obtain authority? Instead of breaking 
with the past, the nationalist, incorporated state forged by President Sukarno 
since 1957 was the embryo that allowed for the managerial-led New Order 
state. The type of state-society relationship that was being brought forth 
during the Guided Democracy was seen to be compatible with a military-
managerial dominated state that followed.
The modernization effort of the 1950s and 1960s thus represents a 
fundamental with the past. The New Order state that followed continued 
to use some of the symbols and institutions of the previous nationalist state 
because of the effectiveness it had in controlling the population. From the 
state’s point of view, the conundrum of expanding participation, which 
had unleashed forces that destroyed classical liberalism through the rise of 
irrational populist sentiments, had finally been solved. A militarily enforced, 
scientifically endorsed authoritative elite was created. 
Position in Historiography
One of the most important book on Indonesia in the 1950s was Herbert 
Feith’s The decline of constitutional democracy.49 While Feith’s book focused 
on the political development that allowed for the rise of Guided Democracy, 
this study will approach it from the development of elite formation through 
a changing institutional environment. Indonesia’s technocracy/bureaucracy 
and their corporatist strategies have been discussed, as shown above, by David 
Reeve, Karl Jackson and John MacDougall.50 This ties in with the broader 
discussion on Indonesian elites and its culture, which have been analyzed 
using a variety of approaches. This include among others the anthropological 
49 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia.
50 John James MacDougall, Technocrats as Modernizers. The Economists of Indonesia’s New Order.
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approaches taken by Clifford Geertz51 and Benedict Anderson,52 the 
sociological approach by Ann Gregory53and the political science approach 
such as those by Harold Crouch.54
This thesis intends to contextualize the Indonesian narrative with three 
fields that it is inherently connected to: the studies on the Cold War, Scientific 
Management and the Developmental State. 
Because of its strategic situation Indonesia is well represented in the Cold 
War historiography which is divided into two groups: the leftist group which 
saw American intrusion and the machination of the CIA as destabilizing 
and creating a violent military regime and a more celebratory view of the 
period by those who were involved in solving the problems of Indonesian 
development. This first group includes, among others, Bradley Simpson’s 
Economists with guns55 and Malcolm Gladwell’s Ten Year Military Terror in 
Indonesia. Articles include the well-known David Ransom in Ramparts56 that 
baptized the Indonesian technocratic elite with the nickname of the Berkeley 
Mafia and Peter Dale Scott’s articles on American aid and elite formation.57 
The second groups consists of men on the spot who had been personally 
engaged in the problems of Indonesian development, such as John Bresnan 
with his monograph on the Indonesian political economy58 and Goenawan 
Mohammad who wrote a history of the Ford Foundation in Indonesia.59
These works must be placed within the greater context of the Cold War 
historiography on American modernism and the Third World. Michael 
51 Clifford Geertz, Religion of Java, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1976).
52 Benedict R’OG Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960).
53 Ann Gregory, Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite: Guided 
Democracy and the New Order, (Dissertation at Colombia University, New York, 1976).
54 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).
55 Bradley Simpson, Economists with guns: Authoritarian Development and US-Indonesian 
Relations, 1960-1968, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
56 David Ransom, “The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre” in Ramparts, Vol. 9, 
No. 4, 1970, p. 27-49.
57 Peter Dale Scott, “Exporting Military-Economic Development. America and the overthrow 
of Sukarno. 1965-1967” in Malcolm Gladwell (ed.), Ten Years Military Terror in Indonesia, 
(Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975), p. 209-263.
58 John Bresnan, Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993). 
59 Goenawan Moehammad, Celebrating Indonesia: Fifty Years with the Ford Foundation, 1953-
2003, (Jakarta: Ford Foundation, 2003).
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Latham’s monographs on the ideology of American modernism and various 
works by other authors describing modernization and its relationship with 
American social science have indicated the wider historiographical context 
that this thesis will address.60 The question of management and national 
planning touches upon the ideologies that became such an important 
part of the American modernism. Harry Braverman’s Marxian analysis 
on the rise of scientific management61 could be compared with the more 
liberal interpretation of Judith Merkle.62 Works pointing out the dangers 
of the rise of the managerial state has been an important fixture of mid-
twentieth century philosophy on society and include such work as Friedrich 
Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom,63 Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man,64 
Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy65 not to speak of James 
Burnham’s prophecy of the decline of individualism and democracy within 
a managerial state.66 These treatises work on the assumption of individual 
liberty as a central value. 
Yet, another theme that this thesis will address is the use of forms of 
economic development. Initially, I intend to integrate this with various works 
that have looked into the reason why some countries were successful while 
others weren’t, such as Atul Kohli’s State Directed Development67 and Linda 
Low’s edited Developmental State.68 Much of the discussion about the successful 
Developmental State has focused on the rise of the East Asia nurturing state 
60 Michael E. Latham and John Lewis Gaddis, Modernization as Ideology: American Social 
Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era, (Chappel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000) and Michael E. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, 
Development and US Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011).
61 Harry Braverman, Labor and monopoly of capital.
62 Judith Merkle, Management and Ideology. The Legacy of the International Scientific 
Management Movement.
63 Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1944).
64 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial 
Society, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968).
65 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (New York: Harper, 1942).
66 James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution: What is happening in this world.
67 Atul Kohli, State-directed development. Political power and industrialization in the global 
periphery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
68 Linda Low (ed.), Developmental States. Relevancy, redundancy or reconfiguration?, (New York: 
Nova, 2004).
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and its embedded industries.69 In contrast with the fearsome picture of the 
Cold War and Scientific Management monographs, the economists have 
tended to praise the Developmental State, despite their full knowledge of 
the lack of rights accorded by the state.70 Most deflect on any attempt at 
moralizing and simply try to understand how some states are more successful 
than others in terms of development. Even so, one of the more popular 
books on the subject Daren Acemoglu & James Robinson’s Why Nations Fail, 
point to the relationship between the institutional arrangement of exclusion 
and inclusion as central to understanding the successes and failures in the 
development process.71 Unfortunately, the thesis itself has strayed away from 
this earlier focus and thus had had less influence in its analysis. 
This dissertation wants to situate within the above discussions. It 
primarily is meant to be a history of the rise of the Indonesian managerial 
elite and the reaction it prompted from its nationalist opposition. The 
development of twentieth century state-society relations in Indonesia is 
a complex process involving a variety of ideas that traversed ideology and 
continents. By focusing on the development of two ideas during the period; 
national planning and scientific management, I hope to show that the main 
difference between the approaches to state-society relations is between a 
state-centered versus a people-centered ideology. This bids the question of 
understanding the importance of liberalism and its relative absence within 
the discourse of Indonesia and Indonesian history. It also begs the question 
whether the conventional way of looking at the rise of the New Order 
should not be amended so that the various institutional and ideological 
developments that occurred before it can be included. 
Division of Chapters
The thesis consists of seven chapters divided into three parts. The chapters one 
and two will deal with elite idea and formation. The first chapter discusses 
69 For instance, Gordon White (ed.), Development State in East Asia, (Sussex: Institute of 
Development Studies, 1988) and Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy. States and Industrial 
Transformation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
70 Linda Low, “Introduction and Overview” in Linda Low (ed.), Developmental States. Relevancy, 
redundancy or reconfiguration?, p. 10-11.
71 Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power, Prosperity 
and Poverty, (London: Profile, 2012).
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the fragility of the new, managerial elite, the experts as they were called by 
nationalists. We will look into the rationale of the dislike shown by Sukarno 
and some of his close nationalist entourage towards the experts as an upstart 
generation. We will argue that it was a generational problem; in a sense, the 
mental framework of each elite group thought was the product of, to use the 
Marxist term, the means of production; a colonial, empire-dominated and a 
post-colonial, American-dominated environment. The second chapter discusses 
the rise of the military elite from two general developments; the experience of 
the revolutionary war that bifurcated the military amongst a similar division 
of nationalists/solidarity makers and experts/administrators, and secondly the 
expansion of American education and the introduction of counterinsurgency 
strategies under both the policy of the Kennedy Administration and Sukarno’s 
increasingly belligerent Konfrontasi policy in the region. This bifurcated the 
military elite into both a territorial/managerial and counter-insurgency/strike 
group. These two chapters will hopefully help to understand the rising elite 
of the period and their stance on the relationship between state and society. 
The second part of the thesis focuses on the development of institutions 
and the import of ideas and ideologies during the 1950s, when Indonesia 
was a nominal ‘liberal’ democracy. Chapter three discusses the Indonesian 
effort at producing experts through the expansion of higher education and 
sending Indonesian abroad to study and the import of technical advisors 
into the country. This has resulted in the formation of what one expert has 
called a community of scholars, whose power and authority was disdained 
by many nationalist and communists. Many of these scholars clustered 
around that growing institution so typical of the 1950s; the institution of 
national planning. Chapter four discusses another significant import item 
of the 1950s; scientific management. Its purpose is to show how scientific 
management has contributed to the re-evaluation of liberal institutions 
current in the country and in particular the rule of law and the separation 
of powers or triaspolitica. The rise of the managerial experts legitimized both 
their authority in policy making and the need to revamp state-society relations 
to allow for their smooth control. These chapters show that the international 
development of the 1950s were very important in understanding the rise of 
the Guided Democracy by the end of the decade.
The last section of the thesis covers three chapters and discusses the 
development of both national planning and scientific management within the 
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context of the Guided Democracy. Chapter five discusses the implementation 
of national planning and the transition from corporatist toward technocratic 
institutional forms and the rise of a new generation of social scientists. 
Recentralization of decision making process under the office of the President 
and the planning for the incorporation of the regional and departmental 
heads within and under a planning body was a testament to the shift away 
from corporative ideas toward implementing ideas of the strong state. 
Chapter six discusses the expansion and implementation of managerial ideas 
and its relationship with the implementation of techniques of control that 
the state imposed on both the civil servants and civil society. Structural and 
behavioural control by the state became a preeminent strategy of the Guided 
Democracy state. This was then continued by the New Order state in ways 
very similar to the Guided Democracy effort. Chapter seven discusses the 
latest phase of the Guided Democracy (1962-1965) by looking at the way 
in which both the nascent technocracy and the communists argued about 
their ideas of state-society relations. The purpose of the chapter is to show 
the extent toward which the defining characteristics of the difference lay not 
between capitalism/liberalism and communism, but between a state-centered 
and a participative type of ideology. 
It is important to demystify the hallowed classification that is used in 
understanding the moral position of the actors in this particular period. 
Classification such as leftist or liberal, Communists or Berkeley Mafia, the 
United States of America or Soviet Union/People’s Republic of China, force 
us to make easy moral choices while interpreting the nineteen fifties and 
sixties. By re-evaluating these labels Indonesians can re-engage a troubled 
past and move beyond the generally accepted interpretation made by the 
state and its elites. By widening our view-point and seeing the ideas of the 
modern Indonesian nation-state through a long range lens, we begin to 
understand the limitation of looking at our history within the perspective 
of what Hobsbawm has called the Age of Extreme.72 Perhaps, it is necessary 
for the Indonesian intellectual to start to deal in an honest and engaging 
manner with the liberal tradition, or the lack of it. In the present liberal 
age it is time we shed our petrified twentieth century perspectives and look 
anew at our recent past.
72 Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century. 1914-1991, (London: Abacus, 1995).
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The Indonesian Elite and its Authority
In 1966, during the notorious trial of Sukarno’s last appointed Bank of 
Indonesia governor, the Acehnese Jusuf Muda Dalam, the mass media and 
the Suharto regime depicted the crimes of the governor mostly involving 
corruption and collusion as some of the most heinous in the history of the 
nation.1 The harsh language indicated that Muda Dalam was being used as 
a symbol to criticize Sukarno.2 Muda Dalam had authority but they claimed 
lacked legitimacy. This was not a unique event in the history of the country 
as recently as 2012 the deputy governor of Bank Indonesia, was jailed after 
1 Proses Jusuf Muda Dalam ex. Ment. Urusan Bank sentral “Kabinet 100 Menteri”: Gema dari 
ruang peradilan subversi di Djakarta, (Jakarta: Pembimbing Massa, 1967). There was also 
explicit personal slander with the publication of a book detailing Muda Dalam’s sexual 
scandals. Considering the widespread knowledge of Sukarno’s licentious affairs, the attack 
seemed to be aimed at Sukarno himself, who had transferred some of his authority to Muda 
Dalam, albeit indirectly. The tradition of sacrificing or attacking peons as a symbolic attack 
on the authority of the provider of that authority has a long tradition in Indonesian politics. 
Much of Indonesian political conduct has to be understood within an analysis of the authority 
and its transference to ‘non-legitimate’ figures. 
2 The Mahmilub trials were indeed used by the army to discredit Sukarno during the 
tumultuous year of 1965-1966 when the struggle for power intensified as Sukarno used his 
fame and authority to try to stem the tide eating away his power base and those of his ally 
the Communist Party, and the cabinet. Jusuf Muda Dalam, along with Air Vice Marshall 
Omar Dhani and Foreign Minister Subandrio were sentenced to death by the military 
tribunal. Their sentences were commuted to life imprisonment later on. 
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beign accused of bribing lawmakers.3 These events highlight the large number 
of former governors, ministers and deputy governors who have gone to jail 
for corruption in the Post-Suharto era.4 
Throughout the 1950s, efforts by both the government and military to 
root out corruption put behind bars some of Indonesia’s most prominent 
financial and economic policy makers. In a large sweep of corruption 
suspects, carried out by the military in 1957, many prominent policy 
makers including Bank Indonesia’s first governor, Jusuf Wibisono, and 
economists such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Ong Eng Die and Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo were implicated.5 Throughout the nation’s history, the 
position of policy makers has been precarious. Only during the New Order 
did the offices of those in charge of determining Indonesia’s policy direction 
become relatively safe from the scrutiny of civil society. 
The facts above present a clue for unraveling the machinations of 
Indonesian society and its relationship with the state. The relationship 
between the Indonesian state and society is fluid and interactive, and 
continually challenges the notion of the state as a bounded entity. Discussion 
on the criminality of the state and the role of the strongman (jago) and 
gangsters (preman) as client or extension of the state showed an inherent 
flaw in abstracting the state as a specific set of bounded institutions with 
specific authorities. In fact, the state extended beyond its legal boundary.6
Yet, both the colonial and New Order regimes prided themselves on 
their effort to create a strong state, by going for modernity and development. 
Both regimes maintained a façade of respectability through the application of 
modern methods of engineering and management. The colonial bureaucracy 
3 Tempo, 27 September 2012. 
4 Includes former Bank head Syahril Sabirin (Tempo, 11 June 2009) and Burhanuddin 
Abdullah (Kompas, 29 October 2008) and deputy governors like Aulia Pohan (Antara, 17 
June 2009), among others.
5 Keng Po, 28 March 1957.
6 The jago and preman element as part of state-extension in society is discussed in all periods 
of Indonesian history. Thus, for instance Schulte Nordholt and Sutherland for the colonial 
period, Barker discussed the New Order and Lindsey for the post-New Order period. Henk 
Schulte Nordholt, “The jago in the shadow: crime and order in the colonial state” in Review 
of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1, Winter, 1991, p. 74-91, Joshua Barker, 
“State of fear: controlling the criminal contagion in Suharto’s New Order” in Indonesia, no. 
66, October, 1998, p. 6-43, Tim Lindsey, “The criminal state: Premanisme and the new 
Indonesia” in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon L. Smith (eds.), Indonesia today. Challenges of 
history, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p. 283-297.  
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was proud of its achievements in Western techniek (engineering) and its 
administrative capabilities. The raison d’etre of the Dutch colonial project, 
at least by some colonial supporters,7 lay exactly in bridging the dichotomy 
between a modern, official, technically advanced Dutch bureaucracy and 
the traditional, feudal and technically deficient Indonesian bureaucracy. The 
Indonesian needed the colonial imposition in order to become modern.8
This dichotomy of the official, legal, professional and modern against 
those on the other side, was the leitmotif of twentieth century Indonesia. 
The Pangreh Praja, the indigenous bureaucracy, originating from Java but 
assigned to positions throughout the archipelago, arose from a pre-colonial 
bureaucracy whose claim to authority was based on military power.9 Their 
accession to being part of the state was based on their prior demonstration of 
real military power. Robert Cribb has shown that this notion of violence as 
conferring legitimate authority was what caused many of Jakarta’s underworld 
to fight in the revolution,10 signaling the continued presence of these ideas in 
post-colonial Indonesia. Yet, the failure of the bandits to gain recognition of 
their authority from the state, and the willingness of the Republic to stamp 
them out pointed to the way in which alternative, international protocols 
of authority existed alongside.
How to prop up bureaucratic authority in a society not under 
colonial suppression was the big question of the 1950s. Clifford Geertz’s 
anthropological analysis of the fictionally named town of Modjokuto11 in the 
early 1950s divided Javanese society into two major social groups or alirans.12 
7 For instance, De Kat Angelino, Staatkundig Beleid en Bestuurszorg in Nederlandsch Indie. 
Eerste Gedeelte, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1929), who argued for the melding between 
the technical west and the spiritual east as the basis for the state.
8 Marieke Bloembergen and Remco Raben, “Wegen naar het nieuwe Indie” in Bloembergen 
and Raben (ed.), Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief: wegens naar het nieuwe Indie, (Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 2009), p.7-24.
9 Henk Schulte Nordholt, ‘A genealogy of violence’, in Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad 
(eds.), Roots of violence in Indonesia: Contemporary violence in historical perspective, (Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 2002), p. 33–61.
10  Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries. The Jakarta People’s Militia and the Indonesian 
Revolution, 1945-1949, (North Sydney: Allen Unwin, 1991), p. 89-99. 
11 In actuality, the town of Pare.
12 According to Geertz: “The institutional agency of this new mode of integration was the 
aliran system. Aliran… has been extended in Republican Indonesia to signify what in 
English we call a social movement, an ideologically defined political faction animated by 
rather far-reaching moral ambitions. In particular, an aliran consists of a political party 
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It was a religious and ideologically based model of the workings of society, 
consisting of Javanist and Islamist groups. The Javanist elite, the priyayi-, 
constituted the social group of the pangreh praja. The priyayi formed the 
Javanese bureaucracy and their claim to rule was based on traditional notions 
of authority and the support of the Dutch colonial state.13 The Islamists were 
those whose view of society was determined by Islam, not by traditional 
Javanese notions. Within Islamist ideology, the priyayi’s cultural legitimacy 
of authority fell apart. The elite of the Islamists had their roots in commerce. 
On a non-elite level, the Javanists were represented by the abangan, ordinary 
Javanese who were Muslim in name but were loyal followers of the Javanese 
religion. The expansion of the devout santri Islamists was the engine that 
allowed for the creation of the Javanist aliran, which welded together the 
priyayi bureaucrats and a wider social group that provided these elite with 
legitimacy and societal power. The Islamist santri and their elite, with no 
access toward the state bureaucracy, penetrated the state apparatus through 
other institutions: the political parties and the parliament.
The Indonesian bureaucracy was tied together based on a shared feeling 
of being overwhelmed by the Islamist, yet the roots of its authority, tradition 
and the support of the colonial state were, by the 1950s, deteriorating or 
downright non-existent. The shrill anti-feudal exclamations of the nationalists 
attacked the core of priyayi privileges while other alirans, especially the 
Communists and leftists, vied for the support of the abangan. The priyayis 
were thus under attack from both the Islamists and the Communists. The 
miracle, perhaps, was how they managed to survive relatively well as a group 
in the 1950s and 1960s. In an analysis of the country’s elite in the early 
New Order period, Donald Emmerson has shown that the fundamental 
classification of the Indonesian elite remained the same until the early 1970s, 
with abangan in control of the bureaucracy and santri in control of the 
parliament, and an equal control of the military by both alirans.14
surrounded by a set of sodalities… formally or informally linked to it.” And that “An aliran 
was more than a mere political party and it was more than a mere ideology: it was a set of 
interconnected social forms which acted to group large masses of people into a generalized 
category”. Clifford Geertz, The social history of an Indonesian town, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1965), p. 127 and 128.
13 Heather Sutherland, The making of a bureaucratic elite. The colonial transformation of the 
Javanese priyayi, (Singapore: Heinemann, 1979), p. 144-151.
14 The military elite, though, was by the early 1960s overwhelmingly Javanese (60-80% of 
the officers). Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 37. These changed by 
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As a social group, the priyayi were institutionally assisted to overcome the 
difficulties in transitioning to a modern Indonesian state. Their strength lay 
in two things. First, they monopolized the local administration. Nationalists, 
most of them hailed from a priyayi background, did not inherit or develop 
a counter bureaucracy to the official bureaucracy of the colonial state. 
Suggestions to destroy the priyayi bureaucracy during the early independence 
year of 1945 came to naught, as most state leaders, including Sukarno, 
Mohammad Hatta and Sjahrir, understood they had to depend on the 
Pangreh Pradja/Pamong Praja.15
Second, their access to state power allowed them access to education.16 
Their near-monopoly on advanced education meant that they could 
conveniently adjust themselves to the needs of the modern state, and even 
more importantly, that they could in turn obtain the power to determine 
the idea of state-society relations through a new authority that they garnered 
through education: the authority of the experts. This model, crafted by 
development economics, sociology, scientific management and public 
administrations specialists, was a model of modernity that the priyayi found 
inherently attractive. The most important aspect of the model was the 
monopoly position of the managers as a special group of educated supermen. 
Yet it would be a mistake to consider that a mere diploma was enough to 
confer the magic of authority on these many newly graduated students. Java’s 
pre-colonial bureaucracy employed gangs of jagos and hoodlums as tools for 
societal control. As Heather Sutherland has remarked, in pre-colonial times, 
“under Mataram [rule] terror and torture had been essential instruments of 
control.”17 Although the Dutch prided themselves on their ability to enforce 
the rule of law in the archipelago, there still continued to be something of 
a modus Vivendi between priyayi bureaucrats and the criminal elements/
the 1960s onwards as access to education expanded. See Thedore M. Smith and Harold F. 
Carpenter, “Indonesian Students and Their Career Aspirations” in Asian Survey, Vol. 14, 
No. 9, September 1974, p. 807-826.
15 Sukarno very much supported the Pangreh Praja and extolled their virtues in many of 
his speeches to the corps during the revolution. The republican elite gave priority to the 
Pangreh Praja for the top echelon post during early independence, for instance. Anthony 
Reid, Indonesian National Revolution. 1945-1950, (Hawthorn: Longman, 1974), p. 32.
16 Thomas R. Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, the First Half Century. 
1920-1970, (Singapore: Chopmen, 1973), p. 90. 
17 Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, p. 26.
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local bullies in keeping order in rural society.18 In order for authority to be 
conferred, the reinstitution of some sort of order on the scale of the colonial 
state had to be done. The local bureaucracy had to have protection from 
above and collaboration from local strong men. As we will see below, these 
two long arms of the bureaucracy would be increasingly provided by the 
military, as both overseer of the state and its enforcers on the ground. 
The history of the modern Indonesian state is thus a history of its 
bureaucracy, and by extension, the nation’s priyayi elite. As Professor James 
Mackie contends, Indonesia’s elite and growing middle class were “essentially 
bureaucratic elites or, as in the Sukarno era, a party-political elite. To the 
extent that an Indonesian middle class has been emerging over the last 
three decades, it is primarily a salaried and professional middle class, not 
an entrepreneurial or propertied” one.19 This is, of course, a simplification 
of the reality. First, although the majority of Indonesian bureaucrats were 
Javanese, there were large numbers of non-Javanese who became important 
members of the elite; this was particularly true for the military.20 Many of 
the economists that were to play an important part during the New Order, 
such as Emil Salim and Frans Seda were non-Javanese.21 Second, the priyayi 
class itself, as a result of education, was undergoing significant changes. 
Franklin Weinstein divided Indonesia’s twentieth century elite into three 
groups based on their respective generation; those of 1928, 1945 and 1966. 
The 1928-generation was those who had enjoyed good colonial education, 
and who continued studies in Dutch universities. Their world-view was 
highly influenced by the works of Karl Marx and other European social 
theorists, and although they initially had a positive outlook on the United 
States, the ‘betrayal’ of America during the revolutionary struggle embittered 
their view of the US, causing a deep sense of ambivalence.22
18 Ibid. and Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries, p. 1-5.
19 J.A.C. Mackie, Property and Power in New Order Indonesia, (S.l: s.n., 1983), p. 1.
20 Ann Gregory has noted, though, that the number of Javanese occupying important 
government positions increased during the Guided Democracy and New Order. Ann 
Gregory, Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite: Guided Democracy 
and the New Order, p. 108.
21 Many of the technocrats were also non-Muslim, including the Catholic Frans Seda and J.B. 
Sumarlin and the Protestant Radius Prawiro, among others. Hamish McDonald, Suharto’s 
Indonesia, (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1981), p. 76. 
22 Frank Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press:, 1976), p. 42-65
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The second group was the 1945-generation. They had experienced first 
hand the Second World War. The majority of them joined the student or 
youth militias set up and trained by the Japanese. Some of the anti-Western 
propaganda that their Japanese trainers passed on to them determined 
their world-view for a long time after the end of the war. Unlike the 
1928-generation, the 1945-generation did not receive a good and full 
colonial education. The government’s temporary reduction of the education 
budget in the 1930s, owing to the Depression and the increasing availability 
of ‘nationalist’ schools that competed with Dutch education in the colony 
affected their outlook.23 Aside from becoming soldiers and participating in 
the war, many youngsters also had the chance to become low and middle-
level civil servants before going off to university in Indonesia, with some 
continuing on with post-graduate study in the United States. Although 
less Marxist in their outlook in comparison to many nationalists of the 
1928-generation, they were generally open to the ideas that the left had to 
offer. Their involvement in the Indonesian state as administrators or army 
officers and their formative education abroad, mostly in US universities, were 
important factors that changed their world-view of state-society relations in 
comparison to the earlier generation, which had little opportunity to work in 
managerial government services and had received almost exclusively Dutch 
education, and were actually Dutch-speaking among themselves.24
The 1966-generation was the one that grew up during the Guided 
Democracy and cheered at the ending of Sukarno’s regime and the rise of 
the New Order.25 This generation was generally deeply anti-Marxist, if not 
apolitical, but for our purpose will not be referred to further because of their 
limited relevance to the discussion.
The shift from the democracy of the 1950s to Guided Democracy and 
the New Order must be seen in terms of the shift from the 1928 to the 1945 
generation. As we will see, the gradual control of the bureaucracy and state 
23 A process of politicization of the teachers also occurred during the period in government-
owned Indonesian schools as well, signifying increased attention at participatory pedagogy 
which Agus Suwignyo has termed public intellectuality. This process appeared again as part 
of the participatory discourse of Indonesian nationalism, which will be discussed further 
in the next chapters. Agus Suwignyo, The breach in the dike: regime change and the 
standardization of public primary-school teacher training in Indonesia, 1893-1969, Thesis 
for Leiden, 2013, p. 152-207. 
24 Frank Weinstein, Indonesian foreign policy and the dilemma of dependence, p. 42-65
25 Ibid. 
28 CHAPTER I
by the 1945-generation occurred under the aegis of the 1928-generation, 
especially as the ideas they espoused became inherently anti-democratic 
and in favour of a strong state-one that controlled society in a vice-like 
grip. Sukarno himself, as the pre-eminent icon of the 1928-generation, 
came to appreciate these tendencies. Even so, Guided Democracy was a 
period in transition and many in the 1928-generation saw their powers 
erode. Younger ones just graduating from American universities were able 
to obtain government positions but saw their influence as highly limited in 
middle management or university positions. Their ability to hook up with 
the military meant a deep similarity in outlook and aspirations for the state.
Yet, the Guided Democracy state was anything but a full control of the 
1928-generation. Many of its influential policy makers, such as Roeslan 
Abdulgani and Mohammad Yamin espoused ideas that, on the whole, were 
a reaction against the competition of the upstart 1945-generation. In an 
age where the iconic image of the white-collar office head or plant manager 
was a man employing mathematically inclined science and social science,26 
even in such an underdeveloped society as Indonesia of the 1950s, the 
old elite was educationally inadequate. In the face of the new perspectives 
in efficiency and its associated managerial tools, the old elite came from 
another period. This was a period when leadership was earned through 
revolutionary capabilities, where history and literature guided the workings 
of human society and the path of nations instead of the graphs of economics, 
the analysis of the psychologists and the theories of the sociologists. Where 
the study of the law meant an understanding of how the state worked 
and how government functioned, instead of the studies of time-motion 
and other Taylorist tools. According to MacDougal “…their emergence 
in policy making roles represents a fundamental shift in the nature of the 
ruling elite.”27 It was this inherent tension between what Roeslan Abdulgani 
termed the ‘professionals’ or ‘unprofessionals’, what Herbert Feith called the 
‘administrator’ or ‘solidarity-makers’28 or what Pye called the “administrators” 
and “politicians” in Burma29 or what Franz Schurmann called the “experts” 
26 C. Wright Mills, White Collar. The American Middle Class, (New York: Galaxy, 1956), p. 
142-160.
27 John James MacDougall, Technocrats as Modernizers, p. 15.
28 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 24-26 and 113-122.
29 Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma’s search for Identity, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 97-109.
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and “reds” in China,30 that was inherent in Guided Democracy and indeed 
in many other countries around the world. Many conflicts that engulfed 
Third World states during the mid-twentieth century were as much caused 
by the Cold War as by a generational shift. This was a shift fully realized by 
many of the older generation, to the extent that the Indonesians used the 
term reds and experts.31 
Going back to the question on the roots of authority in the Indonesian 
bureaucracy, the answer could be deciphered by analyzing the changing of the 
guard from the 1928-generation to the 1945-generation highlighted above. 
The authority of the bureaucracy was possible as a result of an international 
protocol determined by educational and ideological status. 
To understand Indonesian state and society without considering this 
important international dimension would result in omitting a basic component 
in determining the reasons why a certain group of people, American-trained, 
came to dominate policy making in what was essentially a military dictatorship. 
The New Order state functioned the way it did because it obtained its authority 
and its legitimacy from two fundamentally different source: a culturally-based 
definition of authority that had existed in the archipelago for centuries32 and an 
internationally-based definition that allowed the regime to obtain international 
aid, technical assistance and economic integration. What emerged was a 
relatively impressive developmental state that brought economic growth 
and massive political violence at the same time. The 1950s and the Guided 
Democracy transition was thus essential in unlocking this transformative phase 
of the Indonesian state. 
I will first discuss the inherent tension of the Guided Democracy ideology 
as it searched for a compromise that would allow the retention of the 1928 
generation within a new world of experts and professionals, but contained 
30 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1968), p. 163-167.
31 For instance, in the discussion on the production of expert manpower and the university 
system in the 1960s, which emphasized the creation of both reds and expert cadres. See 
Bachtiar Rifai, Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi selama 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, (Jakarta: 
Departemen Perguruan Tinggi dan Ilmu Pengetahuan, 1965), p. 26.
32 This was also the case with Sukarno under the Guided Democracy. “When we look at the 
political system of Guided Democracy and its operation, one cannot escape finding striking 
similarities with the political system and its operation during the Mataram rulers.” Baladas 
Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics 1955-1959. The Emergence of Guided Democracy, (Calcutta: 
K.P. Bagchi, 1982), p. 98.
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within it what Geertz has called “the advance toward vagueness” that will 
ultimately let to its own demise.33 I will then discuss the ideas of state-society 
relations that were understood by the 1945-generation and its internationally 
ideological root: development and management.
Tensions in the Guided Democracy: the 1928-generation and 
their ideology
The difference in generation along educational lines represented two almost 
completely separate groups: the 1928 and 1945 educated elites; their 
difference could be termed a difference between intellectual and expert-based 
groups. Ann Gregory wrote, “There is no continuity between the Guided 
Democracy non-party elite segment and the technocrats of the New Order. 
The very nature of the two segments differs. The technocratic segment 
contains a high number of professionals for whom politics is a secondary 
career begun after success was achieved in their primary occupation, whereas 
for most of the Guided Democracy non-party elite politics was their primary 
career.”34 The old generation was effectively fighting for their legitimate elite 
status and authority.
This difference, as we will see, resulted in a deep distrust of the new 
generation of expert social scientists. What those of the old generation 
feared most from economists and other social scientists was what they 
considered the inherently authoritarian nature of their ideology. Roeslan 
Abdulgani thus said that “we are therefore faced with the peculiar situation 
where economists, stern anti-communists all, present us with a plan which 
politicians believe impossible without economic and social coercion on the 
communist pattern.”35 The promise of both Communism and Western social 
33 Clifford Geertz, Agricultural involution: the process of ecological change in Indonesia, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1963), p. 102. 
34 Ann Gregory, Recruitment and Political Patterns of the Indonesian Elite: Guided Democracy 
and New Order, p. 349.
35 Roeslan Abdulgani, Beberapa soal Demokrasi dan Ekonomi (Jakarta: Dewan Nasional 
Indonesia, 1958), p. 33. Of course, Abdulgani was a politician first and thinker second. He 
was to survive the transition to the New Order and become part of the new regime, one that 
was to be dominated by those professional, text-book thinkers he once derided. Whatever 
his belief, his position as a spokesperson of the Guided Democracy state gave credence to 
his announcement, if not purely of his own devising, then as a perfectly capable filter from 
which the state produced its discourse. 
The Indonesian Elite and its Authority 31
science was an authoritarian state whereby people, intelligent and of good 
faith, were to be excluded from participation and authority. This dislike was 
obviously shared by Sukarno. In his address at the Bandung Non-Alignment 
Summit, he expounded:  “I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in 
the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts 
of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form 
of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small 
but alien community within a nation.”36 The fear of authoritarianism seemed 
to be a peculiar irony, considering the fact that Guided Democracy itself 
reduced participation of parties and organizations it deemed dangerous, 
the most important being Sjahrir’s Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and the 
santri-based Masyumi Party, which were banned outright in 1960. On a 
Geertzian analysis, the banning might have meant a strengthening of the 
abangan bureaucratic elite whose main power base lay in the Sukarnoist 
parties like the PNI.37
Yet, the attack on these parties was also explicitly an attack on the nascent 
technocracy, whose ‘liberal’ credentials had been built up through its control 
of the liaison institutions connecting the vast pools of financial aid and 
security and educational opportunity of the international community and 
its Indonesian protégé. This control was explicitly pictured in the PSI, whose 
members and sympathizers became prominent authorities in important 
bodies such as the BPN (National Planning Agency), the FINEK (financial 
and economic) bureau, Seskoad (Army Staff and Command School) and 
other important institutions. The formation of various Guided Democracy 
institutions such as the Depernas (National Planning Board), Paran (retooling 
committee) and others were created to replace these institutions that had 
been dominated by ‘administrators’. There was one important and major 
exception: the Army School of Staff and Command under General A.H. 
Nasution. Although Nasution did not sympathize much with the PSI,38 he 
was considered as a relatively able administrator. Yet, Sukarno willy-nilly 
allowed Nasution to participate in these institutional formations. 
36 Quoted in Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns, p. 18.
37 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 139-143.
38 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution. A Political Biography, (St. Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1985), p. 125-126. Sjahrir calling the headquarter of the army 
as ‘a Fascist military clique headed by Nasution’ further disenchanted him from this party. 
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The reason for this was that Sukarno was not powerful enough to run 
the entire show. He needed the support of the military, yet the development 
of the army in the 1950s resulted in the lessening influence of PETA-based 
army commanders who had similar ideological view as Sukarno and who 
were just as suspicious of the educated ‘professionals’ as Abdulgani.39 The 
group was initially successful in ousting Nasution from power after the 1952 
attempted putsch, yet they were not strong enough to protect their staff and 
command school, the Tjandradimuka Academy, from Nasution’s wrecking 
ball.40 After 1955, Nasution saw his power rise again. In fact, it was Sukarno 
who appointed him again as the Chief of Staff of the Army in 1955, thus 
placing Nasution as head of a vast and growing military government that 
mimicked and then took over many of the administrative authorities of 
civilian institutions within the state and the economy. Nasution thus, by 
the end of the 1950s, had control of both the military government and the 
military schools that deeply affected graduating army officers.41 His control 
of key institutions, especially the Seskoad, was essential in understanding 
the development of Guided Democracy. 
As newly graduated Indonesian social scientists started arriving from the 
United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s, they found a state that was 
suspicious of receiving them, but at the same time keen on benefitting some 
of their expertise. One major institution that opened their arms to incoming 
social scientists was Nasution’s military faction, especially his Siliwangi 
Division. His successor, General Ahmad Yani (1962-1965), although loyal to 
Sukarno, was keeping the doors of the military to these new-graduates open. 
The marriage between the military and technocracy was thus a development 
that occurred under the harsh conditions of Guided Democracy. 
The tension of Guided Democracy can be understood, albeit simplistically, 
as a tension between Sukarno and Nasution, each representing an ideology 
produced from totally different eras. Nasution was born on 3 December 1918, 
39 In an article at Vrij Nederland, the Dutch journalist J. Eijkelboom called Abdulgani a parrot 
that can say Usdek. The parroting nature of the elites of Guided Democracy may point to 
the weakness in saying that there was a whole generation of pro-Sukarnoist elements, but it 
is undeniable that there was a coterie of people within the elites that had put their fortune 
with supporting Sukano throughout the entire Guided Democracy. 
40 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, p. 82.
41 Split within the army elites occurred at regional level instead of the national level, with 
regional commanders opposing Nasution’s rationalization policies. Harold Crouch, Army 
and Politics in Indonesia, p. 32.
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18 years after Sukarno (6 June 1901). They came from different generations, 
maturing intellectually in different periods and different social conditions. 
While Sukarno was a typical 1928-generation member, forming his ideas on 
state-society relations during the colonial period, Nasution’s formative period 
was during the revolutionary struggle. Many of his ideas were rooted in his 
experience working in the general staff of General Oerip Soemohardjo and 
developing the tactics for guerilla war and the formation of a state-society 
model based on that war. This revolution was a formative period that forged 
the 1945-generation. For instance, many of the people in the “Berkeley Mafia,” 
the notorious name coined for Suharto’s cabal of technocrats, had participated 
as soldiers during the revolution,42 understanding thus the sense of honour 
of battle and developing an ambivalent attitude toward the simplicity of 
Marxism and the importance of outside power in determining local events. A 
comparative analysis of the ideas of these two men opens the way for a better 
understanding of the inherent contradictions of Guided Democracy.
Sukarno
Sukarno was born in the industrial colonial city of Surabaya with its excellent 
infrastructures connecting it to the outside world. Yet, unlike many of his 
fellow nationalists, he would never experience the thrill and mundane 
boredom of Europe. His Europe was a mythical place, whose main features 
were the name of the series of train stations between Groningen and Limburg 
and his consumption of a large number of books written by European social 
42 For instance, Suhadi Mangkusuwondo joined the TRIP militia in Malang, Emil Salim was 
active in the student army in Palembang, Subroto joined in the fight with the PETA army. 
Those that had not been active in fighting during the revolution like Mohammad Sadli 
and Sarbini Sumawinata were slightly older and thus were active in a more intellectual 
fashion.  See Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, “Recollections of my career” in Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, Vol. 31, no. 1, April 1996, p. 34-35, Subroto “Recollections of my 
career” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 34, no. 2, August 1998, p. 68-70, 
Emil Salim, “Recollections of my career” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 
33, no. 1, April 1997, p. 47, Mohammad Sadli, “Recollections of my career” in Bulletin 
of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 39, no. 1, April 1993, p. 36 and Sarbini Sumawinata, 
“Recollections of my career” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 28, no. 2, 
August 1992, p. 34-35. Lastly, the doyen of the Berkeley Mafia, Widjojo Nitisastro, also 
took part in the revolutionary war for independence. Peter McCawley and Thee Kian Wie, 
“In memoriam: Widjojo Nitisastro, 1927-2012” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
Vol. 48, no. 2, 2012, p. 275.
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theorists, from Marx to Weber. His father was Javanese and his mother 
Balinese, and despite his depiction of poverty in his autobiography, his family 
was well to do enough as a minor priyayi.43 His father, being a theosophist, 
was deep into the Javanese religion. Sukarno himself grew up within a 
Javanese milieu and he would forever remain enthralled by the history and 
culture of Java, as was evinced in the amount of Javanese iconography that 
was erected as symbols of the Indonesian state during his period (and in fact 
continued under the Suharto dictatorship).44
Although a follower of Javanese religion, Sukarno was comfortable 
enough to venture into Islam during his period of banishments in the 1930s, 
writing several Islam-related articles.45 In fact, a peculiar and enduring theme 
of Sukarno’s belief has been corporatism, the possibility of reconciling the 
fragmented division of Indonesia’s alirans into one imposing unity. In a 
1926 article, Sukarno expounded his Nasakom46 vision, which reasoned 
away the differences by stressing commonalities of the major strands of 
Indonesia’s radical political movements: radical nationalist, Islamic revivalism 
and communism.47 The most significant commonality was their anti-
capitalist, anti-imperialist and anti-liberal drives and their call for Indonesian 
independence.48 Sukarno was peculiar in that the ideas he espoused never 
fundamentally changed throughout his life. He had the same basic ideas in 
the 1920s as he had in the 1950s. His was an ideology that had little substance 
and no definitive structure, but it was this fluidity that enabled it to endure. 
The vagueness left open interpretation and re-interpretation. 
Sukarno’s ideas were developed within a deep anti-authoritarian state 
of mind, considering that he and all other nationalists had little access to 
43 Leslie H. Palmier, “Sukarno: the Nationalist” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2, June, 1957, 
p. 101-119.
44 This was especially apparent through the effect of Taman Siswa philosophy. CLM Penders, 
Life and Times of Sukarno, (Rutherford: Farley Dickinson University Press, 1974), p. 24. 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo according to Dutch administrator Charles Van der Plas, was 
important in Westernizing Sukarno. Bob Herring, Soekarno: Founding Father of Indonesia, 
1901-1945, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), p. 132-134.
45 Lambert Giebels, Soekarno, Nederlands Onderdaan. Een biographie, 1901-1950, (Amsterdam: 
Bert Bakker, 1999), p. 214-218. Also see Sukarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, Volume 1 
(Jakarta: Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), p. 325-455.
46 Nasionalis-Agama-Komunis – Nationalist, Religion and Communism. 
47 Bob Herring, Soekarno. Founding father of Indonesia, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002),  p. 95.
48 C.L.M. Penders, The Life and Times of Sukarno, (London: University of Queensland, 1974), p. 30.
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authority of the colonial state. Imprisonment and banishment had left them 
deeply distrustful of both the state and its institutions, particularly that of 
the court and judiciary. Like many of his fellow nationalists, he was much 
more enthralled by the ideas of Marxists, who were subscribing to the anti-
colonial cause. Reading the works of Karl Kautsky, Rudolf Hilferding, Karl 
Renner and H.N. Brailsford, he came to equate colonialism, the state and 
capitalism as the same thing.49 For him, the promise of technical and material 
progress that the West and its capitalist system offered was a lie. Sukarno kept 
harping on the sufferings of the people as a result of imperialism, something 
that was also acknowledged by the colonial government and its Mindere 
Welvaartscommissie. “Wasn’t it (Colonial) Minister Idenburg who, twenty-
five years ago, called the chronic needs as continuous suffering?”50 He saw 
capitalism as a big pipe draining the wealth and prosperity of those people 
on the negative end of the modern imperial project. Colonial capitalism was 
producing indigenous proletariats, not a middle class.
Way before the Guided Democracy, Sukarno was suspicious of liberalism. 
Although the Netherlands espoused a social democratic ideology, the 
liberal elements of the Dutch state were the mainstay that endured in the 
Netherlands throughout the interwar period when many other European 
states turned to Fascism or Communism. The 1920s and 1930s saw many 
parts of Europe ending their experiment with parliamentary democracy and 
the rise of strong men as leaders of unified, racially purified nations, in the 
process displacing hundreds of thousands of people in Eastern Europe, and 
later on during the war killing millions.51 Although the Netherlands never 
fell into extremism, its imperialist policies strengthened Sukarno’s disdain for 
liberals. Here was a liberal, democratic and enlightened European state that 
was open to participation from its citizens through its own cultural version 
of aliran, the pillar society, and yet it was also the agent of Western capital 
draining the wealth of the people of the Indies.
49  Sukarno, “Swadeshi dan massa-aksi di Indonesia” in Dibawah Bendera Revolusi. Volume 1 
(Jakarta: Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), p. 121-157. His own idea 
coined in the term Marhaenism was rooted in the Marxist ideas of Karl Kautsky and Bakunin. 
Lambert Giebels, Soekarno, Nederlands Onderdaan, p. 80-81. Although borrowing from 
many Western thinkers, he didn’t bind himself within a single Western frame of thought. 
Bob Herring, Soekarno. Founding father of Indonesia, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), p. 102.
50  Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1961), p. 55.
51  Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s twentieth century, p. 1-75.
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Growing up in the aftermath of World War I, he sided with the leftist 
criticism of capitalism as heralding the end of the liberal order as a result of 
the loss of political control over the masses and petit bourgeois. Sukarno, like 
many of his nationalist compatriots had a much more positive outlook on 
the United States of America in Indonesia’s pre-revolutionary period, and so 
he was probably unaware that the same process of industrial relations and 
the decimation of America’s own petit bourgeois was happening at the same 
time.52 There was thus a perception that democratic states were different 
from authoritarian ones. Sukarno grew up being explicitly anti-fascist in this 
regard. “The Indonesian soul is the soul of democracy, the soul of the common 
people (kerakyatan), while the fascist soul is anti-democratic, anti-people.”53
He placed the rise of fascism entirely within the logic of capitalism, as an 
expression of the decline of capitalism in its last phase.54 Within this Marxist 
view, fascism was the product of cooperation between the corporation and the 
petit bourgeois.55And yet, his obliviousness to the American change toward 
its own version of a military-industrial complex and the re-creation of society 
in the image of the modern industries of capitalism, left him unaware that 
American social scientists were exporting their version of capitalism through 
freewheeling agents or corporate giants to places like the Soviet Union and 
Nazi Germany.56
In a speech to Parliament during Guided Democracy, he said; “We can 
no longer follow the politics of liberalism…our revolution is a multi-complex 
revolution, a summing up of many revolutions in one generation, all of which 
generates conflicts. Without the leadership in providing planning in each of 
the fields and complexity of this Revolution, we will achieve a complexity 
52 One of the first books to have warned about the dangers of the ‘managerial revolution’ was 
James Burnham, The managerial revolution. 
53 Sukarno, “Indonesia versus Fasisme. Faham jang bertentangan dengan djiwa Indonesia, in 
Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, Volume 1 (Jakarta: Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 
1964), p. 457
54 Sukarno, “Beratnja perdjoangan melawan Fasisme. Perlunja menarik simpati kaum 
kleinburgertum dan kaum tani di Djerman, in Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, Volume 1 (Jakarta: 
Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), p. 549.
55 Sukarno, “Beratnja perdjoangan melawan Fasisme. Perlunja menarik simpati kaum 
kleinburgertum dan kaum tani di Djerman, in Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, Volume 1 (Jakarta: 
Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), p. 549.
56 Judith Merkle, Management and ideology. The legacy of the International Scientific Management 
Movement, p. 103-135.
The Indonesian Elite and its Authority 37
in chaos. We must have a planned policy. This is the central idea of Guided 
Democracy. Our revolution is not a revolution for the sake of revolution, it 
is a highly planned, clear and certain type of revolution.”57 In fact, the word 
‘Guided’ itself has a somewhat similar ring to the ‘expert and manager-led’ 
state and society. Sukarno’s revolution was to be a long drawn-out revolution. 
Revolution occurs not in the span of months or years, but over decades 
long.58 It is a rearrangement of the entire society, toward the creation of a 
Socialism a la Indonesia. 
The role of the state was to guide the revolution, produce its elites and 
recreate society in the most logical and scientific fashion possible. Replacing 
atomized society, the state would eventually take over the economy. Quoting 
Abdulgani: “Within the framework of Indonesian society, economic co-
operation and collective action will be effective, not nineteenth century Western 
individualism. In any case, the fact is that such individualism is outmoded even 
in the West. It has been displaced by State enterprise and monopoly, which 
leave little scope for the idealized capitalism of an earlier day.”59
Liberalism was the ideology that was imposed on Indonesia to allow for 
the sinister neocolonial domination of international capitalism on society. 
Here we see a deep conundrum in the Guided Democracy revolution: despite 
Sukarno’s sincere intention to apply his ideals of corporatism and unite the 
various strands of national ideologies in the country, his championing of the 
state as the prime agent of revolution meant, in essence, giving more authority 
to the bureaucrats than to anyone else. Within the Depernas development 
plan, this danger was acknowledged. Quoting E.H. Carr in his book The 
Soviet Impact on the Western World:  “If on the other hand we neglect the 
“social” aspect, we shall fall into the heresy of efficiency for efficiency’s sake 
and conclude that planning is simply the instrument of national power 
and national aggrandizement – the doctrine of fascism. Hitlerism took the 
name of national socialism. But the fact that it was not capitalist did not 
make it socialist: it approximated far more nearly to the conceptions of the 
57 Sukarno, Handbook on the Political Manifesto. Two executive directions of Manipol, (Jakarta: 
Department of Information, 1961), p. 
58 Sukarno, Handbook on the Political Manifesto. Two executive directions of Manipol, (Jakarta: 
Department of Information, 1961), p. 31.
59 Roeslan Abdulgani, Beberapa Soal Demokrasi dan Ekonomi, p. 38.
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American “technocrats” or of Mr. Burnham’s “managerial revolution” – the 
cult of efficiency for the sake of power.”60
As we will see, in the initial Guided Democracy state, there was a genuine 
effort to involve a variety of people within the state.61 It lasted briefly and 
acted only to strengthen the idea that the country needed the expert it 
once thought it could do without. The focus on planning or retooling, the 
institutional approach toward revolution and the centralization of power 
within bodies and experts highlights the difficulties of allowing ‘society’ into 
the ‘state’, while at the same time applying a planning program that was to 
be meticulous, scientific and efficient. “In the practice of development, there 
needs to be firm leadership. Without leadership, the development would 
be shaky, and could even result in the failure of a well-thought-out plan.”62
This state-controlled idea, embodied in Keynesianism and Communist 
industrialism, represented the Weltanschauung of the era. This explains why 
Guided Democracy was so successful in bringing together a range of widely 
disparate groups within the government. The application of Nasakom to 
Guided Democracy, which entailed giving equal roles to the three major 
alirans in its various institutions, transcended the ideological divide. It also 
meant that the nation-state could go both ways, into either a communists 
or a military state. The real possibility of a Communist takeover seemed 
slim, even by the middle of the 1960s. Yet, the fear of one was enough to 
push the army to position it comfortably within the ever-expanding state 
institutions that was replacing the “nineteenth century individualism” of 
Indonesian liberalism. Many of the ideas of the army were founded, or at 
least voiced, by its most important member Army Chief of Staff General 
Abdul Haris Nasution. 
Nasution
60 Quoted by the Rantjangan Dasar Undang-Undang Pembangunan Nasional Semesta-
Berantjana delapan tahun: 1961-1969, Buku ke I, Djilid II: Sosialisme Tripola Pembangunan, 
p. 236 was quoted in Dutch and left out the line: Hitlerism took the name of national socialism 
to leave out any comparison between socialism a la Indonesia with fascism. E.H. Carr, The 
Soviet impact on the Western world, (London: MacMillan and co., 1946), p. 27.
61 This was also Lenin’s policy in his attack against the bureaucracy and his wish to draw the masses 
into direct management of affairs. E.H. Carr, The Soviet impact on the Western world, p. 17-19.
62 Quoted in D.H. Assegaff, “Aspek management dalam pembanguna semesta berentjana” in 
Manager, no. 30, 3, September, 1962, p. 274.
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In many ways, Nasution was the opposite of Sukarno. Unlike Sukarno’s 
Javanese credentials, Nasution was a Batak, a people living in the interior 
of North Sumatra around the Toba lake region. He was thus an Outer 
Islander. Unlike Sukarno’s abangan religious beliefs, Nasution was a devout 
Muslim and continued to be so throughout his life.63 Sukarno was brash and 
impulsive. Nasution was reflective and pragmatic. He had studied to become 
a teacher at the Hogere Inlandse Kweekschool in Bandung in 1935. Sukarno 
and other nationalists affected Nasution in the 1930s, where he initially 
experienced a maturation of his intellect.64 Despite professing to opinions 
of nationalism, Nasution’s essentially pragmatic character saw him deciding 
at the outbreak of the war to join the colonial army as, what he considered 
to be, a nationalist gesture.65
When the Netherlands capitulated to Germany in May 1940, Nasution 
volunteered as a cadet officer and was admitted, along with five other 
Indonesians, to the newly created Royal Military Academy in Bandung. 
Nasution specialized in infantry studies. After the fall of the Netherlands 
East Indies to Japan in 1942, Nasution slipped away and went into hiding in 
various areas in Java. After three months, he returned to Bandung after the 
Japanese released all Indonesian KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Military) 
soldiers. Knowing full well that the Japanese would be defeated ultimately, 
Nasution worked with a number of his KNIL colleagues, university 
students and youth leaders. He did this first by joining the Japanese-created 
paramilitary organizations. Instead of joining PETA, he then joined the 
Priangan Soldier’s Aid Society and was elected to the governing board. He 
also worked as an army instructor for the Seinendan, Keibodan and other 
organizations. During 1944-1945, Nasution travelled often to Central Java. 
He once visited Major Oerip Soemohardjo, a retired KNIL officer with 
experience for military organization who would be appointed as the first 
chief of staff of the Indonesian army by Prime Minister Sjahrir in 1945. 
During the first year of the revolution, Nasution rose from being an army 
instructor to commander of the Siliwangi Division (1946). He would then 
63 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, p. 3.
64 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi panggilan tugas. Jilid 1: kenangan masa muda, (Jakarta: Haji 
Masagung, 1990), p. 38-40.
65 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi panggilan tugas. Jilid 1: kenangan masa muda, p. 64-65.
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rise to become the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Java (1948) 
and the Chief of Staff of the Army (1949-1952 and again 1955-1963).66
Many of his ideas concerning state-society relations were formulated 
during the revolutionary period, especially the emergency of the Second 
Dutch aggression (19 December 1948 – 5 January 1949), which, as chief 
of the operational staff of the Army Headquarter, resulted in the publication 
of his guerrilla instructions. Because of the lack of focus on the part of the 
political leadership, the army was never able to form a conventional ground 
force before the coming of the Dutch. Nasution blamed this indecision 
squarely on the bickering disunity of politicians. In contrast, he resented 
the ability of the Dutch to create, from scratch, a functioning working army 
within a short period of time in order to be deployed to the Indies. The lack 
of trust from politicians, especially from the Communists but also from the 
nationalists, in promoting the creation of a professional army, was the result 
of the fragmentation of the politicized public along party lines. With the 
allowance to create parties, patron-client relations were conventionalized 
along party lines, with unruly youth groups or pemudas being integrated into 
paramilitary organization under particular parties. The army thus competed 
for functions with party-based paramilitary organizations. 
For the early part of the revolution, Nasution was busy trying to create a 
professional army within his West Java Siliwangi Division. The division was 
to become the most professional part of the army. Based in Bandung, it also 
contained most of the KNIL military elements that had decided to join the 
Indonesian revolution. There were plenty of military thinkers and strategists 
within the division, which allowed for sharing of ideas. Nasution’s main ideas 
somewhat resembled those of Mao Tse-tung and can be summed up in Mao’s 
statement about the military being a fish with the people being the water. 
A fish out of water is akin to a military without of the people’s support, i.e. 
the people were an essential component.67 The idea of guerrilla war was put 
forth and executed by Nasution during his tenure as Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces in Java, where he published a pamphlet on carrying out 
guerrilla war. As a military strategist, Nasution saw the implementation of total 
war as a central component of Indonesia’s current and future security strategy.
66 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, p. 8-11.
67 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, p. 47-50 
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While Nasution’s 1948 guerilla strategy was never fully implemented, the 
development of these ideas was essential to understanding his contribution 
to the Indonesian state. It envisioned the reduction of state-society relations 
within the dictates of a military strategy. “In this framework of total warfare 
the leadership could recruit and plan a strategy of the whole people for 
one aim.”68 During the 1948 aggression, Nasution created a “guerrilla 
administration,” in which civil administrators who were not keen in 
‘cooperating’ with the Dutch administration, left for the countryside and 
recreated the state. The experience reduced the legitimacy of the politicians 
and the assertion of their necessary presence to the functioning of the 
state. “The leadership is held by civilian authorities, with the assistance of 
the “territorial” forces, but in its relationship to war, everything must be 
brought under the supervision of the military leadership.”69 The idea was to 
arouse a ‘total people’s resistance’ and the state would be handed over to the 
permanent military administration. In conforming to this idea, a military 
administration was created to mirror the civilian one. Thus, a Military Sub-
District Command was created at the Kecamatan level, a Military Region 
Command for the Kabupaten, Military Sub-Territorium Command for the 
Residency and a Commander was created for every province. This idea was 
continued during the Guided Democracy under the Tjatur Tunggal system.
Guerrilla war is based on a decentralized leadership and must, in essence, 
be conducted on a local basis.70 Much of this is modeled on the German 
military district or Wehrkreise, with the formation of seven independent 
military territories (Tentara & Territorium).71 The military district is a product 
of militarized states, such as the America and Britain during the Second 
World War and the Chinese and Vietnamese variants that continued after the 
war. Lack of popular support for civilian counterpart legitimates the military 
administration as a serious alternative to the civilian one. The experience of 
a Wehrkreise became a model later on. Much of the military administration 
was continued through the decentralized divisions. The Wehrkreise unit was 
to be at the level of the sub-district (kecamatan), with a Military Sub-District 
68 Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 26
69 Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, p. 89
70 In fact, “The most salient characteristics of the army was its local character.” Ann Gregory, 
Recruitment and Political Patterns of the Indonesian Elite: Guided Democracy and New Order, p. 242.
71 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, p. 55 
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Command as head, which were given the authority to issue regulations for 
the administrative harmony. 
The assumption of the territorial decentralization saw the national 
leadership as merely coordinating and directing. “The military, political, 
psychological, economic and social wars are conducted on a regional 
basis. Complete decentralization is an essential feature of a guerrilla 
war.”72 The militarization of the administration would allow for a degree 
of decentralization within the bounds mandated by the army’s vertical 
command structure. While decentralization allowed for flexibility, it was 
predicated on the highly reduced roles of civilian politicians and the civil 
administration. This ‘territorialization’ of command allowed greater control 
of the central military authority toward the regions. 
For Nasution, the village had proven to be the most important 
component in guerrilla warfare. Territorial structure started from the 
village level, where the village head (lurahs) were assigned to create guerilla 
administrations with the help of territorial cadres. The lurahs were integrated 
into the lowest level of military governments. It was thus also the village that 
much of the social and economic works of the guerilla administration were 
to work on, despite the fact that much of the coordination was conducted on 
the sub-district level. This later on developed to become the military Civic 
Action program, but its roots were found in these military administrative 
period. The provision of basic schooling, eradication of illiteracy, provision 
of mobile clinics with a doctor (and sometimes nurses), were provided for 
by the military administration.73 
The Idea of Guided Democracy 
Both the ideas of Sukarno and Nasution focused on the state as provider of 
action. In Sukarno’s case as a leadership that guides society into the path of 
revolution; in Nasution’s, as an extension of the military, whose tentacles 
embraced the village and community level of the nation. Going back to the 
problem of authority that plagued the bureaucracy during the tumultuous 
years of revolution and parliamentary democracy in the 1940s and 1950s, 
the ideas espoused above tried to answer these questions. On the one hand, 
72 Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, p. 52
73 Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, p. 144
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revolution as an ideological banner inadvertently became a way to legitimate 
the guiding authority of the bureaucracy. As Sukarno stressed over and over 
again, Guided Democracy was a planned policy. During the initial years of 
the Guided Democracy, the experiment to create institutions that would 
enact a corporatist national plan.
Nasution’s idea of total and territorial warfare elevated the role of 
the military as an essential component of state bureaucracy. The Guided 
Democracy state saw the extension of military, i.e. army, involvement 
throughout the bureaucracy and the economy. One might cynically surmise 
that this was an effort to spread corruption on a grand scale. Yet, that would 
be to miss the more important point of state authority and control. The 
military presence at the village level was an affirmation of the authority of 
the bureaucracy-cum-military state leadership. The army’s deep relationship 
with parts of the civil society, students, criminals, labour organizations and 
so forth not only competed with its communist version during the Guided 
Democracy but was to regulate a specific sort of state-society relationship 
in which society was to be fully subordinated through these civil society 
clientele that was, in effect, extensions of the military.74
In the New Order, the army would thus provide the two things that the 
colonial state had provided, but which had been lost during the revolutionary 
and pre-New Order period. First was the safety of bureaucratic legitimacy and 
authority. The army as purveyor of power would convey to the bureaucracy 
authority through its power to protect them from civil society, especially 
parliament but also other parts as well. It also conveyed legitimacy through 
the implementation of a state ideology that put these bureaucratic experts 
on a pedestal: the ideology of development. Development was different from 
revolution purely as a result of its success and revolution’s miserable failure. 
Second was a bureaucratic extension to control of the rural areas. During 
the colonial era, the state used the traditional authority of the Pangreh Praja 
and its local bully clientele to provide this control.75 The army, along with 
its own clients, would provide state control to its lowest level, thus leaving 
the bureaucracy with the job of planning development. 
74 Loren Stuart Ryter, Youth, Gangs and the State in Indonesia (PhD dissertation University of 
Washington, Seattle, 2002). 
75 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “A genealogy of violence”, Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad (ed.), 
Roots of Violence in Indonesia, p. 33-63, who argued that the colonial state was a violent state and 
that ‘criminal elements’ such as the jago, were an integral part of state expression of power. 
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Although the core leadership of Demokrasi Terpimpin displayed a lack 
of coherence over key issues regarding the Guided Democracy state and 
ideology, there was one person who has succeeded in becoming Sukarno’s 
main ideologue, a person who was capable of translating ‘His Master’s 
Voice’ with accurate fidelity. This man was Roeslan Abdulgani, politician par 
excellence, former Minister of Information, who was several times accused 
of corruption and who, along with A.H. Nasution, the only inner circle to 
have made the transition to the New Order alive and thriving. It is difficult 
to gauge the sincerity of Abdulgani’s words during the period. Yet, there 
was no doubt his influence on Sukarno and the regime as a whole. Casper 
Schuuring said, “Roeslan had een ‘sturende hand’ gehad in de zogenoemde 
geleide democratie.”76 Sukarno entrusted him with producing important 
papers and information on the Guided Democracy and Economy, and it was 
Roeslan who was asked to confer with Prof. Djokosoetono in developing a 
constitutional order for the new state.77 The ideas he espoused in his writings 
had undoubtedly been culled by or had important major similarities with 
that of Sukarno from the very beginning. 
This was different, for instance, with the other of Sukarno’s inner circles. 
Djuanda’s idea concerning the importance of democracy and his plea for 
what amounted to reform instead of revolution was very much put in a 
realist, liberal tone.78 Nasution’s ideas converged somewhat with the ideas 
that would be played out during the New Order.
Perhaps one of the most enduring features of early Guided Democracy 
thought was the deep distrust displayed of so-called ‘experts.’ It has never 
been explicitly determined who exactly these experts were or what type of 
expertise they actually conduct, but one major group that has sometimes 
been alluded to is the economist. There was a particular distrust of Western 
economists. As Abdulgani said: “I am no economist, and I have reservations 
about the purely professional approach of the economist. Particularly, I have 
76 Casper Schuuring, Abdulgani. 70 Jaar Nationalist van het Eerste Uur, (Zutphen: Walburg 
Press, 2003), p. 47.
77 Sukarno, “Pidato Presiden Sukarno tentang “Demokrasi Terpimpin” dalam Sidang Dewan 
Nasional Ke – VIII tanggal 23 Djuli 1958” in Demokrasi Terpimpin, p. 2.
78 “Djuanda Terpaksa diadakan modifikasi, karena terbentur kepada realiteiten. Djadi didalam 
hal ini saja tidak berdiri sendiri akan tetapi berdampingan dengan orang jang mempunjai 
ideologie jang tinggi itu, akan tetapi tjukup realistis untuk melihat beberapa realiteiten 
dan menjesuaikan djalan selandjutnja kepada realiteiten jang ada.” Quoted from Sukarno, 
“Pidato Presiden Sukarno tentang “Demokrasi Terpimpin”, p. 2. 
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reservations about the purely professional approach of the non-Indonesian 
economists, who, while putting his great skill and knowledge at our disposal, 
is still outside the stream of our life, our hopes and desires.”79
Roeslan Abdulgani’s explicit dislike of economists can be summed up 
in another of his quotes. Siding with what he called the ‘unprofessionals’ as 
opposed to the professional experts, he said, “… it was these unprofessionals 
who created and forwarded the Indonesian Nationalist Movement which 
proved capable of leading the country to shake off the bonds of colonialism… 
There is no reason why such persons should be any less successful in the task 
of continuing the Revolution.”80 In a speech at the published at the Mimbar 
Indonesia, Sukarno was apparently angered when professors taught purely 
‘liberal economics’. “Can you believe that this morning I have received 
news from Mr. Prijono (Minister of Education and Culture) that made me 
angry. There was a university in West Java, where the economics professor, 
a foreigner, only teaches liberal economics. Can you believe it! I understand 
now why their students all become liberals.”81
The problem was then not simply economics per se, but its particular 
Western version. The Indonesian must search for his own economic theory 
and experiment. “It is here, in connection with this effort to attain perfection, 
there lies the appropriateness of my recommendation to always “think and 
rethink”, “shape and re-shape”… and not to immerse ourselves in textbook 
thinking alone, not to immerse ourselves in only swallowing everything 
stuffed down our throats from the outside, not just to immerse ourselves in 
the atmosphere of Hollandsdenken – Dutch way of thinking.”82 Sukarno’s 
assertion of a “Hollandsdenken” is, of course, particularly interesting because 
79 Roeslan Abdulgani, Beberapa soal Demokrasi dan Ekonomi, p. 36.
80 Roeslan Abdulgani, “The lessons of Indonesia’s Experience of Planning” in Politik dan Ilmu, 
(Jakarta: B.P. Prapantja, 1962), p. 159. 
81 “Tjoba, tadi pagi saja mendapat laporan dari Bapak Prijono, jang saja mendjadi marah. Ada 
sekolah tinggi, didaerah Djawa Barat ini, dimana ada professor ilmu ekonomi, professor ini 
orang asing dan professor ini tjuma mengkuliahkan ilmu eknonomi liberal tok. Tjoba! “Saja 
mengerti maka mahasiswa2 itu semuanja liberalis.” Quoted in Rantjangan Dasar Undang2 
Pembangunan Nasional-Semesta-Berentjana delapan tahun: 1961-1969. Buku ke-I, Jilid ke 
II, Sosialisme Tripola Pembangunan, p. 201.
82 Sukarno,The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution. Supplements: Manipol-Usdek 
and the birth of Pancasila, (Department of Information: Jakarta, 1965), p. 34. The dislike 
against economists was obviously also well-known amonst economists themselves. Widjojo 
Nitisastro commented that “there was a strong view among the public at the time that the 
science of economics was totally useless textbook thinking. Some even viewed this something 
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there were few Dutch economists working in Indonesia especially by the end 
of the 1950s. It would have made more sense to allude to the Americans, 
which Roeslan in fact did by lamenting on the failure of the first five-year 
plan that had been hatched by the State Planning Bureau (BPN), which had 
a considerable number of Anglo Saxon economists working in it:
“Perhaps the plans have failed, and perhaps they have not even been applied, 
because they run counter to certain basic truth about our country. They are 
plans based on Western conceptions, and do not necessarily have validity 
in another political and social environment. I am prepared to admit that, 
in the realm of pure economics, they are certainly ideal, but no economic 
planning can exist in a vacuum. It is dealing with people living in a society. 
I know of no reason to support that Indonesian people will react the same 
way to the same incentives as Western people do.”83
That the West failed to provide an adequate economic plan for the nation 
meant that Indonesia needed another plan, one that would throw away the 
constraints of textbook thinking. 
“To solve the economic problems of a nation that has been already formed, 
especially for nations that are called nations arrivees, perhaps the person of 
outstanding skills in the routine of economics would be required, very precise 
knowledge of economic science would be required, very highly technical, 
very “expert”, knowledge of economics would be required. But praise be 
to God, I know that our economic problems do not have to be solved in a 
routine fashion.”84
The revolutionary character of the Guided Democracy was to be placed 
in the hands of what he termed the ‘non-professional’; those who has had 
experience in the real world, with a broad education and broad interests.
“Government by experts is no substitute for democracy, any more than good 
government is any substitute for self-government. Again, that pattern of 
that could harm the way of life of the people.” In Widjojo Nitisastro, The Indonesian 
Development Experience, (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2011), p. 3.
83 Roeslan Abdulgani, Beberapa soal Demokrasi dan Ekonomi, Buah karangan Roeslan Abdulgani 
dalam “The Far Eastern Survey” dan “United Asia”, (Jakarta: Dewan Nasional, 1958), p. 36.
84 Sukarno, The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution. Supplements: Manipol-Usdek 
and the birth of Pancasila, (Jakarta: Directorate of Foreign Publications, 1965), p. 44.
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thinking shows a deplorable lack of faith in the good sense and intelligence 
of the people.”85
This belittling of the professional was a major theme of Sukarno’s 
speeches, in which often he attacked those “bald headed non-political 
individuals and text-book thinking teachers.”86 This sentiment was to be 
displayed by the National Planning Council (Depernas), which was to 
be composed of the ordinary people, with a smattering of intellectuals. 
“Differing from the planning and development boards of yore, who 
restricted their membership to the expert-intellectuals, the Depernas will 
stress their membership on the golongan karya87 who are rooted and live in 
the community without ignoring the advice and opinion of the experts.”88 
The expert-intellectuals are motivated only by careerism and professionalism, 
which, according to Abdulgani, is the root problem of modern bureaucracy. 
Instead, the membership of the Depernas is of the cultivated man: “a person 
who has a general education and a wide and forward perspective, who may 
not be or not yet become a specialist, but who is not yet infected by the 
disease of modern bureaucracy.”89
The assumption of Guided Democracy must be seen as an appeal for 
collectivism and the raising of the Indonesian mass as participants in its 
development. “With the creation of the Depernas we have entered a new 
85 Roeslan Abdulgani, Beberapa soal Demokrasi dan Ekonomi, p. 19.
86 Selo Soemardjan, The Changing Role of Intellectuals in Indonesian National Development: 
a Socio-Historical interpretation, (S.n.: s.l., 1976), p. 14. The particular attack against the 
Economics Faculty of the University of Indonesia after the PRRI Rebellion and Sumitro’s 
role, was directed by the leftist element and President Sukarno. Its relationship with Berkeley 
and the Ford Foundation made it an even easier target. John Bresnan, At Home Abroad. A 
Memoir of the Ford Foundation in Indonesia, 1953-1973, (Jakarta: Equinox, 2006), p. 41.
87 Golongan karya or Golkar functional groups are groups of associations based on their 
function in society (youth, women, farmers, journalists, intellectuals and so forth), which in 
Sukarno’s ideal society were to replace political parties as the main component for political 
participation. Golkar was continued under the Suharto regime as a method of political 
control and became the main political party of the New Order.
88 Roeslan Abdulgani, Sosialisme Indonesia, (Jakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1963), p. 63, “Berbeda 
dengan dewan2 perantjang dan pembangunan jang dulu2, jang menitik-beratkan 
keanggautaannja kepada para intelek-ahli dan intelek-expert, maka Depernas mengutamakan 
keanggautaannja untuk golongan2 karya jang berakar dimasjarakat dan ditengah-tengah 
rakjat tanpa mengabaikan nasehat dan pendapat para ahli dan para expert.”
89 Ibid., “…seorang jang berpendidikan umum, dan berpandangan luas serta djauh kemuka, 
jang mungkin tidak ada atau belum gespecialiseerd, tetapi tidak kena tularan kesempitan 
pandangan dari penjakit birokrasi modern.”
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phase in the forms of development of our country and nation. This means 
that the past experiences must not be replicated again, a development 
plan that did not involve the masses, but was a purely academic plan that 
was incomprehensible to the rest of the Indonesian population.”90 As was 
discussed previously, the difference between collectivism and the absence of 
the masses was a difference between fascism or technocratism and that of a 
true socialism a la Indonesia. In a speech in front of the Depernas on August 
1959, Sukarno said, “Within management there must be decentralization 
and democratization of control.”91 The state was to be decentralized 
and democratized by opening up its management, previously a strong 
monopoly of the experts. By empowering the unprofessional, it assumed 
the empowerment of the people, i.e. the mass. Socialism à la Indonesia was 
not merely a means for reaching the goals of the nation-state: it was the goal 
itself. Socialism was a way of life and one that was to be created through the 
adjustment, adaptation and acculturation of a Western idea, i.e. socialism, 
with the cultural base of the Indonesian nation. It assumed a deep wide-
ranging changes within the Indonesian personhood. Including the need 
to adapt and acculturate rationality as a Western value within Indonesian 
culture, which has always been based on a deep spiritual belief. 
The need to balance out Western rationality and Indonesian spirituality 
was a touchy subject. “The scientific/rational way of thought is something 
new to us Indonesians, because previously our culture has stressed on spiritual 
issues. This rational way of thought is the result of Western culture, where 
a harmonious relationship has been achieved between rational thought and 
the core values of Western culture.”92 But because of the divide in Indonesian 
90 “Dengan terbentuknja Dewan Perantjang Nasional kita memasuki taraf baru dalam tata-tjara 
pembangunan negara dan bangsa. Ini berarti, bahwa pengalaman dimasa jang lalu dengan 
pembuatan rentjana pembangunan tidak boleh terulang lagi satu plan pembangunan jang 
tidak mendjadi plannja massa, tapi hanja merupakan satu plan akademis belaka jang tidak 
dipahami oleh sebagian besar Rakjat Indonesia” in Rantjangan Dasar Undang2 Pembangunan 
Nasional Semesta-Berentjana delapan tahun: 1961-1969 Buku ke I, Pokok2 Pembangunan 
Nasional Semesta Berentjana, Djilid I: Pendahuluan, p. 56.
91 Quoted in Runturambi, Problim Management Ekonomi di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Sumber 
Tjahaja, 1963), p. 8.
92 “Tjara berfikir setjara ilmiah/rasionil ini merupakan sesuatu jang baru bagi kita di Indonesia, 
karena sebelumnja kebudajaan kita lebih menekankan pada soal2 spirituil. Tjara berfikir 
setjara rasionil ini adalah hasil kehidupan kebudajaan di Barat, dimana telah tertjapai 
harmoni antara tjara berfikir setjara rasionil itu dengan dasar2 kehidupan kebudajaan 
bangsa2 Barat itu” in Rantjangan Dasar Undang2 Pembangunan Nasional Semesta-Berentjana 
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culture between belief and rational thought, it was important that the school 
did not only focus upon rationalism. It would result in the students regarding 
their own culture as worthless. This intellectualist foundation of the colonial 
education system had resulted in the estrangement of its Indonesian pupils 
toward their own culture. It resulted in the formation of a Westernized man: 
individualistic, materialistic, capitalistic, liberal and intellectual differing 
from the Eastern man, which was to be a collectivist and socialist, with a 
sense of family (kekeluargaan), focusing on harmony and giving weight to 
spiritual matters.93
The main appeal was thus directed to Indonesia’s new educated youths, 
i.e. the future elite of the nation, at least those that hadn’t yet received too 
much Western education. The university thus had a very important role in 
the process. Instead of liberal theories, they were expected to cultivate the 
ideas of scientific socialism. 
“Indonesian socialism needs thousands of young working cadres on all 
fields, and the University and its students should function to educate these 
cadres with the proper intellect, behaviour and goals as soon as possible.”94
The university thus should not confine itself to producing experts. It 
should produce militant revolutionized youths between the ages of 20 and 25 
years. It should not be a sanctum sanctorum saevis tranquillis in undis, an island 
of peace amongst the revolutionary upheaval, producing cynical, skeptical, 
hyper-intellectual and hedonistic (leedvermaak) young people. Universities 
should not be ivory towers, which would allow the importation of ideas 
that become barrier towards progress and socialism.95 Sukarno reiterated the 
dangers of these types of intellectuals. 
delapan tahun: 1961-1969, Buku ke III, Bidang Mental/Ruhani dan Penelitian, Jilid V: Pola 
Pendjelasan, Bidang Kebudajaan dan Pendidikan, p. 1024.
93 Rantjangan Dasar Undang2 Pembangunan Nasional Semesta-Berentjana delapan tahun: 
1961-1969, Buku ke III, Bidang Mental/Ruhani dan Penelitian, Jilid V: Pola Pendjelasan, 
Bidang Kebudajaan dan Pendidikan, p. 1024.
94 Roeslan Abdulgani, Sosialisme Indonesia, p. 96.
95 Roeslan Abdulgani, Sosialisme Indonesia, p. 98.
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“Cynicism would appear. The faith in the ability of their own nation would 
be shaken. The inlander souls look down upon their own nation and praise 
to high heavens the foreigners. Especially amongst the intellectuals.”96
Abdulgani used the image of the helmsman assisted by experts to picture 
the Indonesian ‘elite’ under Guided Democracy. The experts would thus 
be relegated to the position of assistant to the broadly cultivated elite. In 
speeches to the Dewan Nasional conferences during the early years of Guided 
Democracy, Sukarno never once used the term experts (ahli) instead he used 
intellectuals. In comparison, Djuanda and Nasution both used the word 
‘experts’ in a positive light. Djuanda said this about the Depernas; “If we 
can harmoniously put together the best experts of each field, then it would 
succeed.”97 Nasution said “because of that, the Depernas must be filled with 
experienced or highly educated experts to be a permanent advisor of the 
government that would guarantee the perfection of the plan by conducting 
dynamic planning and supervision.”98 Sukarno had reiterated several times of 
the experimental nature of the revolution and asked students and intellectuals 
to, in fact, fill in the blank spaces. “It is to you, youths who are pursuing 
knowledge, to the experts, to the professors, to all those with the intelligence 
of the mind, that I ask of you to enrich my ideas.”99 The idea of an intellectual 
supremacy over the more technical experts is, of course, an elite definition 
that would allow the position of the 1928-generation politician to continue 
under the onslaught of the new generation. By positioning the politician as 
96 Sukarno, “Penemuan kembali Revolusi Kita” in Tudjuh Bahan2 Pokok Indoktrinasi, p. 103, 
“Sinisme lantas timbul. Kepertjajaan kepada kemampuan bangsa sendiri gojang. Djiwa 
inlander jang memandang rendah kepada bangsa sendiri dan memandang agung kepada 
bangsa asing muntjul disana-sini, terutama sekali dikalangan kaum intellektuil.”
97 Djuanda, “Pidato Perdana Menteri Ir. Djuanda tentang “Demokrasi Terpimpin” dalam 
sidang Dewan Nasional ke – VIII tgl. 22 Djuli 1958”, in Demokrasi Terpimpin, p. 5, “Saja 
rasa bagi saja, ahli2nja bisa kita kumpulkan jang terbaik dalam komposisi jang harmonis, 
bisa.”
98 A.H. Nasution,“Bahan Sidang Dewan Nasional ke VIII (landjutan) tentang “Demokrasi 
Terpimpin” oleh Let. Djen. A.H. Nasution,” in Demokrasi Terpimpin, p. 1, “Oleh karena 
itu DPN harus berisikan ahli2 jang berpengalaman atau berilmu. DPN tersebut harus 
merupakan penasehat pemerintah jang continue untuk mendjamin kesempurnaan 
pelaksanaan dengan melakukan planning dan supervisi jang dinamis.”
99 Kepadamulah, hai pemuda-pemudi jang sedang mengedjar ilmu, kepada Saudara2 ahli2, 
mahaguru2, kepada semua orang jang mempunjai intelligensi untuk berfikir, berusaha 
memperkaja ide saya ini. Rantjangan Dasar Undang-undang Pembangunan Nasional Semesta-
Berantjana Delapan Tahun: 1961-1969, p. 202 
The Indonesian Elite and its Authority 51
helmsman in a boat, helped by the experts, the politician, as purveyor of the 
Revolution, would still have a role to play. 
The fact that Djuanda and Mohammad Hatta, amongst others, 
support the new generation of experts, to what extent can we say about an 
intergenerational divide as opposed to what Feith has called the group divide 
between the solidarity maker and administrator? While it is true that there 
were some within the 1928-generation that were supportive of the new 
growing expertise in Indonesia, they themselves were never truly educated in 
the kinds of American social science that the new elite of the 1945-generation 
had been during the period. Among those of the 1945-generation, the great 
majority never obtained the kind of higher education that would put them 
on an elite mantel. The educational difference is a generational difference. 
One of the first questions asked to Sukarno by a member of the Dewan 
Nasional concerning the Guided Democracy was its implementation outside 
the country. Sukarno had always stressed the ideology’s universal nature, 
putting the Indonesian revolution within a spectrum of a humanity-wide 
revolution. He was to equate it favourably with the Chinese. Sukarno had 
visited China in 1956 and was highly impressed with the success of its 
industrialization programme. Interviewed by reporters, Sukarno said “if 
you were to ask me to make a comparison what I learned and experienced 
during my first wave of visits to the USA, Canada, Italy, West Germany and 
Switzerland and what I learned and experienced during my second wave of 
visits to socialist countries, I say firmly, once again firmly, that I gained more 
experience and knowledge during the second wave of visits.”100
The roots of this fascination with China were based on alleged efficacy of 
Chinese collectivism, which was compared with Indonesia’s idealized notions 
of its own village collectivism based on rural, non-feudal values of self-help 
and cooperation. “It is not to be denied that the development in the People’s 
Republic of China is a development under the policy of a New Democracy or 
a People’s Democracy, a type of state-society relations (ketatanegaraan) that is 
in accordance with the character of the Chinese nation. This is similar to the 
Guided Democracy, which we are implementing today in order to replace a 
worn and outdated liberal democracy. The wish of the people to be directed so 
as to participate in the development with efficiency in funds, time and forces 
100 Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics 1955-1959. The Emergence of Guided Democracy, p. 96.
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should be made real.”101 It also assumed that the incentives for development 
were inherently present within the people. China’s backwardness and, thus, its 
seeming similarity with Indonesia during this period, concealed its capability 
for state managerialism and the relative efficacy of its civil service. 
The Chinese were also quite skeptical about experts and, specifically, 
intellectuals. The main credentials of Chinese elite were their participation 
in the military. The Chinese were obtaining help from Soviet engineers in 
their industrialization programme, which would be discontinued in 1960 
as a result of the ideological rupture between Beijing and Moscow. This 
was different from American aid to Indonesia that was to a large extent 
dominated by social science. It was no secret that the Chinese model had a 
very important influence to Sukarno. In comparison, Djuanda appealed for 
electoral reform so that voters had direct representation in parliament “so 
they would not merely represent the party, but would also represent voters 
similar to the system in England and Japan.”102 
The Guided Democracy state has a number of similarities and differences 
with the New Order state. Both saw the revolution and Indonesian socialism 
as having deep roots in Indonesia’s ancient cultural past. This cultural root is 
the source of Indonesian socialist ideals. Thus although an important cultural 
root of Indonesian nationalism is contained within the Javanese shadow play, 
“the Javanese concept of “Ratu Adil”, the Goddess of Justice,” is used, “for it 
is again social justice which is meant here, not merely the implementation 
of laws, regulations and other social codes.”103 The Indonesian past is 
101 “Dan suatu kenjataan jang tidak dipungkiri ialah, bahwa pembangunan di RRT tersebut, 
adalah pembangunan dengan rentjana keseluruhannja dibawah pimpinan kebidjaksanaan 
daripada Demokrasi Baru atau Demokrasi Rakjat, jaitu suatu bentuk ketata-negaraan jang 
sesuai dengan kepribadian bangsa Tionghoa, seperti Demokrasi Terpimpin ditanah Indonesia 
jang akan kita laksanakan dewasa ini untuk menggantikan Demokrasi liberal jang telah usang 
dan tidak memenuhi tuntutan zaman. Terutama hasrat Rakjat jang dikerahkan tenaganja 
untuk ikut membangun dengan melihatkan tendens untuk berhemat pembiajaan, waktu dan 
tenaga, hendaklah diperhatikan benar2, supaja ditimbulkan pula pada Rakjat membangun: 
berhemat biaja, waktu dan bahan.” From Rantjangan Dasar Undang2 Pembangunan Nasional 
Semesta-Berentjana delapan tahun: 1961-1969, Buku ke I, Pokok2 Pembangunan Nasional 
Semesta Berentjana, Djilid I: Pendahuluan, p. 22.
102 Djuanda, “Pidato Perdana Menteri Ir. Djuanda tentang “Demokrasi Terpimpin” dalam 
sidang Dewan Nasional ke – VIII tgl. 22 Djuli 1958”, p. 6. “Djadi kita mentjari systeem 
dimana anggota2 Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat itu lebih dekat kepada sipemilih, Dadji bukan 
sadja mewakili partai, tetapi djuga mewakili voters seperti ssyteem di Inggris, di Djepang.”
103 Roeslan Abdulgani, Manipol and USDEK in questions and answers, (Jakarta: Department 
of Information, 1961), p. 36.
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an agrarian-communitarian past, an ur-communist society whose latent 
socialism is inherent in its deepest make up.104 The ancient past is thus 
shown to be socialist and leftist, not the glorification of a rightist, culturalist 
aristocratic culture. 
“Since ancient times, Indonesian society has been averse both to dictatorship 
and to the individualism of liberalism. The old system of government was 
based upon musjawarah and mufakat (consensus) with the leadership of a 
single central authority in the hands of a “sesepuh” or elder, who did not 
dictate, but led and protected.”105
This idea of an elder who was not dictatorial was also to be used by the 
New Order to picture the ideal leadership. This is different from the feudal 
aristocratic assumption of authority based on heredity. Alluding to the ideas 
of the aristocratic nationalist Noto Soeroto, Abdulgani said that 
“Guided Democracy was not an Aristo-democracy or a Demo-aristocracy… 
This is because the term Guided Democracy is not a combination of the 
term Demos with Aristos, or the Kawulo with the Gusti. In other words, the 
Demos is not combined with Hero, Führer, Held or Il Duce, but with the 
idea of social justice; it is the synthesis between Democracy and Socialism.”106
The body politic of the nation is to be pictured within the harmonious 
image of the family; “Guided Democracy is the democracy of the family 
system, without the anarchy of liberalism, without the autocracy of 
dictatorship.”107 Sukarno though, rarely used the image of himself as father of 
the revolution for his position in Indonesian society. In comparison to Suharto 
who fashioned himself as the father of development, Sukarno’s depiction of 
himself was active, as being part of the youth.108 The leadership of Guided 
Democracy was actually the leadership of an Idea, of the nationalist ideology 
of Pancasila. Perhaps the most peculiar nature of the ideas that was discussed 
104 Roeslan Abdulgani, Sosialisme Indonesia, p. 12.
105 Roeslan Abdulgani, Manipol and USDEK in Questions and Answers, p. 40.
106 Roeslan Abdulgani, Resapkan dan Amalkan Pantjasila, (Jakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1964), 
p. 110.
107 Roeslan Abdulgani, Manipol USDEK in Questions and Answers, p. 39.
108 Instead of father of the revolution, he was its mouthpiece, signifying vigor and participation. 
This was inherently different from Suharto, who looked on with the benign and concerned 
visage of the father, or the Sultan from his throne. 
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surrounding Guided Democracy was its stated ideal toward democracy. 
By extension, it was coupled with keeping a healthy distance from the 
military. Obviously, the period in question was to see a greater increase in 
military participation in all walks of life, but within the writings of its main 
ideologues, with the exception of Nasution, the military was always assumed 
to be a state apparatus. It wasn’t assumed that the structure of the state would 
or should mimic that of the military, an idea that was to have greater traction 
later on during the New Order.
The Ideology of the 1945-Generation
Selo Soemardjan, secretary to Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX and one of the 
pioneers in the development of sociology in Indonesia, explicitly divided 
the elite into three groups: the aristocrats, the religious leaders and the 
intellectuals. Differing from Geertz broad classification of the abangan and 
santri, Soemardjan placed greater emphasis on the third group whose power 
to legitimacy was made purely through education and technical capabilities. 
“It can even be said without exaggeration that a university degree in modern 
Indonesian social life functions in the same way as did the now de-socialized 
aristocratic titles before the 1945 revolution for national independence and 
democracy.”109 It is also of no irony, though, that many of the Indonesian 
intellectuals were composed of those men who had fought during the 
revolution and had the good luck of being family members of bureaucrats, 
i.e. the same aristocrats that he alluded to.110 Few of the santris were to obtain 
access to post-graduate education in the West well until the 1980s, when a 
shift in foreign aid provided greater access to non-governmental organization 
to send non elite, i.e. non-state actors, for Western scholarship. Soemardjan’s 
own acceptance of the difference between the feudal aristocrats and the 
modern intellectual was an admission of a generational difference. 
First, the revolutionary credential was an important component of 
legitimacy. Several of Suharto’s most important economic policy makers, 
including Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadli and Subroto, were active 
109 Selo Soemardjan, “The changing role of intellectuals in Indonesian national development”, p. 4.
110 Ann Gregory, Recruitment and Political Patterns of the Indonesian Elite: Guided Democracy 
and New Order, p. 52.  “The technocrats and the military came from the highest social 
status origins (97% and 71% respectively)”
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in the war in a student battalion.111 The revolutionary experience was as 
transformative to these people as it had been to the experience of Nasution. 
Second was the American educational experience. For the top policy 
makers, America represented a formative influence that was not only 
important in determining the kinds of ideas that they had for the nation and 
the state, but more importantly, their stay in the USA was punctuated with 
an increasing sense of togetherness and a feeling of solidarity and common 
goals. In terms of economic policy making, it was in the dorm rooms of 
the University of California, Berkeley and in the halls of the Army Staff 
and Command School that the idea of a future Indonesian economy was 
thought out amongst the economists and the military men. Head of the 
School General Suwarto often asked the economists to stay the night at the 
compound to discuss about the Indonesian economy.112 Widjojo Nitisastro 
came out as being the natural leader of a small team of economists (altogether 
17 persons), which determined policy-making during the entire New Order 
period.113 The American experience also underscored the importance of the 
university as a binding force among the group. “The technocratic elite led 
primarily academic lives, before and after the completion of their degrees,”114 
and the universities represented a mechanism for elite recruitment and for 
forging solidarity, just as the officer school and the military legal school 
reflected the military side of the equation. 
As David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz explained, the New Order national 
discourse seemed to be a mishmash of ideas that at first sight appeared to 
clash with one another. On the one hand, the state was seen to be organicist,115 
i.e., state-society relations was seen through familial, nativist and organic 
111 Ann Gregory, Recruitment and Political Patterns of the Indonesian Elite: Guided Democracy 
and New Order, p. 327-357.
112 Emil Salim, “Tanpa tedeng aling-aling” in Ekonomi Indonesia di Era Politik Baru: 80 Tahun 
Muhammad Sadli, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2002) p. 6.
113 Ahmad Helmy Fuadi, Elites and Economic Policies in Indonesia and Nigeria, 1966-1998, 
(PhD Dissertation Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 2012), p. 75.
114 Ann Gregory, Recruitment and Political Patterns of the Indonesian Elite: Guided Democracy 
and New Order, p. 334.
115 David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz (ed.), Indonesian Politics and Society. A reader, (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 27, also Anthony Reid, “Political Tradition in Indonesia: the 
One and the Many” in Asian Studies Review, Vol. 22, no. 1, (March, 1998), p. 23-38 and 
Barry Turner, Nasution: Total People’s Resistance and Organicist Thinking in Indonesia, (PhD 
Dissertation Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, 2005), p. 1-28. 
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metaphors, with the state or elite being the father and the nation being 
the children. In following with Eastern ideals of family relationship, the 
emphasis was on harmony, not justice. The children were obliged to respect 
and follow the orders of the father. The roots of this organic notion were 
plucked from the ideas of the noted legal scholar Soepomo and then carried 
over into the New Order under Brigadier General Soetjipno and the Military 
Law Academy.116
The second strand of state-society relations was the emphasis on the 
communitarian and agricultural basis of Indonesian society, the roots of 
which came from the army’s experience during the revolution and their anti-
communist efforts at the end of the 1950s and 1960s, when they actively 
created and promoted civil organizations that were extensions of the army 
in various sectors of society. Many of these ideas were discussed by Nasution 
in his extensive collection of works, and were shared by a large majority of 
the army elite. Fearing social revolution from the agrarian population, which 
represented the majority of the Indonesian society as a result of communist 
agitation, the army’s main concern was to develop and create programmes 
that would involve the military in the rural areas on a more-or-less permanent 
basis, as we will see in the chapter on the military.117
What was significant about the ideas of the New Order was actually how 
widely it was accepted amongst the elite. To be sure, there were differences 
between whether the economy should be opened up for investments or 
whether an import-substitution industrialization model was the better 
option. Another significant aspect was how many of the New Order ideas 
were actually a continuation of the ideas that had been developed during the 
Guided Democracy. As General Panggabean remarked during his opening 
speech at the second army seminar in 1966; “What we mean by the New 
Order is not a political, economic or societal order that is totally different 
from the Old Order… What we want is to do away with some of the Old 
Order way of thinking and social system that would be a hindrance to our 
goals of achieving our national dream.”118
116 David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz (ed.), Indonesian Politics and Society, p. 27. 
117 Guy Pauker, “Political Consequences of Rural Development Programs in Indonesia” in 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 41, no. 3, Autumn, 1968, p. 386-402.
118 “Jang kita maksudkan dengan Orde Baru bukanlah suatu tata politik, tata ekonomi atau 
tata masjarakat jang sama sekali berbeda daripada jang dinamakan Orde Lama… Jang kita 
mau buang djauh2 dari Orde Lama adalah beberapa tjiri tata fikir dan tata kehidupan jang 
The Indonesian Elite and its Authority 57
As Bourchier and Hadiz wrote: “the regime’s managerial and 
developmentalist character grew partly out of Soeharto’s close relations with 
Lieutenant-General Suwarto, the man who brought together Indonesia’s first 
generation of US-trained economists and senior officers at the Army Staff 
and Command School (Seskoad).”119 According to Koentjoro-Jakti, “the 
culmination of these trends emerged when all the ideas finally appeared as an 
ideological package under the authoritarian systems of Guided Democracy, 
and later, the New Order.”120 The traditionalist ideas of New Order organicism 
and rural bias developed earlier, as part of the revolutionary war or even as 
part of the effort by Indonesian intellectuals to understand the nature of 
Indonesian society during the colonial period.121 Development, on the other 
hand, was an idea that appeared after independence, especially during the 
Guided Democracy period. What Sukarno called as ‘revolution’ was what 
many of New Order intellectuals termed ‘development’. It’s modernist and 
planned character, its managerial component, its almost fetish need to control 
and change society were shared.
In 1965-1966, several conferences were held at Seskoad and The 
University of Indonesia to discuss what the change in regime meant for 
Indonesian state-society relations. If one reads the speeches given at these 
conferences, one gains an insight into a project, which entailed molding 
traditional society into its modern form. At that junction, the New Order 
was fragile and illusory. The intellectuals who hailed from the social science 
halls of the Universitas Indonesia (especially the Faculty of Economics) and 
the school of staff and command in Bandung regarded their project from 
a respectable intellectual position and saw their nation-building project 
using the latest social science ‘knowledge’ with deep homage to Guided 
tidak mungkin dapat membawa kita ketudjuan nasional jang kita idam-idamkan dahulu” 
in Amanat/Pidato, Prasaran dalam seminar AD ke-II, 1966, (Jakarta: Pertjetakan negara, 
1967), p. 3.
119 David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz (ed.), Indonesian Politics and Society, p. 27.
120 He defined the trends as technocracy, elitism, populism and nationalism all of which were 
to at some variance similar to Bourchier and Hadiz’s analysis. Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, 
The political economy of development: the case of Indonesia under the New Order government, 
1966-1978, (PhD Dissertation University of California, Berkeley, 1980), p. 29.
121 To what extent the rural bias of the army was a fully Indonesian invention is open to doubt. 
Although generally speaking, the roots of the army’s civic action programme was attributed 
by Ibrahim Adjie’s Siliwangi Division’s effort for community development after a successful 
counter-insurgency programme mounted on the DI/TII rebels, there are possibility for its 
American roots. 
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Democracy’s traditionalist-socialist roots. That Indonesia was under an 
intensely brutal clampdown which resulted in massive loss of life in a manner 
that seemed patently primitive, barbaric, and anti-modern, didn’t seem to 
have fazed the modern outlook of the people in the conference. The violence 
was seen in terms of systemic excesses, a failure to control, and channel and 
command society by the old regime.
A persistent theme of many of the papers given in this conference was 
the almost logically assumed position of the military within a leadership 
position. In fact, both the society and the economy were seen in a militarized 
fashion, under the command of a militarized elite. Thus Emil Salim said 
that there was good reason for the launching of the Guided Economy by 
Sukarno because “economic activities cannot be put under the mercy of 
market powers alone, but would need to be controlled and commanded.”122 
The Guided Democracy’s effort at militarily controlling the economy and 
with Sukarno granting himself and the state’s economic policy makers like 
Abdulgani, Soebandrio and Chairul Saleh with military ranks, weren’t seen so 
much as a break with the perceived normal route toward modernity as a lack 
on the part of the leadership to orient themselves with development. Thus 
Sarbini Sumawinata contends, “Only a leadership that was ‘developmentally 
oriented’ could face the challenges of development. A leadership that failed 
to orient their goals toward development, fail to maintain stability within 
the community.”123 The doyen of the technocracy, Widjojo Nitisastro based 
on his support of a militarized economy on the natural quality of military 
leadership.
“The raw determination to overcome economic difficulties in a responsible 
and disciplined manner can only be conducted if all of the government’s 
122 Emil Salim, “Politik dan ekonomi Pantjasila” in Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), Masalah-masalah 
Ekonomi dan Faktor-faktor Ipolsos, (Jakarta: Terbatas, 1965), p. 103. “Oleh karena itu kebutuhan 
untuk melansir konsep Ekonomi Terpimpin. Kegiatan ekonomi tidak dapat dibebaskan pada 
kekuatan2 didalam pasar semata akan tetapi perlu dikendalikan dan dipimpin.”
123 Sarbini Sumawinata, “Masalah stabilisasi politik” in Amanat/Pidato, Prasaran dalam seminar 
AD ke-II, 1966, (Jakarta: Pertjetakan negara, 1967), p. 48. “Hanjalah leadership jang 
“development oriented”-lah jangakan menghadapi tantangan2 tersebut. Suatu leadership 
jang orientasi-nja kearah segala sesuatu jang bukan pembangunan, pasti akan gagal 
mempertahankan stabilitas.”
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apparatus can work as one harmonious team with an effective ‘unity of 
command’ in the economic sector.”124
Nitisastro would actually run a relatively tight ship within his group 
of technocrats and so his reference to a ‘unity of command’ was to a large 
extent aimed at technocratic policy makers. Yet, the militarized language 
was to concede the necessity of a military-run state, one in which the 
technocrats would eventually, hopefully, help in directing its leadership 
towards development. 
The people were reconfigured within a new imagery: the masses. Barli 
Halim said, “the masses has a temporary relationship with its members, its 
relationship based on emotion and is less rational. The masses feels itself ‘more 
powerful and more potent’ than other people/groups or it has a tendency 
to blame other groups for something despite a lack of evidence.”125 Being 
a managerial specialist with an MBA degree, Halim reduced the people 
and their political aspiration to a form of mob and masses. Sumawinata’s 
discussion about stability panders to this image of the masses. That a society 
transitioning from the traditional masses to its modern citizen contains 
within it political, social and cultural powers that will have to be channelled 
by the authority in a way that was to benefited the development process. 
“The goal of political stability should be a dynamic stability, in which social 
forces should neither be suppressed nor equalized, but should be channeled 
and guided toward positive and productive activities. This type of stability is 
not in ‘static equilibrium’, but must be understood as a type of control and 
124 Widjojo Nitisastro, “Persoalan ekonomi-tehnis dan ekonomi-politis dalam menanggulangi 
masalah2 ekonomi” in Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), Masalah-masalah ekonomi dan faktor-
faktor Ipolsos, p. 13. “Kebuletan tekad untuk menaggulangi kesulitan2 ekonomi dengan 
konsekwen dan dengan penuh self-discipline hanjalah dapat dijadikan kenjataan apabila 
alat2 pemerintah bisa bergerak sebagai satu team jang serasi dengan ‘unity of command’ 
dibidang ekonomi jang effektif.”
125 Barli Halim, “Massa dan Media” in Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), Masalah-masalah ekonomi dan 
faktor-faktor Ipolsos, p. 64. “Massa bersifat sementara dalam hubungan diantara para anggotanja, 
sedangkan tiap anggautanja lebih banjak beremosi dan kurang rationil. Berdasarkan ini massa 
mempunjai perasaan ‘lebih kuat dan lebh perkasa’ dari orang/golongan lain, atau massa itu 
tjepat menjalahkan golongan lain walaupun bukti2 tidak tjukup lengkap dan sebagainja.”
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supervision, in which all the tensions and conflicts be resolved in a peaceful 
manner, without killing its dynamism.”126
The people as masses were seen in opposition to the nurturing and 
managing capability of the elite. In fact, the military elite was seen to be 
the opposite of the masses. Kartomo Wirjosuhardjo’s article paints the 
inevitable picture of societal stratification and the need to place each group 
according to their place in society. If each group objectively knows where 
it belongs within the pyramidal structure of social stratification, then peace 
and harmony would reign in the body politic. This traditionalist and static 
view of society was ironically couched within a picture of a modern transition 
from the previous feudal society. 
In fact, the top tier of the pyramid should be filled with a combination of 
three elites. First, the military elite with their “discipline, initiative, militancy 
and earnestness in doing their duty.” Second, the secular intelligentsia, 
which are those “people who have obtained expert education, for instance 
doctors, economists, lawyers, engineers, agricultural experts, educational 
experts, journalists and others. This is a group of people who uses science 
and technology in their line of work. They have expertise in their field but 
sometimes lack the push to conduct real change.” The third group is the 
entrepreneurs who are “creators or people who uses new ways to obtain 
great profits. They are motors of industry and trade and are composed of 
people who are always searching for greater success.”127 Each of these three 
126 Sarbini Sumawinata, “Masalah stabilisasi politik” in Amanat/Pidato, Prasaran dalam seminar 
AD ke-II, 1966, (Jakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1967), p. 47. “…stabilitas politik jang 
harus ditjapai ialah stabilitas jang dinamis, dimana kekuatan sosial tidak ditekan ataupun 
diimbangkan, melainkan harus dapat disalurkan dan didjuruskan keareah kegiatan2 jang 
positif dan produktif. Stabilitas jang demikian ini bukanlah suatu ‘static equilibrium’, 
melainkan harus diartikan sebagai suatu penguasaan dan pengawasan keadaan, dimana semua 
ketegangan2 dan konflik2 dapat diselesaikan seetjara damai, tanpa mematikan dinamiknja. 
127 Kartomo Wirosuhardjo, “Masalah kekaryaan ABRI” in Amanat/Pidato, Prasaran dalam seminar 
AD ke-II, 1966, (Jakarta: Pertjetakan negara, 1967), p. 197.“Golongan militer mempunjai 
disiplin, inisiatif, militansi dan kesungguhan dalam melaksanakan satu tugas.” “Golongan 
seculer intelligentsia ini terdiri dari orang-orang jang mendapatkan pendidikan keahlian, jakni 
dokter, sardjana ekonomi, hukum, teknik, pertanian, pendidikan, wartawan dan lain-lain. 
Golongan ini terdiri atas orang-orang jang dalam pekerdjaannja mengetrapkan ilmu dan 
tehnologi modern dalam praktek. Mereka ini mempunjai ketjakapan dalam bidangnja tetapi 
sering kurang mempunjai dorongan untuk perubahan-perubahan jang njata.” “Golongan 
entrepreneur ini merupakan pentjipta-pentjipta atau orang-orang jang menggunakan tjara-
tjara baru untuk memperoleh keuntungan atau hasil-hasil jang lebih besar.”
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groups working together can strengthen modernity among the masses. The 
people on the other hand, required the guiding hands of disciplined experts 
and creators. In fact, instead of power, the masses would be given culture. 
A national culture based on the nation’s history was essential in 
indoctrinating the people to accept this pyramidal structure with military-
expert-businessman elite at the helm. Wirjosuhardjo again argued for the 
necessity of creating a culture that would be immune to outside cultural 
influences that have the devious tendency to seep into Old Order national 
culture. For instance, the Communist cultural forms of indoctrination with 
their general meetings or party parades with their flags, banners, drum band, 
traditional dancers and so forth. The usage of foreign terminology, which 
effectively replaces Indonesian ideas with those imported from outside, i.e. 
Communist’s frame of reference: progressive, revolutionary, socialist, patriots, 
the people, etc. Social realist art forms that tend to “depict the importance of 
physical prowess in comparison to mental power, and their paintings of large-
bodied people with strong hands and tiny heads.”128 As were songs and dances 
inspired by socialist/communist countries. What Wirjosuhardjo contends 
is that by allowing these type of cultural forms to exist in the country, it 
spreads their content across the wider community, thus allowing for subtle 
forms of indoctrination. Cultural forms are instruments and weapons in the 
elite’s arsenal to control and channel the masses. The New Order would thus 
have to search for its own specific forms of national culture; and a return 
to tradition is what was offered by many social scientists. Selo Soemardjan 
called for the need to revive the old idea of role model in traditional society 
(panutan), whose roots went deep into Javanese society. The Javanese word 
manut means to follow, specifically to follow the leadership. The Javanese 
role model is passive, while its modern role would be active. 
“In other words, the role model of the past requires only tut wuri handayani, 
which mean pushing their influence from behind. But now role models 
within Indonesia’s modern society are expected to take the lead and fulfil 
their role as ing ngarsa sung tulada, i.e. to give a good example up front. The 
128 Kartomo Wirosuhardjo,“Re-thinking Dalam Indoktrinasi” in Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), 
Masalah-masalah ekonomi dan faktor-faktor Ipolsos, p. 41. “gambar-gambar/lukisan-lukisan 
jang selalu menggambarkan pentingnja tenaga fisik dan kurang pentingnja kerdja otak, jaitu 
dengan lukisan orang bertubuh besar dengan tangan-tangan jang kuat, tetapi kepala ketjil.” 
A decidely anti-intellectual form that was popular amongst the Communist of the period. 
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appreciation of society in today’s democratic age for their role models would 
surely increase if they also situated themselves as ing madya mangun karsa, 
which is to live in society and together work with society to build a strong 
spirit in the effort to create societal happiness and state magnificence.”129
What is significant about Soemardjan’s imagery is again their deeply 
feudal form taken from Javanese’s long feudal past, something that the 
nationalists, leftists and many Islamist in Indonesia abhorred. Soemardjan, 
a loyal follower and personal secretary of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, 
and himself an aristocrat, must have had fewer qualms in painting a picture 
of modern Indonesian society through an aristocratic Javanese ‘frame of 
reference.’ Even more significant is, of course, his credential as the ‘father 
of Indonesian sociology.’ His American education did not conflict with 
what he saw as a rational way of ordering society. Wirjosuhardjo’s ideas on 
indoctrination also have their roots in his study in America. A modern take 
on Indonesian culture thus took the form primarily of a feudal revivalism. 
The reason for this was the inherently conservative form of Indonesian 
intellectualism, since many of Indonesia’s social scientists hailed from 
basically the same social class: Javanese priyayi bureaucrats. 
Conclusion
The development of the Indonesian idea about authority and state-society 
relations evolved during the Guided Democracy. The change was partly 
brought about by both a generational shift from what I’ve termed, using 
Weinstein’s analysis, the 1928 and 1945 generation. More importantly, the 
roots of these changes were entwined with the development of the 1950s 
and the expansion of education, which will be discussed in chapter 5. The 
129  Selo Soemardjan, “Sifat2 panutan didalam pandangan masjarakat Indonesia” in Widjojo 
Nitisastro (ed.), Masalah-masalah ekonomi dan faktor-faktor Ipolsos, p. 53.“Dengan perkataan 
lain, para panutan dalam zaman dahulu tjukup mengambil peranan “tut wuri handajani”, 
jaitu memberikan pengaruh dari belakang. Tetapi sekarang para panutan didalam masjarakat 
Indonesia modern diharapkan tampil kemuka dan menempati kedudukan “ing ngarsa sung 
tulada”, jaitu tampil kedepan untuk memberikan contoh. Penghargaan masjarakat dalam 
zaman demokratis sekarang terhadap para panutannja akan memuntjak tinggi apabila 
mereka itu djuga menempatkan diri “ing madya mangun karsa”, jaitu hidup ditengah-tengah 
masjarakat dan bersama-sama dengan masjarakat membentuk semangat madju terus kearah 
kebahagiaan masjarakat dan kebesaran negara. 
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clash of ideas between Sukarno and expert economists represented a conflict 
over authority. The expert elite of the 1950s was considered to be a threat to 
Sukarno’s corporatist ideas. What Sukarno wanted was not to destroy and 
eliminate experts, professionals and economists, but merely to discipline 
them. Force them to conform to his ideas of state-society relations that would 
allow the continued relevance of politicians. 
Two things happened. The major decision makers of the 1950s had been 
sidelined and, more importantly, a new generation of experts was to work 
within the new Guided Democracy state corporate discourse. As we will see 
in Chapter 7, their study of Communist institutions increasingly drew them 
closer to the military managerial elites. The development of the military 
in relations to the corporatist state is an essential development of Guided 
Democracy that cemented Indonesia’s long twentieth century military rule. 
The coalescence of experts and the military elite was a side effect of Sukarno’s 
anti-expert ideology. The Guided Democracy thus had a profound role in 
molding this emergent elite.

CHAPTER II
The Military Expansion into the State
The formation of the military dual-function (dwifungsi) was one of the 
cornerstones of both the Guided Democracy and the New Order. This 
chapter looks into the structural transformation that allowed for the creation 
of a military legitimacy within the ‘developmentalist’ project of the Guided 
Democracy state. I will first look at the gradual centralization of army 
command around General Abdul Haris Nasution and, at the same time, the 
production of military elites. Following the work of both Rudolf Mrazek1 
and Ernst Utrecht,2 I will look into the development of two different army 
doctrines: the territorial doctrine and the Tri Ubaya Cakti.  These doctrines 
represented an ideological response to two army factions, the territorial 
elite who saw territorial management as the answer to the problems of 
coordination and the para-military elites who focussed on forward capability. 
The question of control is essential here. The territorial doctrine aimed 
at expanded military control over other institutions within the central and 
regional governments. The revolutionary doctrine wanted the military to be 
under the command of Sukarno. In both cases, the formation of territorial 
and strike-command elites required education. The production of both a 
1 Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945-1965: a Study of an 
Intervention.
2 Ernst Utrecht, The Indonesian Army: a Socio-Political Study of an Armed, Privileged Group 
in the Developing Countries, (Townsville: Southeast Asian Studies Committee, 1978).
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military managerial elite and a para-command elite was often predicated on 
American help. This was especially true for the para-command elites of the 
Guided Democracy, which obtained educational grants from the Kennedy 
administration to go to the United States and obtain training in the latest 
counter-insurgency tactics.
Everett Hawkins calls the process by which Indonesians took on multiple 
jobs to make ends meet job inflation.3 Similarly, an institutional inflation 
occurred within the military. The multiplication of military tasks after 1957 
can be conceived as job inflation into civilian fields within an economy that 
was contracting. Initially, the extension of job provision was conducted as a 
result of foreign attrition caused by nationalization. The territorial commands 
during the second Martial Law period (1957-1963) also allowed for a greater 
role of the army within various posts. 
The Revolutionary Period
During the war, Japanese control of Indonesia was conducted through three 
separate military administrations controlled by respectively the army and 
the navy.4 Each administration pursued different policies, thus indigenous 
military organizations were prevalent in Java.5 The Japanese also introduced 
army control at the neighbourhood level, the so-called Tonari Gumi.6 Because 
politicians working under the Japanese were not allowed to organize at these 
3 Everet Hawkins, “Job Inflation in Indonesia” in Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 5, May 1966, p. 
264-275.
4 The 25th army division held sway Sumatra and the 16th division in Java. East Indonesia was 
under administration of the navy. 
5 Paramilitary organizations and schools were effectively used to instill radical nationalism. 
M.A. Azis, Japan’s Colonialism and Indonesia, (The Hague: n.a., 1955), p. 178.
6 This was translated into Indonesian into the still existing Rukun Tetangga (RT) and Rukun 
Warga (RW) system of security control. A committee was created in 1947 under the Minister 
of Interior Mr. Mohammad Roem, the Social Minister, Mr. Maria Ulfah Santoso and the 
Minister of Information and later Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir. In the fifties, it 
grew primarily in the urban areas and was used as proxies by political parties. The Guided 
Democracy started putting emphasis for social control through these RT/RK bodies, but 
it was the New Order state that had put it to good use. See Rantjangan Dasar Undang2 
Pembangunan Nasional-Semesta Berentjana delapan tahun: 1961-1969, VIII book, Edition 
16, p. 2518, see also Shigeru Sato, War Nationalism and Peasant: Java under the Japanese 
occupation, (Armonk: Sharpe, 1994), p. 72 and 74-75, and David Kilcullen, The political 
consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia, University of New South Wales-PhD, 2000, 
p. 32-33.
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levels, local state presence was expressed in military forms. ‘The system was 
a means of coercion, propaganda, information collection, aid distribution 
and control over the population.’7
The PETA8 was the first army in history commanded and controlled by 
Indonesians. By December 1944, PETA had 66 battalions in Java, with a total 
estimated force of over 37,000 soldiers by 1945. The number of Indonesians 
involved in various military and para-military organizations was estimated 
to be in the order of 2 to 2.2 million people. Indonesian politicians were 
never able to form a comparable administrative or organizational presence at 
the local and village level during this period. Guerilla operations weakened 
central command, resulting in regionalization of military power.9
Military control over the territories contributed to the idea of Indonesia’s 
state-society relations. Robert Cribb writes that Nasution’s principal 
contribution to the study of guerrilla warfare was his ability to depoliticize 
it, unlike the politicization of people toward social change that was espoused 
by such generals as Vo Nguyen Giap.10 The depoliticized nature of Indonesia’s 
guerrillas stemmed from both Nasution’s modernist aspiration to create a 
professional army and what can only be regarded as Indonesia’s elite distrust 
of the masses.11 Nasution strove to create a conventional and professional 
force that could meet the Dutch at their level. This was important in the 
republic’s diplomatic effort to convince the outside world of the capability 
and legitimacy of the Indonesian state.
Nasution’s idea of guerrilla warfare was conceived when he was 
Commander of the Java Army in 1948, in which he was the executive of 
both the military and civilian authority.12 With the formation of a military 
7 David Kilcullen, The political consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia, (PhD 
Dissertation University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2000), p. 33.
8 Pembela Tanah Air or Defenders of the Homeland.
9 David Kilcullen, The political consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia, p. vii.
10 Robert Cribb, “Military Strategy in the Indonesian Revolution. Nasution’s Total People’s 
War in theory and practice” in War and Society, Vol. 19, no. 2, 2001, p. 150.
11 The masses was seen as a destabilizing and destructive force that requires a vigilant redirection 
to productive purposes in an image that equate it with river torrents and the government 
with the engineer’s ability to redirect flows toward irrigation purposes. Something which 
came up during the seminars held by the military and economists during the transition 
period of the Guided Democracy and New Order periods. 
12 Salim Said, The Genesis of Power: Civil and Military Relations in Indonesia during the 
Revolution for Independence. 1945-1949, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
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government, the heads of the divisions automatically became military 
governors for their respective provinces. At the residential level was the sub-
regional military command or STM.13 Beneath this was the district military 
command14 or KDM paralleling at the district (kabupaten) level. Lastly, at 
the sub-district level (kecamatan) was the sub-district military command15 
or KODM. Only at the village level was there a non-militarized executive 
level. Yet, the lurahs were now responsible not to its civilian line of command, 
but to the KODM.16 The Wehrkreise or independent units formed the main 
organization of the mobile units. Most STM commanders were also a 
Wehrkreise commander. 
This system predated the 1948 reorganization of parallel military 
government and was created in October 1947 after the First Dutch Military 
Aggression. It was initially created to support the image of the Siliwangi 
Division as being under one command, although many of its troops had 
spread out after the attack and partial occupation of West Java by the Dutch 
forces in July and August 1947. Instead of utilizing the territorial units, 
the mobile units were also assigned to assist the Military Government in 
local administration. The paralleling and subordination of the civilian 
administration under the military was followed by the decentralization of 
the local territories by local military administration.17
The guerilla-ization of the civilian administration was not only limited 
to the executive administration line, but spread out to include much of 
the public goods service of the government, including the police and 
judicial courts, taxation, information services, public health, education, 
manufacturing and so forth.18 The military commander put to good use 
an auxiliary force called the territorial cadres, composed of civilian trained 
workers, to do the essential and technical jobs that were required for these 
public goods provision. This replacement of civilian functions by military 
1981), p. 195-196.
13 Sub-Territorium Militer
14 Komando Distrik Militer, later known for its abbreviation Kodam.
15 Komando Onder-District Militer. Salim Said, The Genesis of Power: Civil and Military 
Relations in Indonesia during the Revolution for Independence, p. 195-196.
16 Salim Said, “The political role of Indonesian military: past, present and future” in Southeast 
Asian Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1987, p. 17.
17 Salim Said, The genesis of power: Civil and Military Relations in Indonesia during the revolution 
for independence,  p. 199-200.
18 A.H. Nasution, The Fundamentals of Guerilla War, p. 26.
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ones during the direst episode of the revolutionary war, confirmed the beliefs 
of many people in the military that the political elite was not indispensable 
for the running of the state. 
What we have during the revolutionary war was thus the development of 
a segmented army, whereby guerrilla warfare led to the creation of military 
fiefdoms at various local levels. The result was a territorial army, in which 
army divisions were manned and officered by people of the same locality.19 
The failure of the political elites to extend their administrative authority 
outside of the capital was compounded by the failure to effectively integrate 
the segmented military under civilian supremacy. The social democrats 
controlling the government had a modern and professional vision of the army 
that provided backing to ex-KNIL officers to head the military, initially under 
General Urip Sumohardjo (1893-1948). In 1945, when the army voted for 
Sudirman (1916-1950), an ex-PETA officer, the government had no power 
other than to accept the decision.20
Yet, as Ruth McVey has shown, the segmentation of the military was more 
than made up by the fact that the army came out of the revolution without 
a significant divergence in ideological background. The left-influenced part 
of the army was destroyed during the Madiun rebellion and the subsequent 
clampdown. The conservative-colonial part of the army, the KNIL, achieved 
such notoriety that its participation after the transfer of sovereignty was 
made impossible, although some of those occupying positions at the Chief 
of Staff were of KNIL extraction. Lastly, the Islamic influence was reduced 
by the end of the revolution with the decision of Islamist units to part with 
the republic and embark on a protracted guerrilla war for the establishment 
of an Indonesian Islamic State.21
19 Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959, (Ithaca: 
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), p. 12.
20 Salim Said, The genesis of power: Civil and Military Relations in Indonesia during the revolution 
for independence,  p. 98-103.
21 Ruth McVey, “Post-revolutionary transformation of the Indonesian army” in Indonesia, no. 
11, April 1971, p. 131-176.
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The Centralization of the Army in the 1950s
The Indonesian military carried an inherent divide between the Dutch-
educated KNIL officers and the Japanese-educated PETA, Laskar and Youth 
troop officers. Broadly speaking, the division has been attributed by Benedict 
Anderson and Ruth McVey to the two groups. On the one hand was the 
group that coalesced around the venerable war hero General Sudirman. 
Sudirman reached mythical status for his role as a military, but also spiritual, 
leader of the wider army. The Sudirman group was based in the Diponegoro 
Division of Central Java and was highly imbued with the notion of the spirit 
of 194522, an almost spiritual concept that attributed positive value to the 
feelings of revolutionary fervor.23 This group was highly homogeneous, with 
the majority of its officers being local Javanese. They lacked the know-how 
in modern techniques and organizational capability. 
The other group was the one that coalesced around the figure of former 
KNIL-officer General Urip Sumohardjo. The group was based in the former 
Dutch army headquarters in Bandung and the Siliwangi Division of West 
Java and was composed of Dutch-trained, westernized individuals like A.H. 
Nasution and T.B. Simatupang. In 1945, Urip Sumohardjo convened with 
13 other former KNIL officers to pledge their allegiance to Indonesia and 
begin to create a modern military. So the divide in the military was between 
a Javanese-speaking, priyayi-centered, PETA-trained group and a Dutch-
speaking, cosmopolitan-intellectual, KNIL-trained group which contained 
a large proportion of Outer Islanders.24 The latter group’s ‘ability to deal with 
administrative problems, Republic-level politics and Dutch counterparts 
brought them into top positions in the course of the war for Independence.’25
22 Semangat 45
23 Benedict Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, A preliminary analysis of the October 1, 1965, coup in 
Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), p. 4. “For soldiers of this kind, 
revolution is more drama than reconstruction, violent action rather than transformation of 
institutions. Soldiering itself is less a matter of techniques and skills, than the development 
of moral and spiritual faculties through a kind of modernized asceticism. A good soldier is 
identified by the kind of man he is rather than by his effectiveness on military exercises.” 
24 Anderson Benedict and Ruth T. McVey, A preliminary analysis of the October 1, 1965, coup 
in Indonesia, p. 1-6.
25 Ruth McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army” in Indonesia, 
p. 134.
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Although lacking some of the wider support that Sudirman enjoyed, the 
Sjahrir, and later Hatta, cabinet were supportive of the Bandung group and 
proceeded to elect people from the group to head the failed to help modernize 
the army, the reconstruction and rationalization (re dan ra)26 process, coined 
by Nasution in 1948. General A.H. Nasution obtained the position of the 
Army Chief of Staff following the death of General Oerip Soemohardjo in 
1948. Taking in the reins during the second military clash with the Dutch, 
Nasution would start to build his ideas of the role of the military in society 
as a result of that clash.27
With the end of the revolutionary war and the formation of the United 
States of the Republic of Indonesia cabinet, Prime Minister Hatta’s policy to 
reduce the number of civil servants was followed by the military, which aimed 
to reduce the number of fighters in the army through a series of rehabilitation 
programmes that would allow for the transition to civilian life. Unfortunately, 
the project was a failure. Transmigration and community development 
schemes would have allowed thousands of former fighters to start new lives,28 
but the implementation was less than satisfactory.29 Many of these former 
fighters took up roles in the new and democratic society of the 1950s as 
gangsters, henchmen or took up roles in party and mass-based organizations. 
At any rate, there was resentment toward the civilian leadership’s lack of 
concern for the well being of veterans of the revolutionary war.30
As Chief of Staff, Nasution would initiate the re dan ra again in 1950, 
with the consent of Prime Minister Hatta, in the hope of creating a small but 
modern army. This modernization was backed by many of the former-KNIL 
officers, notably Minister of Defence Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX and the 
Secretary General of Defence, Ali Budiardjo, a PSI sympathiser. Half of the 
partisan membership left the army, including officers. Consequently, there 
was a shift in the social background of the military officers.31
26 Rekonstruksi dan rasionalisasi (reconstruction and rationalization). Ernst Utrecht, The 
Indonesian Army, p. 14.
27 Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, p. 25.
28 Report of the Social Ministry to the Prime Minister on the National Planning Board, Jakarta 
15 June 1951, ANRI, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1950-1959. Inv. Nr. 1277.
29 Abdul Haris Nasution, Tjatatan Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia, (Jakarta: Pembimbing, 
1955), p. 349-350.
30 Abdul Haris Nasution, Tjatatan Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia, p. 204.
31 Ernst Utrecht, “The Indonesian army as instruments of repression” in Journal of Contemporary 
Asia, Vol. 2, no. 1, 1972, 58, Ernst Utrecht, The Indonesian Army, p. 7 and R.E. Elson, 
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Parliamentary members voiced their support for the partisan grievances, 
attacking Nasution’s effort at army modernization and his willingness to 
work with the NMM.32 The parliamentary attack on the military leadership 
under Nasution and T.B. Simatupang led to the 17 October 1952 affair, 
in which Nasution’s military faction tried to force President Sukarno to 
dissolve Parliament and take over as a dictator. Sukarno managed to defuse 
the situation and convinced the troops surrounding the palace to go home 
and prevented the death of parliamentary democracy until the later part of 
the 1950s. This action disgraced Nasution who had his position as Chief of 
Staff annulled. Parliament voted in a new and more neutral Army Chief of 
Staff: Major-General Bambang Sugeng.33
The shift toward the PETA faction in the military might have signaled 
the weakening power of the modernizer faction that had supported 
reconstruction and modernization, and the formation of a military based on 
the rule of military experts, in both the administrative and modern fighting 
skills. Yet, Chief of Staff Bambang Sugeng made an honest effort to bridge 
the gap. This culminated in the Yogyakarta Charter of February 1955. This 
meeting of the most important military elites resulted in ending the bickering 
between the KNIL and PETA groups under the threat of politicians who 
had been trying to enforce civilian supremacy over the national army. Under 
Minister of Defence Iwa Kusumasumantri there was an effort to rid the army 
of any officers that had connection with the 17 October 1952 affair. 
With the support of the PETA faction, Nasution was able to swiftly move 
to dominate the army leadership. Support by some officers of the Siliwangi 
division in Col. Zulkifli Lubis’s attempt to overthrow the government 
improved Nasution’s image. With the PKI emerging as the fourth largest 
party in Parliament after the 1955 election, Nasution increasingly called for 
the dissolution of the parties, a demand that would stir Sukarno’s interest later 
on. In 1956, Nasution announced plans to rotate territorial commanders, 
which would weaken the hold of these military men and their fiefdoms in 
order to slowly bring the fragmented and decentralized military under the 
Suharto, a political biography, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 61.
32 Nederlands Militaire Missie, the Dutch military mission which was created in accordance 
to the Round Table Agreement to train the Indonesian armed forces in modern warfare for 
a period of five years. It ended in 1963 and was not renewed. 
33 Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power. Indonesian Military Politics. 1945-1967, (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 74-75.
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leadership of Jakarta. Regionalist displeasure against Jakarta resulted in the 
PRRI34 rebellion and was joined by the PSI and Masyumi leadership.35
From 1955, a relatively solid army was being created, supporting the 
position of A.H. Nasution.36 Units and commanders reluctant to back-up 
Jakarta rebelled and eventually merged into the PRRI/Permesta movement, 
whose core consisted of Masyumi and PSI members. This eventually led 
to the banning of these two pro-Western, anti-Communist and influential 
parties. The success of the army in quelling the rebellion meant the 
destruction of the once independent authority of regional commanders. 
The new regional commanders represented a more tightly knit, centralized 
group. The centralization of army command in the 1950s was an important 
prerequisite to later developments related to the rise of the New Order 
military regime. 
Anti-Corruption and the Road to Power
During Nasution’s civilian stint (1952-1955) he published his ideas 
concerning the role of the military in modern Indonesian society.37 The 
hope of the 1955 election in creating a non-corrupt and stable government 
was dashed when the Second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet proved to be as 
corrupt and incapable as previous ones.38 The period of 1955-1957 thus 
represented a litmus test of the workability of civilian leadership in staving 
off an increasingly hostile camp of the anti-liberal.39 At the Technical Faculty 
of the University of Indonesia in 1955, Sukarno reiterated his feelings for the 
34 Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or Revolutionary Government of the Republic 
of Indonesia was a rebel movement by regional army officers who were dissatisfied with 
Jakarta’s policies and conduct. 
35 Herbert Feith and Daniel Lev, “The end of the Indonesian rebellion” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 
36, No. 1 (Spring, 1963), p. 32-46.
36 Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power. Indonesian Military Politics. 1945-1967, p. 79-88, 
Harold Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 32.
37 Including the publication of his most important work on guerilla warfare. This was later 
translated into English and was particularly appreciated as a non-Leftist approach toward 
guerilla warfare. 
38 Herbert Feith, The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia, p. 462-473.
39 In particular, the Murba party which came out as a supporter of Sukarno’s Konsepsi later on. 
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democratic system by saying that “parties can disappear but the universities 
must not.”40
On 14 September 1956, Nasution held a meeting with the National 
Security Board specifically to design the course to be taken by the military 
in regulating the press and eradicating corruption.41 The public rationale 
for greater military involvement in civilian affairs was thus to eradicate 
corruption, an effort justified by the failure of Parliament to enact an anti-
corruption bill that had been voted during the Burhanuddin Cabinet and 
failed to materialize into law before the Guided Democracy.42
The end of the Second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet paved the way for an 
aggressive military participation in executive affairs. When Ali Sastroamidjojo 
handed over his mandate to the President at 10 am on 14 March 1957, it 
took Sukarno 30 minutes to declare martial law.43 On 9 April, Chief of Staff 
and military ruler A.H. Nasution issued a Regulation on the Eradication 
of Corruption, whose broad definition of corruption included persons or 
bodies which directly or indirectly result in the financial or economic loss 
to the state and persons upholding a position who receive a salary from the 
state and through using their authority, power or opportunity provided by 
the position has, directly or indirectly, resulted in a financial or material 
benefit to him/her.44 On the same day, Nasution set-up a system of military 
observers within the civilian bureaucracy, keeping an eye on the government 
departments.45
On 28 March 1957, one day after Nasution’s announcement to 
investigate allegedly corrupt government officials, 12 civil servants were called 
in by the commander of the military police corps (CPM). The newspaper 
Keng Po published their names, which included Dr. A.K. Gani, Mr. Iskaq 
Tjokroadisurjo, Dr. Ong Eng Die, Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo, Mr. Tan Goan-
Po, Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Mr. Jusuf 
Wibisono, Dr. Lie Kiat Teng, Dr. Saroso, Arudji Kartanegara, Djamaluddin 
40 Tangkas, 10 February 1955. 
41 Duta Masyarakat, 17 September 1956.
42 Duta Masyarakat, 11 April 1957 and ANRI, Jakarta, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, 
1950-1959, inv. nr. 1939.
43 SOB or Staat van Oorlog en Beleg (State of War and Siege)
44 Duta Masyarakat, 11 April 1957.
45 National Archives of Australia or NAA, Canberra, A1838, Army intervention on civilian 
affairs.
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Malik and others.46 In total, 37 people went under investigation, with 11 
people officially held by the CPM. Among these, several very important 
names stood out: Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, former Minister of the first Ali 
Cabinet, Dr. Ong Eng Die, former Finance Minister of the first Ali Cabinet 
and Mr. Jusuf Wibisono, the Masjumi Finance Minister in the second Ali 
Cabinet. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo evaded incarceration as he had been 
in Tokyo on a conference about finance.47 He went to West Sumatra to join 
the PRRI rebellion.48
By December 1957, the take-over of Dutch-owned companies had begun 
and the sudden explosion of new posts in both civilian state institutions 
and newly nationalized state-owned companies opened the opportunity for 
military officers to find their way into the civilian state structure. 
The 9 April Regulation on the Eradication of Corruption was a milestone 
for Indonesia, for it represented the first legal move to eradicate corruption. 
Yet it was part of a broader changes enacted by the military.49 On 27 May 
1957, Nasution enacted a regulation to supervise property, followed by a 
21 June 1957 regulation on the confiscation of materials gained through 
unlawful acts. A series of regulation was enacted throughout the period: 
on 16 October 1957, a regulation on the supervision of property owned 
by the Military Rulers and other state officials; on 28 October 1957, on 
the formation of a supervision team and its work programme and the 
guidelines for supervisors of property; on 16 December 1957, on the selling 
and limitation of use of confiscated materials; on 18 March 1958, on the 
supervision of the circulation of essential items; on 16 April 1958, on the 
investigation and prosecution of corruption and supervision of materials; 
on 14 May 1958, on the formation of a Coordination Body on Property 
Investigation50;  and 9 August 1958, on the supervision, limitation of use and 
sale of confiscated property. Thus a series of increasingly stringent regulations 
46 Keng Po, 28 March 1957.
47 Duta Masyarakat, 9 May 1957. NA The Hague, Bevelschrift voor aanhouding Prof. 
Soemitro, inv. nr. 382.
48 Duta Masyarakat, 30 May 1957.
49 “Lampiran Perundang-undangan Peraturan Penguasa Militer” in Hukum, no. 7-8, 1957, 
p. 16-166.
50 Badan Koordinasi Penilikan Harta Benda
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were created. The Committee on Corruption Eradication finally created The 
Property Investigation Unit51 on 12 June 1959.52
The June 1958 formation of a team for the investigation of personal 
wealth was issued by the Justice Ministry to work in all provinces other than 
those in active rebellions or under Dutch occupation.53 The Anti-Corruption 
Commission headed by Prime Minister Djuanda, completed a draft plan 
on the executive instruction concerning the composition, task and working 
method of the Coordination Body for the Investigation of Personal Wealth 
and Property in 1958. Because of the novelty of the entire approach, there 
were major difficulties to be overcome.54
A body on property investigation was considered essential to the task. 
The body would create an inventory of the property of civil servants or 
state organizations. The law forced people to disclose land, house and other 
property purchases and wealth.55 Dozens of corruption cases were brought to 
court by end of 1959. Yet, it was also quite clear that the effects were rather 
disappointing.56 The Military Ruler has decreed the need to create a list of 
trustworthy companies that should be screened and controlled regularly by 
the Ministry of Finance and Trade. The Military Ruler also saw the need to 
create financial supervision posts in each department and on the provincial 
and lower level government. Lastly, there was the formation of a Committee 
on Government Employee Rules57 in an effort to stop civil servants from 
taking part in business and party politics. These anti-corruption efforts 
51 Penilik Harta Benda
52 Panitya Anti Korupsi. Pemberantasan Korupsi, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik 
Indonesia, Jakarta, 20 May 1960. ANRI, Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Inv. Nr. 
518, Nasional, 19 November 1958.
53 With the exception of Central and South Sumatera, Sulawesi, Moluccas and West Irian.
54 Australia National Archive, Indonesian corruption (1956-1970), A. 1838.
55 Pemberantasan Korupsi, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, 20 May 
1960. ANRI, Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Inv. Nr. 518
56 Pemberantasan Korupsi, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, 20 May 1960. 
ANRI, Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Inv. Nr. 518. The results for 1959 were: 48 
cases in West Java, 10 cases in Central Java, 20 cases in East Java, 292 persons required to give 
property detail in Jakarta, 9 cases in West Kalimantan, 4 cases in Aceh and 9 cases in North 
Sumatra. The Regional Military Government (Territorium) handled these corruption cases.
57 Panitya Negara Perantjang Undang-undang Kepegawaian.
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paved the way for the formation of the Committee for the Retooling of 
State Apparatus or PARAN.58
Army involvement in corruption was widely known, yet there was a lack 
of action on the part of Nasution.59 It seems likely that he did not have the 
fortitude to push through his anti-corruption campaigns, especially against 
colleagues in the military. In any case, his effort to assert his presence within 
the Guided Democracy state in institutions he built were to be thwarted by 
President Sukarno, who would appoint Ahmad Yani after 1962 to replace 
him as Head of the Army. Yani “gradually ended the autonomous position 
of the army and brought the head of the army directly under the hands of 
Sukarno and, later pioneered by the police, was made obedient to the whims 
of Sukarno ‘without reserve’.”60 
Officer Education
Army training had been conducted since the early years of independence. 
Ex-PETA officers started training in Tanggerang and Karawang. The 
establishment of the Akademi Militer Nasional on 28 October 1945, in 
Yogyakarta, was the first of its kind. Its curriculum was modelled on the 
basic training of Shoodan-Tyoo.61 Complementing the colonial state’s military 
academy in Bandung, the Koninklijke Militaire Academie, which was founded 
in 1940. On the Republican side, a school for officer was opened in Malang, 
although it was closed in 1948 after the Second Dutch Military Aggression. 
The military academy re-opened in 1950, but did not produce any officers, 
as sub-lieutenants (vaandrig cadets) were sent to the Dutch military academy 
in Breda to finish their education. In 1953, a committee was established in 
order to plan a complete military academy. It finally opened on 1 September 
1957 as the National Military Academy (NMA) in Magelang, Central Java.62
58 Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara or Paran. Laporan Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara. 
ANRI, Bapekan, Inv. Nr. 345.
59 He did take action against Kol. Ibnu Sutowo for smuggling in Tanjong Priok. Harian Rakjat, 
7 January 1959.
60 Abdul Harris Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, 
(Jakarta: GunungAgung, 1985), p. 214. “Ia berangsur2 mengakhiri posisi otonom TNI 
dan membawa pimpinan TNI langsung ditangan Bung Karno dan kelak dipelopori Polri 
ditingkatkan menjadi taat kepada Bung Karno “tanpa reserve”.”
61 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka. Jilid III, (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1965), p. 217.
62 National Military Academy, (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, n.a.), p. 5.
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The National Military Academy was a college set up to produce officers. 
This was different from the SSKAD/Tjandradimuka academies that trained 
officers on a more advanced level. Candidates for the NMA were high 
school graduates who aspired for a military career. Those who finished NMA 
education reaching the highest rank of Chief Warrant Officer (Pembantu 
Letnan) would have the chance to attend the Staff and Command Schools.63
Far more important for the purpose of elite formation were the Staff and 
Command School of which there were two. The first was the Tjandradimuka 
School, which focused more on the ideological education of army officers. 
The second was the Staff and Command School (SSKAD). Both schools 
were located in Bandung. President Sukarno was a frequent lecturer at 
Tjandradimuka, a school that aimed at fostering the spirit of the 1945 
revolution amongst the top leadership of the military. The school was built 
in 1951 under the directorship of Colonel Bambang Supeno, an ex-PETA 
officer. Tjandradimuka’s nationalist and Javanese-oriented stance was in 
contrast with SSKAD’s social-democratic and PSI-dominated orientation. 
It was considered by Nasution and Simatupang to be the centre for agitation 
against military modernization and they succeeded in closing the school 
down in 1952,64 to the displeasure of Sukarno and Bambang Supeno.65
SSKAD was a school that embodied the efforts of military modernization. 
It was founded on 17 October 1951. The school aimed at educating future 
army officers with modern knowledge like scientific administration, military 
analysis and organizational know-how. Hatta made clear the needs of the 
post-revolutionary army: ‘The revolutionary period needs officers with 
flaming passion, burned by the dream of fighting and independence. In this 
period, bravery is rewarded more than capability… Oftentimes, assertiveness 
in action is more precious than the ability to estimate strategies and tactics 
in a thorough manner.’66 After the revolution ‘… aside from passion 
63 Aku ke Akademi Militer Nasional, (Jakarta: s.n., 1957), p. 33.
64 Ernst Utrecht, The Indonesian Army, p. 41-46.
65 Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power. Indonesian Military Politics. 1945-1967, p. 65.
66 Buku Peringatan Lustrum ke I SSKAD. 17 Nopember 1951-17 Nopember 1956, (Bandung: 
SSKAD, 1956), p. 6. “Masa revolusi menghendaki perwira yang semangatnja berapi-api, 
dibakar oleh tjita-tjita perdjuangan dan kemerdekaan. Dalam masa revolusi seringkali 
keberanian didahulukan dari ketjakapan, jang dianggap akan diperoleh berangsur-angsur 
didalam perdjuangan dan pertempuran. Seringkali ketegasan bertindak lebih berharga dari 
perhitungan strategi dan taktik jang dipikirkan dengan teliti.” 
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and assertiveness, the capability to weigh and decide, based on military 
knowledge, strategy, tactics and knowledge of society is needed.’67
By 1953, there were around 129 officers that were undergoing education 
in the Netherlands.68 Others went to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Fort 
Benning, Georgia, in the United States. After 1954, the Netherlands 
wound down Indonesian attendance at its military academies, with the last 
Indonesian cadet leaving in 1957.69 In the same year, the plans were laid for 
a command and staff college along the lines of Fort Leavenworth. SSKAD 
instructors went to the United States, Great Britain, Yugoslavia and the 
Middle East to study the command and staff colleges there. In 1959, the 
SSKAD was renamed Seskoad.70 By the early 1960s, people were also sent 
to study in the USSR, Yugoslavia, Pakistan and China.
In the initial years, the army relied heavily on the Netherlands Military 
Mission (NMM) as the main source for technical and tactical training. This 
included many of the teachers in the SSKAD. The nationalists and ex-PETA 
members were suspicious about the role of former Dutch and KNIL enemies 
being used as instructors and teachers.71 The Round Table Agreement allowed 
for an Indonesian-financed Dutch military mission to provide military 
advisors and trainers. Before 1953, the Netherlands Military Mission supplied 
the largest number of teachers for the college. Of 24 teachers, six Dutchmen 
67 Of those 129 officers, 29 went to the Royal Military Academy (Koninklijk Militaire 
Academie), 60 to the Royal Navy Institute (Koninklijk Instituut der Marine) and 21 to the 
Officer Reserve School (School Reserve Officieren), the rest went to a variety of schools and 
courses. Nota Menteri Pertahanan A.L. tanggal 26 Djanuari 1953, ANRI, Jakarta, Kabinet 
Presiden Republik Indonesia, Inv. Nr. 1855.
68 Since 1951, a stream of Indonesian officers went to the United States and Western Europe 
including the Netherlands to finish their study. In September 1951, 27 Indonesian cadets 
went to the KMA in Breda. See Wim Cappers, “Nasi goreng en negerzaad. De opleiding van 
de Indonesische cadetten aan de Koninklijke Militaire Academie”. Collectie legermuseum.nl
69 The ending of the Dutch-Indonesian Union in 1956 was important in the ending of Indo-
Dutch military cooperation. Wim Cappers, “Nasi goreng en negerzaad. De opleiding van de 
Indonesische cadetten aan de Koninklijke Militaire Academie”. Collectie legermuseum.nl
70 Ann Gregory, Recruitment and factional patterns of the Indonesian political elite: Guided 
Democracy and the New Order, p. 301.
71 Part of Nasution’s 5 Year Plan for the army was to end the military mission. He thought the 
NMM was an imperialist ploy to weaken the army. A.H. Nasution, TNI, (Jakarta: Jajasan 
Pustaka Militer, 1956), p. 18-39. The feeling was mutual from the KL/KNIL side. The 
paternalistic attitude of the Dutch instructors did not help either. Hans Meijer, Den Haag-
Djakarta: De Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen, 1950-1962, (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 
1994), p. 391-393. 
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were permanent employees and 12 were temporary employees of NMM. 
There were only three teachers from the Indonesian army and three civilian 
lecturers. Between 1953 and 1958, there were six class B Courses with 357 
officers. Starting from March 1958, a new C-1 Course was inaugurated, 
which had three classes with 64 attending officers.72
By 1953, President Sukarno and the Nationalist-Left Wing coalition, 
alarmed by the 17 October 1952 affair, pushed for the ending of Dutch 
influence. After 1953, Indonesian teachers replaced all the NMM teachers. 
Early in 1951, Chief of Staff Simatupang reiterated the reasons why the 
NMM might not be the most appropriate for training the Indonesian army; 
first, the Dutch themselves didn’t have a deep knowledge and experience 
of military matters; second, there were psychological problems plaguing 
Indonesian-Dutch relations at the time; and lastly, Indonesia’s focus on a 
people’s defence was not in line with the more conventional warfare doctrine 
of the Dutch.73 The NMM was to help Indonesia build up its land, sea and 
air power and its members were responsible to the Indonesian government 
through its Head Mission, which were paid for by the government.74
On twentieth April 1953, the Dutch signed an agreement of withdrawal 
of the NMM. The formal cessation of the NMM by March 1953 was 
followed immediately by overtures to Australia, Switzerland, West Germany, 
Sweden and Norway to replace the NMM. This proved unsuccessful, and, 
Indonesia then approached ‘less neutral’ countries such as the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Canada, but was equally frustrated. Initially, 
the UK was interested in sending a joint small-scale British Commonwealth 
Military Mission but this was thwarted by the wish to maintain good relations 
with the Netherlands. Attitudes in Indonesia had also become less positive 
about foreign intervention in the military. By October 1953, however, 
72 “Sedjarah Perkembangan Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat” in Karja Wira Djati, 
Vol. 9, no. 31, July, 1969, p. 9.
73 T.B. Simatupang, De Nederlandse Militaire Missie translated from Indonesian published 
in the military magazine Perwira, Nr. 5 – 1951 Pag. 182. NA, Ministerie van Buitenlandse 
Zaken, Hoge Commissariaat Bandung, 1950-1957, Inv. Nmr.: 563-573
74 Nota omtrent de ontwikkeling van zaken in Indonesie in zoverre de verhoudingen binnen 
de Nederlands-Indonesische Unie en de belangen van Nederland daarbij betrokken zijn. 
Ministerie voor Uniezaken en Overzeesche Rijksdelen. Afd. Wetgeving en Juridische Zaken. 
No. 1 ‘s-Gravenhage, 23 Mei 1950. De Minister voor Uniezaken en Overzeesche Rijksdelen. 
J.H. van Maarseveen. Nationaal Archief or NA, The Hague, Ministerie van Buitenlandse 
Zaken, Hoge Commissariaat Bandung, 1950-1957, Inv. Nmr.: 556-566.
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the Australian embassy in Washington DC learned that the Americans 
had in principle agreed about the need for a Western military mission in 
Indonesia, although it had not resulted in a formal American military mission 
programme.75
By 1956, there were in total 46 teachers, with five civilian lecturers, 17 
permanent lecturers and 34 temporary lecturers at SSKAD. The permanent 
lecturers were either graduates of SSKAD or from foreign institutions such 
as the Hogere Krijgsschool (HKS) in the Netherlands or Fort Benning and 
Fort Leavenworth in the USA.76 Much of the curriculum focused on military 
themes, including military law, military administration, tactical knowledge, 
artillery, military geography, military history, maintenance of military 
technology, etc. For the 1956 batch, out of a total of 2210 class hours, 136 
were dedicated to general knowledge, in particular political science, sociology, 
anthropology and economy. Prior to 1956, only political science was taught. 
In the same year, military management was introduced.77 After the shift 
to Seskoad and the introduction of Course C-1 in 1959, the emphasis on 
socio-political themes rose significantly, up to 50% of the entire curriculum.78 
Course C-1 was ‘purely one of Fort Leavenworth’, copying the curriculum 
of the American military staff and command school,79 with its eight teachers 
translating the field manuals, advanced sheets and lesson plans.80
Beginning in 1961, the importance of the ‘defence aspects’ in the 
government resulted in an expansion of Seskoad to include non-military 
students, from the Ministry of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Immigration, 
Attorney General’s office, the State Administrative Institute (Lembaga 
Administrasi Negara-LAN) and other institutions.81 This expansion toward 
75 National Archives of Australian or NAA. No. A1838. East Indies-Australian educational and 
cultural interest in Indonesia, 1946 – 1951. Appendix B. Military Mission to Indonesia.
76 Wilujo Puspojudo, Perkembangan SSKAD in Buku Peringatan Lustrum ke I SSKAD, (N.a.: 
n.a, n.a.), p. 35
77 Wilujo Puspojudo, Perkembangan SSKAD, p. 36-37.
78 Ann Gregory, Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite: Guided 
Democracy and the New Order, p. 302.
79 Ibid. Course C also expanded work of Seskoad from purely educational to research and 
development. 
80 “Perkembangan dan Kegiatan Seskoad sedjak didirikan hingga sekarang” in Karya Wira 
Djati, Vol. 9, no. 31, July, 1969, p. 40-41.
81 “Sedjarah Perkembangan Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat”, p. 11. This was within 
the Defense Issue Orientation Course, which had four classes between the years 1961-1964.
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greater inclusion of the social sciences broadened cooperation with other 
learning institutions including the Higher Learning Institute for Police 
Science, the Political and Social Science Faculties in both Gadjah Mada 
University in Yogyakarta (since 1960) and the FEUI in Jakarta and 
Padjadjaran University in Bandung (since 1962). A political science course 
on state defence was conducted at Padjadjaran University.82 From 1961, there 
was another shift in curriculum toward case studies using the experiences of 
the Mandala and Bhakti operation83 and the anti-guerrilla policies used in 
Malaya, in China, and in Yugoslavia’s territorial warfare.84 The civic-action 
part of the curriculum was thus strengthened.85 Seskoad would play a central 
role in defining civil-military relationship and policy.86 The school thus had 
an important social function to unify the perspective of army leadership 
and also to create an ‘old boy’ network, which fostered a sense of esprit de 
corps within a military increasingly being politicized through political party 
influence.87
Nasution’s second appointment as Army Chief of Staff on 27 October 
1955 gave the impetus for a stronger relationship between the SSKAD and 
other Staff and Command schools in many countries. Although the United 
States of America became one of the most important foreign centres for army 
training, with around one quarter of the army officers getting their education 
in American schools, Nasution was very eager to obtain help to educate 
82 “Perkembangan dan Kegiatan Seskoad sedjak didirikan hingga sekarang”, p. 53.
83 The Mandala operation was Indonesia’s first forward intrusion into enemy territory as part 
of the military campaign against Dutch forces in West Papua inaugurated in 1961. The 
Bhakti operation was the locally-based civic action programme conducted by the Siliwangi 
division under General Ibrahim Adjie. 
84 The territorial concept of Lieutenant General Dushan Kveder of Yugoslavia was published 
in Foreign Affairs magazine in October 1953 and Military Review magazine in July 1954. 
It was translated by the SSKAD in the end of the 1950s and was published in Bahasa 
Indonesia in the army magazine Territorial in June 1961. 
85 “Perkembangan dan Kegiatan Seskoad sedjak didirikan hingga sekarang”, p. 46.
86 Between 1959 until 1966, Seskoad had seven important seminars discussing Indonesia’s 
military doctrine and its relation to the state and society. These included the First Seminar 
on Military Issue (1959-1960), the Second Seminar on Military Issue (January, 1962), the 
First Army Seminar on the Tri Ubaya Cakti Doctrine (April, 1965) and lastly the Revision 
Seminar on the Doctrine Tri Ubaya Cakti (August, 1966). There was also a seminar on 
Civic Mission in July 1967, on Infantry Doctrine in July 1968 and a pre-seminar on the 
Indonesian intelligence doctrine in February 1969.
87 Charles Donald McFetridge, “Seskoad: Training the Elite” in Indonesia, Vol. 36, (Oct., 
1978), p. 87-98.
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SSKAD graduates into other army training schools. Nasution himself, who 
had never finished his schooling at the KMA in Bandung tried to enter 
into the Dutch school of staff and command in 1952 but was distracted 
by the 17 October affair.88 His trips abroad in the second half of the 1950s 
brought possibilities of expanding the educational experience of the army. 
This included sending a student to the Soviet’s Frunze Military Academy, the 
Fuhrungsakademie des Bunderswehr in West Germany, where the important 
early New Order General Soemitro received his education,89 and to the 
British Imperial Defence College, which annually sent a team to Seskoad.90
Aside from the Seskoad, there was another school that was highly 
important in relation to the production of army elite. This was the AHM 
(Akademi Hukum Militer or Military Law Academy), initially founded as 
a legal course for military personnel held in May 1951 until June 1952. 
Nasution issued the order to form a Military Law Academy and appointed 
the PSI-affiliated Ali Budiardjo, who was at the time General Secretary of 
the Ministry of Defence, as head of the committee for the formation of the 
Academy.91 Throughout the 1950s, only two generations graduated. The 
first batch started in September 1952, but as a result of the 17 September 
coup-like event and the havoc it wreaked throughout the military, the cadets 
finished their initially two-year designed courses in four years.92
A second batch was initiated on September 1954 but would not finish 
their courses until 1960. This group had an even more interesting side-job: 
the second-generation Military Law Academy was to play a pivotal role in the 
nationalization of Dutch-owned companies.93 Most students took a whole 
year in 1957 to deal with the managerial difficulties of the nationalization 
process. Many, like Major General Soekamto Sajidiman who would play an 
important role in nationalizing the large trading firm Jacobson van den Berg 
88 Abdul Haris Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid V: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, p. 48.
89 Saleh As’ad Jamhari, Sugiharta Sriwibara and Ramadhan K.H., Perjalanan Seorang Prajurit 
Pejuang dan Profesional: memoir Jenderal TNI (Purn.) Soemitro, (Jakarta: Sinar Cakra Sakti, 
1999), p. 11.
90 Abdul Haris Nasution, Memenuhi panggilan tugas. Jilid V: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, p. 
59 and 147-160.
91 D. Djiwapradja and E. Soewarna, Buku Peringatan Tudjuh Tahun Akademi Hukum Militer, 
(Jakarta: Akademi Hukum Militer, 1960), p. 27.
92 D. Djiwapradja and E. Soewarna, Buku Peringatan Tudjuh Tahun Akademi Hukum Militer, p. 35.
93 Ibid.
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into the state-owned company Juda Bhakti,94 and Lt. Colonel Soedjiwo and 
Lt. Colonel Sukotriwarno,95 would be continuing their managerial role and 
ease themselves into longer career in the business sector.96 The extent to which 
alumni of the Military Law Academy played a role in the nationalization is 
sketchy. According to Sajidiman, he and his “classmates from the Military 
Law Academy were instructed by the government to take over Dutch-owned 
corporations for the purpose of nationalization.”97 A commemoration booklet 
for the academy was sponsored by commercials of various state-owned 
corporations indicating the extensive spread of the cadets into state-owned 
businesses.98AHM graduates like Soedharmono, Ali Said and Ismail Saleh 
were to play important roles as part of the Sekneg group seeking favour 
within Suharto’s New Order court later on.99
Like the Seskoad, the Military Law Academy was reliant on lecturers 
from Indonesia’s major universities. Professor Djokosoetono, the University 
of Indonesia’s legal specialist was appointed as head of the teaching board. 
FEUI economist Tan Goan-Po and Widjojo Nitisastro taught economics, 
Soediman Kartohadiprodjo taught introductory law, Satochid Kartanegara 
criminal law and Hazairin Adat law. P.N. Drost and H.J. Heerens were the 
only Dutch professors who taught at the academy teaching international law 
and sociology.100 Many of the cadets in the academy and in the SSKAD/
Seskoad not only had regular contact with professors and lecturers, especially 
from the UI, but also continue their education to either the universities or 
94 Soekamto Sajidiman, The Tender Power. An Autobiography, (Jakarta: Grafikaria Utama Sakti, 
1978), p. 44.
95 O.G. Roeder, Who’s Who in Indonesia, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971), p. 388-389 and 404.
96 For more on military business, see Bambang Purwanto, “Economic Decolonization and 
the Rise of the Indonesian Military Business” in J. Thomas Lindblad and Peter Post (eds), 
Indonesian Economic Decolonization in Regional and International Perspective, (Leiden: KITLV 
Press, 2009), p. 39-58.
97 Soekamto Sajidiman, The Tender Power. p. 44. “Aku ditugaskan oleh Pemerintah untuk 
mengoper perusahaan Belanda bersama rekan-rekanku lainnya dari Akademi Hukum 
Militer dalam rangka nasionalisasi perusahaan2 Belanda.” 
98 D. Djiwapradja and E. Soewarna, Buku peringatan tudjuh tahun Akademi Hukum Militer. 
Including Juda Bhakti (former Jacob van den Berg), Indevitra (former Borsumij), Ralin 
(former Philips), Satya Negara (former Internatio) and so forth,
99 Robinson Pangaribuan, The Indonesian State Secretariat, 1945-1993, (Perth: Asia Research 
Center on Social, Political and Economic Change, 1995), p. 18-19. 
100 F.X. Sunatra, “Beberapa soal tentang text-book thinking” in D. Djiwapradja and E. 
Soewarna, Buku peringatan tudjuh tahun Akademi Hukum Militer, p. 88.
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took further courses, for instance, the management courses that were to 
become common in the latter part of the 1950s. They would not only meet in 
classrooms, but also in boardrooms and government committees throughout 
the end of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. 
Take a look at the case of Soehardiman, a protégé of General Yani and 
the instigator of the military-created trade union Soksi. This army officer 
started his career in the Ministry of Defence before getting the chance to 
pursue further study in the associate infantry school at Fort Benning in 
1954. Returning to Indonesia, he began teaching military tactics in the 
SSKAD for three years (1954-1957). At the end of 1957, he was assigned 
to the army headquarters and as an economic expert under the Minister 
of Economic Stabilization. He then took on the job as secretary of the 
nationalization body (Banas or Badan Nasionalisasi) and would, in fact, 
become the president director of the state-owned company Djaja Bhakti. 
Soehardiman’s education was furthered when he enrolled at Parahyangan 
Catholic University in Bandung, in 1958, and the University of Indonesia in 
1962, studying business management. In fact, he would obtain a doctorate 
degree in economics in 1970. His book entitled Social Structure Reform as 
precondition for the Development of National Business, espoused the need 
to reconfigure society around the figure of a homo-administrativus and 
the formation of a ‘welfare, service and administrative state’ based on the 
guidance of strategic elites: a cooperative elite composed of businessmen, 
administrator, technocrats and technologues.101 He would later play a role in 
the take-over of the so-called ‘palace millionaires’, businessmen related to 
Sukarno, and the formation of the military company Berdikari.102 
Soehardiman’s case was not unique. A look into a Who’s Who in Indonesia 
published in 1971 showed that there were around twelve military managers 
included in the book, although both Soehardiman and Soekamto Sajidiman 
were absent, obviously indicating the much larger number of military officers 
that the book failed to notice. Amongst these 12 were well-known New 
Order military businessmen, including the Pertamina head Ibnu Sutowo 
and Suharto’s special assistant Soedjono Humardhani. Many of them were 
101 Soehardiman, Kupersembahkan kepada pengadilan sejarah. Otobiografi Soehardiman. 
Disampaikan kepada Ade Komaruddin Mochamad dkk, (Jakarta: Yayasan Bina Produktivitas, 
1993), p. 237-261.
102 Harold Crouch, “Generals and Business in Indonesia” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 4 
(Winter, 1975-1976), p. 519-540. 
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products of Seskoad/AHM and many had attended universities either in 
Indonesia, with many in the Law School of UI, or management courses like 
the IMDD management course in Syracuse, USA. Soehardiman’s ideas on 
the military’s dual function and the creation of what looked like a managerial 
state, with a core elite composed of businessmen-experts-military was a result 
of his rich associations with management specialists and economists. 
Guided Democracy and the Army
The civilian political elite and the military elite translated the concept of 
Guided Democracy in very different ways. Although the idea of efficiency, 
modernity and the use of technical and managerial know-how were voiced by 
both these elites, the politicians never saw themselves as the primary executor 
of the technical details. If they did, it was immediately dashed after the failure 
of the Eight Year Overall National Plan introduced in 1960 and the deep 
economic malaise from 1962. The military elite, meanwhile, because of their 
stronger corporate sense and more ‘technocratic’ education, expanded into 
civilian jobs without hesitating about the primacy of technical know-how. 
General Suwarto, Commander of the Seskoad, summed this up succinctly; 
“de wereld van amateurisme is al voorbij.”103
The army’s crème de la crème had no qualms about experts and expertise. 
Unlike the politicians, many military officers were trained in the technical 
fields and were open to educating themselves further either in the educational 
facilities in Indonesia or abroad. Aside from doctrinal training, they were also 
given technical knowledge. When the army expanded into the administration 
of government entities and companies, opportunities in civilian educational 
institutions were opened up. Traditionally, military officers were trained in 
various technical fields like engineering, medicine and administration, yet by 
the early 1960s, the employment of economists, sociologists, psychologists 
and other social scientists was being considered as a standard in civilian 
engagement. This could be seen, for instance, in the use of sociologists and 
economists by the RPKAD during the West Irian infiltration campaign.104 
103 Suwarto, Himpunan Karangan Djenderal Anumerta Suwarto, (Bandung: Karya Wira Jati, 
1967), p. 16.
104 Kenneth Conboy, Kopassus. Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces, (Jakarta: Equinox, 2003), p. 71. 
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Conversely, the Staff and Command School were opening the door to the 
social sciences and various counterinsurgency ideas.105
Rudolf Mrazek contends that there was a bifurcation of the Indonesian 
military elite starting from the late 1950s onwards, but especially pronounced 
in the 1960s. This bifurcation was the result of the expansion of aid in 
military training in various US military colleges and the production of a 
new military doctrine and a new military elite within the striking units that 
had a more outward, offensive spirit than Nasution’s territorial ideas. During 
the era of Guided Democracy, the years 1962 and 1963 were a watershed 
of major importance. As we will see, these were equally important years in 
the relationship between social science experts (at least economists) and the 
state, starting with the initially promising but later on disappointing Deklarasi 
Ekonomi (Dekon).106 This period saw hope of greater expert participation 
in national policy-making and planning, and a more important but less 
noticeable institutional development. The rise of General Yani to replace 
General Nasution as Army Chief of Staff was one of the pivotal points in 
this change. Being a member in one of the army’s strike group, Yani had 
no qualms in publicly opposing military involvement in the state and the 
economy. Sukarno’s policy of Konfrontasi was greeted with delight as it 
conformed to this group’s offensive spirit. In contrast, the conflict with 
Malaysia was seen to be destabilizing and dangerous to the position of the 
military’s territorial elites.
In chapter I, elite divergence was explained as a generational difference 
between the old, colonial-educated intellectuals of the 1928 and the newer, 
American-educated experts of the 1945 generations. If we follow Mrazek’s 
line of reasoning, the elite divergence of the military was one of educational 
experience, although Mrazek also alludes to a generational difference. 
‘Until the mid-sixties, the Indonesian Army had been officered by the first 
generation of officers who had matured during the forties or before, and who 
were now reaching an age close to retirement. We know for sure that by the 
mid-sixties there served in the Army a great number of young officers trained 
either in the United States or elsewhere abroad, as well as several thousands 
105 Guy Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, 
(Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1963), p. 28 and 37-41.
106 Bradley Simpson, Economist with Guns, p. 92 and Eric J. Chetwynd, “The Indonesian 
Stabilization Attempt of 1963: A Study in the Economics and Politics in Indonesia.” (Masters 
thesis American University, Washington DC, 1965), p. 38-39. 
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of new Magelang Military Academy graduates.’107 A professional, expert type 
within the military establishment had grown to become a formidable force. 
More importantly, they would in turn come to position themselves at the 
pinnacle of the Indonesian elite.
Territorial Management Doctrine 
The territorial doctrine would become the basis for the civic action 
programme and other military activities in civilian areas. As we saw above, 
Nasution rooted the formulation of the doctrine during the Indonesian 
revolution, especially after the Second Dutch Military Aggression and the 
TNI’s shift toward a guerilla-based armed struggle. In 1958, Nasution 
appointed Commodore Siswadi and Colonel Soewarto, the PSI-leaning 
deputy commandant of Seskoad, to head an ad hoc committee for the 
development of the armed forces. The development programme was later 
submitted to and accepted by both the Depernas and the MPRS. 
The idea of territorial doctrine lay in the concept of total warfare, one that 
incorporated the entirety of the nation within a defence strategy. This strategy 
was assumed to be the only means by which Indonesia could effectively 
defend its national interests in time of war. Because of the weaknesses 
of the military, the only way in which Indonesia could give any effective 
form of resistance would be to use a guerilla-based strategy that utilizes the 
Indonesian society as part of its heavy warfare.108 The assumption that there 
would be another catastrophic world war within their life-time was believed 
possible by many in the military elite. The basis of total warfare lay in the 
incorporation of society as a mechanism for defence. Thus war was to be 
waged as an economic, social, political and even cultural offensive, instead 
of just a plain military offensive. Mao Tse-tung’s conception of the army as 
fish and the people as water meant that it was important for the fish to have 
the support and control of the people. Kveder’s idea of territorial warfare 
was also heavy on this assumption of mass control.109
107 Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military. 1945-1965, p. 142.
108 Guy Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, p. 
11-17.
109 Guy Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, p. 
34-37.
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It is not hard to see that total warfare would mean an even greater 
control of society by the military. As an article in the magazine Territorial 
stated “we (the army) shall manage and we shall control so that they (the 
people) could be invited, moved and deployed with their positive power 
in the general goal of state defence, security and development.”110 This was 
initially achieved through the expansion of military duties into civilian areas, 
including the positioning of military men within formerly civilian positions 
and the formation of new institutions that placed control of the army over 
wider arrays of administrative and judicial matters, including Nasution’s anti-
corruption and civil service controlling body of Paran. On a wider level, as 
we will see, the usage of Civic Action programmes was used by the military 
for wider, rural control. This was important for limiting the influence of the 
Communists in the rural areas. The expansion of military-civilian bodies was 
also part of the application of this doctrine. 
Civic Action was part of a wider army idea of territorial management. 
As we saw above, the expansion of military men into nationalized business 
and the application of Civic Action programmes happened before the formal 
announcement of the doctrine. It did legitimize, however, the position of 
army officers as managers, of companies, of rural areas, of whole provinces. 
The army transformed itself into a managerial elite and in the process they 
comingled with the nascent civilian managers. Because of the expansion of 
military jobs into the civilian field, organizations like Seskoad followed suit 
and expanded their education, as the shift toward the Course C-1 had shown. 
Thus, the impetus was created that linked young army officers and young 
American-trained experts in social science to meet and share ideas. This idea 
of a military-cum-civilian managerial elite was an important component of 
the Guided Democracy state, for it contradicted Sukarno’s objectives. The 
idea of managerial control runs counter to the Guided Democracy’s focus 
on societal incorporation within the leadership of the intellectual-politician. 
Instead, education fostered the creation of a military-civilian expert, a 
leadership that saw control as more important than incorporation. 
The legitimation of military men as managers was created not only 
through constant meetings with economists and other social science and 
technical experts in schools like Seskoad, but also in specialized publications. 
110 “Suatu Konsepsi Pembinaan Wilajah Sehubungan dengan Perang Wilajah dalam rangka 
Pertahanan Nasional” in Territorial, year 1, no. 2, January 1962, p. 3.
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Magazines like Manager and Fortuna, both targeting an audience of nascent 
professional managers, was very accommodating to the voices of military 
managers. A.H. Nasution and Ibrahim Adjie, for instance, wrote various 
pieces for these magazines.111 The magazines themselves discussed civic action 
and other military managerial programmes without a hint of suspicion. 
Army-issued magazines like Karya Wira Djati and Territorial on the other 
hand allowed space for expert civilian managers to discuss management 
issues, including military management ones. 
Territorial control, like its civilian managerial counterpart, thus required 
mass control. “We must control mass opinion in our effort to develop our 
national morals.”112 Terms like Psy-war were bandied about in military 
articles on Indonesia. The counter-insurgency tactics used methods by 
which the hostility of the population in enemy territory could be effectively 
countered or reduced. The military managers needed to implement several 
basic elements within their territory: the management of the ideology and 
psychology of the community, the management of the social, economic, 
political and logistical issues of the community, the management of the 
human mindset as subject for people’s resistance and the management of the 
government in times of war or danger, and the implementation of a special 
rural development programme.113
Territorial management was an important subject for army leaders like 
Nasution, but this conflicted with Sukarno’s effort to use the military for his 
foreign policy. In this regard, the shift in power from Nasution to Ahmad 
Yani and the shift of doctrine from Territorial to Tri Ubaya Cakti must be 
understood. Under attack from Sukarnoists and from the communists, both 
civilian experts and military managers sold the territorial doctrine as one that 
could support Guided Democracy’s developmental plans. 
111 For instance, A.H. Nasution, “Kata Sambutan” in Manager, year IV, no. 36, April 1963, 
p. 4-9 and Ibrahim Adjie, “TNI dan Civic Mission” in Manager, year IV, no. 36, April 
1963, p. 10-15.
112 “Suatu Konsepsi Pembinaan Wilajah Sehubungan dengan Perang Wilajah dalam rangka 
Pertahanan Nasional” in Territorial, year 1, no. 2, January 1962, p. 8, “…kita harus 
mengendalikan opini masa untuk ditudjukan kearah pembentukan moril nasional jang 
tinggi dengan semangat melawan jang berkobar-kobar.”
113 “Suatu Konsepsi Pembinaan Wilajah Sehubungan dengan Perang Wilajah dalam rangka 
Pertahanan Nasional” in Territorial, year 1, no. 2, January 1962, p. 4-27.
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American Influence and its Counter-Balance 
The new generation that obtained foreign military education learned both 
the territorial doctrine and the technical capabilities that would result in a 
further bifurcation of military elites. Before 1958, some 250 Indonesian 
officers had been trained in the United States. Another 500 officers were 
trained between 1958 and 1962. The spike between the years 1962 and 1964 
was significant with more than 3000 military officers going to the United 
States for further training. The total number of officers with American 
exposure was thus around 4000 persons, a very significant number of elites 
within the armed force.114
The vast majority of Indonesian military officers received their education 
at Fort Leavenworth, a staff and command school, which focused on 
developing military ideas and doctrines. Theories about counterinsurgency 
and the territorial doctrines were discussed and taught. Various social 
scientists, including those that had advocated the ideology of development 
had also taught at the school. The curriculum at Fort Leavenworth was 
replicated by the C-1 Course focus on a broad-based education, with 
emphasis on intellectual discussion, especially with American-trained social 
scientists, was, on the whole, similar to the Fort Leavenworth experience. 
American help occurred in the form of the Civic Action Programme, with 
its strong focus on territorial control and economic development.
By comparison, the military’s strike groups-like the Army General 
Reserve (Tjaduad, later Kostrad), Army Special Command (RPKAD, 
later Kopassus), the Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob), the Marines (KKO), 
the Flying Corps and the Special Air Force Group Airborne (Linud)-had 
a different educational experience in both the United States and East 
European countries. In the US, they learned technical skills in the latest 
counter-insurgent methods applied in the concurrent Vietnam War. The 
Indonesian military elite aimed to make the country’s strike units comparable 
to American ones, borrowing the American pentomic doctrine as a blueprint 
for Indonesia’s own strike force.115 On the senate committee, it was said that 
‘experts consider the Indonesian army as one of the most skilful in the world 
114 Peter Dale Scott, “Exporting military-economic development”, p. 236, Ruth McVey, “The 
Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: part II” in Indonesia, no. 13, 
April, 1972, p. 169.
115 Kostrad by 1965 was headed by then Brigadier-General Soeharto. 
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at small unit operations in swamps and jungles.’116 American assistance also 
came in the form of providing Indonesian strike units with some of the 
latest US military gadgets. This strike force elite grew to differentiate itself 
from the territorial elite, because it considered them slothful, corrupt, and 
wealthy because of their civilian assignments. At the same time, the territorial 
officers were jealous of the para-command units and their better equipment 
and greater prestige.117
It would be too hasty to conclude that the difference between these elites 
was in any way profound. Differences between the army, navy, air force and 
police had bigger consequences in the later New Order period. Ernst Utrecht 
interprets the relationship differently. He divides the elite as “Field Officers” 
and “Managers” and accordingly, their relationship was one of mutual 
symbolism instead of the antagonistic competition as implied by Mrazek. 
The managers provided the para-commanders with money to operate their 
units and also to indulge in the lifestyle of the elites.118 The expansion of 
‘experts’ developed along two general lines: a pinnacle position of professional 
scientists whose duty was to design the national policies and plans, and a 
middle position of managers whose duty was to run the government offices 
and state-owned factories.
The relationship between the Indonesian army, American-educated 
intellectuals and American counterparts has been a leitmotif of leftist Cold 
War literature on the CIA, perhaps most succinctly expressed in David 
Ransom’s paper which coined the term ‘Berkeley Mafia’, the name given to 
the economic technocracy that engineered much of New Order economic 
policies.119 Such analysis tends to overlook the weaknesses of the pro-American 
factions, especially American-educated economists and social scientists and, by 
1964, the despair of the State Department’s Indonesian planners, as Sukarno 
lurched toward intensifying the friendship with Maoist China.
One of the most important individuals in this relationship was Guy 
Pauker. He collaborated in writing a report funded by the Council on Foreign 
Relations published in 1959 under the authorship of Professor Fifield that saw 
the Indonesian army as ‘among the most capable leaders of Indonesia,’ whose 
116 Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian military, p. 83-84.
117 Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military, p. 46. 
118 Ernst Utrecht, “The Indonesian Army as an Instrument of Repression”, p. 61.
119 David Ransom, “The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre”.
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rare qualities cannot be overlooked.120 Pauker had first visited Indonesia in 
1954 as researcher within the Ford Foundation-MIT Modern Indonesia 
project. In 1958, he became RAND consultant paid for by the CIA. In 
1959, he took up residence as chairman of Berkeley University’s Department 
for South and Southeast Asian Studies. He entertained good relations not 
only with Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, but also with Widjojo Nitisastro and 
Mohammad Sadli in his Berkeley capacity. He also grew close to Nasution 
and the commander of Seskoad, Colonel Soewarto.121
Peter Dale Scott reasons that Pauker was central to the introduction of 
the military dual function and that he had persuaded Nasution to convince 
Sukarno to let the army participate in the government and economy. No 
doubt the ideas of military-development were, in part, inspired by American 
thinking, yet thoughts about the Dwi-Fungsi had been already part of 
Sukarno’s corporatist idea which was espoused much earlier. On 30 August 
1956, an ad hoc committee was created, headed by Col. Azis Saleh in order 
to study the ways in which the TNI could participate in the development 
of the state, in order to further the workability of the idea of military dual 
function.122 In 1958 Nasution set up a Committee on Army Doctrine, headed 
by Lieutenant-Colonel Suwarto and Colonel Mokoginta, which would result 
in the formation of the initial army doctrine of Territorial Warfare.123
The United States played a keyrole in the rise of Civic Action, especially 
in its 1960s form. In 1962, Pauker invited Soewarto to the RAND institute 
in order to inspect the way RAND organized the “academic resources of the 
country as consultants.” At the same time, the Ford Foundation provided 
a $2.5 million grant for training courses. David Ransom pointed out that 
Ford Foundation used their contacts in the FEUI to influence officers within 
the Seskoad. By 1962, University of Indonesia economists were regularly 
visiting the Seskoad where they taught the ‘economic aspects of defence’ and 
where they would discuss the national situation, sometimes way into the 
night.124 According to Pauker, after Suwarto’s visit to the RAND institute, he 
120 Peter Dale Scott, “Exporting military-economic development”, p. 219.
121 Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the overthrow of Sukarno. 1965-1967” in Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Summer, 1985), p. 247-248.
122 Duta Masyarakat, 30 August 1956.
123 Ulf Sundhaussen, Road to Power, p. 138.
124 David Ransom, “Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia” in Steve Weissman (ed.), The 
Trojan Horse. A Radical Look at Foreign Aid, (Palo Alto: Ramparts Press, 1975), p. 101-104.
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appointed four or five economists as the army’s high-level civilian advisers. 
According to Robert Shaplen; ‘The task of Suwarto and his staff… was to 
convince as many as possible of the Army’s 150 general officers and 400 
colonels that it was their responsibility to maintain the delicate balance 
between the representative democratic principle, which makes parties and 
policemen a ‘necessary evil’ in any polity, and the corporative principle which 
gives the Army the means to participate in the government without creating 
a military dictatorship.’125
No doubt the army had close affinity with the United States, but similar 
to the wider Indonesian elites, there was a degree of suspicion toward it. 
Nasution was always looking for potentially useful doctrines and curriculums 
of other nations. Although the Course C-1 used translated Ft. Leavenworth 
material, translation of Chinese and Yugoslavian material was used around 
the same time. The territorial doctrine was very much inspired by Mao Tse-
tung’s interview with Edgar Snow in Red Star Over China and the army’s 
experiences in the revolutionary war.126 According to Suwarto, the article 
“Territorial War: the new concept of resistance”, written by Yugoslavian 
general Dushan Kveder, was very influential, with an Indonesian translation 
available at the Seskoad since 1958, while the officers were also required to 
read Vladimir Dedijer’s “Tito speaks” and other translated Yugoslavian texts.127 
It was planned that by 1965, the army would use Indonesian doctrines for 
60% of its curriculum and in 1964, it was stipulated that all departments 
that focused on doctrinal research and development would be assigned an 
officer graduating from the Soviet Frunze academy as a counter-balance.128
Military Strike Force and the Shift in Military Doctrine (1962-1965)
During the Revolutionary War, the TNI had been involved in both guerilla 
and counterinsurgency tactics. This two-front approach was rare amongst 
other independent revolutions of the twentieth century. Guerilla warfare, 
with its unique command and control structure is inherently decentralized, 
125 Robert Shaplen, Time out of hand. Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia, (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1969), p. 146.
126 Guy Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, p. 8-9.
127 Guy Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, p. 34-37.
128 “Perkembangan dan Kegiatan Seskoad sedjak didirikan hingga sekarang” in Karya Wira 
Djati, p. 52-53.
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lessening the control of the centre, while counterinsurgency tends to increase 
the degree of control of the local military leaders at the expense of both 
local political leaders and the centre. The tendency on both accounts was to 
weaken the central command structure of the army and enhance control by 
regional and local army commanders.129
David Kilcullen has argued that the expanding political influence of 
the TNI during the period of 1945-1965 was the result of a continuous but 
uneven development and deployment of TNI’s insurgency/counterinsurgency 
measures.‘…(W)here COIN and insurgency are conducted at the same time 
or close to each other, political power will flow from central to regional and 
from civilian to military leaders.’130 But the control of local territories had 
its roots as far back as the Japanese occupation. 
Although the strike forces had existed much earlier, the early 1960s was 
a watershed in the Guided Democracy. The development of a military-wide 
strike force, the Tjaduad (tjadangan umum AD or army general reserve) 
in 1963,131 which functioned as an umbrella force composed of selected 
battalions of various strike groups. This was a culmination of the shift in 
military emphasis from territorial commands to strike groups. 
Moekmin Hidajat, writing after the fall of the Guided Democracy said 
‘without declaring the reasons, the (active and free foreign) policy is silently 
left behind. It is then replaced with the politics of confrontation and political 
axes. Not satisfied, they wanted the defence policy to follow suit with 
the confrontation policy. Without understanding the requirements, they 
forced a change to the defence policy so that it would be more ‘offensive-
revolutionary’, a term that is often times run more on the fighting spirit 
(semangat) than on facts. These opportunists were everywhere, even within 
the armed forces. This group is always searching for personal aggrandizement 
by proclaiming themselves to be the most revolutionary and discrediting the 
Territorial Doctrine as a worn concept, not revolutionary and that it should 
be replaced with something new.’132 
129 David Kilcullen, The political consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia, p. 6.
130 David Kilcullen, The political consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia, p. 27.
131 This was the embrio for the Kostrad, an important influential para-military unit during the 
New Order.
132 Hidajat Moekmin, “PKI versus Perang Wilajah. Penilaian Kembali suatu Doktrin” in 
Karya Wira Djati, Vol. 6, no. 21, 196, p. 13. “Tana menjebukan setjara djelas sebab2nja 
maka politik ini kemudian ditingalkan. Itupun setjara diam2 sadja. Selandjutnja diganti 
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The period after 1960 also saw developments of a specific military 
doctrine within the Seskoad that would result in the creation of the Tri Ubaya 
Cakti doctrine expounded in 1965. In April 1963, the Kostrad Seminar on 
Indonesian foreign policy was held at the Seskoad. This was followed by a 
seminar on internal and external affairs (1963-1964).133
In addition, the failure of the Depernas to create a workable national 
planning programme and the economic decline from 1962 curiously resulted 
in the abandonment of the earlier developmental programne. In early 1963, 
Sukarno seemed highly conciliatory with the United States and supportive of 
the economic reform programmes that were initiated by Soebandrio working 
within a professional economic committee with the assistance of World Bank 
and IMF economists. The implementation of the programme was politically 
untenable and Sukarno had by then started his foray into the country’s next 
‘international adventure’. Any pretense of concern about the viability of 
the Indonesian economy was put aside  as the Malaysian confrontation got 
underway in September 1963. 
Strike Force Units
The most important strike force of the army was the RPKAD or the army 
rapid force, created not by the central army command, but by the Siliwangi 
Division under Colonel Alex Kawilarang. On 16 April 1952, Kawilarang 
formally authorized the Kesko (Kesatuan Komando or Commando Unit) 
command. In early January the Kesko unit was transferred by central 
command to be positioned under the Army Chief of Staff. On 18 March, 
it was rechristened as KKAD (Korps Komando Angkatan Darat or Army 
Command Corps). On 25 July 1955, the KKAD was upgraded to RPKAD 
dengan Politik Konfrontasi dan Politik Poros. Tidak terbatas hanja sampai sekian mereka 
menghendaki agar djuga Politik Hankam disesuaikan dengan Politik Konfrontasi itu. Tanpa 
melihat persjaratan jang ada mereka menusahakan afar politik Hankam kita dibuat lebih 
“offensive-revolutioner, kata2 jang sudah terlalu sering hanja diisi dengan semangat daripada 
kenjataan. Golongan opportunis dengan “pamrihisme” meman ada dimana2, djuga dalam 
tubuh AD sendiri. Golongan inilah jan selalu berusaha mentjari “grandeur” pribadi dengan 
menepuk dada bahwa mereka jang paling revolusioner dan mentjap Konsep Perang Wilajah 
sebagai konsep jang using, jang tidak revolusioner dan harus diganti dengan Doktrin jang 
sama sekali baru.”
133 “Sedjarah Perkembangan Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat” in Karya Wira Djati, 
Vol. 9, no. 31, July 1969, p. 13.
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(Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat or Army Commando Force 
Regiments). After the success of ending the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in 
February 1958, educational aid for the army was offered by both the US 
and England, in an effort to mend the relationship.134
In 1960, a parachute instructor was sent for six months rigger training 
and Captain Benny Moerdani graduated from a 12-week special warfare 
officer’s course at Fort Bragg. The American model special forces were very 
different from what had been in existence in Indonesia. They were “self-
sustained units that performed unconventional tasks for long periods far 
behind enemy lines.” They were intended to win the hearts and minds of 
the people and included an interpreter and a medic to help the villagers. 
The training included four combat engineers to assist in demolition duties, 
two doctors, two social scientists and an economist. This unit was called the 
DPC (Detasemen Pasukan Chusus or Special Forces Detachement).135
The shift in assistance and funds towards the mobile forces represented a 
shift in the elite division from the territorial forces. Mrazek contends,“thus the 
development after 1958 and during the early sixties left its deep imprints in 
the structure and ideology of the Indonesian armed forces. While before 1958 
the mobile striking units represented only very small islands in the vast sea of 
the territorial army, during the early sixties they acquired in many aspects a 
decisive position in the Indonesian military establishment.”136 An important 
development that mirrored other areas of the military elite was the use of 
social scientists as a viable part of military mission. According to Kenneth 
Conboy, when the DPC’s infiltration unit arrived on the West Papuan coast, 
a sociologist member of the team was expected to make contact, befriend 
and study the local population and villages.137
With the change from the pro-Territorial General Nasution to the pro-
Mobile Force General Ahmad Yani as Sukarno’s Chief of Staff, the ideological 
shift toward an offensive military policy became more pronounced. Yani had 
received military training in Tokyo during the Japanese occupation. He was 
also among the first Indonesian officers to attend the Command and General 
Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1955. Before returning to Indonesia, 
134 Kenneth Conboy, Kopassus. Inside Indonesia’s special forces, (Jakarta: Equinox, 2003), p. 
13-27.
135 Kenneth Conboy, Koppasus. Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces, p. 86-87.
136 Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945-1965, p. 45.
137 Kenneth Conboy, Koppasus. Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces, p. 86-87.
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he took a two-month course on special warfare in England.138 Nasution 
appointed him as chief of operations and then as deputy of intelligence. 
Under him, American-trained officers were given the most influential 
positions within the staff and command. It was, of course an ironic situation, 
that at the time when Nasution lost his office, the Americans were fully 
backing his territorial doctrine because they believed that a military focus 
on population capture was much more in line with the idea of stamping 
out Communist influence.139 The aggressive doctrine espoused by the 
mobile force elite was a cause for concern, since it destabilized the domestic 
situation, something in which the Communists could find weaknesses to 
take advantage of.140
The rise of Ahmad Yani and his outward, aggressive stance was in line 
with Sukarno and his increasingly agitated policy toward the Dutch presence 
in West Papua. With massive Soviet help, the military, especially the navy 
and air force, was equipped with an impressive hardware, the likes of which 
were non-existent in any other Southeast Asian country. By 1962, the Soviet 
Union had provided hundreds of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery 
pieces and guided missiles, 170 jets and fighter bombers and many ships. 
Indonesia felt far more prepared to shift toward an offensive strategy against 
the Dutch, in comparison to the guerrilla warfare that was Indonesia’s only 
default strategy during the Revolutionary War.  
Tri Ubaya Cakti
The declaration of the Tri Ubaya Cakti (Three Sacred Pledges) doctrine 
was made during a military seminar held at the President’s request on 2 - 9 
April 1965 at the Seskoad in Bandung.  A total of 51 higher officer, 89 mid-
level officer and 32 civilian and military experts converged to discuss the 
military doctrine.141 The seminar was to discuss the three doctrines/issues: the 
military karya, the Indonesian revolutionary war and the development of the 
potential for the Indonesian revolution. These discussions envisioned a new 
government programme that would use the military in a creative-destructive 
138 Soehardiman, Kupersembahkan kepada pengadilan sejarah. Otobiografi Soehardiman, p. 210.
139 Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian military, p. 54-59 and 75-81.
140 Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian military, p. 42.
141 Hikajat Moekmin, “PKI versus perang wilajah. Penilaian kembali suatu Doktrin” in Karya 
Wira Djati, Vol. 11, no. .21, 1966, p. 7.
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(penjebolan-penciptaan) nation-building programme. The military was to 
harness a total participation by the people within a specifically offensive and 
defensive programme. Socially, culturally and economically, the entire society 
was to participate in the protection of the nation-state.
This active call for the state to destroy elements within and outside society 
was telling for subsequent state-society relations. Sukarno asked: ‘What is the 
goal of our revolution, and what is the work that we want the revolution to 
accomplish? To destroy. Our revolution is to destroy and to plant. Now, if we 
think deeply, what is it that we must destroy? What we have to destroy and 
destroy right now is imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, capitalism, 
all of which has been written in the preamble to our constitution.’142 Such 
theoretical enemies were fleshed out as had been discussed in a previous 
Seskoad seminar. Discussion on territorial management as early as 1962 
pointed out the enemies of the state.143 Ideologically, these were individualism 
and liberalism, international communism, religious fanaticism, atheism, 
isolationism, autarchy and chauvinism. Politically, they were imperialism and 
colonialism, federalism and separatism, dictators, tribalism and regionalism. 
Socio-economically, they were capitalism, feudalism, cosmopolitanism, 
negative foreign culture, reformism, conservatism, cynicism and apathy.144
The state, through its military coercion, was to root out the infiltration 
of foreign ideas in the minds of its populace. In order to achieve this, 
indoctrination programmes were devised to reach various sections of the 
people. Thus, the ‘educated section’ of the population was to be indoctrinated 
in an objective-business-like (zakelijk-objektief) manner through rational 
persuasions. The general public was to be seduced by material incentives 
through provisioning primary needs. The orthodox groups were to be given 
142 “Apa tudjuan revolusi kita, dan jang kita kerdajakan dengan revolusi kita itu apa? 
Menggempur. Revolusi kita itu mendjebol kataku, dan menanam. Nah, kalo kita fikir 
benar2, revolusi adalah mendjebol; apa jang harus kita djebol, dan apa jang sedang 
kita djebol. Jang harus kita djebol dan jang sekarang kita djebol jaitu imperialisme dan 
kolonialisme, neokolonialisme dan kapitalisme, sebagaimana jang tertulis dalam kalimat 
jang pertama daripada preambul.” In Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI “Tri Ubaya Cakti”. Buku 
Induk, (LP IKIP, Malang, 1965), p. 20. 
143 Whose focus was to discuss and create regional operational, logistical and management 
patterns, but which eventually discussed a much wider and intrusive population control 
at the individual level. The rise of the New Order Man must be attributed to the ideas 
discussed within these seminars. 
144 “Seminar Seskoad Kedua, 3-8 Januari 1962” in Karja Wira Djati, Vol. 2, No. 8, 1962, p. 
70-71.
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informative seminars that would broaden their horizons and the separatists 
would be corrected through political incentives. The major enemies of the 
state was thus defined as its own population: the educated person and his 
‘liberal and capitalist’ tendency, the general public and its ‘communistic 
ideas’, the orthodox group and its Islamic fanaticism and the separatists 
and their wayward ideas of nationhood.145 This total doctrine formulated 
during the early Guided Democracy focused much of the energy on 
internal possibilities. It saw the possibility of only one type of individual: 
the nationalist, whose definition seems to be much more related to what it 
was not rather than what it was. 
Many of the ideas espoused in the doctrine were developed in the annual 
seminars held by the Seskoad. The idea of Total People’s Defence146 had been 
discussed in earlier seminars at the Seskoad and this envisioned a three-
pronged approach toward defence: a conventional force consisting of the 
military, a non-conventional force consisting of a Civil Defence (Pertahanan 
Sipil or Hansip), and a People’s Resistance Force (Perlawanan Rakjat). The 
Civil Defence would be organizationally under the head of the state to ensure 
unity of command.147 The roots of this strategy were derived from the total 
warfare doctrine that the Japanese had introduced to Indonesian youth by 
the formation of military units (daidans) through community organizations 
(tonarigumi).148
Yet, the Revolusi component of the doctrine represented a change from 
earlier ideas. It was a change from internal to external enemies. This shift 
was possible on condition that Sukarno’s control of the army was total and 
this was only possible after Nasution had been neutralized and Ahmad Yani 
put in his place. Sukarno’s speech during the seminar provided a glimpse 
into the difference. Sukarno said “… during our time, our Revolution was 
side-tracked. Our army also followed with a side-tracked defence policy. It 
side-tracked from the revolution. Our defence policy was force-fed by the 
Neo-colonialist powers. Several of our officers who have obtained foreign 
education... were taught on defence strategies, large and small tactics all of 
which aimed to convince us that ‘the possible enemy will come from the 
145 “Seminar Seskoad Kedua, 3-8 Januari 1962” in Karja Wira Djati, Vol. 2, No. 8, 1962, p. 
70-71.
146 Pertahanan Rakjat Semesta
147 “Pertahanan Rakjat” in Karja Wira Djati, Year III, Vol. 1, July 1963.
148 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, (Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia: Jakarta,), p. 22.
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North.’ We have been ‘forced fed’ those words. Thus, it was taught to us that 
if we want to defend the country, we have to face the north, not the south, 
west or east.”149 The North here was, of course, communist Russia or China. 
But Sukarno insisted that the enemy was the West, the Neo-colonialist powers 
headed by the United States of America. 
This ‘Rediscovery of the Revolution’ was a realignment of Indonesian 
international interests, with Indonesia’s confirmation of its position within 
the non-aligned Third Power Bloc, the Newly Emerging Forces. The military 
played an important part. Sukarno continued: ‘So the military, that word 
is closely inherent, very much inherent with the idea of the enemy. What 
is the purpose of war? It isn’t purely for self-defence. The purpose of war 
is to destroy the enemy; no one conducts war without having this purpose 
to destroy, to defeat the enemy.’150 The doctrine was in line with Sukarno’s 
increasingly erratic view of the world (the Nefo and Oldefo classification) 
and Indonesia as a beacon of revolution. 
This doctrine was significantly revamped after the fall of Sukarno in 1965. 
In the Second Army Seminar held on 25 - 31 August 1966, the belligerent 
tone had disappeared. Instead of a revolutionary army, the army was depicted 
as a modern one; an organization with expert men and their expertise. Thus, 
the values of military leadership were still extolled, with its leadership ideals 
based on almost feudal characteristics side-by-side with modern managerial 
149 “Pada waktu kita, revolusi kita menjeleweng, Angkatan Bersendjata kitapun ikut2 didalam 
ia punja defence policy menjeleweng, njeleweng daripada revolusi itu. Defence policynja 
pada waktu itu, kita “ditjekokkin”, djustru oleh fihak Nekolim. Beberapa hal jang salah 
misalnja saja kenal beberapa Opsir, Perwira, dapat didikan dari Luar Negeri, eh, Parman 
djuga manggut2, didikan dari luar negeri, disitu diadjarkan, hal2 jang mengenai defence 
strategy, taktik besar, taktik ketjil, pada dasarnja jalah, diadjarkan  kepada kita itu “the 
possible enemy will come from the North”. Kita ‘ditjekokkin’ begitu “the possible enemy will 
come from the North. Malahan segala susunan defence policy itu didasarkan atas itu. “The 
enemy is the North, the possible attack of the enemy will come from the North”.  Djadi, 
diadjarkan kepada kita, kalau kau mau defence, menghadaplah keutara, djangan ngadap 
kidul, ngadap ngulon, ngadap ngetan, menghadaplah keutara.” In Doktrin Perdjuangan 
TNI “Tri Ubaya Cakti”. Buku Induk, (Malang: LP IKIP, 1965), p. 21.
150 “Djadi Angkatan Bersendjata, perkataan itu adalah closely inhaerent, inhaerent serapat2nja 
dengan musuh. Malahan “doel” dari perang jaitu apa? Bukan sadja mempertahankan diri 
sendiri. “Doel” daripada perangnja itu, mengalahkan musuh; tidak ada orang mengadakan 
perang, kalau tidak dengan maksud untuk menghantjurkan, mengalahkan musuh.” In 
Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI “Tri Ubaya Cakti”. Buku Induk, p. 20.
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leadership ideals.151 Most important was how un-revolutionary the character 
of the new regime was. ‘The New Order wants a more realistic and pragmatic 
order, although it does not leave behind the idealism of struggle.’152
Mass Control and Job Expansion
The discussion of the definition of state-enemy in the Seskoad above 
has already identified the elements that the military wished to control: 
communists, separatists, federalists, atheists, religious extremists, imperialists, 
isolationists, liberals and even cynics. What this meant was that the enemy 
existed both outside and within the Indonesian society itself. In accordance 
with the rule book of the Cold War, the government was fighting against 
ideas and ideologies as well as armed militias and other radicals. The fight 
was to have a variety of psychological, ideological and military dimensions. 
There were two major approaches that the military took in regard to State 
enemies. The first one was deployment of conventional strike forces against 
separatists, imperialists and, later on, communists and leftists through the use 
of military violence. The second was the so-called Military Karya programme.
Nasution initially introduced the Karya programme in order to allow the 
military access to positions and influence in the various sectors of civilian 
life that had been off limits before the programme’s formal inauguration at 
the end of the 1950s. Another significant reason behind the programme 
was mass population control, especially against communist influence in the 
rural areas. The PKI, with good reasons, wanted the army to abandon the 
territorial doctrine, which the karya programme was partially based upon. 
Communist support for the Tri Ubaya Cakti doctrine and its legitimating of 
foreign adventures provided relief to the harassment that was inflicted by the 
army during the late Guided Democratic period.153 Karya were functional 
151 Thus, the panutan characters discussed earlier and within the Javanese proverbs: Ing Ngarsa 
Sung Tuladha, Hing Madya Mangun Karsa and Tut Wuri Handayani, extolling the virtues 
of leadership within the common people, but also more modern ideals of efficiency, 
transparency, humbleness and planning capabilities. See Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI-AD. 
“Tri Ubaya Cakti”. Buku Induk, p. 38.
152 “Orde Baru menginginisuatu tata-fikir jang lebih realistis dan pragmatis, walaupun tidak 
meninggalkan idealisme perdjuangan.” Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI-AD. “Tri Ubaya Cakti”. 
Buku Induk (Jakarta: Skodik Wala dan Pawamil ABRI, 1968), p. 9.
153 Aidit in his many speeches to military personnel in the various officer schools repeatedly 
stressed the need to abandon the territorial doctrine. Hidajat Moekmin, “PKI versus 
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groups based on a professional definition of community participation in 
the nation. They included, among others, farmers, intellectuals, artists, 
journalists and so forth. These groups were to have representational seats 
in important Guided Democracy bodies such as Parliament, Depernas, the 
National Council, etc. 
By the early 1960s, several ideologies had been effectively banned in 
national politics. Liberalism, with its perceived supporters epitomized by the 
PSI, was banned. Nasution had by the late 1950s begun in earnest to control 
civil society through the formation of various BKS.154 The BKS mirrored 
party-based onderbouw organizations, the largest of which were usually 
communist organizations. The move to integrate civil society organization 
was first begun with the veterans through the formation of the LVRI155, as a 
new veteran’s organization that would replace all other veteran organizations, 
some of the largest of which were the Perbepsi associated with the PKI and 
the Bekas Pedjuang Islam Bersendjata associated with Masjumi. The extensive 
opposition to this military move made them change tactics with the BKS. 
The first BKS was the BKSPM,156 an organization that employed preman 
youths with a thuggish reputation. As Loren Ryter has shown, the BKSPM 
was the nucleus for the later powerful Pemuda Pancasila group of the New 
Order and played an important part in the early years of the regime, including 
during the 1965-66 Communist massacres.157 Relations between BKSPM 
and the military were similar to the relation between pamongpradja and the 
jago elements of the colonial period.158
Job expansion for army personnel occurred at a variety of levels. At the 
highest levels were those military officers who were asked to sit in Parliament 
or to head various ministries, departments, provinces and other high-level 
administrative posts. For instance, the expansion of the military territorial 
PerangWilajah. Penilaiankembalisuatudoktrin” in Karya Wira Djati, Vol. 6, no. 21, 1966, 
p. 18-23.
154 Badan Kerdjasama Militer or Military Cooperation Bodies
155 Legiun Veteran Republik Indonesia or Veteran’s Legion of the Republic of Indonesia
156 Badan Kerdjasama Pemuda Militer or the Cooperation Body between Youth and Military
157 Loren Ryter, Youth, Gangs and the State in Indonesia, p. 36 and 82. Many of those in the 
gangs of the New Order were sons of bureaucrats and army officers, indicating the tight 
connections that the elites had to various sectors of Indonesian society. 
158 Yong Mun Cheong, “The Indonesian Army and Functional Groups, 1957-1959” in Journal 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 7, Issue 1, March, 1976, p. 92-101.
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district159 during Guided Democracy was significant: from 7 to 16 districts.160 
The root of this job expansion was the willingness of the army under Nasution 
in 1958 to avert a military dictatorship and in turn implement a Middle Way. 
This concept as planned between Sukarno, the cabinet, and the Armed Forces 
leaders would give wide opportunities to military officers on an individual 
basis but as exponents of the military, “to participate in non-military fields 
and in determining national policies of the highest levels including such 
fields as state finance, economy, and so on.”161
The take-over of formerly Dutch-owned businesses resulted in a sudden 
expansion of managerial posts for which Indonesia had a hard time to find 
replacement. Nationalization was only achieved after Parliament passed a law 
authorizing a change of legal ownership of the Dutch companies.162 By June 
1960, 489 Dutch-owned companies had been nationalized. The majority of 
them were in manufacturing and mining (161 companies), estate agriculture 
(216 companies) and trading (40 companies). They ranged from relatively 
small bakeries to large multinationals such as the Big Five.163 In 1960, there 
were still around 100 Dutch-owned companies, which had not yet been 
nationalized.164 
The famous Parliamentary Decree no. II/MPRS/1960 is an important 
document for it legalized army participation and proposed a fundamentally 
different economic framework for the country. On A/III/402/5, it stated 
that ‘the Indonesian Armed Forces and the State Police shall participate in 
the process of production without diminishing their main respective tasks.’ 
On A/III/69/415, it stated that ‘the role and activities of the Armed Forces 
in the field of production brings them closer to the People more intensively 
in the process of State Development especially in matters of industrialization 
and the carrying out of land reform.’165
159 Komando District Militer or Kodam
160 Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, p. 125.
161 Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, p. 126.
162 Thomas Lindblad, Bridges to new business. The economic decolonization of Indonesia, (Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 2008), p. 194-203
163 Borsumij, Jacobson van den Berg, Internatio, Lindeteves and Geo Wehry.
164 Kumpulan ketentuan-ketentuan dan pengumuman-pengumuman BANAS, (Jakarta: Badan 
Nasionalisasi, 1961), p. 348.
165 Peraturan Pemerintah no.16 tentang permintaan dan pelaksanaan bantuan militer.
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According to Panglaykim, there were at least six informal groups that 
made up Indonesia’s state company managerial class. ‘i. Lower managers 
who became middle managers and were recruited from the personnel of the 
ex-Dutch firms – this group has a lot of practical experience; ii. Employees 
who were given special on-the-job training by the ex-Dutch firms in the 
framework of their Indonesianization; iii. Officers of the army and other 
military forces who were also given managerial position; iv. Political 
appointees recruited from private companies and the civil service; v. Managers 
recruited from people who had business themselves before coming into the 
state trading corporations, and civil servants who were already at the stage of 
retirement; vi. Young men who had just been awarded a university degree and 
who joined the state trading companies.’166 Many of the military men had 
some measure of education. The army officer corps represented an especially 
highly educated elite group, 71% with higher education, with some attending 
management courses in the United States.167
Military expansion was also obviously occurring within the civilian 
administration. As part of the karya group, the military were reserved 35 seats 
as military deputies in Parliament. In practically all newly created institutions 
of the Guided Democracy, the military were to play a role and get prominent 
seats. Military members were appointed as governors and other executive civil 
service positions. In fact, there were more military members in important 
civil government posts during the last years of the Guided Democracy than 
in the early years of the New Order.168
The territorial affairs department of the general staff had been developing 
the regional authority of the military since proclamation of martial law in 
1957 in a structure commonly known as the Tjatur Tunggal.169 At the first 
regional (provincial) level, in martial law the role of the army was supreme 
within a governmental structure that incorporated other civilian authorities. 
Tjatur Tunggal structured regional government in a hierarchy placing the 
166 Panglaykim, State Trading Corporations in Indonesia. First Year’s Performance, 1961, (Jakarta: 
Jajasan Badan Penerbit FEUI, 1965), p. 7-8.
167 O.G. Roeder, Who’s who in Indonesia, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1980), p. 460
168 In September 1962, officers of the karya operation attended the Graduate School of Business 
Administration at Harvard University, among others. Laporan tahunan 1963 Staf Angkatan 
Bersendjata, Direktorat Keamanan Dalam Negeri, Territorial dan Perlawanan Rakjat, (Jakarta 
: Direktorat Keamanan Dalam Negeri,Territorial dan Perlawanan Rakjat, 1964), p. 11-12.
169 Translated as Four in One from Javanese, providing a picture for the structure of regional 
governments. 
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territorial military commander in charge of a committee that had as members 
the civil governor, the chief of police and the district attorney. If martial 
law were lifted, the civilian governor would replace him as chairman of the 
committee. When martial law was finally lifted in 1963, the military regional 
structure of Tjatur Tunggal remained effectively in place
The expansion of the army in the administrative and economic life of 
the nation resulted in deep centrifugal forces for the military. Obtaining 
managerial and administrative posts, these untrained army men were 
sometimes outwitted and used by more clever elements within the company, 
government or society. Cases where military administrators or managers 
were solely blamed for a fiasco or corruption began to mount. The territorial 
commanders of the army also had very different opinion in comparison to 
those of the mobile forces commanders about Sukarno’s belligerent foreign 
policy. This was most succinctly demonstrated in the less than enthusiastic 
attitude shown by Nasution and many others in the unpublicized opposition 
they had mounted to both the West Irian campaign and Malaysian 
Confrontation. 
Seskoad further developed the territorial doctrine under the order of 
General Nasution. In 1958, Colonel Soewarto, Assistant Commander of the 
Seskoad was ordered to conduct a series of meetings to discuss the meaning 
of the territorial doctrine. This was a precursor to the formation of the Civic 
Action programme, but an equally important component of the doctrine 
was the extension of army-based civilian groups that acted to counterweight 
society-based organization of political parties, in particular that of the 
Communists. Onderbouw organizations are extensions of political parties 
and have been a feature of Indonesian political life since the revolutionary 
war and perhaps even during the colonial period. The Pamongpradja used 
proxy groups during the pre-colonial and colonial period in order to extend 
the power of a particular elite group for things outside the state’s legal 
boundaries.170
Prior to Sukarno’s visit to Washington in April 1961, General Edward 
Lansdale proposed a Civic Action Programme for Indonesia by involving 
the Indonesian army in rural reconstruction and development projects.171 
According to Bunnell, the Chief of Staff approached US officers in Jakarta in 
170 Sutherland, The making of a bureaucratic elite, p. 26.
171 Brad Simpson, Economists with guns, p. 48. 
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July 1962 for American assistance in Civic Action programmes as one of the 
TNI’s post-West Irian military strategies.172 In 1963, the Americans started 
implementing the Civic Action programme as part of the US assistance 
programme, along with five other Asia-Pacific countries. 
President Kennedy offered the MAP agreement during President 
Sukarno’s visit to Washington in 1961. In the spring of 1962, Army Chief 
of Staff General Maxwell Taylor visited Indonesia and concluded a Civic 
Action agreement at the Indonesian Army headquarters. Near the end of the 
year, an Inter-Agency Civic Action Advisory Team arrived in Indonesia and 
established the office of Special Assistant for Civic Action at the US embassy 
in Jakarta. Colonel George Benson, former military attaché to Indonesia and 
close friend to many top Indonesian military elite became its first Special 
Assistant.173 By early 1963, American bulldozers, road scrapers and power 
hammers were arriving in Indonesia. Fifty US officers from Fort Belvoir civic 
training action centre, Virginia, were expected to train Indonesian army 
engineers on the use of the machinery. A group of Indonesian officers was also 
sent to army engineering training centres at Fort Belvoir and Fort Leonard 
Wood, Missouri. General Ahmad Yani officially opened the civic action 
course in late 1963. Civic action centres were being opened up throughout 
the archipelago for the purpose of training those in the ‘development’ brigade. 
The programme was conceived as counterinsurgency training and the plan 
was to equip 35-40 infantry battalions and 13 engineering battalions.174 
Whether the roots of the Civic Action lay in the United States or was 
an indigenous development of Indonesia is difficult to determine. Looking 
at the roots of Nasution’s guerrilla doctrine, public goods provision was 
already considered an important component of guerrilla warfare during 
the revolutionary period. Under the commander of the Siliwangi Division’s 
General Kosasih and then continued by General Ibrahim Adjie,175 the 
Bhakti Operation was launched specifically to implement the Civic Action 
172 Frederick Bunnell, The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963, (PhD Dissertation 
Cornell University, Ithaca, 1969), p. 147 and Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the 
Indonesian Military, p. 78.
173 Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military, p. 77 and Brian Evans III, 
“The Influence of the United States Army on the Development of the Indonesian Army, 
1954-1964” in Indonesia, Vol. 47, April 1989, p. 25-48.
174 Frederick Bunnell, The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963, p. 148.
175 A. H. Nasution, Memenuhi panggilan tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan masa Orde Lama, p. 182. 
108 CHAPTER II
programme within former DI areas in West Java. By 1962, the Civic Mission 
was absorbing 40% of the army’s manpower in rural development projects. 
The expansion of Civic Action and the implementation of the military’s 
Karya role, meant an expansion of military education in sectors previously 
limited to civilians.176 Some, like the formation of these Civic Action training 
centres above, were created specifically for military training in civilian fields. 
They focussed specifically on the development of the military’s engineering 
capabilities in building roads and other infrastructural projects similar to 
the American Military Engineering Corps. Special managerial courses for 
military students were held at various universities, including Administration 
Science at the Faculty of Social and Political Science Padjadaran University 
in Bandung. Padjadjaran social scientists regularly lectured at the Seskoad 
and army officers took BA courses there. Ahmad Yani said ‘we know for 
certain that the development of our country should be in the hands of the 
experts and those responsible. That would require technical education in all 
fields. Administrative science involving managerial know-how is one of the 
most important sciences, because administrative capabilities determine the 
smoothness of our efforts and increase efficiency.’177
Even when US aid to Indonesia was significantly reduced in 1964 and 
was said to be stopped in 1965, the amount of money going into the MAP 
was actually increasing. Between 1962 and 1965, $39.5 million of US 
aid was given to the MAP in comparison to the $ 28.3 million of US aid 
that been disbursed between 1949 and 1961. In fact, military aid for the 
Civic Action programme was increased in 1965, when many thought that 
176 For instance, the production of rice, in which the military increasingly played a part in the 
People’s Welfare Operation Command (KOGM-Komando Operasi Gerakan Makmur) 
created in 1959. The effort to achieve sustainability in rice production was thus created 
within military style organization or commandos, in which the military played an important 
part together with the agricultural ministry and the Depernas. The production of rice would 
be coordinated with the Food Source Board (Dewan Bahan Makanan) and the various 
Tjatur Tunggal at the Provincial level thus securing a truly state-controlled food production 
institution. The military is an essential component in this command structure.  
177 Ahmad Yani, TNI Membina Revolusi, p. 112. Yani in a speech entitled “Beladjar dengan 
tekun dan penuh kesadaran” at the Social and Political Faculty, Padjadjaran University. 
“Kita mengetahui dengan pasti bahwa pembangunan Negara kita ini hendaknjalah berada 
didalam tangan para achli dan jang bertanggung-djawab. Untuk itu diperlukan pendidikan 
kedjuruan dalam segala bidang. Kedjuruan administrasi jang meliputi managerial Know 
how adalah salah satu kedjuruan jang sangat penting, karena keberesan administrasi akan 
membantu melantjarkan setiap usaha kita dan meninggikan efficientie.”
The Military Expansion into the State 109
the United States had stopped all aid. As early as May 1965, US military 
suppliers were negotiating equipment sales to Indonesia. In July 1965, 
Rockwell-Standard delivered 200 light aircraft for the army as part of the 
Civic Mission programme.178
Suwarto in an article co-written with UI economist Kartomo 
Wirosuhardjo laid bare the importance of territorial development and the 
Civic Action programme. The rationale for Civic Action from a military 
standpoint was obviously security, yet the goal of the programme was in line 
with the Constitution: the creation of a peaceful, wealthy and just society. In 
order to reach that goal, the military would have to do its part in directing 
social change. Thus, Civic Action implied bringing about modernization by 
channeling villagers toward other modes of social, political and cultural being. 
‘By introducing the spirit of gotongroyong, which is one of the principles of 
Indonesian socialism, Civic Action would have already helped in moving 
Indonesian socialism forward.’179
This was the result of the changing attitude the army has toward security. 
According to Soewarto ‘in the Cold War there is no difference between peace 
and war,’180 implying the necessity of building a doctrine that functions both 
during wartime and peacetime. Like the BKS organizations, the purpose 
of Civic Action was in line with population control. In accordance to the 
Seskoad’s classification of potential enemies of the state, the uneducated 
and simple peasants were potentially attracted to Communist ideas. The 
army’s anti-Communist campaign was through material incentives; i.e. 
through a military sponsored economic development. Suwarto and Kartomo 
imagined a rural-based army by building military barracks throughout the 
rural heartlands.
178 Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno”, p. 239-264.
179 Suwarto and Kartomo Wirosuhardjo, “Bantuan Angkatan Perang dalam pembangunan 
suatu persiapan Pembinaan Wilajah” in Suwarto, Himpunan Karangan Letnan Djenderal 
Anumerta, (Jakarta: Karya Wira Jati, 1967), p. 57. “Jang terpenting ialah adanja kesadaran 
bahwa perbaikan desa mungkin ditjapai dan telah ditjapai dengan gotong royong. Dengan 
kembalinja semangat gotong rojong jang merupakan salah satu sendi dari Sosialisme 
Indonesia, civic action ikut membantu langsung pelaksanaanSosialisme Indonesia.”
180 Suwarto, “Tjeramah tentang perang wilajah” in Suwarto, Himpunan Karangan Letnan 
Djenderal Anumerta, (Jakarta: Karya Wira Jati, 1967), p. 25. The full sentence was: “Djadi 
oleh karena dalam cold war ini pada hakekatnja tidak ada perbedaan antara perang dan 
damai dikatakan bahwa war is never our goal.”
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For the army, the introduction of army personnel to manual work would 
provide them with capabilities that would help them in transitioning toward 
a future civilian life. Soewarto in an article in Karya Wira Djati commented 
that army personnel must learn to become community leaders; they must 
act in a kind way that would not alienate the villagers. It thus asked the 
individual soldier to develop his social skills.181
It was hoped that developing the rural areas would lessen the perceived 
jealousy of villagers towards the cities. The idea of a military with pretentions 
to pushing forth modernization and social change was very much related to 
the threat of Communism. In fact, the main security threat seen by the army 
was in the form of rural poverty. Development was an essential component 
for the protection of the national and urban elite from the threat of a 
Communist insurrection. Kartomo’s idea, which has been elaborated above, 
of a military-expert-businessman tripartite ruling class is a continuation of 
this idea. Thus, mass control was not merely being conceived through the 
lens of a projection of violent power, but also as a projection of modernity.182 
The employment of sociologists and economists within the para-commando 
and the rationale behind the Civic Action programme were part of the same 
counter insurgency idea. It was an effort to turn soldiers into social engineers.183
Conclusion
Expansion of military importance within the state can be gauged by the 
amount of money the government reserved for it. In 1950, the Indonesian 
military obtained one-third of the total government budget, a small amount 
in comparison to the two-thirds meted out by countries like India, the 
Philippines and Thailand at the time.184 By the time the West Irian campaign 
was under way, 75% of the budget had gone to the military.185 Added to the 
181 Suwarto, “Civic Action” in Karya Wira Djati, No. 8, Vol. 2, 1962.  
182 Michael E. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution, p. 123-124.
183 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-
1976, (Washington: Center of Military History, 2006), p. 225 and Suwarto and Kartomo, 
“Bantuan Angkatan Perang dalam pembangunan suatu persiapan Pembinaan Wilajah” in 
Suwarto, Himpunan karangan Letnan Djenderal Anumerta Suwarto (Bandung: Karya Wira 
Jati, 1967), p. 56-57.
184 Abdul Haris Nasution, Tjatatan Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia, (Jakarta: Pembimbing, 
1955) p. 337.
185 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Harris Nasution, p. 160
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large Soviet aid in military hardware, there was every reason for the military 
to support Sukarno’s foreign adventures. 
The relationship between social scientists, military officers and managers 
became stronger as the Guided Democracy proceeded. Military officers 
routinely undertook economic research, such as visiting Eastern European 
countries in order to find a better economic platform for the Guided 
Economy, and many like Nasution and Adjie published articles in professional 
managerial magazines during the period. It is also no coincidence that officers 
with managerial careers were those that supported the territorial doctrine. 
The territorial doctrine legitimated their participation in the management of 
Indonesian public office and its economy. As a result, both civilian experts 
and territorial officers had the same affinity being both managers. It was in 
this position that they both maintained a strong connection and, perhaps, 
even a feeling of esprit de corps.
Soehardiman credited Suharto’s success “especially to his capable 
managerial skills.”186 It tells a lot about his position as a military manager, 
but it also opens up the view of many from within the New Order: its success 
was the result of the application of the managerial ideology that had become 
available and was taught to many military officers during the period. The 
increasing relationship between the military with both social science and social 
scientist strengthened the view that this was not merely a momentary strategic 
decision but a basic strategy of the New Order state and the modernist view it 
has of itself; its rational and scientific foundation, its managerial capabilities. 
The Tri Ubaya Cakti doctrine was created to replace the territorial doctrine 
and support Sukarno’s offensive approach toward national defence. Although 
the doctrine was significantly reformulated in 1966, eliminating much of 
Sukarno’s adventurist spirit, including the Nefo-Oldefo analysis of geopolitics, 
the permanent revolutionary stance and the project of creating Indonesia as 
a lighthouse of the world and so forth was gone. 
186 Soehardiman, Kupersembahkan kepada Pengadilan Sejarah. Otobiografi Soehardiman, p. 223.

CHAPTER III
Expertise and National Planning 
When the Republic obtained its sovereignty in 1949, there was a consensus 
amongst the leadership that it was in dire need of expertise of various kinds. 
This chapter discusses two developments concerning the post-colonial 
production of expertise during the 1950s. First, the development of higher 
education in both quantitative and qualitative measurement; this includes 
the expansion of domestic tertiary education and the Americanization of the 
curriculum and study methods; and the introduction of the Guided Study 
method. Second, the development of the institution for national planning 
and economic development, which was the result of a new institutional 
relationship forged by Sumitro Djojohadikusumo with the UNTAA and 
American Aid in the form of an intellectual relationship with what was called 
the Charles River (Harvard-MIT) community of scholars. 
The developments above represented the defining characteristics in the 
changing elite culture of the 1950s. First, the decade was a period in which 
the effort to unshackle the colonial legacy occurred throughout various 
aspects of national life. One of the most famous was the nationalization of 
Dutch-owned enterprises and the effort to create a national economy. Yet, 
Indonesianization occurred in more than just the economy. It was prevalent 
in the education, legal and administrative systems, among others. Indonesia 
sought foreign expertise and consultants through the only available channel 
of the period: the international aid structure, which was dominated by the 
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United States of America. As a result, Indonesianization in many respects was 
practically similar to Americanization. 
Second, the development of institutions for national planning and 
economic development resulted in a new protocol of elite production 
that became cemented during the decade. The shift toward education as a 
determinant of elite status was a significant event, surpassing noble status as 
a class marker. A new elite emerged from a social and cultural shift brought 
about by the introduction of the fetish of efficiency and the lexicographic 
assault of English terminology to denote modernity: efficiency, planning, 
manager and management and so forth. Terms like experts and managers 
became markers of status. Scientific management promised the production 
of capable, efficient leadership and that image began to compete with the 
nationalists for elite status. The new elite protocol changed because there was 
no other model available. As such, the Guided Democracy state embraced this 
protocol and implemented an expansive effort to apply managerial efficiency. 
Expert Production
When the Dutch transferred sovereignty, the problem of expertise was 
already acknowledged as a significant problem. The number of Dutch experts 
went into a steep downward slide throughout the 1950s. If in 1950, there 
were more than 16,000 Dutch employees in leading positions, by 1951 the 
number had already dropped to 7,000 and by 1956, it had atrophied to 
just around 600.1 Difficulties at the office owing to unclear division of tasks 
and responsibilities, exacerbated by the rising cost of living, lack of security, 
bad housing and the disappearance of good schools for their children, 
determined the decision of many Dutch experts to repatriate.2 It was quickly 
appreciated that Indonesia needed to create just as many experts to replace 
the repatriating Dutch ones. 
The government’s effort to improve expertise amongst the civil service 
entailed two approaches: retaining or conscripting foreign employees and 
at the same time expanding education either in Indonesia or abroad for 
1 Hans Meier, Den Haag-Djakarta. De Nederlandse-Indonesische betrekkingen, 1950-1962, p. 176.
2 NA, The Hague, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Hoge Commissariaat Bandung, 
1950-1957, Inv. Nmr.: 556-566, Nota omtrent de ontwikkeling van zaken in Indonesie 
in zoverre de verhoudingen binnen de Nederlands-Indonesische Unie en de belangen van 
Nederland daarbij betrokken zijn.
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Indonesian employees. Dutch employees were preferred by Indonesia’s 
administrative elites to importing expertise from other countries for several 
reasons. First, they knew Indonesia far better than experts from other 
countries. Second, the Indonesian higher echelon civil servants knew Dutch 
and thus communication between Indonesian and Dutch experts would be 
less of a problem. Third, the abilities of the Dutch employees were not in 
doubt and, to some extent, were considered to be superior to other Western 
nations.3 Lastly, there were quite a number of new Dutch employees who 
were generally progressive.4Although initially uncertain of being incorporated 
into the social security system of the Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch 
employees of the Republic were assured by the Dutch government when it 
issued a regulation on 1 January 1950 on the payment of pension and other 
support for those that worked in the Indonesian government for a period of 
five year (until 27 December 1954).5
On the other hand, Indonesia was cranking up its production of experts 
by sending them abroad to foreign universities or expanding higher education 
for domestic production. In 1960, the Depernas has tried to get an overall 
picture of the number of experts available in the country by sending out a 
questionnaire to government departments and institutions. The outcome 
of this investigation was not accurate because some departments failed to 
provide information or provided incomplete ones, but the aggregate number 
gave an indication of the limited expert manpower available by the end of 
the decade. In all, there were 4453 Masters/Doctorandus degree, with 1659 
medical doctors, 803 legal specialists, 650 engineers, 219 social/political 
scientist and 200 economists. In addition to this, there were 2519 people with 
bachelor degrees (469 majoring in social/political science, 221 in economics 
major, 282 law and 198 in engineering).6
Related to this was a serious lack of executive managers for the state. A 
look into the statistics of 1941 reveals a ratio of three executives to five non-
3 With the exception of the Netherlands Military Mission, which was disparaged by T.B. 
Simatupang in an article published in a newspaper. ANRI, Jakarta, Delegasi Indonesia, Inv. 
nr. 1267.
4 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Indonesia Dipersimpangan Djalan, (Djakarta: Abadi, 1951), p. 
37-38.
5 Antara, 30 December 1952.
6 Rantjangan Dasar Undang-Undang Pembangunan Nasional Semesta Berentjana: 1961-1969, 
Buku ke III, Mental/Ruhani dan Penelitian, p. 1388-1389.
116 CHAPTER III
executives. Top-level executives were university graduates, while upper mid-
level executives were graduates of college level academies (HBS, Gymnasium, 
MOSVIA, Bestuursacademie, etc.). In comparison to this the 1961 data 
show that the executive and top executive level had shrunk to a minimal 3,5 
percent of the total civil service (E and F group). In order to return to 1941 
levels, the production of eight to ten thousand public administration experts 
would be required, something which the four universities teaching public 
administration were not equipped to handle, with their annual turnout of 










































Data and levels of employment of civil servants, Dutch East Indies, October 1940. 
Taken from Prajudi Atmosudirdjo, “Masalah Pendidikan Ilmu Administrasi pada 
Perguruan-perguruan Tinggi” in Lapuran Musjawarah Ilmu Administrasi Negara dan 
Niaga, (Lembaga Administrasi Negara: Jakarta, 1962)
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Data and levels of employment of civil servants, Indonesia, January 1961. The A-B 
represent workers, C-D represent supervisors, E represent executives and F represent 
top executives. The third bracket represented ratio, thus 5 executives for every 95 
non-executive civil servants. Taken from Prajudi Atmosudirdjo, “Masalah Pendidikan 
Ilmu Administrasi pada Perguruan-perguruan Tinggi” in Lapuran Musjawarah Ilmu 
Administrasi Negara dan Niaga, (Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1962)
7 Prajudi Atmosudirdjo, “Masalah Pendidikan Ilmu Administrasi pada Perguruan-perguruan 
Tinggi” in Lapuran Musjawarah Ilmu Administrasi Negara dan Niaga, (Jakarta: Lembaga 
Administrasi Negara, 1962), p. 32-34.
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PUTABA (Pusat Tenaga Bangsa Asing)
The Center for Foreign Employees8 or PUTABA was established in 1951 
at the Indonesian High Commission in The Hague. It was created after the 
overseas visit of a team in June headed by Prof. Gunarso of the engineering 
faculty in Bandung, Prof. Sukarja, a medical practitioner, and Masoro, head 
of the General Directorate of the Ministry of Personnel Affairs. They were 
sent on a reconnaissance mission to Europe to look into the possibilities of 
importing experts. The team’s itinerary included the Netherlands, Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland. The team did not go to England, instead focusing 
on ‘Germanic language’-speaking countries.9 
In 1950, the Commission that studied the matter of hiring foreign 
employees surveyed various ministries to determine the number of vacancies 
available. Poor coordination made it impossible to reach a specific number. 
Around 1700 to 2000 foreign experts were needed. Such a foreign employee 
on a temporary contract service would obtain all kinds of perks and benefits 
because of the high value attached to his work. He would be entitled to a 
free second-class ticket on a ship, a generous payment of baggage (uitrusting) 
money and he was allowed to send up to f. 5,000 a year to his home country 
and received a bonus of f. 5.940 after three years of work. The disparity of 
remuneration between a government and a private employee was very wide. 
An academic would obtain around Rp. 862 in Bandung or Rp. 918 in Jakarta, 
while a stenographer working for the private sector would collect Rp. 1000 
in 1952.10 Some Indonesian companies also obtained personnel from the 
colonial army as many former military opted for the private sector instead 
of returning to the Netherlands.11
This was an entirely new situation for the state. A foreigner would, first 
of all, have to fill in a huge, two-metre-long form deposited to the High 
Commission Office in The Hague. They had to have six to eight years of 
working experience and should be in the age bracket of 30-45.  Payments 
8 Pusat Tenaga Bangsa Asing 
9 The Ost-Asiatische Gesselschaft and the Institut fur Tropen Medizin in Hamburg received 
the visitors with some enthusiasm and a German-Indonesian Association was created but 
not much seemed to have come out of it. J. Krol, “Internationale Technische Hulp aan 
Indonesia” in Cultureel Nieuws uit Indonesia, no. II, August, 1951, p. 12.
10 Antara, 14 April 1952
11 Antara, 18 July 1952.
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would initially be in Indonesian rupiah. Unlike UN or US experts,  foreign 
workers would be integrated within the various ministries. They would thus 
be working under an Indonesian boss and with Indonesian colleagues and 
subordinates. 
By September 1951, only 100 people had been recruited for the three 
year contract, with another 200 under negotiation. Of the basic income, 
20% would be in the currency of the country of origin, departing from 
the original idea of paying the entire salary and bonus in rupiah. The 
government provided residences in the Kebajoran Baru district in Jakarta. 
In advertisements published in Austria, a very large salary totalling Rp. 
1810 a month was promised, in addition to a f. 13,000 bonus to be paid 
out in Austria after a three-year contract period. On August 21 1952, 17 
medical doctors from various European countries (including the Netherlands, 
Germany, Austria, Italy and Belgium) who had signed a three year work 
contract with the government arrived in Jakarta.12 They were among the 
416 people that the PUTABA successfully recruited in 1952, far less than 
the target of 1200 workers. Of these 416, 229 were Dutch, 111 German, 39 
Austrian and 18 Italians. 186 were doctors and pharmacists.13 For the year 
1952, the Government decided to allocate means to import 8.000 foreign 
workers, based on a coordinated tally with various ministries. This was an 
enlarged number compared to the quota of foreigners allowed to enter into 
the country by the pre-Federal government in 1949 (4.000 persons). It was 
also a much larger number than the previous year which involved 1700-2000 
foreign specialists. 
The quality of many applicants were dissapointing. Some of the Swiss 
youths sent to Indonesia had received only very basic training, which was 
not in line with the remunerations they obtained.14 According to Syafruddin 
Prawiranegara: the problem seems to have been less to get them to Indonesia 
than getting them out of Indonesia.15 In general, Indonesian efforts in 
obtaining foreign expertise to work directly and organically within the 
12 Antara, 21 August 1952.
13 Antara, 31 August 1953.
14 Rp. 1,500 with a 10,000 Swiss franc per year bonus
15 NA, The Hague, Hoge Commissariaat Indonesie, inv. nr. 442.
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national civil service was a failure. The PUTABA continued its work until the 
middle 1950s, but the number recruited lagged far behind what was needed.16
Post-Colonial Dutch Higher Education
Prior to the cessation of the relationship, the Netherlands provided a 
significant amount of schooling for Indonesian. In fact, in the year after 
the signing of the RTC conference, the Netherlands was practically the sole 
provider of foreign higher education to Indonesian youths.17 The list below 
shows the number of Indonesian students that had gone to study in the 
Netherlands during the 1950s. Relatively limited during the Revolutionary 
Period, the number climbed by the end of the 1940s and enjoyed a brief 
high between 1950-1953 before declining and ending by 1957. The number 
sent during this period was comparable to the total number of Indonesians 
studying in the Netherlands from 1924-1940 (344 Indonesians). Not 
included in this number were 360 Indonesian Chinese students.18
Basuki Gunawan’s study of Indonesian students in the Netherlands showed 
that the similarity in educational curriculum and methods, the use of the 
Dutch language and the prestige of going to the Netherlands to study was still 
a factor amongst early Indonesian students, but also that feelings of inferiority 
and the fear of not being able to find permanent government position at home 
were important considerations.19 The Malino scholarship announced after the 
Malino conference in 1946 allowed for continued Indonesian presence in the 
Dutch education system,20 at least until 1957 when a complete cessation of 
the relationship with the Netherlands came about. 
16 PUTABA managed to pay for Dutch professors to teach in Indonesia, which included K. 
Posthumus and J.A.L. Cuisiner to teach at Universitas Gadjah Mada, P.L. van den Velden, F. 
Weinreb and P.N. Drost to teach at Universitas Indonesia and C.G.G. van Herk to teach at 
Universitas Indonesia in Bogor in 1952. In Putusan2 Rapat ke-31 Kabinet Ali Sastroamidjojo 
tanggal 19 Djanuari 1954, ANRI, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, inv. nr. 9h 
17 Basuki Gunawan, Indonesische studenten in Nederland, (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1966), 
p. 31.
18 Thomas R. Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, p. 29.
19 Basuki Gunawan, Indonesische studenten in Nederland, p. 31. 
20 NA, The Hague, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Hoge Commissariaat Bandung, 1950-
1957, inv. nr. 514-523.
120 CHAPTER III

























Source: Basuki Gunawan, Indonesische Student in Nederland, p. 33. The number of 
Indonesian students coming to the Netherlands per year. 
Indonesian civil servants continued to be sent to the Netherlands in 
the earlier period. In February 1951, Sumitro sent eight employees of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry to New York and London.21 On 24 January 
1952, a large contingent of demobilized students left Indonesia for Holland 
on the passenger liner Oranje to pursue a university or high school education. 
The 16-member team was the third to have been sent to the Netherlands 
to obtain education in order to replace Dutch experts that were expected to 
leave the country soon. Fifty-three other Indonesian military-demobilized 
students were already in the Netherlands studying various sciences, including 
psychology, administration, aviation, cooperative farming and fisheries. At 
this time, there were no other countries where Indonesia sent its students.22 
Yet, unease about the steadily worsening Dutch-Indonesian relationship 
impacted the desirability of Dutch higher-learning. Of the 200 Indonesian 
students interviewed, 70% admitted their desire to study elsewhere.23
21 Antara, 24 February 1951.
22 Antara, 24 January 1952.
23 Basuki Gunawan, Indonesische student in Nederland, p. 31.Especially to the United States, 
England, Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Egypt.
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The government sent 284 Indonesians with civil service obligations 
(ikatan dinas) and 142 with foreign exchange to study in the Netherlands 
during the period 1950-1956. In total there were 426 studying in the 
Netherlands. In comparison, the amount of students that went to the United 
States from 1950 to 1962 was only 59 persons. In fact, the next largest 
country that the government sent students to was West Germany with 242 
persons.24 Although most Indonesian would be sent to the US than to any 
other country, from the perspective of the Indonesian government, the 
Netherlands and West Germany represented a more prospective place for 
study. This was in accordance with the initial policy of the PUTABA, which 
probably because of linguistic reasons prioritized ‘Germanic’ countries as a 
source of skilled workers.  
In the academic year 1952-1953, 1540 students from Indonesia went to 
study in Dutch universities and high schools, compared to the 8 Indonesian 
students who went to Paris, for instance. 188 of them were on civil scholarship 
and 187 on military scholarship. The rest were privately paid. Amongst 
civil servants, 9 came from the Ministry of Transportation, 21 from the 
Social Ministry, 11 from the Ministry of Finance, 5 from the Ministry of 
Information, 15 from the Ministry of Education and Culture, 2 from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, 6 from the Ministry of Health and 2 from the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. Post-colonial higher education for Indonesian 
students in the Netherlands experienced a significant shift. During the 1924-
1940 periods, the majority of Indonesian students studied at Leiden, especially 
its law school, while only a limited number went to the engineering school at 
Delft. In fact, out of a total of the 344 Indonesian who pursued Dutch higher 
education, 199 studied in Leiden versus 25 students in Delft.25
There were several reasons for the shift in educational emphasis. First, 
the majority of Indonesians that could afford to go to Dutch universities 
during the colonial period hailed from the traditional aristocracy whose main 
occupation was within the colonial bureaucracy. Since colonial bureaucracy 
focused on the application of Dutch laws, there was an emphasis on legal 
studies for aspiring bureaucrats. Second, many of those that went to the 
Netherlands in the 1950s were paid for by the government or by the Malino 
scholarship, thus they supplied the manpower needs of the state. Economic 
24 Bachtiar Rifai, Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi di Indonesia, 224-226.
25 Thomas R. Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, p. 29.
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deterioration and inflation meant that many, including the former aristocracy, 
had a diminished income that did not allow them to send their children 
abroad. The state and its access to state and foreign scholarship would 
determine those who would be able to obtain foreign education. 
The Universities


















Source: Antara, 22 August 1953
Expansion of Universities and Academies
Glassburner remarked that Indonesia “has probably accomplished more by 
way of eliminating her high-level manpower gap than she has in any other 
area of economic development policy.”26 In 1949/1950, there were only six 
higher learning institutions in Indonesia: Universitas Indonesia, Universitas 
Gadjah Mada, NIAS27 and STOVIT28 (which became Universitas Airlangga 
in 1954), Universitas Nasional and the Police Academy in Jakarta. The 
number of students totaled 3377 persons. By 1955, there was in total 27 
higher learning institutions with 18.122 students. By 1964/65 there were 
355 institution of higher learning with a total student body of 278.000 
people. In comparison, over 1939/1940 there had been 1.693 enrolled 
26 Bruce Glassburner, “High-level manpower for economic development: the Indonesian 
experience” in F. Harbison and C.A. Myers (eds.), Education, manpower and economic 
growth; strategies of human resource development, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), p. 201.
27 Nederlands Indische Artsen School
28 School tot Opleiding van Indischen Tandartsen
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students. Between 1950 and 1959, eight universities were founded. Based 
on the Law no. 22/1961 every province was to be furnished with one higher 
education institute, preferably a university and that the ratio between science 
and engineering faculties and social/behavioural science and humanities to 
be seven to three.29 As a result from 1960 to 1966, twenty-eight universities 
were founded throughout the archipelago.30
There were several ways in which universities were created; some started 
out as faculties of a university that was incorporated into a full-fledged 
university, others were created from scratch by either members or groups 
in the civil society or the government. A number of other state universities 
started as private universities that were later incorporated into a state 
university. These institutions were usually created by prominent regional 
and central civilian and military elites who were concerned about providing 
their areas with higher education, while at the same time elevating their 
status as founder of higher education institutes.31A larger number of private 
universities were not incorporated into state universities. For instance, the 
University of Res Publica (present day Trisakti) was created by the Chinese 
organization Baperki and was also highly influenced by the Communists.32 
By 1959, there were around 80 private universities/schools and as part of 
the enthusiasm of early Guided Democracy developmental push, they grew 
to 114 by 1961.33
Aside from universities, Ministries and private institutions created 
academies. By 1954, 15 academies had been created with a study curriculum 
ranging from two to five years. The Ministry of Education and Culture, 
Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry, Public Works and Defence each 
had an academy, while the Department of Agriculture had three and the 
Department of Communications had four. The total number of persons 
taught in ministerial academies in 1955 totaled 1128, with the largest 
studying in the 3-year course Academy of Military Law.
29 Bachtiar Rifai, Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi, p. 8.
30 Gerhard Junge, The Universities of Indonesia. History and Structure, (Bremen: Bremen 
Economic Research Society, 1973), p. 28.
31 Thomas R. Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, p. 145-154.
32 Thomas R. Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, p. 150-151.
33 Thomas R. Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, p. 87.
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Name of School Conducted by
No. of 
Students
1. Academy of Indonesian Art
2. Academy for the Foreign Service
3. Academy for Foreign Economic Relations
4. Academy of Forestry 
5. Academy of Agricultural Research
6. Governmental Sucrose College
7. Academy of Technical Education-Foundation
8. Higher Education for the PTT
9. School for Technical Experts for the Railways
10. Academy of Navigation
11. Academy of Commercial Navigation
12. Academy of Military Law
13. National Academy of Engineering
14. Indonesian Academy of Commerce
15. Academy of Economics
Ministry of Education and Culture





























Source: Development of Education in Indonesia, (Jakarta: Ministry of Education, 
Instruction and Culture, 1955), p. 13.
The total number of government employees undergoing education in 
1958 was 25,672. About 43% or 11,042 were student with civil service 
obligations (ikatan dinas). Of those 11,000 students, 1,427 were enrolled 
in a course of more than three years, 4,068 were in a 3-year course, 3,383 
were on a 2-year course, 2,115 on a 1-year course and only 49 people on 
a short course of six months. The largest group came from the Ministry 
of Agriculture (8,111), followed by the Ministry of Health (7,055), the 
Ministry of Education and Culture (2,351), the Ministry of Transportation 
(1,634) and the rest (6,521).34 This expansion of civil service obligations 
was in line with the massive expansion of government academies, but also 
with the expansion of government owned-universities. The expansion of the 
number of academies would reach a total of 128 academies by 1970, with 
the largest growth occurring between the years 1961-1970 (with 72 new 
academies opened).35
34 Kursus-kursus departemen dan djawatan, p. vii-viii.
35 Thomas R. Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, p. 131. 
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The government realized early on that the curriculum for educating 
civil servants through a four-year university course would not supply the 
current needs. The urgent demand for trained workers from the business 
world was not covered either. Efforts at hiring Dutch specialists from the 
Dutch-controlled Indonesian business world were unsuccessful. Many 
people entering business were former government civil servants of Dutch 
origin, whether in administration or technical services. Bringing them from 
the Netherlands was expensive and many of the prospective workers were 
not attracted unless they were given some guarantee of safety and financial 
security.
Indonesianization and Americanization
The development of new curriculums and modes of study was an essential 
component in the Indonesianization effort and was dependent on the 
presence of American faculty teachers within the university-to-university 
cooperation agreements. By the middle 1960s, the new Indonesian 
curriculum was based on an American foundation and would have left 
behind much of the Dutch system.36 We will look into the Kentucky 
University – Institute of Agriculture Bogor (IPB) cooperation to see how 
this shift from Dutch to American educational system occurred. It wasn’t 
purely the recreation of Indonesian universities into exact clones of American 
ones. “With Indonesian acuity, the staff at IPB was maintaining some of 
the system they had learned from the Dutch, studying systems elsewhere in 
Europe and Asia, refining their own expectations, and utilizing the innovative 
judgments of Ken-team colleagues. Out of all this it was finding identity as 
the Indonesian Agricultural University.”37 It was thus both a selective process 
of de-Europeanization, Indonesianization and Americanization.
36 Since the early 1950s, calls for changing the Dutch language toward English were heard from 
various educational organizations. ANRI, Jakarta, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, 
inv. nr. 1090.
37 Howard W. Beers, An American experience in Indonesia. The University of Kentucky Affiliation 
with the Agricultural University of Bogor, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1971), 
p. 109.
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University and Faculty Affiliation Financial Support 
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Source: Bruce Glassburner, “High level manpower for economic development: the 
Indonesian experience” in F. H. Harbison & C.A. Myers, Manpower and Education. 
Country Studies in Economic Development, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 186. 
Affiliation agreement in 1960.
On 30 January 1950, the government issued an emergency law on 
university education to replace the Ordinance of Staatsblad 1947 no. 47 
by the pre-Federal government. The formation of an Inter-University 
Committee signaled the end of the dualism that had existed between the 
Republican and Federal systems of higher education. Dutch domination of 
administrative functions was ended; the new president was an Indonesian, 
Soerachman Tjokroadisoerjo, who resigned in 1951 and was replaced by 
Prof. Soepomo. The process of reshuffling professors occurred during the 
course of the 1950s, where faculties that were politically important went 
into Indonesian hands, whereas Dutch professors were to teach courses in 
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specific technical fields that were non-political.38 Thus the faculty of law of 
all state-owned universities was for 80% Indonesian, whereas engineering 
had no Indonesian teachers.39 As explained by the chair of the Council of 
Curators, ‘It is a consequence of our freedom that we must push through 
this nationalization. This applies especially for courses are concerned with 
national administrative leadership.’40 Those who had taught in ‘politically 
sensitive’ subjects were offered to teach courses less sensitive, for instance, 
international law instead of Indonesian law.  
The government responded to the lack of lecturers in several ways. First, 
experts working in government services were required to allocate time for 
temporary teaching. A second effort was to import lecturers from abroad. 
A dozen Dutch professors were invited to teach at various universities for 
a period of 6 to 12 months. Throughout the 1950s, Indonesia imported 
a number of lecturers for the universities. In July 1957, there were 148 
permanent foreign lecturers, consisting of 85 professors and 63 assistant 
lecturers and 120 non-permanent lecturers. Indonesia imported 31 lecturers 
in 1955, 37 in 1956 and only 8 in 1957. Many of these were under the aid 
schemes of UNESCO, the Colombo Plan and the Ford Foundation.41 By the 
end of the 1950s, the expansion of Indonesian faculty members had resulted 
in a gradual but significant Indonesianization of the university system. For 
instance, at the Universitas Indonesia in 1951-1952, of 471 members, only 
190 or 40 percent of the faculty were native Indonesian, with the remaining 
241 or 60 percent consisting of non-native Indonesian, including around 
200 Dutch professors. By 1953, some 75 Dutch professors remained and by 
1956, there were perhaps only around 35 left.42 By 1962-1963, 99 percent of 
the 1,273 faculty members were Indonesian. Considering the fact that most 
38 The university presidents also held a meeting in April 1952 and decided that the Dutch 
language should be replaced as soon as possible with Indonesian. ANRI, Jakarta, Kabinet 
Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1950-1959, inv. nr. 1090.
39 Locomotief, 25 November 1950.
40 NA, The Hague, Hoge Commissariaat Bandung, Inv. Nmr. 514-523, Notities no. 18 over 
“concordant” onderwijs (A) cultuur en Indonesisch onderwijs (B). 
41 “Rapat kerdja menteri PP&K dengan seksi E DPR”, in Suara Guru, Vol. 7, No. 2, September 
1957, p. 4-5, ANRI, Jakarta, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, inv. nr. 529.
42 Bruce Lannes Smith, Indonesian-American Cooperation in Higher Education, (East Lansing: 
Institute of Research on Overseas Program, Michigan State University, 1960), p. 28. 
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professors in the early 1950s were still Dutch, the Indonesianization resulted 
in lowering the level of education of the teaching staffs.43
More importantly, Indonesian universities broadened the scope 
of possible co-operation. Instead of the usual sister-universities in the 
Netherlands, the post-war years provided access to other countries, especially 
the United States. In his acceptance speech as the new president of the UI in 
1951, Prof. Soepomo indicated that the post-colonial university functioned 
in a period rife with internationalism. Aside from receiving professors, 
Indonesian universities also regularly sent professors on short-term stints 
abroad. The UN and its panoply of new international organizations provided 
some relief for the provision of professors. Gadjah Mada in 1951 obtained 
two professors from the WHO and one from UNESCO, and in May of that 
year, Prof. Sardjito and Prof. Johannes attended UNESCO conferences.44
The education of civil servants, especially in the executive and 
administrative branches, was acknowledged by the Department of Interior 
early on, especially in connection with decentralization and regional 
autonomy. The Department focused on providing academic and semi-
academic education, providing more teaching opportunities at local 
universities. Prospective civil servants were screened at local and national 
levels and then admitted to the social, law and political faculty of UGM.45 
In 1952, UGM was the only university in the country to provide the kind 
of education required for executive and administrative civil servants. 
Aside from civil servants, the Ministry of Education and Culture also 
provided scholarships for up to 150 non-civil servants with an ikatan dinas. 
This required them to work for the government after they had finished their 
scholarship.46 The need to expand the education of civil servants paralleled 
the expansion of Gadjah Mada itself. In 1954, the university created a sister-
faculty in Surabaya’s new Airlangga University, focusing on law, economics 
and social and political science. Airlangga was developed out of the Medical 
Faculty and had once been part of the Universitas Indonesia. A Surabaya 
branch of Gadjah Mada law faculty was inaugurated on 9 April 1955, 
whereby lecturers from Gadjah Mada would be appointed as extraordinary 
43 Thomas R. Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, p. 49.
44 M. Sardjito, Laporan Tahunan Universitit Negeri Gadjah Mada, 19 Desember 1951, p. 6-10.
45 Education for the Ministry of Justice was also to be produced through UGM said Justice 
Minister Mr. Wongsonegoro, Harian Indonesia, 13 March 1951.
46 Antara, 14 August 1952.
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lecturers in Airlangga. Airlangga’s first president was A.G. Pringgodigdo who 
also hailed from Gadjah Mada.47
The Rise of the Guided Study 
The shift toward a new curriculum was part of what was then called the “total 
reorganization” that had affected old and new universities alike. Obviously, 
the old core universities- Universitas Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada and 
some of their earlier offshoots like Padjadjaran, Hasanuddin and Universitas 
Sumatra Utara-had difficulties in transitioning. Many of these universities 
still hosted Dutch professors and Dutch-educated teaching staffs. Although 
most Dutch professors were gone by 1957, the teaching staffs required a bit of 
cajoling in order for them to be truly comfortable with the new curriculum. 
The main reason for this change was not merely the need for Indonesia to 
break out of its colonial mold and take the reins in education. It was in fact a 
question of efficiency, or the extreme lack of it within the national education 
system.48 For starters, although the expansion of Indonesians studying in the 
national university system was amazingly fast, there was a lag on the number 
of graduates. Thus, on average only 20% of all the student body passed the 
yearly exams. Although the regular term for a Sardjana Muda (equivalent to 
a bachelor’s degree) was four years, many students overshot this considerably, 
getting their degree in their eighth or even tenth year. 
The reason for this inefficiency lay in the ‘liberal’ nature of the Dutch 
higher education system of the time. Gradually the term “Free Study” was 
used to contrast this with the American-inspired “Guided Study” system, 
a terminology that paid homage to the planning and efficiency idea that 
surrounded the rise of the Guided Democracy state. Within the European 
Free Study system, a graduated high school student had no requirement to 
pass an entrance exam in order to enter into a certain study department. The 
student had no obligation to attend lectures and would show up just for the 
exam, which was an oral exam. If the student failed, he could re-take the 
exam. In fact 60-70% of the students failed their first exam. Little guidance 
47 Thomas R. Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, p. 96-100.
48 It hadn’t merely to do with the curriculum. Problems persisted on the issue of funding 
and the bureaucratic relationship with the central government. Kesukaran-kesukaran pada 
Universitas Indonesia. ANRI. Jakarta, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia 1950-1959, 
inv. nr. 1217.
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or structure existed within this system. In addition, the lack of facilities, 
books and laboratories at Indonesia’s fledgling university system resulted in 
many drop-outs and demotivated students.49
The Guided Study method introduced the entrance exam. The student 
was required to attend mandatory courses and take written exams. The course 
system was to work within the semester system, introducing structure to the 
study lives of students. Oral exam was replaced with written exam and the 
method of rote memorization and professorial lectures were replaced with 
discussion groups. Study term was also expected to be finished within the 
required time-frame. Relationship between lecturers and students changed, 
at least between students and American professors and lecturers. 
The shift toward an American system was not accepted fully by the 
Indonesian staffs. There were those who had grown up within the Dutch 
system and were much more comfortable with it. An Indonesian teaching 
staff at IPB commented that “nearly all stressed too much the system with 
which they were familiar. This is natural because it is difficult to switch to 
another system with which one is not familiar. It was not so much that they 
were ‘pushing,’ but that they were used to their own system and naturally 
considered it better. In the early stages of the affiliation this was felt more 
than now because IPB participants after returning began to use more of 
the American system which they had learned, so prevalence [of the guided 
system] gradually grew.”50 In addition to this, it was felt that American 
methods were time and energy consuming and they also required additional 
equipment and materials that the staff neither had nor desired.
The International Aid Protocol 
President Harry S. Truman’s administration was pivotal in constructing the 
global governance structure, which was predicated on the effort to reduce the 
49 See Bruce Lannes Smith, Indonesian-American Cooperation in Higher Education, Thomas R. 
Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, Kenneth Lee Neff, Educational Planning 
in a National Development Context: Indonesia, a Case Study, Howard W. Beers, An American 
experience in Indonesia. The University of Kentucky Affiliation with the Agricultural University 
of Bogor, Bachtiar Rifai, Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi selama 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, 
among others.
50 Howard W. Beers, An American Experience in Indonesia. The Kentucky Affiliation with the 
Agricultural University at Bogor, p. 156.
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possibility for another conflagration, a systematic planning for peace.51Aside 
from the Keynesian Bretton Woods institutions of the IMF and the World 
Bank, the Marshall Plan and the Point Four Program, a technical assistance 
programme for ‘developing countries’, were created to reduce the possibility 
of Communist expansion.52 The focus on Asia, for instance, was mainly 
directed toward China and Japan. The ECA did provide technical assistance 
for smaller Asian countries (not including Indonesia), but these represented 
small technical aid projects, instead of comprehensive development packages. 
The Point Four Program, proclaimed in 1949, created a bureaucratic 
infrastructure for international technical assistance and focus on foreign 
direct investment under the assumption that economic expansion could 
forge peace and democracy.53
Technical assistance was a multilateral exercise involving a variety of 
nations with the United States taking over the reigns and initially providing 
some 60 percent of the total aid of the United Nations Technical Assistance 
Administration.54 Commonwealth countries within the Colombo Plan 
organization also provided help with an intention that mirrored American 
initiatives; it was an effort to reduce the appeal of Communism and redefine 
an asymmetrical relationship from a colonial one in which, as people within 
the dependency school would put it, the creation and management of the 
Third World was manifested.55At the other end of the spectrum, Soviet 
assistance, especially after the death of Stalin in 1953, shifted toward 
a less military approach and the adoption of a subtler attitude toward 
the underdeveloped parts of the world,56 Communism would also be 
promoted through the power of aid.57 This crusading zeal for modernity 
51 Robert A. Pollard, Economic security and the origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950, (Colombia 
University Press: New York, 1985), p. 10-32.
52 Robert A. Pollard, Economic security and the origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950, p. 133-167.
53 Robert A. Pollard, Economic security and the origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950, p. 205-209.
54 David Webster, “Development advisor in time of cold war and decolonization: the United 
Nations Technical Assistance Administration” in Journal of Global History, Vol. 6, Issue 2, 
July, 2011, p. 249-272. Aside from the UNTAA, there were also other forms of assistance 
organization; such as the WHO, FAO, UNESCO, ILO, ICAO. 
55 Arturo Escobar, “Power and visibility: Development and the invention and management 
of the Third World” in Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 3, No. 4, November, 1988, p. 428-443.
56 Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign aid as foreign policy. The Alliance for Progress in Latin America, 
(Hoboken: CRC Press, 2007), p. 14.
57 Orah Cooper and Carol Fogarty, “Soviet economy and military aid to the less developed 
countries. 1954-1978” in Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade, Vol. 21 Issue 1-3, 
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and modernization, often expressed through the images of industrialization, 
mega-infrastructure and the technological capability of humans to revamp 
whole landscapes, was a modern fetish reverenced everywhere in post-war 
society. Not only was industrialization and modernization pushed by the 
West, but also by the Communists.
This confluence of ideology and belief in the specific modernity brought 
about by the technical assistance experts and the development-minded 
politicians and leaders of newly independent nations were significant.58 
Soviet aid to Indonesia dwarfed that of the United States, yet no pro-Soviet 
economists ever came close to the control of Indonesia’s PSI-dominated 
intellectuals. Three-fourths of all delivered Soviet aid from 1954-1968 were 
in the form of military assistance and those experts that had been sent for 
industrialization purposes were, for the most part, engineers. In fact, most 
Soviet managers, as Indonesian economists would find out in their study 
of East European societies during the Guided Democracy, were engineers.59
These elite of engineers may not have been the gospel-like preachers 
of modernity that the social scientists of the West were. Many technical 
assistance experts had to sell the idea of state-sponsored development in the 
capitalist West, for most were not capitalists themselves in the traditional 
sense. David Webster grouped many of them as Fabian Socialists, a 
political terminology which according to Anne Booth equated well with 
Indonesian social democrats.60 Many of them saw planning as the holy 
grail of development. “Colombo Plan members approached planning with 
an attitude approaching ‘worship’”.61 As we will see, the 1950s’ Indonesian 
technical elite also shared the same political ideology; with most of them 
affected by Dutch social democracy, a political system that they themselves 
were exposed to during their sojourn in the Netherlands, by socialist ideas 
and, perhaps, even by Japanese fascist/corporatist notions. Benjamin 
Spring-Fall1985, p. 54-73.
58 Some of the experts send like Nathan Keyfitz and Douglas Deane were members of churches, 
indicating the presence of some proselytizing spirit in at least a minority of them.
59 Panglaykim and Hazil, Struktur Management dan Organisasi dalam beberapa Negara Sosialis, 
(Jakarta: Pembangunan, 1962), p. 16-18.
60 Anne Booth, “The colonial legacy and its impact on post-independence planning in India 
and Indonesia” in Itineratio, vol. 10, no. 1, 1986, p. 13.
61 David Webster, “Development advisor in time of cold war and decolonization: the United 
Nations Technical Assistance Administration” p. 258.
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Higgins, for instance, believed that public-owned companies could be an 
effective means to pushforth economic growth.62 This was a sentiment shared 
by many Indonesian experts, especially considering the utter lack of an 
entrepreneurial class during the early decades and the seeming impossibility 
to imagine a free market-based economy within the Indonesian society of 
the 1950s.63
On 4 December 1949, a UN resolution was passed on the composition 
of technical assistance; the deployment of a team of experts to assist countries 
as advisors, the training of experts of less developed countries abroad, 
the training of experts and auxiliary personnel within the country, the 
deployment of personnel and materials for specific projects and the exchange 
of information. In May 1950, a mission from the UN Secretariat visited 
Indonesia, along with agents from UNESCO, FAO and WHO. UNESCO 
would help Indonesia develop a people’s education and rural reconstruction. 
The WHO and UNICEF worked together with the Department of Health 
in various health initiatives.64
Development of Indonesian-American Aid Relations 
During the Revolutionary War, a group of Indonesian officials, comprising 
mostly PSI intellectuals, started to lobby the US government. Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo and Soedjatmoko were hosted by an American group 
concerned about the growing clout of Communism in Asia, and met with 
the established circle, especially members of the Council of Foreign Relations, 
62 Benjamin Higgins, “Thoughts and Action: Indonesian Economic Studies and Policies in 
the 1950s” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 26, no. 1, 1990, p. 37-47.
63 Benjamin Higgins, “Introduction” in Benjamin Higgins (ed.), Entrepreneurship and Labor 
Skills in Indonesian Economic Development: a Symposium, p. 22-28, He was rather optimistic 
about the rise of an entrepreneurial class. Everett Hawkins, in the meantime, was less 
so. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, despite the sheer magnitude of corruption, was pleased 
with the Benteng Programme, because even if many of the businessmen nurtured by the 
Indonesian government turned out to be fraudsters, the few that came genuinely out of the 
programme as ‘real entrepreneurs’ could be used as a nucleus for further development of a 
real Indonesian entrepreneurial class. In the end, Indonesia already had an entrepreneurial 
class; the Indonesian-Chinese, and it would be these people that would be nurtured as an 
entrepreneurial and industrial class during the New Order regime later on. 
64 J.R. Krol, “Internationale hulp aan Indonesia” in Cultureel Nieuws Indonesie, no. II, August, 
1951, p. 2-15.
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one of the most influential think tanks in the United States.65 It was Sumitro’s 
duty to drum up American support for the Indonesian-side during the 
Revolution. The fear of Communism had been hampering Indonesia’s effort 
to win America to its side.66 This was part of the charm offensive conducted 
by the Indonesian republic at Yogyakarta to reassure America that a post-
colonial Indonesia would not hastily nationalize Western companies and 
assets within the country.67
In a speech about the Point Four Program and Southeast Asia, Soedjatmoko 
reiterated the cautiousness of the Asian approach toward aid: “Why is it that 
no leaders in Southeast Asia immediately hailed this plan, as Marshall’s 
proposals had been immediately seized upon and embraced by the leaders of 
Europe?” The answer to this was that it came from the disillusionment of the 
elite with America’s dithering stand toward Asian independence movements, 
particularly “America’s failure to make a sufficiently early stand on the issues 
of colonialism” which “left very serious doubts in the minds of many Asians 
as to America’s true intentions.”68 Although there was no doubt about the 
support that technical assistance had from within the Indonesian intellectual 
class, suspicion remained in other parts of the Indonesian elites. The suspicion 
was rooted in, as Soedjatmoko has said, the failure of America to act quickly 
to support the Republic against Dutch aggression during the revolution, but 
also because many of the elites were leftists who harboured reservations against 
American control. The fall the Sukiman cabinet as a result of the signing 
of the Mutual Assistance Agreement with the United States illustrated this 
ambivalence toward the West.69
During the Second Dutch Military Aggression, Sumitro, who had 
become a permanent financial and trade representative to the United States 
and a member of the Indonesian delegation negotiating at the UN in New 
York, met with the acting US Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert A. Lovett 
on 20 December 1948. The Republican elites realized that the Netherlands 
65 David Ransom, “The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre”, p. 2.
66 Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, American Vision of the Netherlands East Indies/
Indonesia. US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920-1949, (Amsterdam University 
Press: Amsterdam, 2002), p. 209-214.
67 This also included the visit by Soedjatmoko to New York in support of the Marshall Plan. 
See: David Ransom, “Ford Country: building an elite for Indonesia”, p. 93-116. 
68 Soedjatmoko, “Point Four and Southeast Asia” in Indonesie, Vol. 4, 1950-1951, p. 3-4.
69 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 198-207.
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had difficulty in funding their operations without the help of the Marshall 
Plan. Lovett reassured him that while the Marshall Plan funds for the 
Netherlands would not be stopped, the money intended for Indonesia had 
been completely halted. Sumitro held news conferences to gauge the opinion 
of the American public and thus was cementing Indonesia’s first important 
post-independence relation with the US. His position on Indonesia’s 
economic diplomacy with the United States was stated clearly in his report 
to the Indonesian Foreign Minister H. Agus Salim, entitled Indonesian 
Economic Maneuvers in America.
Initial contact with America went strictly through US companies and 
these were mostly failures. In the various efforts to break through the Dutch 
blockade of the Republic during the Revolutionary War, shipping companies 
like Isbrandtsen and the Overseas Corporation tried to smuggle goods to 
Singapore. Dutch authorities confiscated the Isbrandtsen ship while the 
Overseas Corporation got away with the money, costing the Republic some 
$ 500,000 worth of rubber and quinine. In 1947, Sumitro, who at the time 
was the Republican Trade Representatives, along with Minister of Prosperity 
A.K. Gani, met with Matthew Fox, a well-known American businessman 
and vice president of Universal Pictures, to create the Indonesian-American 
Corporation.70 The contract, signed in Havana, Cuba, on 3 January 1949, 
allowed the corporation to be granted monopoly over rights of sales of some 
Indonesian commodities. This contract did not go through after the transfer 
of sovereignty. Homan indicated that as much as $ 550,000 might have been 
loaned to support the Indonesian delegation in New York.71
The American aid was institutionally realized through the Economic 
Cooperation Administration (ECA), an organization created to channel 
the Marshall Plan. In the early 50s, the plan was diverted to Asia as a result 
of the Korean War and the opening up of East Asia, including Southeast 
Asia, as an important military front against Communism. In June 1950, the 
70 According to Peter Dale Scott, there was a possibility that Matthew Fox was a front man 
for the CIA. Peter Dale Scott,“Exporting Military-Economic Development”, p. 213. This 
seems quite unlikely though, because the State Secretary was quite critical of its relationship 
with the Indonesian government.
71 Gerlof D. Homan, “American Business interests in the Indonesian Republic” in Indonesia, 
Vol. 35, April 1983, p. 125-132.
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Director of the Far East Division of the ECA, R. Allen Griffin,72 went on an 
Asian tour to recommend the scope and amount of aid for the countries/
colonies of Southeast Asia, including Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, Thailand 
and Indonesia. Indonesia was to obtain the second largest amount of ECA 
help (after Indo-China) in the recommendation totaling fourteen and a 
half million dollars. Griffin also recommended that 63 technical experts be 
sent to Indonesia.73 The amount that was finally given to Indonesia was 13 
million dollars in October 1951, which came from the leftover of unspent 
ECA money on the Republic of China.74 Aside from ECA aid, the US also 
provided 100 million dollars import credit from the Exim Bank in February 
1950 and a 5 million dollar military grant pertained to the signing of the 
Japanese Peace Treaty at the San Francisco Conference in 195175 which had 
resulted in the fall of the Sukiman Cabinet.
Aside from technical help, the Americans were also eager to provide 
institutional links to foster the Indonesian military toward anti-Communism. 
On 3 October 1950, a US mission headed by Mr. John F. Melby and 
Major General Graves B. Ernskine, arrived in Indonesia with the task of 
persuading the Indonesian government to accept arms free-of-charge from 
the US in return for participation in an American military aid programme. 
The mission was received by the President on the occasion of the armed 
forces day on 5 October and both gentlemen held talks with Prime Minister 
Muhammad Natsir, Foreign Minister Mohammad Roem, Vice Premier 
Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces 
General Simatupang. Indonesia obtained a 100 million dollar package of aid 
in goods.76 The military aid programme would allow for a certain degree of 
US control in the organization and training of the armed forces, something 
72 Griffin was an army intelligence veteran and later a trustee of the Asia Foundation, a CIA-funded 
organization. See Peter Dale Scott, “Exporting Military-Economic Development”, p. 212.
73 National Archives of Australia or NAA, Canberra, series no. A.1838. Australian Embassy, 
Washington, 5 June 1950. Memorandum for the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 
Canberra.
74 NAA, Canberra, series no. A.1838. Australian Embassy, Jakarta, Memorandum no. 63, 14 
February 1951.
75 Usha Mahajani, Soviet and American Aid to Indonesia. 1949-1968, (Athens: Center for 
International Studies, 1970), p. 6.
76 J. Krol, “Internationale Hulp aan Indonesia” in Cultureel Nieuws Indonesia, No. 2, (August, 
1951), p. 7.
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that the government found hard to accept, even though it was felt that the 
military needed help in acquiring modern military hardware.77
Acceptance of a US military mission was politically impossible considering 
the degree of suspicion many of the leftist-leaning parliamentarians had of 
the US. At the same time, the Dutch under the Nederlandse Militaire Missie 
was carrying out a similar military assistance programme, which made the 
offer rather redundant. The failure of the Melby mission did not, however, 
affect non-military American aid. Griffin, on a mission to Asia, had discussed 
with the Australians the Colombo Plan mission and stressed that each aid 
programme should be carried out on an individual basis with each country, 
without the need to create a complex organization. On 6 August 1951, Dr. 
Samuel Perkins Hays was appointed as Chief of the ECA Special Technical 
and Economic Mission to Indonesia, replacing Shannon McCune.78
Lester Pearson, Canada’s first ambassador to Indonesia called Indonesia 
“the first child of the United Nations.” There was a belief amongst many in 
the West that left to its own devices, Indonesia would fail to develope and 
modernize itself.79 In fact as Webster has quoted “[The] United Nations plays 
a much more important role here (in Jakarta) than in any other country in 
the area he had visited. Indonesia is desperately short of good Ministers and 
officials, but many of the United Nations people are good and they have had 
a long time there to acquaint themselves with local conditions. The result is 
that they pretty much decide what should be done in the fields in which they 
operate.”80 The strength of influence amongst these foreign experts probably 
contributed a lot to the contempt and displeasure that people like Roeslan 
Abdulgani and Sukarno expressed toward experts.
Initially, the foreign aid relationship was regulated by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry with its Coordinating Bureau for Foreign Assistance81, 
created on 29 December 1950 under the command of C. v.d. Straaten, 
Achmad Ali and J. Kramer. After the formation of the National Planning 
77 NAA, A1838. Australian Embassy Jakarta, 12 October 1950.
78 NAA, A.1838. DMR, US economist named head of Indonesian mission, 25-6-1950.
79 David Webster, Fire and the Full Moon. Canada and Indonesia in a decolonizing world, 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), p. 79-80. 
80 David Webster, Fire and the Full Moon. Canada and Indonesia in a decolonizing world, 
p. 83.
81 Biro Ko-ordinasi Bantuan Luar Negeri-BKBLN
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Bureau, an Inter-Departmental Coordinating Committee82 or Pakin was 
formed as a liaison agency for all the government bodies connected with 
foreign aid. Within the BPN, a section was created to handle foreign 
assistance, headed by the future economist Ir. Mohammad Sadli and Ir. 
Sie Kwat Soen. During the Guided Democracy, with the creation of the 
Depernas and the termination of BPN in 1959, foreign assistance was also 
transferred to the Financial and Economic Bureau of the Office of First 
Minister (Finek).83
As a result, throughout both the Parliamentary and Guided Democracy 
periods, foreign assistance relationships, at least the civilian ones, were 
handled by social-democrats or PSI-related individuals at both the BPN 
and the Finek bureau, which were both pro-Western and anti-Communist. 
These bureaus were sheltered within the confines of both BPN and Finek that 
were placed directly under the Office of the Prime Minister/First Minister. 
Aside from the head of Indonesia’s policy making elite above, enthusiasm 
for foreign assistance was low amongst Indonesian officials. The government 
was reluctant to allow foreign experts to work at the middle or village levels. 
Two types of foreign personnel were sought: trainers, who would be given 
little authority, and experts, that would fill mid-range technical positions 
within the civil service.84
There were two forms of international relations. The first was through 
a direct contract signed by an expert with an aid agency and its respective 
national counterpart. For instance, much of the early aid to the National 
Planning Bureau was through this type of relationship, including the 
sending of economics experts to work on creating Indonesia’s national plan 
with people like Benjamin Higgins and companies like the J.G. White 
Engineers. These relationships bypassed the universities, and the experts 
were contracted to work in a specific government unit, usually policy-
82 Panitia Koordinasi Interdepartemental-Pakin
83 It was placed in FINEK (Biro Ekonomi dan Keuangan) in what was named the Office of 
Overseas Development (Bagian Kerdjasama Luar Negeri) similar to the Coordinating Bureau 
under the National Planning Bureau. All overseas cooperation must first be approved by 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry. “Laporan Bagian Kerdjasama Luar Negeri. Biro Ekonomi dan 
Keuangan, Sekretariat Negara,” ANRI, Inv. No. 2358, Menteri Negara Ekonomi, Keuangan 
dan Industri. 
84 “Foreign Technical Assistance in Economic Development in a Newly Independent Country. 
Some Observations in Indonesia” in Economic and Cultural Change, Vol. 1, No. 1, March, 
1952, p. 78-79.
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making bodies. The second relationship was called the university affiliation 
network. These relationships bypassed the structure of foreign recruitment 
developed by the Ministry of Public Service Employee85 and the PUTABA 
office and were regulated within the National Planning Bureau which had 
a desk that controlled all international aid relationships. On a diagram, the 
two institutional matrices are presented below. The third diagram shows the 
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The difference in comparison to the colonial model was the imperial 
nature of that relationship: only involving the mother country and the 
colony. This new institutional matrix was far more international in character 
and provided help for all newly independent nations, even though it 
skewed heavily towards the American. Another important feature was, of 
course, the voluntary nature of the relationship. Both parties were equal 
in their relationship and this required tact, since it was prone to cultural 
misunderstanding. It was similar to a colonial/imperial relationship only in 
relation to the flow of technical and ideological knowledge. The assumption 
was very clear: the Western experts were to provide Indonesia (and many 
other Third World countries) with the tools and operational know-how in 
order to leave behind their backward, traditional society and enter into a 
modernized and developmental state and society. 
The period 1950-1965 was thus one of massive interaction and transfer 
between Third World and First and Second World countries. In Indonesia’s 
case, the most significant was the relationship with both the American AID 
organization, the various UN organizations and the Ford Foundation. These 
investments put in place institutions within the landscape of the Indonesian 
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state and provided Indonesian the opportunity to study at various universities 
in the West, to ‘correct’ their mindset and prepare them to run the institutions 
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Colombo Plan assistance ANRI, inv, no. 2358, Menteri Negara Ekonomi, Keuangan 
dan Industri.









































Total 106 191 237 12
Eastern European assistance in the form of scholarship for Indonesian trainees. ANRI, 
inv, no. 2358, Menteri Negara Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Industri.
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Aid per year by the American AID, UN and Colombo Plan. Chart in thousand dollars. 
ANRI, inv, no. 2358, Menteri Negara Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Industri. UN and 
Colombo numbers for 1963 and 1964 were not available.
The data sets above were obtained from documents of the Finek 
Bureau.86 They show the number of experts sent to the country by different 
international agencies throughout the period. America came on top as the 
most visited country for Indonesian to obtain higher education or technical 
trainings. American Aid, meanwhile, consistently provided the biggest 
amount of aid money from Western nations throughout the period. 
Yet, there were a variety of other nations that also gave a helping hand. 
Soviet overtures for aid had started relatively early in 1948. But as long as 
Indonesia was under the rule of the social democrats, exemplified by Prime 
Minister Hatta, Natsir and Wilopo, hostility toward the Soviet Union was 
strong. When the Wilopo cabinet fell in July 1953, Ali Sastroamidjojo’s 
government, which depended on the support of the PKI, changed Indonesian 
attitude toward the Eastern Bloc. Trade and payment agreements were signed 
with China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union. 
In 1956, a large Soviet mission concluded a treaty with Indonesia, whereby 
a 100 million dollar long-term, low-interest loan was provided. It was used 
for road building and other various projects. Technical aid for the Five Year 
Plan was envisaged from the Soviet Union.87
86 FINEK bureau took the job of foreign relations after the disbandment of the BPN in light 
of the creation of the Depernas. 
87 Usha Mahajani, Soviet and American aid to Indonesia. 1949-1968, p. 7-15.
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The number of people sent to the Eastern Bloc, especially during the 
1960s, was quite significant, with over 300 people sent to study in the Soviet 
Union at higher education institutions. Kruschev’s visit to Jakarta in 1960 
concluded a 700-800 million dollar aid, with a 250 million dollar military 
grant and followed by a 400 million dollar miliary grant in 1961 in relation 
to the struggle for West Papua.88 By 1961, Indonesia had become one of 
the largest non-Communist recipients of Soviet military aid.89 Over a billion 
dollars in military aid would be given to Indonesia throughout the Guided 
Democracy period, so that Indonesian aid amounted to a third of all aid to 
non-Communist countries by the Soviet Union. According to Guy Pauker, 
the rational reason for Soviet willingness to spend that much money on 
the Indonesian military was to bribe the military to support a Communist 
take-over of the country.90
Most of those sent to the Soviet Union went to study engineering and 
the technical know-how needed to run the various Soviet industrial aid 
programmes that were provided to Indonesia in the 1960s, including the 
1962 Asian Games, the Cilegon Steel Plant, the Superphosphate project in 
Sumatra, the farming mechanization project and the projected oceanographic 
institute in Ambon. Over 100 Indonesian trainees were sent to study 
petroleum engineering as part of Indonesia’s wished to reduce dependence on 
Western oil companies and 125 were sent to study at the Patrice Lumumba 
University in Moscow.91 Conversely, 500 Soviet experts were sent to Indonesia 
to supervise the execution of Sukarno’s grandiose projects.92
National Planning and Technical Assistance 
Two important men figured throughout the 1950s in connection with 
the creation of the Indonesian development plan: the Rotterdam-graduate 
88 Usha Mahajani, Soviet and American aid to Indonesia, p. 15-16.
89 A fifth of all Soviet aid to non-socialist countries went to Indonesia. Ragna Boden, “Cold 
War economics: Soviet aid to Indonesia” in Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 10, no. 3, 
Summer 2008, p.116.
90 Guy Pauker, “General Nasution’s mission to Moscow” in Asian Survey, Vol. 1, no. 1, 
1961, p. 13-22. 
91 ANRI, Jakarta, Menneg Ekuin, inv. nr. 2358.
92 For more on foreign aid numbers, see Donald Hindley, “Foreign Aid to Indonesia and its 
Political Implications” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, no. 2, (Summer, 1963), p. 107-119.
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economist, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and the engineer Djuanda 
Kartawidjaja. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the son of a well-to-do aristocrat 
Margono Djojohadikusumo, was born on 29 May 1917 in Kebumen, 
Central Java.93 After finishing high school at the Hogere Burger School, 
he went on to study economics at Rotterdam. He also spent one year at 
the Sorbonne in Paris where he befriended the noted photographer Henri 
Cartier-Bresson and Indian nationalist Jawaharlal Nehru and met with writer 
and statesman André Malraux. That meeting affected him so deeply that he 
tried to join the anti-fascist International Brigade to fight against General 
Franco of Spain. He finished his doctorate degree, under the Indologist 
Prof. Gonggrijp, in the middle of the war in 1943 with a dissertation on 
small-scale credit.94
Because connections between Indonesia and the Netherlands had all but 
ceased during the war, Sumitro had to wait it out in Rotterdam, working 
at the Rotterdam Hogeschool. After the war, Sumitro initially joined the 
Dutch delegation in the discussion between the Dutch and Indonesian 
governments as an advisor.95 In 1945, Sumitro returned to Indonesia to edit 
Berita Perekonomian. He then became an assistant to the Ministry of Finance 
and to Prime Minister Sjahrir’s office.96 He became one of the Indonesian 
representatives to the Office of Permanent Observer to Indonesia at the UN 
Security Council, alongside Soedarpo Sastrosatomo, Soedjatmoko and N.L. 
Palar. Benjamin Higgins described him, exaggeratedly, “one of the most 
brilliant economists in all Asia.”97
On 31 March 1950, the Indonesian ambassador to the United States 
and future premier, Ali Sastroamidjojo, gave a talk at a dinner in his honour 
in New York on the Indonesian plea for technical assistance for the creation 
of a better economy which, according to his mind “is fundamentally a 
social rather than an industrial reform which must begin with education 
93 For more on his biography, consult Aristides Katoppo et.al., Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. Jejak 
Perlawanan Begawan Pejuang, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2000).
94 Aristide Katoppo, et.al., Sumitro Djojohadikusumo: Jejak Perlawanan Begawan Pejuang, p. 1-15.
95 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, “Recollections of My Career” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, No. 22, Vol. 3, 1986, 27-39.
96 David Webster, Fire and the Full Moon. Canada and Indonesia in a decolonizing world, p. 78.
97 Benjamin Higgins and Jean Higgins, Indonesia: the crisis of the millstone, (Princeton: Van 
Nostrand, 1963), p. 81, NAA, A1838, United States of America – Relations with other 
countries – Pacific – Indonesia.
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and technological assistance from all countries of the world which have the 
advantage of experience.”98 Later, in June 1951, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, 
then advisor for the Minister of Economic Affairs, was undertaking his 
European-American tour to look for experts for the State Planning Bureau 
and the various banks in Jakarta. He had with him a list of 180 experts 
that were needed to formulate and carry out Indonesia’s first national plan. 
Although vinitially Sumitro wanted to obtain Dutch expertise for at least 
six important positions for the Bureau, even citing the Dutch universities 
each of these should be graduates of, he failed to find anyone willing to leave 
for Indonesia.99
In the end, he found help from UNESCO in New York, which promised 
12 financial-economic experts to be paid by the organization. The Planning 
Bureau was to be headed by an Indonesian, with the foreign experts serving 
as executive staff members and senior officers. The Bureau’s position was not 
that of a ‘super department’, thus its coordinating capabilities with respective 
Ministers depended much on the tact and capability of its leadership to gain 
trust and respect with other ministerial members.100 The UN’s Technical 
Assistance Board approved Indonesia’s request in a meeting on the 24-28 
July 1951.101 The Indonesian project was greeted with much approval from 
many within the UNTAA. Indonesia was “one of the most significant among 
those we have been privileged to assist in developing.”102
National Planning Body – UNTAA Cooperation
The National Planning Body or Badan Perantjang Negara was one of the 
most important expert bodies. It was created in 1952 and placed under the 
Office of the Prime Minister. The BPN also contained the largest number of 
experts working on the Indonesian economy inside the country. Its control 
98 NAA, A1838. Indonesia wants technical assistance, envoy says, 31-3-1950.
99 NA, The Hague, Hoge Commissariaat Indonesie, Internationale Technische Hulpverlening, 
18 Juni 1951. 
100 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Bunga Rampai Ekonomi, (Jakarta: Indira, n.a.), p. 259-261.
101 NA, The Hague, Hoge Commissariaat te Bandoeng, 1950-1957, Bureau voor Internationale 
Technische Hulp, Buitenlandse Deskundigen voor Indonesie, 25 September 1951.
102 David Webster, “Development advisor in time of cold war and decolonization: the United 
Nations Technical Assistance Administration” in Journal of Global History, Vol. 6, Issue 2, 
July, 2011, p. 260.
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over foreign aid meant that the BPN also controlled the nation’s expert 
production. The BPN was not only essential in the creating experts, it was 
also important in creating an esprit de corps amongst policy makers and 
economists. “The BPN is an effective and productive means to create cadres. 
The experts of the BPN are given the methods to act rationally and capably 
and also to always act in a nationalist manner to contribute for the state and 
the nation. These experts were then sent to a variety of government offices 
and state-owned companies. The emotional bonds that have been created 
amongst them are kept alive and contribute to aiding cooperation between 
the offices they lead, in accordance to the approach and problem solving 
methods they’ve learned during their stay at the BPN.”103
Prior to the arrival of UNTAA experts, the government contracted the 
engineering consultant firm J.G. White Engineers in January 1951. Financed 
by the ECA, the contract was worth 700.000 dollars out of the 13 million 
dollar aid budgeted for 1951.104 By mid-January 1951, the corporation’s 
team of consultant arrived in Jakarta under the leadership of Mr. Henry 
Tarring. The J.G. White consultants worked behind the scene and their 
presence in Indonesia causing little press attention. This suited the Indonesian 
government, which was wary of being seen to be too dependent on foreign 
consultants.105 Their presence, however, was met with irritation and suspicion 
amongst the Dutch consultants still working for the government, especially 
103 Ali Budiardjo, “Abdi Negara dan Abdi Bangsa” in Awaloeddin Djamin (ed.), Ir. H. Djuanda: 
negarawan, administrator, teknokrat utama, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), p. 255. According to 
Koesoediarso Hadinoto: “Biro Perancang Negara benar-benar efektif dan produktif sebagai 
wadah dan sarana kaderisasi. Para tenaga ahli Biro Perancang Negara dibekali metode berfikir 
dan bertindak yang rasional dan andal, serta selalu berjiwa kebangsaan dengan itikad berbakti 
kepada negara dan bangsa. Kemudian para tenaga ahli itu disebarkan ke berbagai instansi 
Pemerintah serta Badan Usaha Milik Negara. Ikatan batin antara mereka terpelihara secara 
berlanjut, sehingga memperlancar kerjasama antara instansi-instansi yang mereka pimpin, 
berdasarkan metode pendekatan dan penyelesaian masalah yang dulu mereka pelajari 
bersama di Biro Perancang Negara.”
104 NAA, A1838, Republik Indonesia Serikat – Foreign Aid to Indonesia. Australian Embassy 
Jakarta, Memorandum no. 63, 14 February 1951. The J.G. White Engineers were, however, 
quite successful in developing parts of the Taiwanese industry, including in the development 
of its plastic industry. Nan Wiegersma and Joseph E. Medley, US economic development 
policies toward the Pacific Rim. Successes and Failures of US Aid, p. 55.
105 The uproar over the presence of former Nazi Finance Minister Hjalmar Schacht who was 
invited by Sumitro Djojohadikusumo to conduct a three months study of the financial 
position of the country taught a good lesson in focusing on low-key deployment. Hjalmar 
Schacht, Laporan Hjalmar Schacht, (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1951).
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as they feared that long-established Dutch methods would be called into 
question and that they would function as a backdoor for American business 
enterprise to gain access to Indonesia.106
For the purpose of creating a national plan, the government considered 
the White Engineers less helpful. Their job to create a national plan for 
industrialization had been less than stellar. The firm’s economist, Dr. Killough, 
had arrived in Indonesia only in June 1952. Working with an inter-ministerial 
coordinating committee was not suitable in industrial planning as it had 
little resource and organizational coordination with other departments. The 
National Planning Bureau had only come into existence in 1952. The White 
Engineers worked with the National Planning Bureau in reviewing budget 
requests, and recommended various cuts in the capital and maintenance 
budgets. Benjamin Higgins suggested that the Indonesian government renew 
the firm’s contract with Colombo Plan finance because there was nothing 
to replace them. The firm was not only important as a consultant for the 
national plan, but also in providing consultation on efficiency: to recommend 
policies and procedures to overcome this deficiency.107
In June 1952, Professor Benjamin Higgins, who had earlier been 
working in Libya for the UNTEA (United Nations Temporary Executive 
Authority), was appointed UN adviser to the Indonesian government as a 
monetary and fiscal advisor to both the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs and the State Planning Bureau. Later in 1954-55, he came back to 
Indonesia as director of the MIT project on Indonesia within the Center 
for International Studies. In 1959 he left the MIT project to teach at the 
University of Texas and studied Latin America because he was frustrated at 
Southeast Asia’s development at the time.108 Higgins was one of the world’s 
leading authorities on development economy. He had been a teacher of 
economics at the University of Melbourne since 1948 and had worked for the 
ILO during the war. The extent toward which Sumitro considered Higgins 
106 NAA, Canberra, A1838, Republik Indonesia Serikat – Foreign Aid to Indonesia. Australian 
Embassy Jakarta, Memorandum no. 63, 14 February 1951.
107 ANRI, Jakarta, Departemen Keuangan 1950-1969, Inv. No. 294.
108 Benjamin Higgins, “Thought and Action: Indonesian economic studies and policies in the 
1950s” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 26:1, April, 1990, p. 37-47.
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advice as crucial was strengthened by the fact that Higgins office was right 
next door to Sumitro’s.109
Although ECA funded much of the research in Indonesia during the 
period, the coterie of experts had an international character. The first UN 
technical mission to the BPN consisted of nine experts, four of whom were 
Canadians, including Benjamin Higgins and Nathan Keyfitz.110 In fact, 
Higgins, as head of the UNTAA mission in Indonesia, hand-picked the entire 
team, which included American Edgar McVoy, a labour expert who would 
introduce Indonesia to the Training Within Industry labour management 
programme,111 South African income expert Daniel Neumark, British 
industrial economist Peter Diebold, migration expert D.M. Deane and 
New Zealand education specialist, T.R. Smith.112 Many of the UN technical 
assistance experts were civil servants who believed in Keynesian economics 
and Fabian social-democratic ideals. British Fabian values were cherished in 
PSI circle.113 So there was considerable ideological affinity between men like 
Sumitro and Higgins.114
Higgins wielded his huge authority without much democratic oversight. 
Although Djuanda was the head of BPN,115 it was Higgins who went abroad 
to seek international aid and it was he who reviewed these aid programmes. 
It was his decision to renew the J.G White Engineering contract, for 
109 J.A.C. Mackie, “In memoriam: Professor Benjamin Higgins, 1912-2001” in Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2001, p. 183-188. He also regularly saw 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, head of Bank Indonesia, and attend the weekly board meeting 
of the Bank of Indonesia. Benjamin Higgins, “Thoughts and Action: Indonesian Economic 
Studies and Policies in the 1950s,” p. 37-47.
110 David Webster, Fire and the Full Moon. Canada and Indonesia in a Decolonizing World, p. 
78-79. T.R Smith from New Zealand was to consult on management issues. ANRI, Jakarta, 
Kementerian Keuangan 1950-1969, Inv. No. 276.
111 He had previously introduced the TWI programme to Japan and Malaya. Alan G. Robinson 
and Jean M. Schroeder, “Training, continuous improvement and human relations: the US 
TWI program and the Japanese management style” in California Management Review, Vol. 
35, No. 2,Winter 1993, p. 35-56.
112 ANRI, Jakarta, Kementerian Keuangan, Inv. No. 293, 294.
113 Herbert Feith, The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia, p. 130.
114 David Webster, Fire and the Full Moon. Canada and Indonesia in a decolonizing world, p. 
80-81. “PSI policies were “remarkably similar” to those being developed by the national 
CCF in the same period.” The CCF being the Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation 
of government in Saskatchewan, Canada, which relied on social-democratic planning. 
115 ANRI, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia 1950-1959, Inv. Nr. 1381.  
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instance.116 He wrote that the Indonesian government accepted his advice 
with ‘frightening willingness.” In a Colombo Plan meeting, one observer 
wrote that people had mistaken him as head of the BPN, instead of Djuanda.117 
Such huge control by the technical assistance team saw Higgins praising 
the country. “In Sjafruddin and Sumitro, the country had a duumvirate 
on economic policy that few underdeveloped countries could match for 
competence and commitment to the national interest. The Wilopo cabinet 
was composed of extraordinarily able and honest men. In the Planning 
Bureau and its relationship to other government agencies abroad, the country 
had an effective instrument for development planning.”118 
In 1957, when Djuanda was appointed Prime Minister, the BPN went 
to his right hand man, Ali Budiardjo. Budiardjo was the secretary general 
of the Minister of Defence under Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX,119 another 
technocratic figure, from 1950 till 1953. In May, Sumitro offered him the job 
as interim Director General of the BPN before Djuanda took the reins. Like 
many intellectuals, he was close to Sjahrir during the Japanese occupation. 
He obtained a masters degree at MIT’s school of industrial management 
in 1962.120 These two figures worked closely with one another until the 
dissolution of the BPN in 1959 and the transfer of Budiardjo into Djuanda’s 
Financial and Economic (Finek) Bureau under the office of First Minister. 
He was seminal in helping the creation of the Depernas body. There was 
thus some form of continuity for the planning bureau during the transition 
into Guided Democracy within a relatively small bureaucratic body placed 
deep within the government. 
With a highly fragmented government and little ability to coordinate 
amongst themselves, new institutions were created to take over the jobs that 
the Ministries were supposed to accomplish, all of which were to be placed 
under the control of Prime Minister’s office. The universities were part of that 
116 Memorandum from Benjamin Higgins to Minister of Finance Sumitro Djojohadikusumo 
about the renewal of J.G. White contract. ANRI, Jakarta, Departemen Keuangan 1950-
1969, Inv. No. 294. The White Engineering Corporation was still working within the 
BPN in a file on the BPN dated January 1955. ANRI, Jakarta, Kabinet Presiden Republik 
Indonesia 1950-1959, Inv. Nr. 1381 and Departemen Keuangan 1950-1959, inv. Nr. 294.
117 David Webster, Fire and the Full Moon. Canada and Indonesia in a decolonizing world, p. 84.
118 Benjamin Higgins and Jean Higgins, Indonesia: the Crisis of the Millstone, (Princeton: Van 
Nostrand, 1963), p. 88.
119 I.O. Nanulaita, “Ir. Haji Djuanda Kartawidjaja,” p. 110.
120 With a thesis entitled “Management education in Indonesia.”
Expertise and National Planning 151
institutional framework. The Institute for Economic and Social Research at 
the Jakarta School of Economics, University of Indonesia fulfilled this role. 
The Institute along with the National Planning Bureau and the Department 
of Industry investigated the development of industry after independence in 
January 1954. A university-based institution was able to compile, interpret 
and appraise data in an independent and objective way.121
Fakultas Ekonomi-Universitas Indonesia (FEUI)
Perhaps no other higher-learning institution held such an important place 
in modern Indonesian history as that of the FEUI. The most important 
reason for this was the role of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo as institution 
builder par-excellence. He had built the faculty from the ground up, getting 
Dutch professors who were in Indonesia to teach even though many of them 
were not trained economists and taught ‘old-fashioned’ economics. Sumitro 
reformed and overhauled the economics curriculum of the country; the more 
legal-continental approach being taught by Dutch professors was replaced 
with a more Keynesian approach. Sumitro wanted to create a Jakarta School 
of Economics that would be at the leading edge of economics research. He 
wanted to introduce Developmental Economics that would have provided 
ideas in which the state, not the firm, would be the main analysis. According 
to Emil Salim, he was the one who introduced macroeconomics to Indonesia, 
away from the focus on the firm that many of the Dutch professors had 
specialized in.122
Sumitro’s relationship to the Americans provided access for scholarship 
and research money from the West. In 1951, Sumitro signed an agreement 
with Everett Hawkins who was working at the ECA at the time. The ECA 
gave a four hundred thousand dollar grant to finance American economists 
to teach at the faculty. Although he was in contact with the Ford Foundation 
when it opened its office in Jakarta in 1952, he was only able to coax an 
agreement by 1956. His agreement with the Ford Foundation and the 
University of California-Berkeley allowed for the sending of some of the 
brightest economics students of Indonesia to continue their study in the 
121 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, The Government’s Program on Industries, (Jakarta: LPEM, 1954), p. 1-2.
122 Goenawan Moehammad, Celebrating Indonesia. Fifty years with the Ford Foundation. 1953-
2003, (Jakarta: Ford Foundation, 2003), p. 48-60.
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US. Twenty students were sent to various universities in the United States 
in several batches.123 This of course allowed for the rise of the notorious 
Berkeley Mafia, headed by Sumitro’s ablest student and main technocrat of 
the New Order, Widjojo Nitisastro.124
Sumitro was also central to the creation of the Institute of Economic 
and Social Research (LPEM),125 which was funded by the Ford Foundation 
and became a center for research and a place where young social scientists 
were able to obtain practical experience through internships in the BPN. In 
1955, Sumitro founded the Association of Indonesian Economists (ISEI),126 
which became a professional organization.127 Through the formation of 
such institutions and through the linkages it had with American funding 
organizations, the class of experts, or in Higgins’ words, a community of 
scholars, could be created that would have both an esprit de corps and a 
similar ideological approach to the main questions plaguing the nation. 
The shift in education was also a shift in the way of thought of the nation. 
The Ford Foundation thus placed English education as a central component 
of its aid.128 What had to be changed was not merely language, but how 
that language conveyed a different set of assumptions on the perception of 
reality. The 1950s thus not only saw a shift from Dutch toward English, 
but also a shift in the sound bites that peppered elite speech. A look into 
the newspapers of the decade showed an increasing use of such words as 
efficiency, national planning, management and other English words. It was 
a significant cultural change that such expansion of American education, 
books and other materials had provided. Changes in culture were wrought 
through magazines and other forms of cultural mediums, which heralded 
what Vickers called ‘living in the atomic age.’129
123 Ibid.
124 Among them Widjojo Nitisastro. Others include Ali Wardhana, Soebroto, Daoed Joesoef, 
J.B. Soemarlin, Emil Salim, J.E. Ismael, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti and many others.
125 Lembaga Penelitian Ekonomi dan Masjarakat
126 Ikatan Sardjana Ekonomi Indonesia
127 Goenawan Moehammad, Celebrating Indonesia. Fifty years with the Ford Foundation. 1953-
2003, (Jakarta: Ford Foundation, 2003), p. 46-47.
128 John Bresnan, At Home Abroad, p. 34. 
129 Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), p. 126-133.
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The Research Institute for the Economy and Society started an 
industrialization plan in cooperation with the State Planning Bureau and the 
Industrial Section of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The research team 
was led by the then young lector Mohammad Sadli and conducted various 
interviews with government leaders and quantitative calculations in many 
regions of the Republic.130 It also included Widjojo Nitisastro and Emil Salim 
who was sent to interview governors in order to understand regional plans 
outside Java.131 This was part of the effort to reduce the claim by some that 
economic development was too Java-centric.132 Sumitro had placed many 
of his best students within the BPN. In 1955, several economic students 
were recruited as planning staff. According to Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, this 
was the first time they’d had training as technocrats, using the technological 
tools of public policy.133
Ford Foundation-MIT-CENIS
The first Ford Foundation delegation visited Indonesia on July 7 1952. They 
stayed from August 12 to September 11 1952 and visited Jakarta, Bandung, 
Yogyakarta and Surabaya. The report of the visit outlined the importance the 
foundation saw in Indonesia: “Because of the speed with which Indonesia 
has advanced from colonial to sovereign status, because of the complex 
and difficult problems it faces with few resources in trained personnel, and 
because its ability to transform itself into a modern state without becoming 
a totalitarian regime or falling into anarchy is important to all of the free 
world, Indonesia is today a country of unique significance.”134 The report 
concluded that Indonesia needed trained personnel, as there were more 
“economists in Washington working on Indonesian problem than there are 
130 Hendra Esmara and Heru Cahyono, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. Jejak perlawangan Begawan 
pejuang, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 2000), p. 157.
131 I.O. Nanulaita, “Ir. Haji Djuanda Kartawidjaja,”Pahlawan nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda 
Kartawidjaja. Negarawan, administrator dan teknokrat utama, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), p. 111.
132 Ali Budiardjo, “Abdi negara dan abdi bangsa” in Awaloeddin Djamin (ed.), Pahlawan 
nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda Kartawidjaja. Negarawan, administrator dan teknokrat utama, 
(Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), p. 250-251.
133 Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, “Negarawan, administrator dan teknokrat utama” in Awaloeddin 
Djamin (ed.), Pahlawan nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda Kartawidjaja. Negarawan, administrator 
danteknokratutama, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), p. 270.
134 Quoted in John Bresnan, At Home Abroad, p. 27.
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in all Indonesia.” Sukarno had impressed Brown and Arnold immensely 
and they were able to confirm the approval of a 150 thousand dollar grant 
to send American English teachers to Indonesia in 1953-1954. They also 
recommended help to train vocational teachers and help establish an Institute 
for Public Administration.135
They also stressed the need for greater knowledge of the country. In 
1951, the Foundation provided a grant to Stanford University to investigate 
the state of Asian studies in the US, and in 1952 granted 83 fellowships 
to study Asia and the Middle East. In 1953 it gave a 125 thousand dollar 
research grant to the MIT to study economic development in Indonesia, 
India and Italy. This was part of a larger research initiative at the MIT Center 
for International Study, which included research into Communist societies 
by Walt Rostow and the formation of public opinion in France headed by 
Daniel Lerner.136 The Indonesia Program was the result of a three-week 
discussion between the director of the center, the director of the project, 
various Indonesian officials in the government and in Universitas Indonesia. 
The focus of research was on financing economic development, patterns of 
trade, technological aspects of economic development, management and 
administrative techniques and quantitative studies.137
The programme also researched a wider variety of topics related to 
economic growth in Indonesia, divided into six sets of studies: quantitative 
and qualitative description of the economy, economic role and impact of the 
government, private entrepreneurship, labour supply, agricultural progress 
and the political aspects of development. These studies were meant to provide 
a precision instrument in order to understand the underlying problems of 
the economy “providing the analytical knowledge which must precede the 
use of the surgeon’s corrective knife.”138
Its focus on government administration and labour supply allowed a more 
expansive political change as part of the recommendation of the study. Studies 
135 John Bresnan, At Home Abroad, p. 31-33.
136 Benjamin Higgins, “The Indonesia Project of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology-
Center for International Studies” in Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, year III, 1955, p. 
151-154.
137 Benjamin Higgins, “The Indonesia Project of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology-
Center for International Studies,” p. 155-157.
138 Douglas Paauw and William C. Hollinger, “Research Plan for Indonesian Economic 
Development”, Indonesia Project Plans 1, February 18, 1953.
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with Universitas Gadjah Mada painted a picture of a passive Indonesian 
society, waiting for government intervention. “The government is regarded 
as the accepted agent for introducing new techniques of production and 
exchange, and the population is quite willing to accept changes in economic 
institutions so long as they do not greatly alter the existing social and cultural 
patterns.”139 Preliminary study pointed to the need of the government 
to change its outdated fiscal structure and to actively provide ‘external 
economies’ to support economic growth by supporting the private sector. 
The project supported the shift to a welfare state system of government, 
in which the state would provide infrastructural development such as 
transportation infrastructure, education and social welfare programmes 
in order to create a ready labour force for the coming industrialization. 
A study of the tax base, government efficiency in utilizing such tax base, 
economic impact of taxation, patterns of government expenditures and the 
relationship between government’s capacity for developmental investment 
and government borrowing and structures, were important studies to be 
conducted to understand the relationship between the government and 
economic development. A history of trade union movements and its 
relationship with economic development, the political structure of the 
country and its relationship with foreign aid and other forms of social science 
research all provided a multidisciplinary approach to tackling the problems 
related to promoting economic development. Lack of skilled entrepreneurial 
talent amongst the indigenous population required a case study on the more 
successful Indonesian entrepreneurial group, the Dasaad Musin concern.140
Also included in this was the study of Javanese village life and culture 
in relation to development. A multidisciplinary team of social scientists, 
economists, political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists descended 
on Indonesia and especially its small towns and villages. They were to 
provide economic, political, social, administrative, cultural and psychological 
answers as to the problem regarding Indonesia’s transition to modernity and 
its ability to achieve sustainable economic growth. The assumptions made 
about Indonesian society-passivity, lack of entrepreneurial acumen and 
interests and their inherently conservative position-pointed to the need for an 
139 Douglas Paauw and William C. Hollinger, “Research Plan for Indonesian Economic 
Development”, Indonesia Project Plans 1, February 18, 1953.
140 Ibid.
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interventionist state. Changes through the provision of social infrastructures 
were meant to turn the Indonesians into an industrial labour force. 
The International Training and Research funded Max Millikan, head of 
the Center for International Studies at MIT, to send people like Douglas 
Paauw to study fiscal structure, Benjamin Higgins for national income 
and Guy Pauker to study the political environment, among others. Guy 
Pauker would be influential later during the 1960s, helping to strengthen 
the relationship between new generation economists and the military 
officers within the Seskoad.141 Benjamin Higgins, head of the MIT’s 
Indonesian Project, questioned the professional quality of the researches 
being done,142 signaling his dissatisfaction with the programme. Unlike the 
UNTAA programme, their relations and attachment within the National 
Planning Bureau was unsuccessful. The MIT project was the result of 
cooperation amongst social scientists stationed both in Harvard and MIT, 
studying various problems of the post-war world, from the problems of 
communication, to Communism and economic development. In 1954, the 
programme submitted a research proposal to the Ford Foundation, with 40 
separate studies half of which had already been ongoing. It operated under 
an informal agreement with the National Planning Bureau.143
Benjamin Higgins was struck by how his work with the MIT project was 
practically the same as when he was an official advisor to the government 
under the UNTAA. His workload included drafting foreign investment 
law, designing the multiple exchange rate and advance payment system, 
simplifying the regulations of the petroleum industry to reduce government 
take from 70% to 50%, improving the tax system and making it more 
enforceable and analyzing the potential of smallholder agriculture. In no 
other time in Indonesian history have so many foreign experts had such 
a large authority within the Indonesian government. Not only were they 
researching, designing institutions and developing new systems, they were 
also actively producing Indonesia’s next wave of economists and social 
scientists. This unprecedented institutionalized relationship is important to 
141 He was one of the supporter for the army as positive reform and provider of leadership. Guy 
Pauker, The Role of the Military in Indonesia, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1960), p. 
59-65.
142 John Bresnan, At Home Abroad, p. 76.
143 Benjamin Higgins, “The Indonesian Project of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
– Center for International Studies”, p. 152-159.
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understand how Indonesian intellectuals survived the Guided Democracy 
period. Discussion about economic policy was conducted within what was 
called Sumitro’s kitchen cabinet, in the Board of Directors of the Bank of 
Indonesia, in the BPN and its working group, at the Harmonie Club and 
in the journal Keuangan dan Ekonomi Indonesia. 
In 1956, in cooperation with Sumitro, the foundation started shipping 
American economists, mostly from the University of California at Berkeley, 
to take over the positions left by the departing Dutch professors. A new 
post-graduate economics programme had begun and Indonesian faculty 
members had the opportunity to get a PhD degree in economics in 
prestigious universities in the US. The first lot included Widjojo Nitisastro 
and Moehammad Sadli. A second group included economist Emil Salim. 
By 1962, the Ford Foundation through Berkeley University had trained 
some 40 economists to take over the project. Between 1953 and 1965, the 
Ford Foundation had funneled 15 million dollars’ worth of aid to Indonesia, 
practically all in the form of education. Around 400 Indonesians had been 
given fellowships to study abroad; most of them part of a long-term plan to 
build a national system of teacher’s colleges, focusing on English, science and 
mathematics.144 Many these American-trained economists would take part in 
the courses run for higher echelon military personnel at the Military Academy 
(Seskoad) in Bandung as part of the Leknas-Seskoad cooperation agreement. 
It was on these courses that Suharto met with many of the economist who 
would craft for him the economic policy of the New Order.
The 1956-1960 National Plan and Guided Democracy 
The National Plan was finally written in 1956 but only ratified by the 
Parliament in 1959. Later during transition to the Guided Democracy, 
Benjamin Higgins’s idea of the Big Push was central; “big mainly in the ratio 
of savings and investments to national income”,145 calculating the incremental 
capital to output ratio to determine the rate of efficiency of investment both 
from foreign investment and domestic savings. Although Higgins contributed 
144 John Bresnan, At Home Abroad, p. 66.
145 Benjamin Higgins and Jean Higgins, Indonesia: the crisis of the millstones, (Princeton: Van 
Nostrand, 1963), p. 71.
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to the writing of the plan, he had not have the final say. In any case, he was 
quite critical of it and thought it too weak to result in real growth. 
Several basic statistics and numbers were not available in the plan. 
Although the BPN employed a population specialist, the population growth 
assumption of 1.7% was considerably on the low side. The Incremental 
Capital Output Ratio, put at two to one, was also considered too low, 
especially considering the severe lack of infrastructure in the Outer Islands. 
The targets were too modest and evinced compromises with the political 
elites. Take-off growth was assumed to happen at 12-15 billion rupiah 
investment per year, yet the plan targeted 6 billion in the first five years and 
only with the fourth five-year plan would a number be reached which would 
support take off growth. No austerity measures on consumption were taken 
to reallocate capital toward the productive sector; in fact only 40% of the 
increase on per capita would be reinvested, the rest would go to consumption. 
The plan also assumed private and foreign investment to supply 60% of 
capital needs, yet the necessary reform measures for investment incentives in 
such things as land policy, squatter policy, tax and monetary policy were not 
carried out, although a foreign investment, mineral and oil bill was passed.146
When the plan was ratified by Parliament, the time period of the First 
Five Year Plan was almost up. Significant changes in the economic and 
political aspects of the country had made it already rather redundant. 
Inflation had spiked as a result of massive deficit spending when the country 
lurched into Civil War and Sumitro, along with colleagues from PSI and 
Masjumi joined the PRRI rebellion in Sumatra. The National Planning Board 
(Dewan Perantjang Nasional or Depernas) replaced the State Planning Bureau 
and this new planning agency focused on a broader front in line with Guided 
Democracy’s revolutionary intention, producing an eight-year national 
plan that was written by non-economists and heavily criticized for being 
unrealistic. Military costs for the war were paid for by deficit spending. The 
limited and small professional managerial corps of the nation had to undergo 
both expansions as new recruits were incorporated, mostly from the military, 
and educated as speedily as possible as a result of the Indonesianization of 
Dutch enterprises. This would have been another additional problem to the 
already rather modest plans. 
146 Benjamin Higgins, “Introduction” in Douglas Paauw, Financing Development. The Indonesian 
Case. (Glencoe: the Free Press, 1959), p. 15-28.
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Yet, social scientists like Benjamin Higgins were quite upbeat about the 
early Guided Democracy period. Prime Minister Djuanda was seen to be a 
sensible, technocratic choice, which augured well for sober, less grandiose and 
more rational planning with a better understanding of Indonesia’s weaknesses. 
Sumitro’s earlier industrial plans were all very much impacted by the severe 
lack of administrative and entrepreneurial capability of Indonesian state and 
society. It was thought that this aggravating aspect had been made clear to 
the remaining policy makers. Higgins pointed out several changes in the 
way Indonesian leaders saw the situation. The relationship between political 
stability and economic growth was now much clearer; before implementing 
redistribution, it was necessary to increase the size of the economy. Higgins 
thought that Communist involvement was discredited due to its role in the 
Indonesianization debacle and lastly he thought that cultural ideas of village 
consensus had also been discredited with the effort to push ahead national 
policies.147 This upbeat view of the Guided Democracy was shared by many 
in the modernist camp in the Kennedy Administration of the United States.148 
There was a deep underlying current that rational Indonesian technocracy was 
just under the radar, struggling to get out and take over national leadership. 
As a corporatist experiment, Guided Democracy was seen with hopeful eyes 
by modernist social scientists and policy makers. 
Foreign Experts and Indonesian Authority
American aid was a rather sensitive subject in Indonesia. Although the 
country throughout the early 1950s was better predisposed toward the 
Western bloc “…most Indonesians feel that their country lies much more 
exposed to the economic and military power of the United States and 
associated countries than it does to Soviet Russia or China.”149 The roots of 
this elite ambivalence toward the US was directly the result of the perceived 
notion that the US had backed the Netherlands during the Revolutionary 
Period and that later on it had approved Dutch control of West Papua and 
given clandestine support for the rebels, after the outbreak of war in 1958 
147 Benjamin Higgins, “Introduction” in Douglas Paauw, Financing Development. The Indonesian 
Case, p. 46.
148 Frederick Philip Bunnell, The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963, p. 85-90.
149 D.S. Suraputra, “The role of American and Soviet aid to Indonesia,” MA thesis Institute of 
Social Science, The Hague, 1967, p. 5.
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in Sumatra, West Java and South Celebes. This view of America affected the 
way Indonesia interacted with the US throughout the period.150
The extent to which foreign experts gained authority in determining 
an Indonesian national policy during the Parliamentary Democracy period 
was significant-in fact, the most significant in the post-colonial history of 
Indonesia. Some of it rested within the office of the BPN and the persons 
of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Benjamin Higgins. Others were part of 
a panoply of specific projects for the development of certain parts of the 
Indonesian expert production, like Edward Litchfeld and Alan C. Rankin 
or the Kentucky Team in the Agricultural Institute in Bogor. Within the 
BPN were PSI-supporters, Indonesia’s most important intellectual group 
whose belief in Fabian social democracy represented an authoritative but 
inherently weak elite. The Five Year Plan, with its focus on a Big Push 
dependent on foreign investment, was politically unacceptable. Sukarno’s 
Guided Democracy starting from 1957 was a coup d’état against this weak 
authority. Parliamentary democracy and the political party system oftentimes 
were considered the primary culprit for Sukarno’s Guided Democracy policy, 
yet his main target was the PSI and their Masjumi political supporters, by 
extension, the main intellectual expert of the country. 
By 1958, a large section of the intellectual expert, including Sumitro 
himself, but also Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and several others, defected to the 
PRRI rebellion. Asked by Kennedy whether Indonesia’s intellectuals backed 
Sukarno’s government, Soebandrio, who had accompanied the President’s 
1961 trip to the US and around the world, had answered, “the Indonesian 
intellectuals are a reactionary group. They cannot be asked to participate 
in the revolution.”151 When Soedjatmoko, a leading intellectual and friend 
of Soebandrio asked why, his answer was that Sukarno deeply resented 
intellectuals. From within the intellectual circles, the first shock came from 
the result of the 1955 election, in which the PSI, the intellectual party par-
excellence, garnered a measly 5 percent of the vote. Four parties came out of 
the election a major player in Indonesian politics: the nationalist Sukarnoist 
150 Daniel Novotny, Torn between America and China. Elite perception and Indonesian foreign 
policy, (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2010), p. 105-107.
151 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI. Segitiga kekuasaan sebelum prahara politik. 1961-
1965, (Jakarta: Obor Indonesia, 2001), p. 46.
Expertise and National Planning 161
PNI, the modernist Muslim Masyumi, the traditional Muslim NU and the 
Communist PKI.152 
Despite being politically weak, those surrounding the BPN, composed of 
Indonesian and foreign American, Canadian and Australian experts, formed 
what Benjamin Higgins called a ‘community of scholars.’ These included 
economists like Higgins, Douglas Paauw and William Hollinger, political 
scientists like Guy Pauker, Jean Mintz and Ruth McVey, anthropologists 
like Clifford Geertz and the members of his Field Team, which included 
Alex Dewey, Donald Fagg, Hildred Geertz, Edward Ryan and Robert Jay.153 
The ‘community of scholars’ also transcended their geographic boundaries 
and connected places like the BPN, FEUI, the Boston-Cambridge area, 
Wisconsin, Ithaca, and Windsor and Montreal in Canada. 
These geographical points, headquarters of universities, were the 
expression par excellence of the institutionalized technical aid world, 
functioning as provider of experts and legitimizers of its own brand of 
modernization theory. Within the MIT center, these experts included 
sociologist Daniel Lerner, whose work on the passing of traditional society 
was a significant tome on Anglo-Saxon modernism.154 Economists such as 
Paul Samuelson, Evsey Domar and Robert Solow, whose work on the Solow-
Domar growth equation, earned them Nobel prizes later on. George Kahin 
at Cornell, Everett Hawkins, Hans Schmidt and Ted Morgan in Wisconsin, 
Bruce Glassburner in California and scholars from McGill and the University 
of British Columbia represented an array of very distinguished names in social 
sciences working to decipher Indonesian modernity. Especially important 
was the group called the Charles River (Boston-Cambridge area) with their 
access to President Kennedy’s policy-making decisions. Walt W. Rostow 
recalled the situation: “Kennedy sought out and found in CENIS a group 
whose ardent commitment was to enlarged development aid rather than to 
party or political personality. He understood this clearly and used us well.”155 
152 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 424-440.
153 J.A.C. Mackie, “In memoriam: Professor Benjamin Higgins, 1912-2001”, p. 183-188. 
154 Daniel Lerner, The passing of traditional society: modernizing the Middle East, (Glencoe: The 
Free Press, 1958).
155 Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign aid as foreign policy. The Alliance for Progress in Latin America, 
(London: Routledge, 2007), p. 20. 
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Rostow along with Max Millikan became what Nils Gilman called Kennedy’s 
mandarin of modernity.156
An expansion of intellectual interest on Indonesia occured. The 
production of books on Indonesia gradually replaced the Dutch works when 
the shift from Dutch experts and advisors to American ones occurred around 
1957.157 More importantly, these social scientists were, as Higgins admitted, 
clueless about economic development, and tried to figure out a system that 
was most suitable to the Indonesian condition. Albert O’Hirschman, another 
technical expert and modernization theorist said “I went to Colombia in 
1952 without any prior knowledge of … development… (I later) discovered 
I had acquired a point of view of my own that was considerably at odds 
with current doctrines.”158 Knowledge production was thus a confluence 
of the anti-Communist ideology of American modernization and the 
harsh realities of localized context. Benjamin Higgins said that practically 
all the Indonesian experts agreed that a government role was essential for 
Indonesian industrialization. Without a capitalist class, there was agreement 
for government-led development even by the more ardent free market 
economists among the foreign experts.159
In terms of government role, there was no doubt in anyone who had 
been to Indonesia that a government-led economic plan was the only way 
in which Indonesia could move forward.160 This was considerably different 
from the state planning of the Soviet Union or Communist China, but it was 
also very different from the freewheeling capitalism of yesteryear. Yet for all 
the state-led ideas that had been discussed during the period, the question 
of the Indonesian state as a Parliamentary Democracy was never disputed. 
156 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future. Modernization theory in Cold War America, p. 115-
202.
157 The Dutch had a long tradition of planning in Indonesia, especially on social programs. 
But this differed from the large and intricate periodical developmental plans that became 
the economic policy of the New Order. Yet, some of these Dutch projects continued after 
independence. See Leonard Blussé (et.al.), India and Indonesia from the 1920s to the 1950s: 
Origins of Planning, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987).
158 Kirk S. Bouman, Military, Democracy and Development, The perils of praetorianism in South 
America, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002) p. ix.
159 Benjamin Higgins and Jean Higgins, Indonesia: the Crisis of the Millstones, p. 71-77.
160 This does not mean that state-led economic centralization was the only opinion available. 
Experts discussed about the possibility for decentralized economic development. For 
instance, Douglas Paauw, “The Case for Decentralized Financing of Economic Development 
in Indonesia” in The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 15, no. 1, November 1955, p. 77-95.
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It was assumed that the political problems and its instability was something 
that was negatively affecting the capability of the state, resulting in what 
Gunnar Myrdal called a soft state,161 but there never seems to have been any 
discussion on a change in the political landscape of Indonesia. It would have 
been obviously impudent for foreign experts to suggest something that was 
definitely outside their authority, but even in discussion with Indonesian 
economists like Sumitro Djojohadikusumo or Sjafruddin Prawiranegara 
no one seems to have brought up the idea of changing the political system.
Awareness that the military were coming out as a major proponent for 
both political stability and economic development grew only gradually and 
not obviously. Political scientists like Guy Pauker would gradually realize 
the potential of military men and thought of them as the most promising 
and rational amongst the Indonesian elite, but this would not come about 
until the late 1950s. On the other hand, when Sukarno started his campaign 
to bury the party and initiate a major change in the state-society relations 
of the country, Sumitro, Sjafruddin, Mohammad Natsir and many of the 
more technocratic-minded elite of Indonesia rebelled against the central 
government and created a separate revolutionary state in Sumatra. There 
was no indication that the PRRI was envisioning a military-dominated state 
that would have to restructure Indonesian society within a state directed 
relationship. In fact, it seems to have been the case that the intellectual experts 
of PRRI still held to a belief in the efficacy of the parliamentary model of 
the social democrats. It was this discrepancy between the old intellectuals of 
the 1950s and the new intellectuals who started to emerge by the late 1950s 
that was to be one of the more significant facts of the period. 
At the international level, the 1950s was a rather naïve decade. President 
Eisenhower’s policy on aid contained no specific strategy other than to support 
economic and social development. It was hoped that such assistance would 
push economic growth and thus reduce the temptation to Communism 
in much of the developing world. By the end of the 1950s, the world saw 
a series of development, which toppled democracies in many developing 
nations. Parliamentary democracy was being discredited on an international 
scale and American response to it was to shift its own aid strategy. Instead 
of development perse, the Kennedy era approach to aid was to connect it 
161 Gunnar Myrdal, The Asian Drama. An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, (Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1968), p. 891-900.
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intimately with the war on Communism, thus to refocus the aid toward the 
military and to revamp social science in order to support this notion. The 
Kennedy Doctrine and the creation of the Alliance for Progress shifted the 
aid toward a political goal. The focus was not merely on development, but 
on population control. Of course, the idea of social development has always 
been central to the idea of modernization. 
Through education and community development, an increase in the 
capacity of the individual would go a long way to help ease the transformation 
from traditional society toward a modern, industrial one. But no discussion 
of the 1950s had talked about the kinds of pervasive and invasive action 
that was to be conducted by the Guided Democracy state, nor did anyone 
talk about the role of the military in this regard. This idea of control was 
what was missing within the discourse of the 1950s experts. It was to be 
the main idea developed during the Guided Democracy period by both the 
proponents and its intellectual opponents whose ‘chameleon-like’ hypocrisy, 
to use a phrase made by the journalist, Mochtar Lubis, against the second 
generation economists, allowed them both to cultivate a new relationship 
of power within a new notion of population control and development. This 
inherently anti-democratic idea became the basis of modern Indonesian 
society and its state-society relationship for a long time to come. 
Conclusions
Americanization of various aspects of Indonesian elite production was met 
with resistance in many forms. Inertia of the bureaucracy pushed for the 
continuation of ‘Dutch’ ways of doing business and, in fact, continued to 
do so as a result of the sheer limitation of American impact on the large 
Indonesian bureaucracy. At the regional and local level, there was little 
American presence, the change occurred at the central institutions; the major 
universities and schools created through expert recommendations and at 
national planning institutions. As a result, it was a flimsy affair, the changes 
occurring within small, almost separated institutions whose effects on the 
vertical level was generally unknown, but considered to be very much limited. 
Yet, these developments paved the way for Guided Democracy’s institutional 
experiment. The next two chapters discuss the Guided Democracy state 
and the implementation of the various ideas that shaped it. This included 
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the corporatist ideas whose roots stemmed from the colonial and Japanese 
period, as succinctly expressed in the 1945 Constitution, and the various 
developments that occurred during this period. That development was 
important, for it cemented models of state-society relations that would 
continue throughout the second half of the twentieth century.

CHAPTER IV
Scientific Administration and 
the Question of  Efficiency 
Like national planning, scientific administration was new, in the sense that 
although colonial antecedents existed, the incorporation of American ideas 
provided new ways of dealing with state-society relations. And like national 
planning, scientific management was part of the international aid structure 
provided by the US to newly independent states across the world, as other 
states, emerging from centuries of dependence on an empire would also 
find it less of an efficacious medicine that what it was once thought to be. 
In its incarnation within Indonesia, the ideas of efficiency would be 
implemented at a wide range of levels across the state and its economy. 
The rise of administration science would result in the formation of a series 
of institutions within the universities and specialized learning institutions 
created to provide education and research and to develop a specifically 
Indonesian-type of public administration. Within the Indonesian economy 
there were two major drives of the 1950s. The first was the development of the 
business administration science that was to provide the managerial manpower 
needs of the business offices. Both public and business management were two 
sides of the same coin. Despite the similarity, both developed separately in 
Indonesia within differing institutional environments. Public administration 
science developed within the halls of social and political science. Business 
administration was developed as part of the economics faculty. 
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The development of scientific management deeply affected the 
decolonization process. First, it entailed Americanization that provided the 
means to leave behind Dutch, i.e. liberal, ways of doing things. Second, 
and related to this, was the relationship between managerial science and the 
legitimacy of Guided Democracy. It would not be too wrong to say that the 
idea of efficiency helped to end Parliamentary Democracy.
Development of Management 
Public administration developed from the confines of political science while 
scientific management developed from that of engineering. Both were 
predicated on the idea of producing professional, white-collar administrative 
experts for the government office and the factory floor. The administrative 
experts were seen as the panacea for the creation of efficiency and efficiency 
was central to the most important goal of the twentieth century state: 
development. “The primary obstacle to development is administrative rather 
than economic... Countries generally lack the administrative capability for 
implementing plans and programmes. Countries share in common most 
of the same administrative problems and obstacles.”1 Although modern 
business management had developed rapidly before the Second World War, 
the science of what came to be known as public administration was still 
at a gestation period. It had been one of the primary exports of American 
scientific achievement to be channelled through the Marshall Plan and the 
various American aid programmes. 
In 1955 Americans started exporting the nascent science throughout the 
world. It was a science still under development, “… defining the subject was 
less an issue than doing it, studying it and exporting it, whatever it might be.”2 
From 1955 to 1963 American aid for Public Administration had reached 
187 million dollars and from 1952 to 1963 around 6.000 persons from all 
over the world were sent to the US for training courtesy of the ICA. The 
UN, Ford Foundation and the US government helped to establish some 70 
public administration-training institutions in various developing countries.3
1 Donald C. Stone, “Government Machinery necessary for Development” quoted in William 
J. Siffin, “Two Decades of Public Administration in Developing Countries” in Public 
Administration Review, Vol. 36, No. 1, (January/February, 1976), p. 62.
2 William J. Siffin, “Two Decades of Public Administration in Developing Countries”, p. 61.
3 William J. Siffin, “Two Decades of Public Administration in Developing Countries”, p. 66.
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In East Asia, the interest in promoting public administration was evinced 
early on. During the Economic Survey Mission to Southeast Asia (the Griffin 
Mission) in 1950, the report had concluded that there was a need to support 
public administration for Indonesia. Formal recognition of this came with 
the Bell Mission to the Philippines.4 US economic assistance to the region 
from 1948-1967 was 7.6 billion dollars. Technical Cooperation amounted 
to 522.2 million dollars or roughly 7.3 percent of the total. Of those, only 
33.7 million dollars or half a percent went on public administration. In 
Indonesia, that amounted to 6.1 million dollars. Together with Thailand, 
Korea and the Philippines, they represented 88% of the total aid on public 
administration to East Asia.5
From 1952 through 1965, the ECA sent 502 Indonesian participant 
trainees to the US for studies in Public Administration. The ECA would help 
establish a series of public administration organizations such as the Public 
Service Centre (Balai Pelatihan Administrasi) at Gadjah Mada University, 
the Local Government Training Academy (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam 
Negeri) and the National Institute of Administration (Lembaga Administrasi 
Negara). In the period 1957-1965, AID had seven projects in public 
administration-four on training and three others on fiscal management, 
central government administration, and local government.6 Comparatively 
speaking, the United States had little interest to promote it in East Asia in 
contrast to the situation in Latin America. The United States would help 
create 12 public administration institutions in East Asia, 10 of which were 
assisted with direct university contracts. These involved the University 
of Michigan in the Philippines, Japan and Taiwan, Indiana University in 
Thailand and Indonesia and the University of Minnesota and Washington 
State University in South Vietnam.7
4 Frank M. Landers and Harry W. Marsh, United States Technical Assistance in Public 
Administration in East Asia, (New York: The East Asia Society, 1968), p. 2.
5 Frank M. Landers and Harry W. Marsh, United States Technical Assistance in Public 
Administration in East Asia, p. 4.
6 Frank M. Landers and Harry W. Marsh, United States Technical Assistance in Public 
Administration in East Asia, p. 13.
7 Frank M. Landers and Harry W. Marsh, United States Technical Assistance in Public 
Administration in East Asia, p. 4-6.
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Problems of Efficiency
The push for the implementation of scientific management resulted from the 
failure of a series of state-based industrialization efforts within the Economic 
Urgency Plan (Rentjana Urgensi Perekonomian) and the Benteng Programme 
started in 1951. The Urgency or Sumitro Plan outlined the improvement and 
expansion of research and training institutes of the Department of Industries, 
the extension of loans and credits to cottage and small-scale industries, the 
establishment through direct government sponsorship of central production 
and processing units (induk perusahaan) in industrial centres of various rural 
regions in Java and Madura, and the establishment of government-sponsored 
large-scale industrial plants in sectors of vital importance. The problems 
were especially relevant to the last two efforts of the plan: the development 
of central production and processing units or induks and the creation of 
large-scale industrial plants.
In 1954, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo under commission from the 
National Planning Bureau (BPN) and the Department of Industry of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, appointed the LPEM,8 the research arm of 
the Faculty of Economics, Universitas Indonesia, to conduct research on the 
industrialization effort in the country. Mohammad Sadli, who at the time was 
an associate lecturer, was in charge of the daily executive supervision of the 
project. Hutomo Saidhidajat and Harun Zain assisted him. Their findings 
emphasized the need to build up both public and business administration 
in the country, if it wanted to develop a state-based industrialization 
programme.9
The government’s large-scale industrial programme made little progress 
since its inception in 1951. Projects that were supposed to have been 
ready by the end of 1952 were, for the greater part, not yet completed 
by the middle of 1954. The reasons were bad organization as a result of 
incompetent management and lack of experience, shortage of expert and 
experienced labour, and unattractive wages for technicians and management. 
On the government’s side, bureaucracy hampered instead of helped as a 
result of various administrative and financial regulations. There was a lack 
8 Lembaga Penjelidikan Ekonomi dan Masjarakat or the Research Insitute on Economy and 
Society.
9 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (ed.), The Government’s Program on Industries. A Progress Report 
by the Institute for Economic and Social Research, (Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia, 1954), p. 3.
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of coordination between the government departments and at a lower level 
between the department and the project managers. This showed the sad state 
of public administration. Lastly, there was a general lack of technical experts 
in the government.10
The Induk Perusahaan programme met with similar problems. The 
induks were bodies created in order to improve the quality of output of small 
industries, organize better production techniques, standardized qualities of 
production, introduce new and more efficient forms of organizations, instil 
a sense of organization and cooperation and organize joint and cooperative 
sales of finished products. The projects included woodwork, ceramics, 
textiles, ironworks and leather goods in various places in Java and Madura. 
Again, a series of problems that plagued the projects pointed in the general 
direction of lack of managerial capabilities as the main culprit. Marketing 
aspects has been neglected by all the induks organizations. The Department 
of Industries, on the whole, focused exclusively on quality improvement 
and techniques of production. As a result, induks had difficulty in finding 
markets or getting the best possible price for their products. Related to this 
was a lack of an organized distribution apparatuses. There was also a lack 
of technical knowledge and technical training. Induks also lacked rational 
business organization because of an inadequate attention to the most 
elementary principles of business administration. There was also a problem 
of securing raw materials, largely also related to this lack of administrative 
capability and experience.11
Externally speaking, there was a wider problem concerning public 
administration. Agencies related to industrialization had few detailed plans 
to implement. As a result, modification and changes were necessary. This 
was related to the acute lack of technical experts. “Until recently, the internal 
conditions of administration at the department were more or less chaotic. 
Even documentation and filing were not well taken care of. Preliminary 
reports and surveys frequently went missing. Basic reports were scattered all 
through sections and subsections. There was no concentration of master files. 
There was a lack of an adequate number of trained administrative personnel 
to disseminate and to follow up on reports coming in from regional branches. 
Control by the department of industries and its extended services of induks 
10 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (ed.), The Government’s program on industries, p. 9-10
11 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (ed.), The Government’s program on industries. p. 15-16
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have been inefficiently executed. A good deal of overlapping and cross wiring 
could be observed in the course of our research. One of the fundamental 
reasons was probably the frequent transfer of people who were in charge 
of supervision and control on induks. There was also lack of delineation 
of responsibilities. Sometimes there was confusion concerning the agency 
responsible for implementation of the induks. Was it the central department 
of industries at the centre or was it the regional branch (inspector) of the 
department of industries?”12
Administrative regulations by the government also contributed to 
hampering the development of induks. For instance, cash balances of the 
induks had to be transferred to the treasury as soon as was possible, yet when 
the induks required funds, the cumbersome and tedious procedures hampered 
them in conducting their business. Policies on import and foreign exchange 
made the provision of raw materials difficult. On top of that, there was a lack 
of consistency and uniformity in the organizational set-up of the induks. It 
was quite clear to economists that the problem of Indonesia’s industrialization 
required reforms within government-owned companies and bodies and the 
larger bureaucracy. 
Sumitro realized that there was a major problem in Indonesian ability 
to absorb capital investment. The lack of entrepreneurial skill amongst the 
indigenous population was well known, living, as Boeke defined them, in 
the non-productive side of the colonial dual economy.13 His effort to increase 
entrepreneurial capabilities by implementing government policies like the 
Benteng Programme was seen to be a failure. The programme received much 
enthusiasm, growing from 250 businessmen to over 2,200 by 1954. Yet the 
government found that 90% of them lacked business experience and often 
became a front for Chinese-Indonesian businessmen.14
The failure of the Benteng Programme was a major setback to the idea 
that the Indonesian government could instantly develop an indigenous 
entrepreneurial class through the application of government policies. Sumitro 
reiterated, “Lack of equipment was not the most serious bottleneck. Equally 
serious, if not more so, was the lack of skills in general, and the critical 
12 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (ed.), The Government’s program on industries. p. 16-19.
13 J.H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies. As Exemplified by Indonesia, 
(Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1953), p. 36-51.
14 For more on the Benteng programme, consult Thomas Lindblad, Bridges to New Business. 
The Economic Decolonization of Indonesia, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008), p. 125-147.
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conditions of public administration in particular… Immediate improvement 
of our public administration is a precondition for satisfactory implementation 
of future economic and financial policies. We refer not only to the government 
but also to government controlled or government sponsored enterprises, 
banks, credit agencies, etc.”15  It pointed the need for Indonesia not only to 
create entrepreneurs, but a whole range of administrative capabilities and 
administrative scaffolding for growth. This was why business administration 
seemed like the perfect answer to the lack of Indonesian entrepreneurial spirit. 
“We have experienced to our bitter disappointment, however, that capital 
equipment purchased resulted in actual capital loss just because no account 
was taken of the organizational preparation and skills required to generate 
capital expenditures into really productive results. I would consider for the 
next five years the problems of human investment of equal importance as 
capital investments, if not more important.” 16
In both the Benteng Programme and the Economic Urgency Plan, the 
ability of Indonesian actors to “supply the increased volume of administrative, 
technical, and entrepreneurial skills to complement capital and credit was 
once again overestimated.”17 There was thus a belief that both the bureaucracy 
and industrial or economic managers required some form of reform measures. 
The problem of development required basic changes to the organizational 
structure of the bureaucracy, but it also required a fundamental change in 
the mind-set and leadership of the economic and bureaucratic managers. 
There was an obvious need to introduce to the nation a new paradigm on 
leadership and a new structure of power and authority relationship. Scientific 
management emerged as a logical extension of this need. 
Shift from Legal to Managerial Concepts
Within the government, the first effort to come to grips with a structured 
approach toward governance was evinced in the formation of the State 
Committee for the research of ministerial organizations or Panok (Panitya 
15 Quoted in Douglas Paauw, Financing development. The Indonesian case. (Glencoe: the Free 
Press, 1959), p. 75.
16 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, “Budget and its implications” in Ekonomi dan Keuangan 
Indonesia, vol. VI, January, 1953, p. 10. 
17 Douglas Paauw, Financing development. The Indonesian Case. (Glencoe: the Free Press, 1959), 
p. 77.
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Negara untuk menjelidiki organisasi kementerian-kementerian) commissioned 
by the President in 1952. The committee was tasked with investigating an 
efficient form of organizations for the government in order to reduce the 
expansion of organization and civil servants. It looked to create order and 
uniformity in the structure of the ministries and government institutions. 
Headed by legal specialist A.M. Pringgodigdo, the report was published 
in 1954 and was often consulted throughout the period.18 The committee 
conducted research and found both formal legal differences in the ministerial 
forms and organizational differences; highly differentiated organizational 
structure, overlapping and redundant functions.19 The purpose of the 
committee’s ministerial plan was to create continuity in the administration 
in the event of government change, regulate new ministers and achieve clarity 
to the entire administrative structure. As a result, a series of re-ordering and 
regrouping was conducted on several ministerial sub-organizations. 
Unfortunately, the committee failed to understand the psychological 
impact the changes had on the staff. A division (bagian) that was ‘demoted’ 
to section (seksi) felt underappreciated. The integration of redundant offices 
made many people anxious about their position and the shift of offices or 
sections or division from one ministry to another was met with hostility 
by those ministries slated to lose their workers and perceived prestige. The 
centralization of office administration (tata usaha) under the secretary general 
office failed to understand that not all central ministries work in the same 
building. “The writer came to the conclusion that the committee’s numbers 
are faulty.” They extrapolated numbers based on past ministries, not future 
extrapolation. “Perhaps it was the result of the inaccurate calculation of the 
committee, perhaps it could also be the result of the stress on practical persons 
especially legal specialists…Within Panok there were five jurists, one legal 
expert, one candidate jurist, and as a result the plan was created in a ‘rigid’ 
fashion with no escape clauses.”20
18 Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, ”Perkembangan ilmu administrasi negara di Indonesia,” in M. 
Makagiansar and Widjojo Nitisastro, Research di Indonesia. 1945-1965. IV. Bidang sosial, 
ekonomi dan kebudajaan, (Jakarta: Departemen Urusan Research Nasional, 1965), p. 22-23.
19 Mohammad Sidik Moeljono, “Rantjangan Panok” in Pantjawarsa LAN, (Jakarta: Lembaga 
Administrasi Negara, 1963), p. 86-87.
20 Mohammad Sidik Moeljono, “Rantjangan Panok” in Pantjawarsa LAN, (Jakarta: LAN, 
1963), p. 90-91. “Mungkin a.l. karena perhitungan2 Panok kurang sempurna, mungkin 
djuga karena Panok terdiri dari orang-orang praktek dengan titik berat ahli hukum… Dalam 
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The shift from a Continental legal toward an Anglo-Saxon administrative 
approach was a significant testament to the prevailing attitude toward 
Indonesia’s Dutch legacy. There was an almost fanatical need to pry 
Indonesian practices as far away from Dutch ones as possible and a view that 
saw Dutch colonial practices as inherently bad and unnecessary for further 
consideration.  In 1950, the Word Commission (Komisi Istilah) was created 
at the Language Institute (Lembaga Bahasa) and UI’s faculty of literature 
and philosophy. By 1962, they had compiled 254,960 words, including 
5,858 legal terms, 10,318 military terms, 27,973 aviation terms and 18.525 
engineering terms, many of them Dutch in origin.21 Although the success 
of the commission varied, many words were being changed into English, 
especially in sciences like management. 
A number of the reasons for the disinterest in the colonial heritage had 
strong compelling argument; there was widespread acknowledgement that 
the bureaucratic tradition of the colonial state was too complicated to be 
implemented effectively. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo said: 
We have taken over from the colonial government a bureaucratic body that 
is in itself very difficult to understand. The bureaucracy used difficult and 
complicated work methods. This difficult bureaucratic body was, during the 
colonial period, run by people who had been acclimatized to work within 
such structures. At the present condition, the same bureaucratic system is 
being filled with new employees whose technical capabilities and experience 
is not in line with the needs of the system. The procedures used in the 
colonial bureaucratic system (still being used today), is according to the 
experience of the writer, very hard to understand and control. Oftentimes 
people working within the environment of these bureaucracies have a hard 
time understanding the regulations. As a result, decisions are often based on 
whims (or oftentimes people decide not to make any decision”).22
Panok terdapat 5 juris, 1 ahli hukum, 1 tjalon juris, maka rantjangan Panok tersusun setjara 
‘rigid’ (strak, kaku) tanpa escape clausules.
21 Suwarna, “Arti istilah bagi hukum militer” in Chakra Vijaya, Vol. 1, No. 29, April 1962, 
p. 14-25.
22 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Bunga Rampai Ekonomi, (Jakarta: Indira, 1951), p. 266. Kita 
telah mengambil over dari pemerintahan kolonial, suatu badan birokrasi jang pada dirinja 
sudah sangat sukar difahami. Birokrasi tersebut mempergunakan tjara bekerdja jang sulit 
dan gecompliceerd. Badan birokrasi jang serba sulit itu, dizaman colonial didjalankan oleh 
tenaga2 jang sudah biasa bekerdja dalam susunan demikian. Dalam keadaan sekarang, 
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Such legal approach was considered anathema to economic development 
and represented what Sumitro called the regulation economy (ekonomi 
peraturan), in which regulations grew haphazardly and in contradictory ways 
as to reduce efficiency for the economy as a whole.23 Daan Marks has argued 
that the Dutch had failed in leaving behind lasting, efficient institutions 
that were properly indigenized and this was the reason why Indonesia 
experienced institutional damage, which slowed down growth significantly, 
in comparison to other countries that experienced proper indigenization of 
their state institutions.24
The reduction of Dutch influence was an active policy that was part 
of Indonesian decolonization. As chapter four has shown, people clung 
to Dutch methods and the government continued to pay civil servants to 
study in the Netherlands. The shift had to be pushed through by the elites 
and American alacrity in providing funds. The shift from the ‘legal’ to the 
‘practical’ approach accompanied the shift from Dutch to American ideas.25 
According to Carmel Budiardjo “the experts in England and the United States 
in general say that political science is about the study of power in society. 
Power is analysed on the basis of its properties, principles, development, 
framework and consequences. In comparison, experts from countries under 
German influence maintain that political science studies the state as a legal 
phenomenon, juridical-constitutional interpretation and administrative 
law.”26
system birokrasi tersebut diisi oleh tenaga2 baru jang baik mengenai pengalaman maupun 
ketjakapan technis, tidak menerima didikan jang sepadan. Procedure jang dipakai dalam 
susunan birokrasi bekas kolonial (jang dilandjutkan hingga sekarang), memang menurut 
pengalaman pengarang sendiri, adalah sangat sukar dimengerti dan dikendalikan. Seringkali 
orang2 jang harus kerdja dalam lingkungan badan birokrasi ini, tidak mengerti sendiri 
peraturan2 jang berlaku. Akibatnja ialah, tindakan2 jang diambil mempunjai sifat jang 
tidak karuan (ataupun sama sekali tiada diambil tindakan dan/atau keputusan).
23 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Management dan Mismanagement dalam Perusahaan dan 
Masjarakat, (Jakarta: Pembangunan, 1957), p. 5.
24 Daan Marks, “The economic consequences of decolonization” in Thomas Lindblad (ed.), 
Indonesian economic decolonization in regional and international perspectives, (Leiden: KITLV 
Press, 2009), p. 161-162. 
25 There was growing interest in economics and other social sciences that had begun to rival 
the law department in attracting students, for instance. Bruce Glassburner, “High level 
manpower for economic development: the Indonesian experience”, p. 180.
26 Ernst Utrecht, “Beberapa tjatatan tentang ‘Public Administration’,” p. 52. “Para sardjana 
di Inggris dan Amerika Serikat umumnja mengatakan bahwa ilmu politik mempeladjari 
soal kekuasaan dalam masjarakat. Kekuasaan ini diperlihatkan sifatnja, asasnja, 
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The shift from the Dutch Continental system was thus, according 
to Padjadjaran University legal specialist Ernst Utrecht, a shift from the 
Continental Rechtstaat to the Anglo-Saxon welfare state or Wohlfahrtstaat. 
Utrecht, one of the few Indo-European who have taken the Indonesian 
citizenship and a staunch supporter of Sukarno and member of the PNI, 
daubed in politics and academics equally during the period.27 The German 
Rechtstaat attempted to impose a legal order in which all government 
decision could be regulated within the law, yet the problem appeared when 
the state began to expand its function as part of the development of social 
service and purveyor of public goods.28 “This narrow view wanted to put in 
a straightjacket the government’s activity within its legal boundaries. As a 
result, when government activity was expanded because of the acceptance of 
the Wolhfahrtstaat, an expansion of a ‘web of administrative prescription’29 
happened that was increasingly complicated and in contradiction. This was 
because of the wish that nothing be left to its own devices and that positive 
legal supervision be maintained. As a result, there appeared a bureaucracy 
that preferred to obstruct instead of support the government’s activity for 
the general welfare and individual interests!”30 Quoting Yugoslavian legal 
specialist Eugen Pusic, Utrecht wrote “And administrative inefficiency, caused 
by legal guarantees, can finally reduce these guarantees to nil.”31
Sukarno, in a speech to the Indonesian Jurist Association in 1961 said 
this about legal-mindedness: “Wilhelm Liebknecht has said – in Dutch – 
perkembangannja, rangka dan akibatnja. Sebaliknja ahli-ahli dari Negara jang terpengaruh 
oleh Djerman mempertahankan bahwa ilmu politik terutama mempeladjari ‘negara’ sebagai 
gedjala hukum, tafsiran juridis UUD dan hokum administratief.” 
27 He hated the PSI and called it de partij van ‘salon-socialisten’ in Eileen Utrecht, Twee Zijden 
van een Waterscheiding. Herrineringen aan Indonesie Voor en Na de Onafhankelijkheid, 
(Amsterdam: Sua, 1991), p. 87-90, 138 and 152-162.
28 For more on the liberal character of the Rechtsstaat see Rachel S. Turner, Neo-Liberal Ideology, 
p. 27-31.
29 Net van administratieve voorschiften
30 Ernst Utrecht, “Beberapa tjatatan tentang ‘Public Administration’”, p. 62. “Pendapat 
sempit ini hendak mengikat aktivitet pemerintah pada hukum. Akibatnja: ketika kemudian 
aktivitet pemerintah sangat diperluas karena diterimanja “Wohlfahrtstaat”, maka dilahirkan 
suatu ‘net van administratievevoorschiften’ luas jang sangat berbelit2 dan makin luas makin 
bertentangan (!), sebab keinginan supaja tiada sesuatupun jang dilepaskan dari pengawasan 
hukum positif tetap dipertahankan. Dengan demikian dilahirkan suatu birokrasi jang lebih 




‘Met juristen kun je geen revolutie maken.’ What Liebknecht said was that 
most legal specialists, jurists, are very legalistic, they cling to the prevailing 
laws so strongly that if they were to be asked to join the revolution, which 
requires throwing away the current... these legalistic jurists, would find it 
very difficult to do so.”32 Sukarno had equated legalistic thinking as being 
almost contra-revolutionary. In 1958, Sukarno inaugurated the creation of 
the Institution for the Development of National Law (Lembaga Pembinaan 
Hukum Nasional), whose goal was to change the colonial roots of Indonesian 
law.33 In 1960, Sukarno gave ministerial status to the head of the Supreme 
Court, thus suspending Indonesia’s law-based state.34
The root reasons for public administration was thus coincident with 
the root reasons for Sumitro’s effort to promote Business Administration, 
as they were predicated on the idea of efficiency as a central feature of both 
government and economic functions. The new Anglo-Saxon approach was 
to see the administration of the state as similar to the administration of the 
company. The main ideas of business administration such as ‘organization’ 
and ‘management’ were imported and geared toward the practical and the 
pragmatic. The analysis of ‘power’ within the state was based on understanding 
the workings of institutions and how to solve problems associated with its 
bureaucratic tendency to be slow and inefficient. The resultant system was 
an efficient, flexible approach that was geared toward problem solving and 
not merely toward the implementation of regulation and the law. 
32 Sukarno, Sosialisme dalam Kepribadian Indonesia. Pidato Presiden Sukarno pada Pembukaan 
Kongress Persahi di Jogjakarta, 26 Nopember 1961, (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1961), 
p. 4. “…Wilhelm Liebknecht telah berkata – salinannja dalam bahasa Belanda – “Met 
juristen kun je geen revolutie maken. Jang dimaksudkan oleh Liebknecht ialah bahwa 
ahlihukum, juristen, kebanjakan – demikianlah maksud Liebknecht – sangat legalistis, sangat 
memegang kepada hukum-hukum jang “prevaleren”, sangat memegang kepada hukum-
hukum jangada, sehingga djikalau diadjak ber-revolusi – revolusi jangberarti melemparkan 
hukum jang ada, “a revolution rejects yesterday” kata seorang pemimpin revolusi jang lain, 
“a revolution rejects yesterday” – sehingga djikalau jurist-jurist janglegalistis ini diadjak 
ber-revolusi, katanja, amat sulitlah hal jang demikian itu.”
33 Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia no. 107 tahun 1958 tentang Lembaga Pembinaan 
Hukum Nasional (LPHN) in ANRI, Jakarta, Mohammad Yamin, inv.nr. 360. LPHN was 
composed of lawyers and other elements of society in order to create a legal system that was 
not merely based on a legal approach, but also accommodate other elements, at least according 
to the Minister of Education and Culture to the Ministerial Board in charge of creating the 
body. ANRI in Jakarta, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, inv. Nr. 1651. 
34 A.M. Reksohadiprodjo, “The Relations of Law and Economic Development. With special 
reference to Indonesia”, MA thesis Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1969, p. 33.
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At the same time, the shift toward the welfare state and the concomitant 
rise of the administrative state occurred in much of the world, including 
the Netherlands. The first development of public administration in the 
Netherlands was conducted not at Leiden or Utrecht University but at 
the Rotterdam Business School by Gerrit van Poelje. Its implementation 
was facilitated as a result of the destruction of the Dutch economy during 
the Second World War and the need to reconstruct and rehabilitate both 
government and economic administration. Yet, in Indonesia, it was recounted 
as a shift away from the Dutch discourse and toward the American. Ernst 
Utrecht warned that such alacrity in accepting American ideas was dangerous 
and that “there is nothing wrong for us to direct our interest to the problem 
solving system of progressive countries like the Chinese People’s Republic.”35
Expansion and Development
During the colonial period, Indonesians had little chance of obtaining 
training in administration because there had been few opportunities for 
Indonesians to occupy decision-making posts and because the Continental, 
legal-formal approach held sway. Legal education was often the only 
training given to candidate administrators in administrative schools like the 
MOSVIA/OSVIA, Rechtshoogeschool and the Bestuursacademie. After the war, 
Dutch development of public administration started to make an impact in 
Indonesia as Gerrit A. van Poelje’s 1942 book on Bestuurskunde was translated 
in 1953, the same year as the publication of A.M. Donner’s Nederlandsch 
Bestuursrecht. Ernst Utrecht’s Pengantar Hukum Administrasi Negara was 
published in 1955, a year after the Panok Committee conducted their study 
and published their plans. Aside from the Panok, the government through 
the Biro Perantjang Negara also conducted research and invited a public 
administration specialist T.R. Smith from New Zealand to train in November 
1953. Smith also produced a memorandum on public administration. By this 
time, there was considerable interest in the introduction and implementation 
of training in public administration, not just because of the extent toward 
which the failure of the Sumitro Plan had become widespread but also 
35 Ernst Utrecht, “Beberapa tjatatan tentang ‘Public Administration” berhubungan dengan 
pidato-pidato Prajudi dan Tjia Kok Tjiang” in Padjadjaran, p. 72.
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because the elites realized that the production of expertise was a pressing 
matter.36
From a business perspective, the discussion of American scientific 
management occurred as early as those of the public administration. A. 
Strachoff and E. Smit, both Dutch engineers at Unilever wrote in the journal 
Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia on the need to increase labour productivity 
in Indonesian plants through the application of modern managerial 
methods.37Ko-Ordinasi dalam Republik Indonesia written by Sutomo around 
1953 gave a glimpse of the problems concerning lack of coordination and 
unhealthy competition within government offices and agencies from the 
viewpoint of people within the government, and looked at the psychological 
problems at the root of the problem.38 This book, though, had less impact 
on the development of Indonesian administration science than it should 
have. For instance, it was not cited in Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo’s article on 20 
years of development of Indonesian public administration science,39 despite 
the insights his book had on the problems surrounding coordination and 
the lack of esprit de corps in the civil service. Written by a revolutionary hero 
with access to government officials and their thoughts, Sutomo’s answer to 
the problem was not fixed on the problem of leadership, but on creating 
common interest amongst the elites: the officials of bureaucracy, the military 
and the business sector. It sought to emulate the colonial bureaucracy and 
its usage of clubs and parties (soos and societiets) to create a community of 
elite with unified goals.40
36 For instance, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Indonesia dipersimpangan djalan, (Jakarta: Alma’Arif, 
1951).
37 A. Strachoff and E. Smit, “The possibility of increasing the labour productivity in Indonesia 
by application of modern managerial methods” in Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Year 
VI, 1953, p. 164-181.
38 Sutomo, Ko-Ordinasi dalam Republik Indonesia, (Malang: Balapan, n.a.). 
39 Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, “Perkembangan ilmu administrasi negara di Indonesia”, p. 16-53.
40 Sutomo, Ko-Ordinasi dalam Republik Indonesia, p. 33-34 and 42-43.Sutomo or Bung Tomo 
is a famous revolutionary fighter who had led the fight against the British in the romanticized 
battle of Surabaya on 10 November 1945. He had become a liaison officer between the 
military and civilian government during the last years of the revolution. He had dabbled in 
politics, entering the Parliament in the 1950s before being deeply disappointed and leaving 
public life for good. He died in 1981.
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Litchfeld and Rankin Report 
In 1954, the Indonesian government and the University of Indonesia invited 
Dr. Edward H. Litchfeld and Alan C. Rankin, the then dean and assistant 
professor of Cornell’s School of Business and Public Administration to 
conduct a wide-ranging three-month survey of Indonesia’s administrative 
woes. The two men met with important Indonesian leaders, including Vice 
President Mohammad Hatta, the head of the National Planning Bureau 
Ir. H.A. Djuanda and prominent intellectuals such as Dr.Mohammad 
Yamin, Dr.Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Dr. R. Supomo, President of 
the University of Indonesia. Lichtfelt and Rankin interviewed various 
Indonesians in top, middle and low positions in government.
Knowledge of basic concepts of public administration was practically 
non-existent in almost every organization they visited: government offices, 
hospitals, school, etc. “Generally speaking, we would say that the field of 
administrative science is largely unknown in contemporary Indonesia”.41 
What Lichtfeld and Rankin suggested was the creation of university-based 
Indonesian administrative courses that would cater to Indonesian need 
in creating an administrative leadership, people who were able to apply 
the science of public management in order to create efficient government 
institutions. Furthermore, because administrative science was fairly new and 
Anglo-Saxon-centred, the Dutch never left behind anything pertaining to 
it. They encouraged the development of literature in administration, which 
included acquisition of foreign materials, translation of standard materials 
and the development of Indonesian-based literature on administration. In 
fact, Dwight Waldo’s The Study of Public Administration, a classic in the 
development of public administrative science was translated a year after the 
Litchfeld and Rankin visit and seven years after its first publication in 1948.42
They also encouraged the need to create libraries and train librarians as 
support for literature development. They found resources within the country 
lacking; there were only a couple of hundred books for the entire university 
41 Edward H. Lichtfeld and Alan C. Rankin, Training for Administration in Indonesia, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University, 1954), p. 11.
42 It was translated by Slamet W. Atmosoedarmo and published in 1955 as Pengantar Studi 
Public Administration. The term Public Administration was left to its English original, 
signaling the novelty of the entire discourse for the Indonesian intellectual public. 
Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State. A study of the Political Theory of American Public 
Administration. 
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system in Indonesia, many of which were imported and were related to 
Indonesia only tangentially. Many universities did not even have a library. 
The available books on Indonesia were confined mostly to those written in the 
Law Department and a few on the economy, with practically no supporting 
literature on political science and psychology.43
Another step was to develop university faculties in administrative science, 
initially for the University of Indonesia, to be spread to other universities 
such as Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta and one in the Celebes and 
Sumatra. The import of temporary foreign teachers and the active training 
of a permanent Indonesian faculty would be required. Such formation 
would also allow for the creation of organized research programs through the 
formation of both. Not only would they be part of the Indonesian faculty, 
they would also be part of government and business, thus creating the system 
of relationship between government, universities and the business world 
that was and is a feature of society and governance in the Western world. 
They suggested a program of graduate work involving three years of study in 
residence and a fourth year in the field leading toward a PhD degree. They 
calculated that if only one person were to be trained each year for each of the 
ministries, provinces, regencies and very large cities, then 200 graduates a year 
would be needed. A four-year undergraduate training program with 1000 
students would be needed. In fact, larger, considering the rate of attrition, 
which they calculated conservatively to be around 25%.44
Another important consideration was the provision of education for 
those who were already in government service. In-service training programs 
to the higher-level administrative echelons, instead of the usual technical and 
lower-level positions would be necessary. Included within it would be the 
executive development programs. Such programs needed to be sensitive and 
they suggested that participation of very senior persons in the government 
to be essential to enable others to participate without losing face and to 
find acceptance in the lower levels of the administration. Training overseas 
would also be beneficial for public officials to acquaint themselves with the 
concepts and practices of administration. Such officials would also be more 
sympathetic to young graduates filling in the position in their office. They 
supported a survey on personnel practice with recommendation for the 
43 Lichtfeld, Edward H. and Alan C. Rankin, Training for Administration in Indonesia, p. 13-14.
44 Lichtfeld, Edward H. and Alan C. Rankin, Training for Administration in Indonesia, p. 19-20
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improvement of the system, which the National Planning Bureau supported. 
This would result in the creation of the Lembaga Administrasi Negara or LAN 
as one of the main education centres for government managerial production.45
The Effect of the Report 
A committee was formed to follow up on the report headed by Vice 
President Mohammad Hatta and with Djuanda Kartawidjaja of the National 
Planning Bureau, M. Hutasoit from the Ministry of Culture and Education 
and Sumarman as members, among others. The committee agreed on the 
development of a specifically Indonesian program that would unite both 
public and business administration within a single educational centre. The 
Planning Bureau also published “Administrative requirements for social and 
economic development” in August 1954.46 But it was only after 1955 that 
a significant development occurred in the education of public and business 
administration, and especially after 1957 when there was anticipation of 
greater government control as a result of the rise of Guided Democracy. In 
1956, the ICA funded Joseph L Sutton, who was working as advisor to the 
Thai Public Administration Institute at Thammasat University, Bangkok. 
They also created a Public Administration division in Jakarta with Harry 
W. Marsh and John A. Ulinski as officers. The ICA program focused on 
importing books on administration and sending Indonesians to study 
scientific administration abroad.47
The Indonesian government had by this time sent many government 
employees abroad to the United States of America, England, Australia, the 
Philippines, India and many other countries. More important was the quick 
expansion of education on the matter. On 20 September 1956, Prajudi 
Atmosudirdjo made a speech on public administration to open the Faculty 
of Administration in the private University Krisnadwipajana in Jakarta. 
In December of the same year, Tjia Kok Tjiang also opened a Faculty of 
Public Administration at the Universitas Indonesia in Makassar. These 
speeches were to be criticized heavily by Ernst Utrecht in 1958.48 Even so, 
45 Edward H. Lichtfeld and Alan C. Rankin, Training for Administration in Indonesia, p. 21-23.
46 Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, ”Perkembangan Ilmu Administrasi Negara di Indonesia,” p. 27-28.
47 Ibid.
48 Ernst Utrecht, “Beberapa tjatatan tentang ‘Public Administration’.”
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there was no doubt that interest in public administration had resulted in a 
swift expansion of state-sponsored institutional development pertaining to 
education and research. 
What is necessary to understand here is the high level of support from 
experts in developing this wide range of educational institutions from both 
within the state and the broader community. The creation of the Akademi 
Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri (APDN) by the Ministry of the Interior in March 
1956 to replace the C-Course was predicated on a shift in curriculum toward 
public administration. The C-Course was started in 1953 as an integration 
of previous schools of government of the Pamong Praja corps. Pupils at the 
APDN were to be taught the latest knowledge on public administration to the 
detriment of administrative law (hukum administrasi) which was effectively 
replaced. American professors like Garth C. Jones and Henry W. Bush 
were posted to teach there.49 It was not merely the speed at which all these 
developments occurred, but also the cutting edge-ness of the process. The 
newest books on public administration and scientific management became 
widely available in the libraries of the places. Many books were quickly 
translated including Dwight Waldo’s The Administrative State, which was 
published in Indonesian in 1955.50
Criticism of Scientific Management
Public Administration and Scientific Management had become modern 
mantras with the promise of bringing efficiency and order as if by magic. 
Utrecht called it a ‘mode-woorden’ and, in fact, a ‘toverwoorden’, magical 
words.51 “Has the result of public administration matched the enormous 
interest we have of it?” he asked, and which he answered with a negative.52 A 
USAID report said in 1964: “One of the current fetishes in most developing 
countries is the field of “management”. Everyone seems to look on it as a 
panacea to all problems.”53American support for its expansion also meant 
that it not only conformed to the intellectual fashion of the day, but that 
49 Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, ”Perkembangan ilmu administrasi negara di Indonesia,” p. 33-34.
50 Dwight Waldo, Pengantar Studi Public Administration, (Jakarta: Djajasakti, 1955).
51 Ernst Utrecht, “Beberapa tjatatan tentang ‘Public Administration’,” p. 69-70.
52 Ernst Utrecht, “Beberapa tjatatan tentang ‘Public Administration’,” p. 68.
53 Human Resource Development. Problems, Policies, Programs, (Jakarta: USAID, 1964), p. 11. 
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authorities saw it as an opportunity to obtain available funds and aid that 
the US had opened up. Yet, Indonesia’s acquaintance with the science was 
new and this was most obviously apparent in the writings of the supposed 
experts of public administration in the country. Ernst Utrecht’s criticism 
to lectures given by Prajudi Atmosudirdjo for the opening of the Faculty 
of Management at the Universitas Krisnadwipajana and Tjia Kok Tjiang’s 
lecture for the five-year celebration of the Faculty of Public Administration 
at the Universitas 17 Agustus 1945 in Makassar was brutally honest and rare 
for post-independent Indonesia. In it, Utrecht accused both men of being 
dilettantes, and worse, he accused Prajudi of being intellectually dishonest. 
On Prajudi’s lecture, he said, “I’ve never encountered from the mouth of 
an Indonesian intellectual a series of bullshit and lies, as have been written 
on the quotation above.”54 Prajudi’s discussion on public administration, 
especially in the Netherlands, according to Utrecht, misunderstood the 
Dutch condition. His lecture failed to provide a good definition of what 
Public Administration and management actually entailed and his discussion 
on the problems of public administration did not respond to the conditions 
of Indonesia. In fact, Utrecht’s main criticism was with the dangers of over-
estimating the ‘magical’ abilities of the public administration and as a result 
the loss of interest in understanding the importance of administrative law 
(hukum tata-negara), the law-based approach which was used by Dutch 
scholars in understanding the function of the state. In comparison to the 
European legal-based approach, the Anglo-Saxon approach was a political 
science approach, which used power as an analytical tool to understand the 
structure of state and management. To be fair, Utrecht himself was a legal 
specialist and wrote what came to be a tome in Indonesian administrative 
law. There was obviously a professional angle to his criticism. Being an Indo-
European and a graduate of Leiden Law, he came from a European/Dutch 
intellectual tradition, which was eroded away during this period. 
Because of the antipathy towards many things Dutch, the shift toward 
Anglo-Saxon public management science was conducted not through an 
initial understanding of the science but with the experimental appeal to try 
something new. Sumitro Djojohadisukumo in an opening lecture for the start 
54 Ernst Utrecht, “Beberapa tjatatan tentang ‘Public Administration’,”p. 47. “Belum pernah 
saja mendengar dari mulut seorang tjendikiawan bangsa Indonesia suatu rentetan omong-
kosong dan bohong, seperti tertera dalam kutipan diatas.” 
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of the School for Business and Public Management55 on 14 January 1957, 
said “I should stress that the term ‘administration’ must not be confused with 
the term ‘administrasi’ which are usually used in Indonesia as an extension of 
the Dutch usage of the word.”56 Because of the wish to get Indonesia away as 
soon as possible from their Dutch legacy, there was a somewhat haphazard 
attempt to install scientific management as a replacement to former Dutch-
based studies that had a long colonial precedent. 
There was, thus, a quality of detachment expressed in the books, articles 
and lectures of the works on public management in Indonesia during 
the period.57 The American books were seldom contextualized with the 
Indonesian condition. The case studies compiled and used as the foundation 
for the build-up for a contextualized Indonesian science of public and 
private management lacked a deep understanding of the power relation and 
institutions that were needed in order to understand fully its ‘ecology’.58 The 
lack of the development in Indonesian political science made it difficult to 
fully analyse the ‘ecological’ context of the manager. The approach toward 
power was then, as we will see below, expressed in the form of formulating 
leadership problems, as an extension of a cultural analysis of Indonesians in 
general. But the discussion on power rarely touched on the structure of the 
power as it was played out within the institutional environment of the state. 
For that to occur would require the full authority of the ‘scientific managers’ 
or ‘public administration specialists.’ The problem of power was a political 
problem, but it was exactly this problem of lack of authority that the ‘experts’ 
were dealing with during the period.
Utrecht provided an example of this problem. A student of his at the C 
Course in Malang who had studied public finance under Professor Garth N. 
55 Perguruan Tinggi Ketataniagaan dan Ketatapradjaan
56 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Management dan Mismanagement dalam Perusahaan dan 
Masjarakat, (Jakarta: Pembangunan, 1957), p. 3. “Hendaklah saja tekankan, bahwa kata 
‘administration’ djangan ditjampur-adukkan dengan ‘administrasi’ dalam arti jang lazim 
masih dipakai di Indonesia sebagai kelangsungan rangka pengertian bahasa Belanda.” 
57  Often times, the books were rehashed version of American books with little effort to apply 
it within an Indonesian context or situation. 
58 J. Rossall and Leon Mears, Indonesian Cases in Business Administration, (Jakarta: LPEM, 
1961) also Everett Hawkins, Cases in Business Administration, (Yogyakarta: Fakultas 
Ekonomi-UGM, 1964). The analysis of the cases was politically detached and focused 
on a purely economic approach, instead of understanding the wider societal and political 
implication of inefficiency.
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Jones, an American expert who studied the problems of public administration 
in the United States and Mexico, was unable to fully implement the 
techniques he has learned from his professor because the administrative 
apparatus in his division wouldn’t provide him with the authority to do so. 
Efficiency change thus required understanding and changing the basis of 
the Indonesia’s staatsrecht. To allow for changes in efficiency, the law would 
have to be changed in order to conform the system of government. In order 
for this to be successful, one has to understand the Indonesian system of 
government.59 In order for Indonesians to engage in the reform of the state’s 
legal basis, it required an emphasis on legal study and an engagement with 
their Dutch intellectual past. The problem was twofold. First, if such legal 
changes in the state system allowed greater authority for managers, it required 
a redistribution of power of the political elites toward their ‘expert’-based 
elite, and this did not happen. Second, ‘scientific management’ provided a 
magic word for the political elite that was at the same time supported by US 
aid that effectively blocked the need to deal with the ‘real’ problem, which 
was a political problem.
The Development of Business Management
Like that of public management, business administration grew fast in the 
1950s and exhibited the same shift from the Dutch/Continental system 
towards an American/Anglo-Saxon type. Barli Halim divided the period into 
three: 1945-1957 as a Continental period, 1958-1959 as an Anglo-Saxon 
one and 1960-1965 as a business management science based on Indonesian 
socialism.60 Although he placed Americanization as a brief and almost 
insignificant one-year development, it would be foolish to underestimate 
the strength of its message and ideology. Reading through works on business 
administration throughout the 1960 would easily show how replete were 
ideas of scientific management within the pages of supposedly socialist 
Indonesian tracts on management. 
There is doubt that business administration lagged behind in its 
‘Indonesianization’ process in comparison to the vigorous interest exhibited 
59 Ernst Utrecht, “Beberapa tjatatan tentang ‘Public Administration’,” p. 69-70.
60 Barli Halim, “Ilmu ekonomi perusahaan” in M. Makagiansar and Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), 
Research di Indonesia, p. 211.
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by state elite in the development of Indonesian public administration. This 
was the result of several factors. First, business administration was a lot less 
politically sensitive than public administration, whose relationship to state 
power was deep. Second, the continuation of Dutch perspectives on business 
administration was the result of the continued presence of Dutch professors 
teaching the field in Indonesian universities. Again, the root of this was similar 
to the first reason above; teaching business administration carried less political 
weight than law or public administration. Third, the continuing and large 
presence of Dutch-owned enterprises meant that Indonesian graduates had 
the chance of entering employment in these enterprises and thus continuing 
the relevance of a Dutch perspective on business administration. All of this 
was ended as a result of the nationalization of Dutch-owned enterprises and 
the forced repatriation of Dutch citizens by 1957. It was only obvious that 
America came to replace them.61
There were basically three main tracks in obtaining business management 
in the country: the university-based system, corporate-based business courses 
and state-based programs. Economics, and especially business administration, 
was not available at the few existing faculties during the colonial period. The 
only faculty with some economics education was in the law faculty. Some 
15 Indonesian economists were available at independence; they graduated 
from Dutch universities, mostly the Erasmus University in Rotterdam, and 
some from the Universities of Amsterdam and Tilburg. After independence, 
three universities develop a relatively strong economics faculty: the University 
of Indonesia, Gadjah Mada University and the Protestant Nommensen 
University in Medan. A college of business management was set up in the 
early 1950s by Dutch commercial organizations and chambers of commerce 
representing a private sector response to the need for commercial managers.62
Business economics brought by the Dutch focused on the study of the 
firm. This liberal approach contrasted with the study of the state, i.e. its role in 
economic development, in the nascent science of developmental economics. 
The study of business management was divided into four sciences: cost theory 
(ilmu biaya), expenditure theory (ilmu belandja), external organization and 
internal organization theory. The books were also in Dutch; J.C. Rietveld’s 
61 Barli Halim, “Ilmu ekonomi perusahaan”, p. 215-218.
62 Antara, 29 November 1953.
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Inleidend Leerboek der Bedrijfseconomie, v.d. Meer’s Schets der Bedrijfseconomie, 
P.J. Potgieter’s Inleiding tot de Bedrijfseconomie and so forth.63
In 1955, the FEUI discussed the possibility of hooking up with an 
American University in order to support the upgrading of Indonesian 
teaching staffs. Prior to 1957, Sumitro had succeeded in recruiting Dutch 
teachers through his connections with the Rotterdam School of Economics.64 
In 1956, an agreement was signed with the University of California at 
Berkeley to be funded by the Ford Foundation. Aside from sending young 
Indonesian lecturers to pursue post-graduate studies there, Berkeley would 
also be sending professors to teach at UI. In 1957, six UI staff members 
were sent to California while Berkeley sent three of their staff members. In 
1955, Universitas Gadjah Mada took Economics out of the Law, Economics 
and Social Science Faculty to stand as a faculty on its own and appointed 
lecturers Dr. J.B. Stock, Prof. Stanislaw Swianiewicz, a Polish economist, and 
Prof. C. de Heer,65 former professor of business enterprise at Makassar.66 In 
1957, UGM signed an agreement with the Ford Foundation and Wisconsin 
University, which allowed the sending of eight foreign lecturers, six of which 
came from Wisconsin University, including Everett Hawkins.67
The first changes they made were to replace the theories that were being 
taught in classes. The American Frederick Taylor and the French Henry Fayol 
now started making their appearance. Fayol divided business administration 
into six parts: management, production, marketing, financing, accountancy, 
and personnel. The introduction of American textbooks appeared in 
Indonesia for the first time; Prentice Hall, McGraw and Hill and Macmillan, 
among others, provided, more pragmatic books designed for the uninitiated.68 
The shift was observable also in the method of teaching. The introduction 
of discussion groups and seminars was seen to be a refreshing change to the 
lecture forms of Dutch professors. The teaching staffs were taught to assist 
63 Barli Halim, “Ilmu ekonomi perusahaan”, p. 213-214.
64 Thee Kian Wie, “Economics” in Koentjaraningrat (ed.), The Social Sciences in Indonesia, 
(Jakarta: LIPI, 1979), p. 229.
65 Sardjito, Laporan Tahunan Universitas Gadjah Mada Tahun Pengadjaran 1955/1956, 
(Yogyakarta: UGM, 1956), p. 4.
66 A.N.J. De Hollander, The Social Sciences in Indonesia, (Paris: UNESCO, 1951). 
67 Sardjito, Laporan Tahunan Universitas Gadjah Mada, p .13-14. 
68 Barli Halim, “Ilmu ekonomi perusahaan”, p. 216.
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the learner, instead of being the source of knowledge. The introduction of 
the Indonesian study case methods was empirical and contextual.  
Caldwell & Timms Report 
The rise of interest in business administration was portrayed succinctly in 
the Caldwell and Timms Report. The report was published in November 1 
1958 under commission to the planning body and was the result of a survey 
by the two men undertaken in Indonesia between the months of July and 
August of the same year. They interviewed around 300-350 leaders in public, 
business management and education, half of them in Jakarta and the rest 
in other cities such as Bogor, Bandung, Pekalongan, Semarang, Yogyakarta, 
Surabaya, Malang, Medan and Palembang. Because of the short two-month 
stay of the consultants and their general prior ignorance of Indonesia, the 
report functioned more as an instrument to express the general ideas by 
Indonesians working in the field.69
The report was important exactly because it recorded the sentiments of 
the general Indonesian managers at the beginning of the Guided Democracy. 
There was a degree of apprehension amongst those interviewed that the 
gradual retirement of a significant number of Dutch-trained administrators 
would mean a reduction in the efficacy of government administration over 
time.70 The report was also important because it addressed the production of 
business managers and signalled greater state concern and intrusion into the 
management of the private economy. The European education system did not 
recognize the possibility of teaching business administration in universities; 
thus like economics in general, Indonesia did not have any tradition for 
such education. Like public administration, business administration was an 
American-developed education curriculum.71 The curriculum consisted of 
the introduction of Taylorist scientific management and the collection of 
69 Caldwell and Timms, Developing the managerial resources of Indonesia. A report to the Biro 
Perantjang Negara, (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1958), p. 8. ANRI, Mohammad 
Bondan, Inv. Nr. 699.
70 Caldwell and Timms, Developing the managerial resources of Indonesia, p. 9.
71 Caldwell and Timms, Developing the managerial resources of Indonesia, p. 40-41.
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case studies of companies and their problems. Leon A. Mears and Rossall J. 
Johnson were among the first to collect business study cases.72
The report highlighted several issues that needed to be addressed for the 
development of business administration. As an immediate goal, it called for 
the creation of a management development program to be modelled after 
the Advanced Management Program of the Far East in the Philippines. 
This was an extension of the Advanced Management Program set up by the 
Harvard School of Business Management. It also called on the establishment 
of evening programs in business administration in business and government 
centres throughout Indonesia and within the Indonesian universities. 
For the long-range goal, it pushed the need to speed up the output of 
faculty members through supporting the doctorandus program in business 
administration at the University of Indonesia, which was at the time the 
most advanced program in business administration in the country. Lastly, 
it called on the development of a first-rate institution of higher education, 
similar to the Harvard School of Business Management. This should be 
located within the FEUI.73
As follow-up of the Caldwell and Timms report, a committee headed 
by FEUI economists Subroto, Mohammad Sadli, Panglaykim and Arifin 
Abdulrachman was created. Many of the experts involved in the committee 
were from the Faculty of Economics at the University of Indonesia. The focus 
on business management resulted in the formation of a series of managerial 
courses that were meant to upgrade the capabilities of business managers, 
especially of state-owned companies. With the help of the Ford Foundation 
and the University of California, a Development Management (Pembangunan 
Ketatalaksanaan) course was started. This was the start of the various courses 
that were to be a permanent feature of the Guided Democracy state. We 
will discuss in more detail the development of both public and business 
administration during the Guided Democracy in later chapters, but a better 
understanding of business administration is needed. 
In 1957, the law professor Djokosutono took on the Acting Dean 
of the Economics Faculty of the Universitas Indonesia after Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo joined the PRRI rebellion in Sumatra. As part of the 
72 Rossal J. Johnson, Dale McKeen and Leon A. Mears, Indonesian cases in business 
administration, (Jakarta: Lembaga Penjelidikan Ekonomi dan Masjarakat, 1961).
73 Caldwell and Timms, Developing the managerial resources of Indonesia, p. 48-50.
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Guided Democracy shift, the curriculum of the faculty was also revamped. 
Djokosutono felt that the curriculum should be geared toward the specific 
needs of a developing country. Courses that were considered ‘luxury’ were 
eliminated, the dabbling of ‘abstract analyses’ were discontinued.74 The 
Dutch-based curriculum had included a large amount of law education, 
including courses on private law, fiscal law, Islamic law and commercial law 
at the undergraduate level. Instead, many of the economics courses were 
taught with little differentiation.75
The shift toward an Americanized curriculum, alongside the introduction 
of American-influenced sciences like public and business administration was 
significant and widespread. The overall result of the changes led to a more 
pragmatic focus, i.e. a heavier emphasis on applied economics as opposed to 
a general one. The economic courses were differentiated within three fields 
of specialization: general economics, business economics and accountancy. 
In 1964, governmental economics were introduced. These changes were 
happening throughout the university system. Before 1955, economics were 
taught within a single social science faculty and it was heavily based on the 
Dutch curriculum. All the books and articles used in the courses were Dutch 
in origin.76
Another important reason for the Americanization of the curriculum lay 
in the shift in language ability. Thee Kian Wie argued that since the mid-
fifties, there had been an influx of students with little ability to command 
the Dutch language, because their primary education had started after the 
Japanese invasion in 1942. A change in language proficiency necessitated 
the move toward English-based reading materials.77
As we will see below, the expansion of both managerial education and 
thought occurred in the early years of Guided Democracy (1957-1962), a 
period in which efforts for the application of sciences into a new political 
order was seen possible. Although that belief would be shattered as the 
Guided Democracy state would be even less efficient, there was no doubt that 
the structural and organizational changes toward a managerially controlled 
economy provided impetus toward the creation of a type of New Order elite. 
74 Pidato Dekan Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia pada peringatan Dwi-Dasawarsa 
dan Reuni Alumni ke II, Jakarta, 1970. 
75 Thee Kian Wie, “Economics” p. 230-234.
76 Thee KianWie, “Economics”, p. 230-234.
77 Thee KianWie, “Economics”, p. 231-232.
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The development of public and business management in Indonesia 
developed alongside and was intertwined; the fact was that government 
regulation created by the bureaucracy often conflicted with the need to 
increase efficiency of the Indonesian business sector. The expansion of the 
Indonesian government within the business sector hastened the need for 
both the bureaucracy and company management to understand and support 
one another. LAN and other learning institutes like the School of Public 
and Business Management tried to provide spaces of understanding between 
these two types of managers. Organizational structure within both state 
and company institutions would be useless without a working managerial 
staff; without proper leadership. The formation of a managerial elite would 
eventually reduce the divide between the state’s public and business managers. 
As Sumitro asked in his lecture: is it possible that such a managerial elite 
can be ‘created’ within educational centers?78 The science of management 
provided a convenient answer, a magical answer, in which managers could be 
produced in educational factories, without dealing with the big elephant in 
the room: the political set-up of the republic and the failure of Parliamentary 
Democracy in appointing good public managers. 
Later criticisms were important in order to understand the way in which 
public administration in Indonesia developed during the period. In a report 
submitted by the labour division of the USAID in February 1964, the roots 
of the problem in the implementation of Indonesian management science 
was spelled out. The report outlined two reasons. “First, the approach 
has been substantially one of taking Western management concepts and 
methods and attempting to overlay them on a culture and economy not 
yet attuned to them. The result is that the trainees can, at the conclusion 
of their course, glibly repeat the management jargon, but the basic cultural 
barriers have not been broken through. Processes of thinking and acting 
have not fundamentally changed. Second, the courses tend to be academic 
and abstract; there is little emphasis on or use of the case methods or the 
problem-solving technique. As a result, there is no effective transition from 
principle to practice. Third, the teaching process consists almost entirely of 
‘lectures’, which, in this case, usually consist of transferring the notes from 
the book of the lecturer to that of the student without necessarily passing 
78 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Management dan Mismanagement dalam Perusahaan dan 
Masjarakat, p. 20.
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through the minds of either.”79 The report laid out two suggestions for the 
development of public administration. First, an approach geared toward the 
social mores of the Indonesian rather than an attempt to transplant Western 
management ideology was necessary. Second, an in-depth program, which 
attends to the specific skills and practices of management and supervision 
and does not merely focus on the academic side of it.80
The public administration specialist Garth N. Jones mentioned above 
saw that the problem with Indonesian public administration was its de-
contextualized character. “Unfortunately, there is a dearth of scholarly studies 
concerning the social milieu of Indonesia. Public administrators even if they 
understand the importance of the relationship of social science to their work, 
must operate almost in a void of knowledge about their social setting.”81 As 
a result, he advocated in early 1960s, that any technical assistance program 
must be focused on a scholarly study of the social milieu, governmental 
structures and processes, i.e. a considerable effort would have to be expended 
in order to obtain solid and basic information on the Indonesian government 
and society.82 It was summed up as: “Fundamentally, the management process 
must be brought down out of the sky and back to earth.”83 They stressed that 
the pouring of capital investment into an economy or a society not yet ready 
to expand its productive capacity represented a waste of money. 
Production of a Managerial Class
The Indonesian government had already decided by the middle of the 1950s 
to produce its own managerial class. Expansion of schooling public and 
business management was testament to this ambitious goal. The less than 
satisfying effort of the PUTABA scheme may have been one of the reasons 
for this, but it was always realized that the Indonesian state and society 
were to be managed by Indonesians. It was clearly stated within the Eight 
79 Human resource development. Problems, policies, development, p. 8.
80 Human resource development. Problems, policies, development,  p. 11.
81 Garth N. Jones, “Some critical areas concerning technical assistance in public administration 
in Indonesia” in Lembaga Administrasi Negara, p. 10-11.
82 Garth N. Jones, “Some critical areas concerning technical assistance in public administration 
in Indonesia”, p. 13.
83 Human resource development. Problems, policies, development, p. 11. 
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Year Development Plan that each state university was to be equipped with 
a faculty on public administration.84
The weak authority of the experts may have affected the closeness of many 
experts with the army elites. For instance, the magazine Manager often had 
special edition in which military management would be discussed. Generals 
like A.H. Nasution, Ibrahim Adjie and Ahmad Yani has often graced the 
edition with their opinions. Thus Nasution and his discussion of the Paran 
and Ibrahim Adjie and a discussion on the civic action program.85 Aside from 
the military elites, most other contributors came from the civilian expert 
elites, including First Minister Djuanda. A coterie of limited military and 
civilian experts, most with ties or sympathy to the PSI, represented the core 
managerial class of the country. It is the same group of people that would 
eventually come to power under the banner of the New Order. 
It is an interesting juxtaposition to see the large feelings of inadequacy 
that are apparent in the grumblings of the ‘cultural’ weaknesses of the 
Indonesian managers and the almost triumphant exclamation of the 
managerial revolution by those same managers themselves. In magazines 
like Fortuna, Manager and Perusahaan Negara, interest in expounding the 
managers as the future leaders of the country abound. The confinement of 
managerial production within the social science was a unique and modern 
perspective. “It is now prevalent in the United States to leave behind the 
old tradition that assumes potential managers require them to be educated 
in engineering. The large industries in today’s America, with their various 
kinds of societal activities, is a modern social group…” What was desirable 
in a person was their flexibility. Many American companies in fact claimed 
that humanity and social science students as being more preferred than the 
more technical types.86
On the other side of management, the expansion of doctorandus degree 
business management went apace and, in fact, the intake of business 
management students shot up after the take-over of Dutch-owned businesses 
84 Rantjangan Dasar UU Pembangunan Nasional-Semesta Berentjana Delapan Tahun: 1961-
1969. Bidang Mental/Ruhani dan Penelitian Buku ke III. Djilik ke VI. Pola pendjelasan bidang 
pendidikan tenaga pembangunan, (Jakarta: Dewan Perentjanaan Negara, 1960), p. 1751.
85 A.H. Nasution, “Kata Sambutan”, p. 4-9 and Ibrahim Adjie, “TNI dan ‘Civic Mission’” in 
Manager, Vol. IV, No. 37, April 1963, p. 10-15.
86 “Apakah anda laksanawan type baru?” in Fortuna, Vol. 1, No. 11, February 1961, p. 744-
748.
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in Indonesia. The table below showed the number of graduates of the FEUI 
during the time period of 1952-1963. It shows that business management 
trailed behind general economics. Yet, even more significant was the 
expansion of student intake in the business management science. The most 
significant rise was the year 1959-1960, when 146 economics science and 
1960-1961 where 37 business management majors graduated. 













































Total 426 210 723
Graduates of the three departments of the Faculty of Economics at the University of 
Indonesia. Taken from J. Panglaykim, “Some notes on the Development of Economic 
and Business Administration Education in Indonesia” in De Economist, Vol. 113, Nr. 
4, 1965, p. 281.
In the case of the FEUI, business administration produced its first 
graduates as early as 1952. Yet up to 1957, enrolment at the department 
remained fairly limited. The department experienced an expansion of student 
enrolment from 1958. This was dwarfed by the expansion of the department 
of economics, which exploded to more than 100 students in the year 1959 
in anticipation of the Guided Economy. By 1963, a total of 210 business 
administrator had been educated by FEUI, about half of the 429 graduates 
in economics. Yet, if we look at the enrolment of the year 1963-1964, there 
were around 101 first-year and 280 second-year graduate students in business 
administration at FEUI in comparison to only 26 first-year and 104 second-
year students in general economics. The unmistakable trend was an increasing 
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interest in business administration in comparison to general economics as 
the 1960s wore on.87
The interest in public and business management thus peaked at around 
the early part of the Guided Democracy, between the years 1957-1962. The 
expansion could be seen in both the rise of interest in business management 
courses, as the data above has shown and also from the production of books, 
especially on public administration. In a survey of book production on the 
various subjects labelled as administration, The Liang Gie has found the 
peak within the 1960-1961 period,88 a period in which Law 19/1960 was 
passed which effectively transferred the coordination of the entire economy, 
including the private economy, into the hands of the government. 
The chart below shows the number of publications in the forms of books 
and articles that was either written or translated into Indonesian during the 
period. The amount of article production reached its peak with 86 articles for 
1960 and 89 articles for 1961.  Of the 289 published books on administration, 
91 or a third of the total were translations.89After this year, the number of 
production in both articles and books went on a downward spiral. It was then 
followed by the closure of the journal Madjalah Manager in 1965.
Production of books and articles on managerial science between 1950-1968, with a 
peak in 1961. Taken from The Liang Gie, Bibliografi Ilmu Administrasi, (Penerbit Karya: 
Yogyakarta, 1970), p. 184-185.
87 Panglaykim, “Some notes on the Development of Economic and Business Administration 
Education in Indonesia” in De Economist, Vol. 113, No. 4, 1965, p. 277-291.
88 The Liang Gie, Bibliografi Ilmu Administrasi, (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Karya, 1970), p. 184-185.
89 The Liang Gie, Bibliografi Ilmu Administrasi, p. 183 and 209-210.
198 CHAPTER IV
The institutional expansion during the early Guided Democracy 
period necessitated greater participation of managers within the state and 
the economy and people followed the demand in kind. At the FEUI, 
the Executive Development Program, which was supported by the Ford 
Foundation, was launched in 1960 and formed a curriculum that was in 
line with the curriculum at the LAN. The focus was exactly on the problems 
associated with the lack of civil service authority, thus the preponderance on 
decision-making and leadership qualities as themes for managerial courses. 
The curriculum devised by the Executive Development Program in 1960 
was to be in use up until 1965. Thus even at a curricular level, the period 
after 1961 represented no great development.90 At Universitas Gadjah 
Mada, the formation of the Balai Pembinaan Administrasi or BPA peaked 
with its involvement in the Congress of the Science of Public and Business 
Administration held in 1961 with the cooperation of LAN.91  LAN published 
over 25 books/booklets/reports between 1958 and 1963.92
A series of managerial courses were introduced by a variety of 
organizations. The Ministry of Industry, for instance, set up a School of 
Industrial Management starting in 1958. Copying the principles and 
curriculum of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s School of Industrial 
Technology, the course provide a two-semester introduction on the modern 
firm and management in the first year, a second semester six class course 
for the second year and a third-year thesis. The aim of the course was to 
develop an approach to solving problems of the industrial firm in relation 
to industrial, economic and sociological issues. Courses include, among 
others, industrial management, economics of industry, physics, calculus, 
engineering drawing, machine elements, mechanical technology, personnel 
administration, industrial statistics, methods engineering, accounting, 
finance, marketing, industrial power engineering, fundamentals of electrical 
engineering, machine tools, applied mechanics, labour and management 
relations, labour law, business law, production management, statistical quality 
90 Aminin Honggodjojo, “Curricula Implications in Management Education for Present and 
Future Needs” in Yip Yat Hoong (ed.), Role of Universities in Management Education for 
National Development in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Regional Institute of Higher Education 
and Development, 1972), p. 213-225.
91 The Liang Gie, Bibliografi Ilmu Administrasi, p. 188.
92 Imam Buchari, Buku Peringatan Pantjawarsa Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1958-1963, 
(Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1963), p. 40-41.
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control, new enterprise planning, materials handling, plant maintenance, 
chemical technology, and a seminar and thesis.93
The number of managerial positions opened as a result of the expansion 
of government-owned companies is difficult to quantify. Within the field 
of agricultural estates, the nationalization of Dutch-owned companies had 
resulted in the Indonesianization of 2,300 managerial positions on 400 
estates.94 The production of professional, i.e. University-trained, managers 
did not keep up with the expansion. Atmosudirdjo reckoned roughly that if 
Universitas Gadjah Mada produced 100 graduates, Padjadjaran 30 graduates, 
LAN 50 graduates and Hassanudin 20 graduates, it would only amount to 
200 managers, which was not enough.95 In its eight-year history, by 1959 
the FEUI produced only 60 economists, 55 business administrators and 
five accountants.96 The limitation of the education system in producing 
professional managers meant that a large percentage of the managerial 
personnel came from other parts of society. Panglaykim had pared it down 
to six categories; including civil servants, military personnel and university 
graduates.97 The majority of managers obtained schooling during the colonial 
period in general schools. Some of them were former teachers, civil servants 
or army personnel.98
The expansion of business management schools promoted the idea 
that managers should be educated in managerial sciences, but many of the 
management positions has already been taken by various groups who had 
prior education. Who were the Indonesian managers? According to Achmad 
Sanusi: “Sometimes he is drawn as an ideologist, a carrier of the people’s 
wishes and a father faithful to his children. He does not have university 
93 Program Akademi Pemimpin Perusahaan, 1958-1959, (Jakarta: Kementerian Perindustrian, 
n.a.), p. 3-15. 
94 Everett D. Hawkins, “Indonesia” in Walter Galenson (ed.), Labor in developing economies, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p.117.
95 Prajudi Atmosudirdjo, “Masalah Pendidikan Ilmu Administrasi pada Perguruan2 Tinggi” 
in Lapuran Umum Musjawarah Ilmu Administrasi Negara dan Niaga, (Jakarta: Lembaga 
Administrasi Negara, 1962), p. 34.
96 Mohammad Sadli, The structural and operational aspects of public (especially industrial) 
enterprises in Indonesia, (Jakarta: s.n., 1959), p. 249.
97 Panglaykim, State Trading Corporations in Indonesia, p. 7-8.
98 Achmad Sanusi, Manager: insentif dan motif putusannja. Satu perbandingan umum pada 
perusahaan2 di Uni Sovjet, Amerika dan Indonesia, (Bandung: Universitas Bandung, 1964), 
p. 62-63.
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education, but has had plenty of experience, and knows deeply the bitter 
laws of life. At other times, the image was of a youth, a students, who is 
trying and experimenting, conducting within a formalist fashion, still lacking 
skill in translating policies from theories and not clever enough to play the 
games according to the real ground rules. Sometimes, the manager takes on 
the image of the leader of society, who constantly manages his relation with 
those of government leaders, head of offices, which cooperates with and for 
businessmen lending his name and service.”99 Sanusi painted a picture of a 
rather politicized group of people; young, ideological and often influential 
in society. 
Jamie Mackie’s survey of agricultural estate companies in 1960-1961 has 
shown the extent to which the rise of the new managerial elite has resulted 
in the formation of new regional power structures. “Relatively powerless 
in central politics, the new managers appear to be an influential group in 
the daerahs (districts), particularly in those where there are close bonds of 
interest and affinity between them and the existing regional authorities, 
pamongpradja and Army officers. Thus, the divorce between political power 
and responsibility for production, which characterized the years 1950-57, 
has been remedied (in a uniquely Indonesian fashion) at the regional level.”100
Regionalization has to be understood in the context of the expansion of 
the military into both the economy, as military managers, and the regional 
government as part of the application of the territorial management doctrine. 
Martial law also strengthened the territorial armies, which functioned almost 
99 Achmad Sanusi, Manager: insentif dan motif putusannja. Satu perbandingan umum pada 
perusahaan2 di Uni Sovjet, Amerika dan Indonesia, p. 67. “Kadang2 ia tergambarlah sebagai 
seorang karyawan ideologist, pengemban amanat penderitaan rakjat, dan sebagai bapak 
jang setia kepada anak2nja. Ia tak berpendidikan universiter, tapi telah tjukup banjak 
makan garam, dan tahu betuk kenjataan hukum2 hidup jang pahit-getir sekalipun. Lain 
kali manager Indonesia tergambar sebaga tokoh muda, sardjana, jang sedang membuat 
eksperimen2, masih banjak formalism, belum handig lagi membuat satu policy dari 
satu teori, dan belum lagi pandai main “the games according to the real ground-rules”. 
Kadang2 manager kita tergambar lagi sebagai symbol tokoh masjarakat, jang pernah dan 
terus memperhatikan banjak relasinja dengan pimpinan pemerintahan, djawatan2, jang 
bekerdja-sama dengan, atau untuk, pengusaha2 jang memindjam nama dan djasa2nja 
itu. Betapapun sifat2 itu jang lebih sesuai, manager di Indonesia pun dipandang umum 
sebagai satu golongan elite jang kedudukan ekonomisnja lebih tinggi, dan hidupnja jauh 
lebih mewah daripada rata2 penduduk biasa, bahkan djuga dapat mempengaruhi djalan 
pelaksanaan politik pemerintah atau djawatan2.”
100 J.A.C. Mackie, “Indonesia’s Government Estate’s and Their Masters” in Pacific Affairs, vol. 
34, no. 4, winter, 1961-1962, p. 339-340.
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within a federalist fashion and “there was often a close cultural affinity, an 
identity of conservative interests, a shared distaste for the political parties, 
and a sense of mutual support between army men and the elite corps of 
pamongpraja.”101 This ‘federalization’ of the region under military rule 
resulted in a significant restructuring of the state. “Already identified with 
their provinces, army commands hyperactively and over-optimistically 
undertook to fulfil local demands for the economic development which 
civilian government had been unable to accomplish.”102 The development 
of a military-cum-expert planning structure, within what was to become 
the Bappenas planning structure, provided the answer to the question of the 
problem of decentralization. The formation of the Pantja Tunggal, a regional 
power structure in which the executive and planning decision-making process 
was entrusted to, initially four, called the Tjatur Tunggal, then five regional 
executives: the governor or head of the region, head of the regional military 
or Kodam, head of the prosecutor’s office (kejaksaan tinggi), head of regional 
police or Komdak and head of the regional air force (komando regional udara). 
The structure would be renamed the Bakopda or Regional Coordinating 
Development Board and renamed again in 1967 as the Muspida or Regional 
Development Council.103
It is difficult to understand the development of the 1950s without 
referring to the managerial explosion of the early 1960s. The expansion could 
be understood also as a greater participation of those new generations of 
educated experts that had begun streaming into Indonesian society in the late 
1950s. A discourse on development and efficiency thus began to take shape. 
This occurred not only at the upper managerial levels, but on practically 
all managerial levels, including the factory shop-floors and the plantation 
industry. This could be seen in the manager training of the Ministry of Labour 
and the import of the Training Within Industry program.104 But behind the 
expansion was a major problem, which the ‘science of management’ could do 
little to solve. Increasingly, the roots of Indonesia’s managerial woes were to 
be blamed on the Indonesian culture and its lack of leadership quality. This 
101 R.E. Elson, Suharto, a Political Biography, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
p. 61.
102 Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959, p. 63.
103 Ateng Syafruddin, Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, (Bandung: Wiyana Mukti, 1990).
104 TWI program. ANRI, Jakarta, Mohammad Bondan, Inv. Nr. 734, 735 and 736.
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realization during the Guided Democracy period may partially explain why 
there was a sudden decrease in interest in management science after 1962.
Public Administration, Welfare State and Guided Democracy
It is necessary to understand the extent to which the ‘ideologies’ behind public 
administration and Guided Democracy was compatible and thus helped 
each other in bringing about the rise of a corporatist, centralized, executive-
dominated state. In order to understand this, one of the most important 
textbooks on Indonesian administrative law, written by the pro-Sukarnoist, 
legal specialist and PNI-member Ernst Utrecht, is analyzed.105 The major 
documents of the Guided Democracy and Guided Economy is consulted; 
those collected within the Seven Basic Indoctrination texts.106 During the 
inaugural address of the LAN, its head Prajudi Atmosudirdjo stated: 
“The formation of this LAN by the government signals the wish to speed 
up the change in the spirit (djiwa) of our civil servant, which currently is 
only a laughing stock of society. This is the change from a civil servants that 
“merely follows the rules” to a new Indonesian civil servant, one which has 
an entrepreneurial spirit, which embodies the spirit of the “managers of 
the state” or “public managers”, full of personal initiative and a dynamic 
mind-set in their effort to increase their work productivity, the national 
capital productivity, to reach the highest welfare of the people and state, in 
as little time as possible.”107
Even more significantly the change in the spirit of the civil service was 
part of the underlying spirit of the Guided Democracy and that of the New 
Order state itself. 
105 Ernst Utrecht, Administrasi Negara Indonesia, (Jakarta: Ichtiar, 1962).
106 Tudjuh Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi, 
107 Pantjawarsa Lembaga Administrasi Negara, (Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 
1963), p.10. “Dengan mendirikannja Lembaga Administrasi Negara ini Pemerintah ingin 
mempertjepat proses perubahan djiwa pegawai2 negeri kita, jang pada masa ini masih selalu 
mendjadi edjekan masjarakat, jaitu perubahan dari pegawai negeri jang “hanja mendjalankan 
peraturan” sadja kepegawai negeri Indonesia Baru, jang mempunjai entrepreneurship dan 
leadership, jang berdjiwa sebagai “managers of the state” atau “public managers” jang 
penuh inisiatif sendiri serta berdjiwa dinamis dan jang selalu berusaha untuk mempertinggi 
produktivitet kerdja, produktivitet mode nasional dan sebagainja, guna mentjapai 
kemakmuran Bangsa dan Negara jang se-tinggi2nja dalam waktu jang sesingkat2nja…”
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“…the duty of this organization is to implement a government decision 
that is revolutionary in character. The decision of the government to 
create the LAN meant that the government was serious in creating ‘public 
administration’ in Indonesia and represented an important caesura in the 
history of our government. With this decision, we leave behind the ‘law-
based state’ doctrine that we have inherited from the Dutch, and, without 
forgetting the law, we are on our way to becoming an ‘administrative state,’ 
which is the most modern governmental idea, whereby the state is seen to 
form as a sort of corporation (ondernemingsvorm). In comparison, the ‘law-
based state’ saw the state as merely a juridical-formal body. In a ‘law-based 
state’ the main purpose of the government is to keep ‘peace and order,’ 
while in an administrative state,’ the government actively conduct efforts 
to increase the welfare of the people and the state. In other words, with 
this government decision, we decidedly move from a ‘legal state’ toward an 
‘administrative state on a legal basis’…”108
There was thus a deep contradiction between the rise of the welfare state 
or in Atmosudirdjo’s word, the administrative state, within the traditional 
and ‘liberal’ forms of political democracy. In fact, the shift toward an 
administrative state was stated as leaving behind triaspolitica and the 
separation of power that had been the prime model of Western democracy 
since the French and American Revolutions and which had been reflected 
in the 1950 Indonesian ‘liberal’ constitution. The ‘liberal’ triaspolitica state 
was a night-watch state, which focused on the application of the law. In fact, 
Montesquieu’s idea was based on the effort to deny the possibility of state 
tyranny and ensure the liberty of the individual citizen. Yet, as Atmosudirdjo 
108 Pantjawarsa Lembaga Administrasi Negara, p.10. “…tugas Lembaga ini merupakan 
pelaksanaan dari suatu Keputusan Pemerintah jang bersifat revolusioner. Keputusan 
Pemerintah untuk mendirikan Lembaga Administrasi Negara jang berarti, bahwa Pemerintah 
setjara tegas hendak membangun “Public Administration” in Indonesia, adalah suatu 
titik-perubahan pokok didalam sedjarah kenegaraan kita. Dengan keputusan tersebut kita 
meninggalkan azas “Negara Hukum” jang kita peladjari dari Belanda, dan dengan tidak 
meninggalkan hukum itu kita sekarang sedang menudju kesuatu “Negara Administratif ”, 
jaitu pandangan kenegaraan jang paling modern, dalam mana negara itu dipandang sebagai 
salah satu bentuk pengusahaan (Ondernemingsvorm), sedang didalam rangka pandangan 
“Negara Hukum” kewadjiban pokok dari Pemerintah hanjalah memelihara “keamanan dan 
ketertiban”, sedangd idalam “Negara Administratif” Pemerintah ikut aktif menjelenggarakan 
usaha2 untuk memperbesar kemakmuran masjarakat dan Negara. Dengan perkataan 
lain, dengan keputusan Pemerintah itu kita lebih tegas lagi menudju dari “Legal State” ke 
“Administrative State on Legal Basis”…”
204 CHAPTER IV
has reiterated above, it was the policy of Guided Democracy to create a 
corporate state. Individual liberty was traded for the completion of revolution 
and development.
There are several ideas related to the Guided Democracy state in relation 
to this constitutional reordering. The root of the failure of 1950s development 
was pointed out, quite correctly, as a problem of planning and coordination. 
Sukarno attributed this to the inherent chaos that liberalism had induced. 
The fact that seven governments existed between 1950 and 1957 certainly 
strengthened that accusation. According to Sukarno, the only way to solve 
this problem was to finish off the Indonesian revolution. There were several 
obstacles that needed to be overcome if this were to be accomplished. First, 
Indonesia needed to eliminate the dualism that coloured governance in the 
1950s, between the ‘government’ and the ‘revolutionary leaders’. Sukarno 
pointed out that as a result of the compromise taken in 1950, i.e. the Round 
Table Conference and the rule of the social democrats, “Our earth became 
fertile for the growth of all types of conventional, conservative, reactionary 
and contra-revolutionary and liberal ideas.”109
These ‘contra-revolutionary, reactionaries’, i.e. the social democrats, the 
PSI and economists such as Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, had taken over 
the country and divided the government from its leadership. “The head 
of the revolution is separated from the head of government. The head of 
the government in fact weakens the head of the revolution. He becomes 
nothing more than a “stamp machine”. He often clashes with the ideology 
of the head of government. He has been “trias-politica-ized” not only within 
the executive. He has become Togog.110 This, according to the supporter 
of the system, is said to be the highest of wisdom within democracy. Yes! 
Liberal Democracy! Dutch Democracy! The democracy of the Western 
States, whose democracy was born to the mother of middle class capitalism 
(burgerlijkkapitalisme).”111 This was an unconventional revolution and as 
109 Sukarno, Manifesto Politik Republik Indonesia, p. 19. “Bumi mendjadi subur untuk 
bertumbuhnja segala matjam aliran konvensionil, konservatif reaksioner dan kontra-
revolusioner serta liberalism.”
110 Character in the Wayang shadow play, son of Semar who had failed to be born, i.e. his 
power was denied to him.
111 Sukarno, Djalannja Revolusi Kita (Djarek), p. 38-39. “Pimpinan revolusi dipisahkan daripada 
pimpinan pemerintahan. Pimpinan Revolusi malahan dilumpuhkan (diverlamd-kan) oleh 
pimpinan Pemerintahan. Ia kadang-kadang didjadikan sekedar “tukangstempel”. Ia sering 
sekali tabrakan faham dengan pimpinan Pemerintahan. Ia di-“triaspolitica”-kan bukan sadja, 
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a result, requires unconventional means. “It cannot be solved with means 
taken from the decrepit warehouse of liberalism. It cannot be solved with 
the means written in the textbooks of yore.”112
Sukarno was certainly quite adamant that his revolution was ‘modern’ and 
in this regard, he considered the changes brought about by the revolution to 
be both modern and anti-liberal. This cleansing of the contra-revolutionary 
was to be applied with what was called retooling, a managerial strategy in 
which people were to be evaluated on basis of their position in the revolution 
and replaced accordingly. The revolution would only allow those that are 
pro-revolutionary to participate. As we will see, this type of action would 
be a significant part of the Guided Democracy state and a whole slew of 
institutions would be created in order to achieve the goals of retooling. 
Second, the Indonesian revolutionary leadership needed to pool together 
the ‘funds and forces of the people.’ Sukarno understood that as a result of 
modern technological changes, the nature of participation had changed 
profoundly. “In this twentieth century, with sophisticated communication 
technology, every revolution is a people’s revolution, a mass revolution, 
not like those of the previous centuries, where the revolution is often times 
limited to the upper classes, the revolution of the ruling few.”113 Thus, there 
was an historical inevitability and an almost scientific and natural character 
of the revolution in question. It was a revolution that was present in three-
quarters of humanity.  “Look and observe! A state that does not mature in 
a revolutionary fashion will not only be crushed by its own people, it will 
be swept clean by the universal revolutionary typhoon that is the most 
tetapi dalam bagian eksekutif daripada triaspolitica itupun ia sekedar didjadikan sematjam 
togog. Ini, menurut pentolan-pentolan sistim itu, dinamakan “hoogstewijsheid” dalam alam 
demokrasi. Ja! Demokrasi liberalisme! Demokrasinja Belanda! Demokrasinja negara-negara 
Barat, jang an sich demokrasi disana itu adalah anak-kandung dan ibu kandung daripada 
burgerlijk kapitalisme.”
112 Sukarno, Penemuan kembali Revolusi kita. Pidato Presiden Republik Indonesia pada hari 
Proklamasi 17 Agustus, 1959, p. 73. “Ta’dapat ia diselesaikandengan tjara-tjara jang keluar 
dari gudang-apeknja liberalisme. Ta dapat ia diselesaikan dengan tjara-tjara jang tertulis 
dalam text-booknja kaum sardjana dari zaman baheula.”
113 Sukarno, Penemuan kembali Revolusi kita. Pidato Presiden Republik Indonesia pada hari 
Proklamasi 17 Agustus, 1959, p. 72. “Dalam abad ke-XX ini, dengan ia punja teknik-
perhubungan jang tinggi, tiap revolusi adalah revolusi Rakjat, revolusi Massa, bukan sebagai 
diabad-abad jang lalu, jang revolusi-revolusinja adalah sering sekali revolusinja segundukan 
manusia-atasan sadja – ‘the revolution of the rulling few.’”
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significant phenomenon of the present age.”114 The revolution was thus not 
only modern, but also in time with global changes, i.e. it was international. 
The importance of participation of the mass was described succinctly in 
the form of participative development that Guided Democracy promised. 
This was especially relevant for the creation of the national plan through 
the ‘corporative’ planning agency of the Depernas. “Universal development 
cannot succeed without mobilizing universal work. The revolution cannot 
work without the participation of the people in it.”115 In order for this to 
work, the relationship between the administrator and the mass had to be 
profoundly changed. “I stressed this in my Political Manifesto speech about 
the summoning of the energy and passion of the people because many of 
the people within the state apparatuses – the people with noble qualities 
– do not understand the meaning of mass energy and mass passion, and 
in fact suffer from a phobia of the mass and the people. The spirit of these 
nobleman and noble women must be cleansed and destroyed, so that the 
Revolution can continue as a People’s Revolution and thus reach an optimal 
level of efficiency!”116
Sukarno’s visit to China in 1956 must have had an important influence in 
forming this picture of a united people working together under the guidance 
of revolutionary leadership. “Differing from other countries in Asia, the 
People’s Republic of China has based its development on collectivism and 
foreign development experiences that are attuned to concrete conditions 
114 Sukarno, Djalannja Revolusi kita (Djarek). Amanat Presiden Republik Indonesia padahari 
Proklamasi 17 Agustus, 1960, p. 38. “Lihat dan perhatikan! Suatu Negara jang tidak 
bertumbuh setjara revolusioner, tidak sadja akan digilas oleh Rakjatnja sendiri, tetapi djuga 
nanti akan disapu oleh Taufan Revolusi Universil jang merupakan phenomenon terpenting 
daripada dunia dewasa ini.”
115 Sukarno, Djalannja Revolusi kita (Djarek). Amanat Presiden Republik Indonesia pada hari 
Proklamasi 17 Agustus, 1960, p. 72. “…sebab pembangunan semesta ta’ mungkin berdjalan 
penuh tanpa ikut-ber-Revolusinja seluruh Rakjat.”
116 Sukarno, Djalannja Revolusi kita (Djarek). Amanat Presiden Republik Indonesia pada hari 
Proklamasi 17 Agustus, 1960, p. 72-73. “Saja mengulangi bagian pidato Manifesto Politik 
jang mengenai penggalangan tenaga dan semangat massa Rakjat ini in extensor (dengan 
lengkap), oleh karena masih banjak orang-orang dalam kalangan aparatur Negara – orang-
orang dengan kwaliteit ndoro-ndoro dan djuragan-djuragan, wanita-wanita dengan kwaliteit 
den-adjeng den-adjeng dan den-aju-den-aju – jang tidak mengerti artinja tenaga massa dan 
semangat massa, bahkan menderita penjakit massa-phobi dan Rakjat phobi, jaitu takut 
kepada massa dan takut kepada Rakjat. Djiwandoro dan djiwa den-aju itu harus kita tjutji 
sama sekali dan harus kita kikis samasekali, agar supaja Revolusi dapat berdjalan benar-benar 
sebagai Revolusi Rakjat, dan oleh sebabnja berdjalan seeffisien-effisiennja pula!”
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and the history of China itself.”117 According to Sukarno, China had 
implemented a developmental program that was contextualized within the 
history, culture and character of the nation. China’s industrialization program 
has mesmerised him during his visit to the country. Industrialization was 
driven not through foreign investment but through revolutionary reordering 
of the productive powers of society, which appealed to him immensely. It 
was perhaps no coincidence that Mao’s Great Leap Forward occurred in just 
about the same period as Sukarno’s Guided Democracy.118
Third, it was a planned and coordinated revolution. This planned nature 
of the revolution was essential. “Planning is an absolute requirement for the 
implementation of socialism! Planning in its implementation could then 
be separated between Guided Economy and Guided Democracy.”119 It 
was a planned political, economic, social, cultural and mental activity. The 
people through such organization as the Depernas created the plans, but 
its implementation was to be guided by the revolutionary leadership. This 
was the last but perhaps one of the most important components. For in 
order for the revolution to succeed, it had to be guided by a leadership. “In 
the absence of leadership, without the provision of planning in each of the 
complex part of the revolution, then we would reach, as I have said before, 
a multi-complex chaos.”120
117 Sukarno, Amanat Pembangunan Presiden. 28 Agustus 1959, p. 11. “Berlainan 
dengan beberapa Negara dibenua Asia, maka Republik Rakjat Tiongkok mendasarkan 
pembagnunannja kepada kolektivisme dan pengalaman-pengalaman pembangunan diluar 
negeri jang disesuaikan dengan keadaan dan pengalaman jang kongkrit di Tiongkok sendiri.”
118 In comparison to the failure of Guided Democracy, the Great Leap Forward was successful at 
least in the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to mobilize the people. This, of course, 
resulted in a massive tragedy as the indigenous industrialization process resulted in the loss 
of lives of millions. It may perhaps have been a lucky thing for Indonesia to have had such 
a weak bureaucracy, for the state couldn’t be made to implement massive programmes that 
would have been prone to violence even if it had wanted to. 
119 Sukarno, Djalannja Revolusi kita (Djarek). Amanat Presiden Republik Indonesia pada hari 
Proklamasi 17 Agustus, 1960, p. 59. “Perentjanaan Pola, atau Planning, adalah satu sjarat 
mutlak bagi pelaksanaan Sosialisme! Planning itu nanti dalam pengkarjaannja mendjadilah 
wahananja Ekonomi Terpimpin dan Demokrasi Terpimpin.”
120 Sukarno, Amanat Presiden tentang Pembangunan Semesta Berentjana. Sidang Pleno 
Depernas 28 Agustus 1959, p. 60. “Djikalau tidak diberi pimpinan, tidak diberi planning 
dimasing-masing bidang dari kompleksiteit daripada revolusi ini, maka kita achirnja sebagai 
tadi sudah saja katakan, dating kepada kompleksiteit kekatjauan.”
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The root of the revolution was thus predicated on the changing nature 
of the relationship between the people/masses and its leadership. It was a 
change that was determined by the shift in the purpose of the state. It was 
paradoxical to a certain extent, for it was predicated on the incorporation 
of the masses to participate within the revolution, but also assumed control 
of the revolutionary leadership. The root of the revolution thus shared its 
source from the democratic expansion of participation. “The foundation and 
goal of the Indonesian Revolution is congruent to the social conscience of 
man! Social justice, individual freedom, national freedom and other forms 
of the expression of the social conscience of man.”121 It was a goal that was 
espoused by Sukarno during the formation of Indonesia’s national ideology 
and principles, Pancasila, in 1945. “It is not a Western Democracy, but 
a political-economic democracy, a political democracy with social justice 
(socialerechtvaardigheid), a democracy with welfare; those two notions I 
squeeze into one. This is what I have always called a socio-democracy.”122
This focus on social justice and welfare that was promoted through the 
state was contrasted with a liberal notion of statehood. And in this regard, 
the root of the constitutional changes that was promoted by Sukarno was 
justified. For in order to allow the state to actually act on ways that would 
promote social justice and welfare, it required the ability of the executive to act 
outside the bounds that had been set up within the separation of power. “The 
granting of ‘freies Ermessen’123 to the state administration meant that some 
of the power held by the Parliament, by the legislative body, is transferred to 
the hands of the government, the administration, as the executive body. This 
is something that occurred in all ‘welfare states’ as a logical consequence of 
the implementation of said ‘welfare state’, by expanding executive power, it 
gives birth to a guided democracy as a system of government of the welfare 
121 Sukarno, Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita. Pidato Presiden RI pada Hari Proklamasi 17 
Agustus 1959, p. 41. “Dasar dan tudjuan Revolusi Indonesia adalah congruen dengan Social 
Conscience of Man itu! Keadilan sosial, kemerdekaan individu, kemerdekaan bangsa dan 
lain sebagainja itu adalah pengedja-wantahan daripada Social Conscience of Man itu.”
122 Sukarno, Lahirnja Pantjasila, 1947, p. 29. “Dan Demokrasi jang bukan demokrasi 
Barat, tetapi politiek-economische democratie, jaitu politieke democratie dengans 
ocialerechtvaardigheid, demokrasi dengan kesedjahteraan, saja peraskan pula mendjadi 
satu. Inilah jang dahulu saja namakan socio-democratie.” 
123 Discretionary power or pouvoir discretionaire or beoordelingsvrijheid. It has become an 
essential component in Indonesian administrative legal theory. 
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state.”124 This executive expansion was a worrying aspect of the administrative 
state in relation to democracy and it was something that had been bothering 
people both in the West and in Indonesia. “Differing from the narrow 
definition of the legal state (Kant, Fichte), the ‘idea of the modern legal state 
does not emphasize the law (positive law), but on the goal of social justice 
(socialegerechtigheid) to all citizens. If necessary, the state can act outside of the 
law in order to reach that social justice.”125 The ‘welfare state’ thus expanded 
the discretionary power of the executive.126
In fact, leaving behind trias politica was a phenomenon transcending 
the ideological divide of the Cold War. In his discussion on public 
administration, Utrecht discussed the various new ideas surrounding the 
shift from a separation of power to a separation of function. “The separation 
was present in three famous American experts who have studied about 
‘government’ and ‘public administration’, Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow 
and Herman Finer.”127 Obviously the rise of the welfare state in the West had 
not resulted in the rise of military dictatorships. Sukarno was adamant that 
the revolution was essentially democratic and its roots were also democratic; 
he saw its genesis to be Western but more inherently perfect, claiming 
antecedent toward both the French and American bourgeois revolution and 
the Marxist Russian revolution. It was a better revolution because it was one 
124  Ernst Utrecht, Administrasi Negara Indonesia, p. 23. “Diberinja ‘freies Ermessen’ kepada 
administrasi negara itu sebenarnja berarti bahwa sebagian kekuasaan jang dipegang oleh 
dewan perwakilan rakjat, sebagai badan legislatif, dipindahkan kedalam tangan pemerintah, 
administrasi negara, sebagai badan eksekutif. Hal ini mendjadi kenjataan ditiap-tiap “welfare 
State” sebagai suatu konsekwensi logis dari diadakannja “welare State” itu: supremasi 
badan legislatif diganti oleh supremasi badan eksekutif! Ekonomi terpimpin, sebagai sistim 
perekonomian ‘welfare State’, - sebagai suatu konsekwensi logis – memperbesar kekuasaan 
eksekutif, melahirkan demokrasi terpimpin sebagai sistim pemeritahan ‘welfare State’.”
125 Ernst Utrecht, Administrasi Negara Indonesia, p. 35.“Berlainan dengan “idee” negara hukum 
dalam arti kata sempit (Kant, Fichte), maka dalam “idee” negara hukum modern titik-berat 
pada pokoknja tidak terletak pada “hukum” (hukum positif ), tetapi pada tudjuan mentjapai 
keadilan sosial (sociale gerechtigheid) bagi semua warga negara. Apabila perlu, negara djuga 
boleh bertindak diluar hukum untuk dapat mentjapai keadilan sosial bagi semua warga 
negara itu.”
126 Some legal experts put the end of the law-based state when Sukarno gave ministerial status 
to the head of the Supreme Court in 1961. A.M. Reksohadiprodjo, The relations of law 
and economic development: with special reference to Indonesia, (The Hague: Institute of Social 
Studies, 1969), p. 33. 
127 Ernst Utrecht, Administrasi Negara Indonesia, p. 34. “Pembagian tersebut terdapat dalam 
tiga ahli terkemuka bangsa Amerika Serikat jang mempeladjari “Government” dan “Public 
Administration”, jaitu Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow dan Herman Finer.”
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that combined the best parts of both revolutions; it was not capitalist nor 
was it atheistic. Yet, there was no doubt that leaving behind the separation 
of powers, alongside the decimation of the legislative body and its party 
elements, signalled a significant lurch toward the creation of a military 
dictatorship. Even if the Guided Democracy never became an outright 
dictatorship, it did provide its principles and groundwork. 
It is also important to understand that the foundation of the Guided 
Democracy and Guided Economy state, Indonesia’s constitutional ideology, 
did not particularly conflict with the ideas surrounding the rise of the 
administrative state. The Presidential Decree 1959 was issued outside the 
bounds of the constitution but was justified as a “logical consequence to 
the implementation of a welfare state (guided democracy)”128 in order to 
create executive supremacy above the legislative body. Sukarno used Article 
22 of the 1945 Constitution (or Article 96 of the 1950 Constitution), 
which allowed for the creation of a Government Regulation in lieu of the 
Constitution (peraturan Pemerintah pengganti undang-undang – p.P.p.u.u.) 
justified in ‘situation of forced emergency.’129 Instead, it justified the ending 
of parliamentary democracy through attacking liberal straw men. Guided 
Democracy was a social philosophy that went with the times, whereas 
liberalism was painted as something that was conservative and un-modern. 
The only difference was that it was to be a managerial state that was at the 
same time revolutionary. The argument shown above was congruent with the 
arguments discussed in Chapter One; the 1928-generation was now being 
garbed as the ‘revolutionary leadership.’  
As a result, the rise of the Guided Democracy state was not incompatible 
with the development in public administration that had occurred during the 
1950s. The LAN was to occupy a relatively important position during the 
period, although it failed in taking over the leadership in the development 
of Indonesian public and business administration education.130 It was not 
predicated on any form of East-West divide, rather on an almost mythical 
divide between liberalism and socialism that, especially during the period in 
question, was at best a moot, academic discussion. As Utrecht’s discussion on 
128 Ernst Utrecht, Administrasi Negara Indonesia, p. 26.
129 Ernst Utrecht, Administrasi Negara Indonesia, p. 23.
130 Djuna Hadisumarto, The Indonesian Civil Service and its Reform Movement, (PhD 
Dissertation Indiana University, Bloomington, 1974), p. 182-183
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the rise of the public administration in Indonesia shows, its roots were entirely 
Western, i.e. American. Utrecht did discuss on the German and Dutch case 
and their own ‘Americanization’ during the period, especially the thoughts 
of the Dutch legal specialist O.M. Donner and the management specialist 
Gerrit van Poelje.131 As we will see in a later chapter on the economy, we see 
again the weakness of understanding the Guided Democracy experiment 
through an East-West lens or as a Capitalist-Communist divide. 
Legal Culture and Democracy
The conflict between democracy and efficiency was the main divider between 
what Waldo, writing in the 1940s, termed ‘progressives,’ who advocated 
planning, and the ‘old-liberals’ who believed that efficiency could only be 
had if more democracy were introduced. “They knew that the Future must 
well up from below. In opposition were those whose patience was exhausted 
waiting for the Promise of American Life to realize itself by natural and 
inevitable means, whose view of human nature was not so charitable and 
who had no faith in the devices of primitive democracy, who had begun to 
think of planning and who realized that builders need tools.”132 The roots 
of this ambivalence toward democracy were partially based in the disdain 
the manager had toward the legal process. “The anti-legal temper of public 
administration is obvious and its import clear. In fact, one does not need 
to go far in the literature of public administration to find that if any person 
is to count for less than one in the New Order it is the lawyer! The lawyer 
suffers from a meager social outlook, the spirit of the New Management 
does not abide with him…”133
Yet, the image of the Welfare State was exemplified by the success stories 
of Western European and North American democracies. The Welfare State 
became the symbol of the success of the West. There was no doubt that people 
131 Donner’s idea understood in Indonesia as dwipradja divided the government on a functional 
approach as those that determine the function of government duties (taakstelling), i.e. policy 
makers, and those that implement the duties (verwezenlijking van de taak). This was in line 
with Woodrow Wilson’s division of Government as the political arm that determine policies 
and Public Administration as those that implement the policies in question.   
132 Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State, a Study of the Theory of American Public 
Administration, p. 18. 
133 Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State, a Study of the Theory of American Public 
Administration, p. 79.
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like Waldo, Burnham134 or Redford135 who had ruminated on the potential 
autocratic nature of the state in question, saw this inherent problem between 
individualism, democracy and the Welfare State. In fact, many of the analyses 
of public administration in the United States focused on reconciling the 
problem between the ideals of individualism and democracy and expansion 
of an efficient state.136
Daniel Lev, in discussing about legal culture, pointed to fundamental 
assumptions about distribution and the use of resources, social rights and 
so on. These ideological themes were often expressed in polar opposites: 
personal freedom versus authority, private ownership versus public ones, 
decentralization versus centralization and so on.137 These assumptions were 
important determinants of the legal culture of a society and this in turn 
determines the efficacy of the judicial institution in playing a role in said 
society. As such, the strength of the Indonesian commitment to the rule of 
law was related to the state-society ideology that the nation prescribed itself. 
In this case, it could be argued that American values of individualism, rooted 
in a tradition of economic independence, allowed for critical opposition that 
functioned to check the expansion of the administrative state. This ‘liberal’ 
opposition was practically non-existent in Indonesia. As we will see, Western-
educated social scientists and economists supported the corporative, familial, 
thus anti-individual, state-society relations. With perhaps the exception of 
a small group of intellectuals around the indomitably democratic Sjahrir, 
there seemed to be little support for liberalism, individualism and the many 
trappings of Western democracy.
Lev has discussed the reduction of legal culture at an institutional level 
and Pompe in relation to the loss of authority of the Supreme Court.138 
Even a legal specialist like Ernst Utrecht, who tried to argue the relevancy 
and importance of at least administrative law, as was depicted above, did 
not particularly posit the rule of law as an inherently central component 
134 James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution.
135 E.S. Redford, Democracy in the administrative state, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1969).
136 For instance, E.S. Redford, Democracy in the administrative state and F.C. Mosher, Democracy 
and the public service, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).
137 Daniel Lev, Legal Evolution and Political Authority in Indonesia, (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000), p. 162.
138 Sebastiaan Pompe, The Indonesian Supreme Court. A Study of Institutional Collapse, p. 35-76.
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of democracy. Although he relied heavily on Dutch legal authorities, in 
relation to the discussion on Indonesia, Marxist legal ideas cropped up 
significantly. Similar to the Communist’s attack on the economic science 
taught by ‘Sumitro-followers,’ the Marxist legal approach was to see the law 
as inherently bound up within the class struggle. The law did not spring forth 
from a natural source, but was created by the ruling class in order to legitimize 
and prolong their control.139 Jusuf Aditjorop, member of the politbureau and 
secretary of the PKI, said that the main issue for national law was “how to 
integrate the work of the legal specialist with that of the masses.”140
Rule of law was considered a bourgeois belief that masked the class 
roots of the law under objective and neutralist notions. “The theory about 
the law and the state that is formalistic, logical-formal-abstract, instructs 
the creation of the law for the ‘vested interests’, to maintain a state without 
justice (Staat ohne Recht).”141As such, it was important that the law be 
revolutionized in order to reflect the changing values of its new ruling class. 
The role of national law was to raise the awareness of Indonesian socialism, 
gotong rojong values and push for more equitable production methods for 
a just society.142 Utrecht was a member of the National Law Development 
Institute (Lembaga Pembinaan Hukum Nasional) created in 1958 as part of 
the Guided Democracy revolution. In a National Law Seminar held in 1963 
by the Institute, Suprapto a legal specialist explained the idea of the law as 
understood under Guided Democracy. 
“Until now the influence of formalism on a theory of law based on static, 
abstract way of thinking, narrow formal logics, which is known as “beslissing 
leer”, “theorie van stelligstaatsrecht” and so forth cannot be fully cleansed 
from the science of Dutch legal knowledge. Basically, these theories intends 
to separate the law from the relation to the entirety of the social and 
individual life with all its myriad forms, which affects and is affected by one 
139 Ernst Utrecht, Pengantar Hukum Indonesia, (Jakarta: Ichtiar, 1964), p. 230 and 306.
140 Jusuf Aditjorop, Peranan dan tugas2 hukum nasional dalam alam Manipol, (Jakarta: Jajasan 
Pembaruan, 1963), p. 6.
141 Suprapto, Dasar pokok, fungsi, sifat2 dan bentuk hukum nasional, (Jakarta: Lembaga 
Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, 1963), p. 8.“…teori tentang hukum dan negara jang 
formalistis, logis-formil-abstrak, itu mengadjarkan untuk menegakkan hukum bagi kaum 
“vested interest”, untuk mempertahankan negara tanpa keadilan (Staat ohne Recht).”
142 Suprapto, Dasar pokok, fungsi, sifat2 dan bentuk hukum nasional, (Jakarta: Lembaga 
Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, 1963), p. 15.
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another, always moving and contradicting, with its own dynamics of change 
through the process of evolution and revolution and creating qualitative and 
quantitative exchanges. The theory of law that says that the law is the result 
of the abstraction of decision made by officials appointed by the state, and 
that the state is merely an organization composed of a series of functions, 
is a formalism needed by the colonialist to protect the vested interest of the 
monopolist and feudalist, of the landlords and other bloodsuckers.”143
Individualism was seen as anathema to the ideals of Indonesian society. 
According to Lev, the roots of this was born during the early period of 
independence, when institutional continuity with the colonial state had 
to be maintained because the new state could be held only through the 
conservative Pangreh Praja/Pamong Praja corps.144 During the constitutional 
discussion in 1945, which gave birth to the national ideology, the conservative 
nationalist leadership chose the indigenous legal code (HIR) as opposed to 
the European legal code. The HIR had less provision to protect the legal 
subjects. According to Lev, the logic of colonial law “had mainly to do with 
maintaining a manageable mass of Indonesians in place.”145
During the Japanese occupation, many of Indonesia’s nationalist leaders 
had worked in the administration. In a meeting with Sukarno, the head 
of the military ruler in Java, General Imamura, personally supported the 
143 Suprapto, Dasar pokok, fungsi, sifat2 dan bentuk hukum nasional, (Jakarta: Lembaga 
Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, 1963), p. 7. “Sampai pada saat ini masih belum dapat 
dihapuskan seluruhnja pengaruh formalisme daripada teori hukum jang didasarkan pada 
tjara berfikir abstrak jang statis, logika formil jang sempit, sebagai jang terkenal dengan nama 
“beslissingen leer”, “theorie van stellig staatsrecht” dsb. Dari dunia ilmu pengetahuan hukum 
Belanda. Dalam hakekatnja teori-teori tadi hendaknja melepaskan hukum dari hubungannja 
dengan keseluruhan kehidupan masjarakat dan individu dalam berbagai-bagai seginja, 
jang saling berhubungan dan saling mempengaruhi, jang senantiasa bergerak dan saling 
berkontradiksi dan jang dengan dinamikanja sendiri berobah melalui evolusi dan revolusi, 
dengan menimbulkan pertukaran kwalitas dan kwantitas. Teori hukum jang mengadjarkan, 
bahwa hukum adalah hasil pengabstrakan dengan pikiran dari keputusan-keputusan jang 
dibuat oleh pedjabat-pedjabat jang ditundjuk oleh negara dan negara tak lain hanjalah suatu 
organisasi jang terdiri daripada rangkaian fungsi-fungsi adalah suatu bentuk formalisme jang 
diperlukan oleh kaum pendjadjah untuk mempertahankan “vested interest” kaum modal 
monopoli dan golongan feodal, golongan tuan tanah dan kaum penghisap lainnja.”
144 Daniel Lev, Legal evolution and political authority in Indonesia. Selected Essays, p. 28-29.
145 Daniel Lev, Legal evolution and political authority in Indonesia. Selected Essays, p. 19.
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employment of as many Indonesians within the government as possible.146 
Perhaps one of the most significant effects of Japanese occupation has been 
the promotion of a world-view based on a deep and inherent suspicion 
and dislike of Western imperialism and its replacement with a corporatist 
economic order. One that placed the ‘Eastern’ concept of the family as a 
governing principle in understanding state-society relations. Hakko Ichiu is 
Japanese for the family of nations and represent a total break against Western 
imperialism and the ideologies that was inherent in it; economic liberalism, 
humanism, democracy, the parliament and laissez faire.“The New Economic 
Order now being announced is based upon this spirit of pioneering nations 
and is a moral economics with a framework of service and neighborly 
cooperation. The philosophy of total pursuit of profit clearly opens the 
way for the aggressor and is the guiding principle of individualistic Jewish 
economics which creates divisions and antagonisms among the oppressed.”147
No doubt that both Marxist ideas imbibed during the colonial period 
and Japanese notions of Hakko Ichiu and total mobilization of the population 
for development purposes was probably present in determining the Guided 
Democracy revolution. It was significant exactly for its anti-liberal roots. 
The hostility shown by youth groups during the early years of independence 
damaged the legitimacy of this new ruling class, at least temporarily.148 The 
manoeuvre of the democrat Sjahrir in implementing a parliamentary 
democracy based on the political party system started a long, ‘liberal’, 
social democracy that had lost its steam by the middle of the 1950s.149 The 
significance American social science, especially public administration and 
business management, was that within its philosophy of efficiency, there also 
lay an anti-liberal tendency. The rise of the managerial elite and its ideology 
was thus also important because it supported the corporatist ideology that 
was being espoused by Sukarno. 
146 Mitsuo Nakamura, “General Imamura and the early period of Japanese occupation” in 
Indonesia, Vol. No. 10, October 1979, p. 1-26.
147 On the basic objectives in establishing a New Economic Order for the people of Java (Jawa 
jumin keizai shintai seiken setsu no kompon shushini tsuite) in Harry J. Benda, James K. Irikura 
and Koichi Kishi, Japanese military administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents, (Ithaca: 
Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), p. 113.
148 Benedict R O’G Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1972), p. 334.
149 Sjahrir also attacked the pamongpradja and the ‘collaborationist’ nationalist elites. Anthony 
Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution, p. 68-70.
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Conclusion
The ideological development of the 1950s is essential in understanding the 
changes that occurred starting in the late 1950s as the Guided Democracy. 
The process of Americanization had inadvertently led to the import of 
scientific management, whose Indonesian incarnation prompted an 
ideological shift. This allowed the rise of a pre-independence corporatist 
notion, which had been written into the earlier 1945 Constitution to join 
forces with the efficiency mantra that powered the interest toward scientific 
management. This resulted in the reordering of state-society relations 
congruent with corporatism and the idea of the Welfare State. 
The rise of a new Indonesian managerial class was a component for the 
structural changes that occurred with the creation of national planning. The 
expansion of these new managers-graduates of the management education 
provided during the decade, military officers who had obtained managerial 
posts within the government and the economy-required the reordering of 
the economy and the wider society. In order to do this, a national planning 
scheme was created as part of the Indonesian revolution. It is to this national 
planning and structural transformation that the next chapter focuses its 
attention on. It is an essential component that complements the changes 
in ideas that was inadvertently introduced as a result of the expansion of 
scientific management into the country.
CHAPTER V
Economic Planning during 
the Guided Democracy 
This chapter discusses the development of the institution of national planning 
during the Guided Democracy and its increasing role in integrating the state 
within this structure. The succession of national planning organizations 
created by the state-initially in the Depernas or State Planning Board (Dewan 
Perantjang Nasional) which had been in operation from 1959 until the rise of 
the Bappenas (Badan Perantjang Nasional)-mirrored the tensions inherent in 
the ideas of state-society relationship. The development began with a burst 
of enthusiasm to push through the ideals of the Guided Democracy during 
its initial years (1957-1962); incorporation through non-party means, but 
also its conflicting tendencies-the centralization of control by strengthening 
the pamong pradja corps and leaving behind the decentralization program. 
Leaving party-based liberalism behind, the Depernas was a corporatist 
plan that would allow greater participation of society through a system of 
societal organizations called the karya. Karyas were mass organizations based 
on their functions within society: farmers, labourers, youths, women and so 
forth. The Depernas was a forum that bypassed Parliament and functioned 
to combine the older planning board and political representation in one 
body, a form of social control through incorporation. The function of the 
‘democratic’ Depernas was to represent the people in national planning. 
Thus, its decisions and consensus was to be acknowledged down the line 
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and the authority of the planning body would be self-evident. The idea of 
social control, as exemplified by the Depernas, but also by the introduction 
of new institutions like the Company Board (Dewan Perusahaan) and the 
idea of open management represented a genuine attempt of the early Guided 
Democracy (1957-1962) to implement changes that would allow for the 
inclusion of social participation.
The second form of planning was through the Bappenas or National 
Planning Body (Badan Perantjang Nasional) created in 1963 to replace the 
Depernas. This represented a correction to the corporatist experiment in 
which the ‘experts’ were allowed greater participation within a planning 
agency but also included a political wing, the Muppenas or National 
Planning Consensus (Musjawarah Perentjanaan Nasional), which acted as the 
Parliamentary wing of the Depernas. The Bappenas-Muppenas represented 
a gradual re-infiltration of the ‘experts’ managerial class, although to be fair, 
the technocrats of the post-1965 New Order had not yet penetrated into 
the policy-making positions of these organizations. What it did do was to 
create a planning structure that united the central and regional executive 
within a semblance of order. In this way, the answer to the problem that had 
plagued the 1950s-the creation of a national executive coordination, in lieu 
of the pamongpradja-had seemingly emerged. This is a pertinent question in 
understanding the development of the Indonesian planning body. Starting 
out as a very Westernized body, it was briefly taken over by the politician 
before gradually receding to allow greater expert participation. It ended in 
the New Order where politicians lost all powers and the expert technocrats 
gained everything within the Bappenas minus the Muppenas.
The inherent tension between participation of ‘society’ versus the 
leadership of experts was to play out more forcefully in the economic policy-
making of the period. The institutional development of planning, however, 
illustrated the rise of an executive class that owed their position to the efforts 
to implement national planning. The rise of the military managers and their 
increasing control of regional governments allowed for new coordination 
corridors. The Bappenas also expanded the participation of experts through 
the formation of research and educational institutions that were deemed 
necessary as part of a more professional approach to national planning. 
The integration and coordination of the central and regional executive 
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with national research and educational institutions thus continued the elite 
managerial development that was started in the 1950s. 
Transition from the BPN
The BPN drew up a Five Year Development Plan (1956-1960) in 1956. 
It was submitted to Parliament but was not approved until 1958. In the 
meantime, much of the economic assumptions had changed. Aside from the 
enactment of a foreign investment bill,1 the Plan did not materialize. The 
role of Parliament had diminished considerably and the role of the BPN was 
being replaced by the newly created Depernas. The BPN had been a PSI-
dominated bureau and when the social democrats lost political influence, 
the PKI succeeded in closing it down on charges of it being too ‘capitalist.’2 
The Communists were very critical of the BPN’s large-scale manufacturing 
projects, especially the Asahan Aluminium Mill. Ir. Djuanda Kartawidjaja, 
as Prime Minister, presided over the dissolution of his BPN power base, but 
recouped by creating the Economic and Finance Bureau (FINEK/Bureau 
II), a Prime Ministerial office with the task of assisting in economic matters. 
He appointed former BPN staff Muljatno Sindhudarmoko as Bureau Chief 
and Ali Budiardjo and Saubari as staff.3 This coupled with the control of 
both the FEUI, the Ministry of National Research and the Leknas provided 
adequate protection for the core social scientists to flourish both in research 
and in developing power relations during the period to come.
The role of Djuanda during the early Guided Democracy period, from 
around 1957 to 1962/1963, was perhaps as central as that of A.H. Nasution 
for the army. Although people like Sumitro Djojohadikusumo had left, the 
‘technocratic element’ still existed at the core of both the government and 
the military. Taufik Abdullah recalled a conversation in which a famous 
Indonesianist said, “people will realize later on how crucial Djuanda’s role 
was in these critical years, and how much of a loss to the nation the sudden 
1 Submitted to parliament during the second Ali cabinet in 1956, it was finally passed in 
1959. Bruce Glassburner, The economy of Indonesia. Select reading, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1971), p. 90.
2 Robinson Pangaribuan, The Indonesian State Secretariat, 1945-1993, (Perth: Murdoch 
University, 1995), p. 15.
3 Robinson Pangaribuan, The Indonesian State Secretariat, p. 16. Budiardjo were sympathetic 
to the PSI. Benjamin Higgins and Jean Higgins, Indonesia: the Crisis of the Millstone, p. 87.
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death of Djuanda had been.”4 Djuanda died in 1963. Born on 14 January 
1922 to Raden Kartawidjaja, a schoolteacher from the lower Sundanese 
nobility, Djuanda started his education with scholarship at the Technische 
Hogeschool Bandoeng in 1929. He graduated in 1933 with the title civil 
engineer. He became a director for the Muhammadiyah teacher’s school in 
Batavia before getting a job as a civil servant with the department of water 
control (waterstaat) of the province of West Java in 1939.  Unlike Hatta 
or Sumitro, Djuanda thus never experienced living in Holland nor was he 
particularly active within the nationalist movement.5 Not affiliating with any 
particular party or ideology, Djuanda stood as a neutral option for Sukarno’s 
right-hand man during the early period of Guided Democracy. 
Rosihan Anwar called Djuanda a pioneer in Indonesian technocracy, in 
that people like him “have no specific ideological commitment, in fact they 
acted and were apolitical. Their main function was to be a helper and aid 
their political master.”6 This was certainly not fully true with the New Order 
technocrats, whose relationship with the military state was determined by 
their desire to promote a certain vision of the Indonesian economy, but it 
may have been quite correct in understanding the Guided Democracy regime. 
Quoting Hanna, Higgins pointed at Sukarno’s entourage as composed of 
sycophants, rouges and houris.7 And although he wasn’t ‘political’ in the 
normal sense, Djuanda was pro-heavy industry, supporting large projects like 
the Jatiluhur electric plant, Gresik cement plant and the Krakatau steel mill.8
One of the most important components of the Guided Democracy 
state was the belief in executive centralization and the shift away from the 
decentralized democracy that was inherent in the Parliamentary Democracy 
system of the 1950s. The Pamongpradja corps, which had been slated to 
disappear under the decentralized regional governments, was saved by 
Sukarno when he superseded the Decentralization Law no. 1/1957 and 
4 Taufik Abdullah, “Kata pengantar” in Awaloeddin Djamin (ed.), Pahlawan Nasional. Ir. H. 
Djuanda. Negarawan, Administrator dan Teknokrat Utama, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), p. xx.
5 I.O. Nanulaita, “Ir. Haji Djuanda Kartawidjaja” in Awaloeddin Djamin (ed.), Pahlawan 
Nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda. Negarawan, Administrator dan Teknokrat Utama, (Jakarta: Kompas, 
2001), p. 8-71.
6 Rosihan Anwar, “Pelopor Teknokrat. Non-stop jadi menteri” in Awaloeddin Djamin (ed.), 
Pahlawan Nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda, p. 217-218.
7 Benjamin Higgins and Jean Higgins, Indonesia: the Crisis of the Millstone, p. 122.
8 Mohammad Sadli, “Pelopor Perencanaan Pembangunan Ekonomi” in Awaloeddin Djamin 
(ed.), Pahlawan Nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda, p. 258-259. 
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instituted a Presidential edict in 1959.9 This had the effect of recentralizing 
the executive.10 The Pamongpradja was to work alongside a territorial military 
structure that had also been expanded during the period under Nasution’s 
territorial management doctrine. With the creation of a National Planning 
body composed of representatives of working bodies (karyas), the fractious, 
decentralized, party-based society of Indonesian liberalism was replaced with 
an incorporated structure in which society would participate in national 
planning and in the greater economy through the application of open 
management systems. The structure of power could be centralized and society 
and state could function as one organic whole. 
Institutional Development during the Guided Democracy 
On a general level, we can divide Guided Democracy into two periods. The 
first occurred between 1957 and 1962 and represented an experimental 
period, in which various new institutions were set up within an environment 
that bespoke an optimistic view of the future. It was a corporative period in 
which participation through karya organizations within the planning body 
was heralded as a foundation for a stable and efficient Indonesia. It was the 
time in which Sukarno’s anti-experts mood was at its height. The second 
period from 1962-1965 was a period in which the experiments had been 
conducted and a shift occurred toward a feeling of apathy and pessimism. 
The shift also saw the increasing authority wielded by Sukarno while at the 
same time the loss of authority of Nasution. Interestingly, it also saw the rise 
of the Western-educated social scientists and the Communists in both the 
government executive and the discourse on the economy. It saw increasing 
economic distress and the loss of the control of the state while at the same 
time the creation of a series of new, executive institutions that were to 
become the institutional bedrock of the future New Order state. In short, it 
was a period rife with contradiction and conflict that witnessed the rise of a 
new generation of experts who were to exercise an increasing influence and 
impact on the executive. 
9 J.D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: a Study of Local 
Administration. 1950-1960, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 21.
10 J.D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia, p. 201-229.
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As Herbert Feith describes, Guided Democracy was both an initiative 
of the military and Sukarno, “and they did so not as leaders and followers 
or as part of a single power group, but as two partners and followers, or as a 
part of a single power group, as two partners between whom relations were 
competitive as well as cooperative.”11 In the early phase starting around 1957, 
Nasution used the martial law that was proclaimed after the dissolution 
of Ali Sastroamidjojo’s Cabinet in order to push forward his institutional 
ideas. His authority as Chief of Staff of the army resulted in his control of 
the Central War Authority (Peperpu), which controlled the Regional War 
Authority (Peperda). Sukarno successfully wrested control of this double 
administration when he dissolved the Peperpu and established the Supreme 
War Authority (Peperti) in which he was the head of both the civilian and 
military administration.12 In December 1961, the Supreme Commander for 
the Liberation of West Irian or KOTI was created under Sukarno and this 
became the most important government agency and acted like a cabinet.13 
The competitive sphere had resulted in the formation of institutions along 
similar lines by both the military and Sukarno. In many cases, the initiative 
was taken by Nasution and then followed by Sukarno. Not until 1962 when 
Sukarno succeeded in undermining Nasution’s position did an expansion 
of executive authority took place under the Presidential office, putting 
institutional authority in the hands of the President.
According to Daniel Lev “(T)he striking aspect of Guided Democracy 
as it developed after the restoration of the 1945 Constitution was that it 
contained many political but few institutional controls. For institutions were 
pulled apart and broken down but poorly reassembled.”14 While there was an 
institutional breakdown, new organization and institutions did arise. While 
Sukarno’s preoccupation in politics and the shoring up of his support base 
deflected the efficacy of these new institutional arrangements, it is important 
to realize that significant path-dependent changes were being wrought. The 
importance of the Guided Democracy experiment is located in the founding 
of Indonesia’s state-society relations. The problems of perceived government 
inefficiency resulted in the creation of an ‘experimental’ state. In the words 
11 Herbert Feith, “The Dynamics of Guided Democracy” in Ruth McVey (ed.), Indonesia, 
(New Haven: Hraf Press, 1964), p. 327.
12 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 47.
13 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhausen, Abdul Haris Nasution, a Political Biography, p. 158.
14 Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian politics, 1957-1959, p. 286. 
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of Sukarno: ‘…if we admit that the Indonesian revolution is not yet over, 
we have to understand that we will have to confront continued renewal. 
Try this, if it doesn’t work, try something else… if that doesn’t work, then 
try again…Revolution is a dynamic process.’15 This experimental approach 
showed a belief in historical materialism and the dialectic of nature itself. 
As Engels said “the whole of nature has its existence in eternal coming into 
being and passing away, in ceaseless flux, unresting motion and change.”16 The 
Guided Democracy revolution worked along the lines of this institutional 
experimentation.
Two important events heralded the rise of Guided Democracy. First, 
the expropriation of Dutch-owned enterprises and the subsequent forced 
repatriation of Dutch citizens from Indonesia. This resulted in the opening 
up of positions in newly nationalized corporations and subsequently, the 
hasty expansion of management science to fill the void left by the departing 
Dutchmen. Second, a further implementation of the military dual-function 
occured, which allowed greater participation by the military in both civilian 




Guided Democracy Revolution for the Government 
The figure above represents a simplified model of institutional development within the 
government during this period. The strategy can be divided into two: a macro strategy on state 
coordination and a micro strategy on the individual civil servants. The macro strategy tries to 
answer that old 1950s’ question of the problems surrounding the inability of the state to 
implement concrete national coordination and planning. The micro strategy takes a deeper look 
at the implementation of management science and the ideological effort to create a ‘new 
Indonesian man’ as the creation of both state effectiveness and nation-building exercise. State 
capability and nation-building became intertwined within an ideology that promoted the state as 
the end goal of the nation. This development is important because, although Guided Democracy 
was a failure, it also cemented the kind of military-technocratic state that the New Order would 
become. 
The Indonesian economy was restructured along corporative lines when the government 
issued the Law on State Enterprise (Peraturan Pemerintah no. 16/1960) in April 1960. The law 
stipulated the creation of the General Management Boards (Badan Pimpinan Umum or BPUs) 
which were given the authority for general management and staff function, based on particular 
industries: trading, mining and industry, sugar, rubber, agricultural products, etcetera. The 
Management Boards were created to replace the Nationalization Board or Banas (Badan 











Socialism a la Indonesia  
Guided Democracy Revolution for the Government
15 Soekarno, “Don’t built a façade on s nd” in DewanNasional, (Kementeri n Peneran an RI: 
n.a., n.a.), p. 62.
16 Friedrich Engels The dialectics of nature quoted by Roeslan Abdoelgani, Tentang ketegasan 
sosialisme Indonesia I. Landjutan kuliah umum di Universitas Malang padatanggal 13 
Februari 1961, Roeslan Abdulgani, I v.nr. 641, ANRI.
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The figure above represents a simplified model of institutional 
development within the government during this period. The strategy can 
be divided into two: a macro strategy on state coordination and a micro 
strategy on the individual civil servants. The macro strategy tries to answer 
that old 1950s’ question of the problems surrounding the inability of the 
state to implement concrete national coordination and planning. The micro 
strategy takes a deeper look at the implementation of management science 
and the ideological effort to create a ‘new Indonesian man’ as the creation 
of both state effectiveness and nation-building exercise. State capability and 
nation-building became intertwined within an ideology that promoted the 
state as the end goal of the nation. This development is important because, 
although Guided Democracy was a failure, it also cemented the kind of 
military-technocratic state that the New Order would become.
The Indonesian economy was restructured along corporative lines when 
the government issued the Law on State Enterprise (Peraturan Pemerintah 
no. 16/1960) in April 1960. The law stipulated the creation of the General 
Management Boards (Badan Pimpinan Umum or BPUs) which were given 
the authority for general management and staff function, based on particular 
industries: trading, mining and industry, sugar, rubber, agricultural products, 
etcetera. The Management Boards were created to replace the Nationalization 
Board or Banas (Badan Nasionalisasi) headed by Prime Minister Djuanda, the 
governor of the central bank and eleven other ministers, who had managed 
the nationalization process of Dutch-owned companies.17 These BPUs 
were placed under related ministries. Many government-owned companies 
originated from the Dutch enterprises that had been nationalized in late 
1957. The Management Boards acted as a ‘super management’ board with 
the authority to intervene in day-to-day operation. 
The take-over of Dutch corporations in December 1957 brought 
together a group of military and civilian officers into the management 
rooms of corporations. On 10 December 1957, the Central Military Ruler18 
Nasution instructed all Regional Military Rulers19 to take charge of Dutch 
corporations, many of which had already ended up in the hands of mostly 
leftist trade unions. The creation of the Banas or Badan Nasionalisasi was a 
17 J.A.C. Mackie, “Indonesia’s Government Estate and their Masters”, p. 341-342.
18 Penguasa Militer Pusat
19 Penguasa Perang Daerah (Peperda)
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significant event for it centralized policy-making of all types of nationalized 
enterprises by Prime Minister Djuanda with eleven other ministers and the 
governor of Bank Indonesia. When a more permanent control machinery 
replaced the Banas, their staffs were incorporated as a coordination board, 
ensuring continuity.20 There were two important factors here. First, the 
appointment of Colonel Suprajogi as head of Banas and as Minister of 
Production Coordinator meant that the military gained a significant say in 
the organization. This included hiring people like Colonel Soehardiman and 
other military managers to work in the Banas. Second, retaining the Banas 
under the office of the First Minister ensured the continuity of large parts 
of the experts policy-making elites of the planning body. As in economic 
planning, much of the policy-making was thus successfully retained under 
the authority of First Minister Djuanda.
Several months later in March 1958, Nasution ordered the creation of 
the Central Body for the Management of Industrial and Mining Companies 
or Bappit21 The biggest shift in the management of state-owned companies 
took place in 1960 with the issue of a government regulation in lieu of law.22 
This regulation legally transferred the ownership of the seized companies 
within the central government through the creation of General Management 
Boards,23 which provided managerial service for the companies.24 These BPUs 
were placed under diverse ministers, thus solidifying the central government’s 
control of them. 
Despite these manoeuvres, the presence of the military within these 
corporations, in the Bappit and, in fact, within the newly created BPUs, was 
not removed, as in fact army men were present in practically all important 
state institutions. Within Bappit, three BPUs were created.25 The Depernas 
discussion on the Bamunas finally solved the questions surrounding 
the position of government-owned corporations within the framework 
of socialism à la Indonesia. Like national planning, experts like Mr. Ali 
Budiardjo and managers such as Lieutenant-Colonel Sajidiman, who was 
20 J.A.C. Mackie, “Indonesia’s Government Estates and their Masters”, p. 328.
21 Badan Pusat Penjelenggaraan Perusahaan-perusahaan Industri dan Tambang
22 Perpu or Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang 
23 Badan Pimpinan Umum
24 It also contained regulation to start the implementation of national programme for land 
redistribution. 
25 Machine and Electricity, Chemistry and Transportation
226 CHAPTER V
the BPU director of the State Trading Corporation, visited countries like 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia to study the role of the state, the market and 
organizations like the Chamber of Commerce within the economies of these 
socialist states.26 There were interests in Yugoslavia’s “socialized enterprises” 
system where companies were not centrally nationalized, but controlled by 
the workers through the formation of collectives. Like the regionalization 
of national planning, which Depernas envisaged later on, many experts also 
saw the need to decentralize ownership.27
Another important innovation to corporate management was the 
Worker-Management Council or Dewan Perusahaan. It was created on the 
assumption that worker control over management might result in a system 
of check and balances that would reduce the amount of corruption that has 
plagued the Indonesian state sector and created a condition of self-control.28 
“The system of capitalist oppression conducted through the hierarchical 
system, from the opperdirecteur in the Netherlands, via the directors, 
managers, representatives and zetbaas in Indonesia must be revamped and 
changed into a democratic system that allows for the participation of workers 
in the management of the company, the planning of work and of planning 
itself.”29 There were two levels of Council: the Management Board level 
and the company level. At the Management Board level, the council was 
composed of representatives from management who served as chairman 
and a representative from a union and farmer organization connected 
to the company. If the company was not in an agricultural sector, union 
26 Lieutenant-Colonel Sajidiman specifically met with the Chamber of Commerce of 
Czechoslovakia in September 1961 to understand its role in the socialized economy, 
something which he envisaged the BPUs to mimic. Sajidiman, “Perdjalanan ke negeri 
Tjekoslowakia dalam rangka tugas pemerintah” in Madjallah Perusahaan Negara, no. 11, 
year 1, November 1961.
27 Mohammad Sadli, “Masalah Perusahaan Negara di Indonesia. Laporan symposium pada 
latihan pembangunan ketatalaksanaan” in Madjallah Perusahaan Negara, no. 18, year 2, 
June 1962, p. 4.
28 Mochammad Natzir, Dewan Perusahaan sesuai dengan UU no. 45 Prp. thn. 1960, (Makassar: 
Sedjahtera, 1963), p. 7.
29 Suprapto, Dasar pokok, fungsi, sifat2 dan bentuk hukum nasional, p. 17. “Sistim penindasan 
kapitalisme jang didjalankan dengan melalui hierarchie dari atas ke bawah, mulai dari 
opperdirectur di Negeri Belanda, direktur-direktur/manager-manager/vertegenwoordiger-
vertegenwoordiger/zetbaas-zetbaas di Indonesia harus dirombak dan diganti dengan 
sistim jang demokratis, jang memungkinkan kaum pekerdja turut serta dalam pimpinan 
perusahaan, turut merentjanakan pekerdjaan dan turut mengambil bagian dalam 
pelaksanaan rentjana.”
Economic Planning during the Guided Democracy 227
representatives could replace the farmer representatives. A union must have 
a membership that was up to 30% of the total workforce of the company. 
Ministries appointed an expert to be part of the councils. At the company 
level, the ministers also had the right to appoint community leaders suggested 
by the Governor of the locality. The Company Board was a consultative body, 
offering recommendations for improving the environment of the companies 
in order to increase productivity. By the middle of 1964, there were 21 
workers-management councils at the BPU level and 636 at the enterprise 
level; 60,5% of this number were from the labour union, 13,5% from the 
farmers union, 24% belayed to the management and 2% were experts.30
The labour union always had a strong position within post-colonial 
Indonesian society. Government administration traditionally sided with 
labour in many disputes, while company management was tainted with a 
Dutch aftertaste. But within the army controlling the plantation sector it 
was harder for the union to push for the creation of Councils, which would 
have accrued greater membership from farmer’s representatives. Studies by 
Everett Hawkins have shown that there was a decrease in the number of 
labour disputes from 4,131 involving over five million workers in 1957 
to 807 involving over 700,000 workers in 1963. This was not because of a 
decrease in the grievances but because labour disputes were transferred from 
the labour dispute bureau toward the military’s labour relations group (BKS-
Bumil).31 Again, in accordance with Indonesian corporatist ideas, disputes 
and any other forms of decentralized decision making were replaced by 
consensus within familial structures dominated by the executive, the military 
or a combination of the two. The expansion of participation was met with 
hostility by some parts of the management, which often had a difficult 
relationship with aggressive unions.32
30 Panglaykim, “Indonesian State Enterprise and Worker-Management Councils (Dewan 
Perusaaan)” in Asian Survey, vol. 3, no. 6, June, 1963, p. 285-288. 
31 Everett Hawkins, “Labor in Transition” in Ruth T. McVey, Indonesia, (New Haven: Southeast 
Asia Studies, 1963), p. 248-271 and Panglaykim, “Worker-Management Councils in 
Indonesia” in World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2, Jan., 1965, p. 243-255.
32 Panglaykim, “Worker-Management Councils in Indonesia”, p. 252.
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Depernas
The Depernas differed with the BPN in its ambitious planning targets. It 
was entrusted to create not just an industrial or development plan, but an 
overall national plan, “to be built in accordance with Indonesian ideals”33 in 
order to create a just and prosperous society. It was thus a social, political 
and cultural plan, as well as a developmental one. It was also an official High 
Government Body on a par with the Parliament and the Supreme Court. 
Sukarno wanted the Depernas to stand outside and above the authority of 
the Cabinet, although Djuanda was legitimately worried that this would 
make coordination difficult. Although he insisted in Parliament that the 
body should be under the authority of the Cabinet, Sukarno’s corporatist 
idea held sway.34 It was a decision made by the National Council,35 an 
initially important Guided Democracy national body that effectively 
replaced Parliament, in September 1957. The Council appointed the 
engineer Prof. Herman C. Johannes of Gadjah Mada University to lead a 
19-man commission on the formation of the Depernas. The commission 
was composed of several intellectuals, including Prof. Johannes, Prof. G.A. 
Siwabessy, also an engineer, the Sinologist Prof. Tjan Tjoen Som and a legal 
expert, Prof. Raden Djokosutono. As was becoming customary, it had several 
members of the police and the military as well as people with Communist 
ties, including the future Vice Mayor of Jakarta, Henk Ngantung. On 8 
October 1957, Johannes gave an exposition of the Depernas in the National 
Council which approved it the following day. Mohammad Hatta refused the 
offer to head the new body, arguing that it wasn’t necessary for Indonesian 
development.
Further discussion on the Depernas was deferred to the National 
Development Congress or Munap (Musyawarah Pembangunan Nasional), 
held on 25-27 November 1957 at the sport hall in Merdeka Square. The 
Munap was organized by the BPN and was to lay the foundation for national 
development. The BPN was given the task of producing working papers which 
were distributed and discussed by the various panels. Around 400 delegates 
attended the congress from the government and the private sector. Regional 
33 Roeslan Abdulgani, “The lessons of Indonesia’s experience in planning” in Politik dan Ilmu, 
(Jakarta: B.P. Prapantja, 1962), p. 157.
34 Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian politics, 1957-1959, p. 180.
35 Dewan Nasional
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civilian and military governors came with their advisors, along with members 
from the central government, Parliament, the Constituent Assembly, the 
National Council and representatives of traders, industrialists, banking sector, 
labourers, farmers, youths, women, reporters, veterans, artists and religious 
leaders all of whom were represented in their modern organizational forms. 
SOBSI, KBKI, RKS etcetera for the labour organizations, Majelis Perniagaan 
dan Perindustrian, DEIP, MII, KENSI, Perbana etcetera for the ‘economic 
sector.’ BTI, STII, Petanu for the agricultural sector, PWI, IPPKN, Ikatan 
Wartawan Ekonomi etcetera for the reporters, Wakil Legiun Veteran and 
MUVI for the veterans and LEKRA and BKMN for the artists.36
The corporatist nature of the congress was to be replicated in the 
Depernas, the prototype of which was first displayed by the National 
Council. These corporatist organizations were to mobilize consensus through 
traditional Indonesian means (musyawarah untuk mufakat). It was part of 
the effort to create social control through social participation, a central tenet 
of the Guided Democracy state.37 These groups had traditionally vertical ties 
to various parties similar, according to Nasution, to the Dutch verzuiling 
form.38 Constitutional expert Djokosoetono warned that corporatist states 
only exist in fascist and Communist countries.39 Particularly important was 
the absence of domestic and foreign ‘experts’. The BPN had a relatively 
high concentration of domestic and foreign experts, working closely with 
Yale University and the Ford Foundation. The BPN was also connected, 
through Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, with budding Indonesian economists 
concentrated at the Faculty of Economics in the University of Indonesia. 
The Munap and the Depernas had however almost none of these, although 
the ICA did provide private economic consultants Bernard Bell and Oscar 
A. Ornati by April 1960 at the request of the government for technical 
36 Keng Po, 26 November 1957. 
37 Even at the end of Guided Democracy, the creation of the Bamunas (Corporative Body 
of Private Business Owners) in 1965 was in part of the effort for “social participation and 
social control.” Musjawarah Pusat Bamunas Ke-I. 19-20 Pebruari 1965, (Jakarta: Bamunas, 
1965), p.2. 
38 A.H. Nasution, “Mengabdi Bangsa bersama pak Djuanda” in Awaoeddin Djamin (ed.), 
Pahlawan nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda Kartawidjaja. Negarawan, administrator dan teknokrat 
utama, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), p. 296-297.
39 A.H. Nasution, “Mengabdi Bangsa bersama pak Djuanda” p. 297.
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consultation.40 Mr. Bell had been acquainted with Djuanda Kartawidjaja 
since the end of the 1940s as a personal economic consultant. 
Yet, the plan stressed the ‘indigenous’ nature of its creation, in 
comparison to the 1950s’ addiction to foreign assistance. Indonesia had 
always had an ambivalent attitude toward foreign assistance,41 and many of 
the foreign experts were shielded from the public view, both to protect them 
from political fallouts of the highly galvanized Indonesian media42 and to 
secure a degree of confidence in the ability of the Indonesian officials. Many 
of Indonesia’s economists were discredited by the military’s anti-corruption 
effort or through association with the social democrats. Real economic 
decision-making was retained within the Prime Minister’s office through the 
Finek, the economic and development council, the monetary council and 
the development council.43
The Depernas was to be a testament to the capabilities of the non-
professional. Roeslan reiterated again in his speech in Malang: “The results 
of Depernas in its basic principles are full of quality and value, in line with 
our revolution and the wishes of the people. This is not surprising. The 
character of its members determines the character of its results.”44 He added, 
“it is not too much to say that the members of the Depernas are the sons of 
revolution and the sons of the people. They are different from the previous 
40 Guy Pauker, “Indonesia’s eight year development plan” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 2, 
1961, p. 116.
41 “Foreign Technical Assistance in Economic Development in a Newly Independent Country: 
Some Observation in Indonesia” in Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 1, 
No.1 (March, 1952), p. 73-80.
42 An example of this was the fiasco of the visit of former Nazi finance minister Hjalmar 
Schacht, in which the government was attacked, especially by leftist elements. Harian 
Indonesia, 24 July 1951 and 3 August 1951. Wertheim (and allegedly other professors) 
refused to visit Universitas Gadjah Mada, and other Indonesian universities, because of 
Schacht’s stay in Indonesia. Harian Indonesia, 13 August 1951 and 21 August 1951. For 
more on the result of his visit, see Hjalmar Schacht, Laporan Hjalmar Schacht, (Jakarta: 
Kementerian Penerangan:, 1951). 
43 Donald Humphrey et.al., Indonesia. Perspectives and Proposals for United States Economic 
Aid, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 77-79
44 Roeslan Abdulgani, Tentang ketegasan Sosialisme Indonesia II. Landjutan kuliah umum 
di Universitas Malang pada tanggal 13 Februari 1961, p. 68 in Roeslan Abdulgani, Inv.nr. 
641, ANRI. “Hasil-karya Depernas dibidang pengertian-pengertian jang pokok-pokok ini 
adalah hasil jang bermutu dan bernilai, tjotjok dengan tuntutan Revolusi kita dan Amanat 
Pederitaan Rakjat. Hal ini tidak mengherankan. Watak keangautaannja menentukkan 
watak-hasilnja.”
Economic Planning during the Guided Democracy 231
planning and development boards, who stressed their membership on the 
intellectual-experts. Instead of these theorists who had little contact with the 
common people, the Depernas prioritizes its membership to groups or karya 
that have deep roots within and amidst society, without dispensing the advice 
and opinion of the experts. No less than 270 Indonesian experts in twelve 
fields of development, who are of high quality and with a large capacity have 
been deployed and have had their opinions heard by the Depernas in order 
to perfect their work.”45 Thus, despite Depernas’s essentially non-professional 
character, a contingent of experts, including economists, tried to help with 
the process by offering opinions to the members. For instance, in the case of 
agriculture, the Depernas relied on the reports of FEUI’s Research Institute 
for the Economy and Society.46 In any case, the members of the Depernas 
were not those of the ‘perfect and specialized type of man’, but the ‘cultivated 
man’, a man who has received general and broad education, who has grown 
up together with the people and who will stay aloof of the temptation of 
‘career’ and ‘professionalism.’ 
On 16 July 1958, the Ministerial Council appointed the nationalist 
Sumatran Mohammad Yamin and Hanafi to formulate the Depernas bill. 
The Depernas was to devise, supervise and evaluate an overall national plan. 
Its first duty was to create an Eight-Year Overall Development Plan. This was 
later expanded when on January 1961 the President formed a working body 
to create an annual plan based on the eight year plan. On 30 June 1959, 
the Depernas decided to name Mohammad Yamin as Minister-Chairman 
of Depernas. Within the Depernas prominent individuals represented 
45 Roeslan Abdulgani, Tentang ketegasan Sosialisme Indonesia II. Landjutan kuliah umum 
di Universitas Malang pada tanggal 13 Februari 1961, p. 68 in Roeslan Abdulgani, Inv.
nr. 641, ANRI. “”Karena itu tak berlebih-lebihan kiranja kalau dikatakan disini bahwa 
anggauta-anggauta Depernas adalah putra-putra Revolusi dan putra-putra Rakjat. Berbeda 
dengan dewan-dewan perantjang dan pembangunan jang dulu-dulu, jang menitik-beratkan 
keangautaannja kepada para intelek-ahli dan intelek-expert, dan kepada ahli-ahli teori jang 
kurang berkontak dengan kehidupan Rakjat dan masjarakat, maka Depernas mengutamakan 
keanggautaannja untuk golongan-golongan karya jang berakar dimasjarakat dan ditengah-
tengah rakjat, tanpa mengabaikan nasehat dan pendapat para ahli dan para expert. Tidak 
kurang dari 270 orang tenaga ahli Indonesia dalam 12 bidang pembangunan, jang bermutu 
tinggi dan berkapasiteit besar telah dikerahkan dan didengar pendapatnja oleh Depernas 
dalam penjempurnaan pekerdjaannja.”
46 Rantjangan Dasar UU Pembangunan Nasional-Semesta Berentjana Delapan Tahun: 1961-
1969. Bidang Mental/Ruhani dan Penelitian Buku ke III. Djilid ke VI. Pola pendjelasan bidang 
pendidikan tenaga pembangunan, (Jakarta: Dewan Perentjanaan Negara, 1960), p. 1689. 
Lembaga Penjelidikan Ekonomi dan Masjarakat.
232 CHAPTER V
each Province, usually the Governor. The armed forces, as well as national 
businessmen and minority groups were given seats on the body. This disparate 
collection of interests was convened within a period of 10 months in order 
to create the Eight-Year Overall Development Plan. 
Lack of number was cited as one of the main problem with the Eight 
Year Overall Plan.47 “More often than not, the numbers do not conform 
to other data, or were not in accordance with reality. Such a condition had 
forced the Depernas to calculate their own numbers in important fields 
through the creation of Special Committees, such as: Population Committee 
and National Income Committee.”48 They thus ignored the vital fact that 
the plan had no supporting organization to provide them with data. As a 
result, there was a lot of guesswork as to numbers. For instance, the gross 
domestic product were calculated to be between 163 billion rupiah to 267 
billion rupiah, depending on which of the 17 volumes of the master plan 
was consulted, per capita growth was assumed to be between 0,1 to 5,6 per 
cent/year until 1969, depending on population growth rate which varied 
from 1 percent to 3,6 percent/year in the various volumes.49 These figures 
were significantly different and thus provided different estimations of the 
developments in question.50
There were four plenary sessions based on development themes: basic 
necessity (sandang pangan), state constitution (kenegaraan), economy/finance 
and society. The intellectuals and experts participating in the Depernas 
were bunched together as part of the ‘intellectual representative of society’ 
to complement the women’s, labour’s and journalist’s sections. Intellectuals 
included Buntaran Martoatmodjo, a medical doctor and former Minister of 
Health, Sudarisman Purwokusumo, a legal expert, Djuneid Pusponegoro, 
another medical doctor, as well as Djokosutono, Tjan Tjoe Som and Imam 
Sutikno.51 In conducting the overall development plan, the Depernas created 
47 Badan Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas). Peraturan-peraturan. (Jakarta: 
Bappenas, 1964), p. 8-9.
48 Badan Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas). Peraturan-peraturan. p. 8-9 
49 R. Soerjadi, “Sistim Ekonomi Terpimpin dibidang Moneter”, speech given at the HSI 
Economic Seminar, 20 July 1963, p. 14-16.
50 For more on the history of the national income accounting, see W.H. Arndt and C. Ross, 
“The National Income Estimates” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 6, no. 3, 
1970, p. 33-60.
51 Harian Rakyat, 31 June 1959.
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a series of central and regional committees. In the regions, the Governor 
headed the regional committees.
When the Depernas finished the master plan of Indonesia’s first and only 
Eight-Year Overall Development Plan, it was met with much scepticism. 
The plan was presented in the form of eight books, 17 volumes and 1,945 
paragraphs. The symbolic nature of the arrangement of the plan, conforming 
to the August 17, 1945 independence day, gave it less weight in the 
judgement of many. The Depernas was not clear on how its plans were to 
be superintended and reviewed.52 There was a struggle among the leadership 
on who was to carry out the plan, with Djuanda trying to entrust its control 
to a small, expert group of ministers and Chaerul Saleh trying to move it 
to his ministry.53 However, Depernas lacked the institutional capability to 
carry out a national plan and became merely a council for the collection 
of departmental plans. It lacked coordinating and supervising capabilities. 
The plan also contained only those projects that were to be financed by the 
central government. Regional government and private sector finance were not 
included.54 The plans themselves would eventually be given back to respective 
ministries and department and the problems inherent in them would work 
their way to foul-up the plans. In any case, it was merely composed of various 
projects without any grand unifying theme. 
The plan was criticized internally as well as externally. On a visit to 
Washington DC in April 1961, Sukarno gave President Kennedy a copy of 
Indonesia’s economic plan. Kennedy sent the plan to a team of experts from 
Yale University, who went on a 24-day mission to Indonesia in August of the 
same year. The mission found deep flaws in the development program. The 
biggest flaw was basically the way in which Indonesia administered itself. An 
expanded program of development was impossible “until Indonesia makes 
greater progress in putting its house in order.”55 One of the main conclusions 
was that American help to Indonesia should focus on education and training 
of Indonesian managers and technicians and proposed aid to the tune of 
52 Hasil Konferensi Kerdja Bappenas-Baperdep, (Jakarta: Bappenas, 1964), p. 4.
53 J.A.C. Mackie, Problems of the Indonesian Inflation, p. 28. 
54 Sutikno Slamet, “Uraian mengenai pembiajaan pembangunan nasional, pengawasan dan 
penilaian” in Hasil Konferensi Kedja Bappenas/Baperdep-Bakopda, (Jakarta: Bappenas, 1964), 
p. 102.
55 Donald Humpfhrey et.al., Indonesia. Perspectives and proposals for United States Economic 
Aid, p. 160. 
234 CHAPTER V
325-390 million dollars.56 Without adequate skilled personnel, that money 
would go nowhere and only add to inflationary pressure before Indonesia 
could expand its capacity to absorb capital for new projects. The investment 
required 30 billion rupiahs or 13 percent of Indonesian GDP in 1961 alone, 
for the entire eight years, it would have required 240 billion rupiahs, 50 
percent of which had to be paid in dollars, i.e. 270 million dollars.57 The 
government ignored the report.58
In a report to the President, the Minister of Public Works, the engineer 
S. Dipokusumo, reiterated that the plan had weak assumptions about project 
financing. The plan divided the projects into two: A-projects and B-projects. 
The A-projects were the ‘proper’ development projects, including rice 
self-sufficiency, textile self-sufficiency and laying the foundation for heavy 
industry, such as steel and aluminum mills and petrochemical plants. All this 
was to be financed through the B-plan, which constituted ‘low-hanging fruit’ 
from Indonesia’s rich resources. Depernas mapped eight areas of Indonesian 
low-hanging fruits: petroleum, timber, fishery, copra, rubber, tin, alumina 
and tourism. While Indonesia had these in abundance, they failed to assess 
the capital and expertise necessary to increase production in these sectors. 
For instance, the plan for Kalimantan timber was to export 37 million cubic 
metres of wood per year. At the same time, the wood export volume of the 
entire world was 40 million cubic metres. It would not only swamp world 
markets, but would have required roads whose capital investment would have 
required up to 90 billion rupiahs, twice the size of the 1961 national budget.59 
The same can be seen in fishery, where calculations required Indonesia to 
invest in a fleet three times as large as the fleet of the top fishing nation, 
Japan. As Dipokusumo reiterated in his conclusion “all the plans above do 
not contain reality. None of them can be successfully conducted, perhaps 
some may be conducted on a small scale, but such scales would never justify 
56 Usha Mahajani, Soviet and American aid to Indonesia. 1949-1968, p. 19.
57 Roeslan Abdulgani, Tentang ketegasan Sosialisme Indonesia I. Landjutan kuliah umum di 
Malang pada tanggal 13 Februari 1961, p. 54 in Roeslan Abdoelgani, ANRI Inv.nr. 641. 
58 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 189. That 30 billion had to be paid for through 
the national budget. Exports, in fact, decreced during the period. ANRI, Jakarta, Roeslan 
Abdulgani, inv. nr. 880.
59 Two times the national budget for 1961.
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itself as a source for meaningful development.”60 Unfortunately, Yamin totally 
disregarded cabinet criticisms of the plans.61
By 1962, the plan had essentially unravelled. Government investment in 
the plan had reached 67,7 billion rupiahs or 41% of the 1960 GDP using 
the Depernas’s lower estimate. By the end of 1961, government revenue from 
these development projects yielded 10,4 billion instead of the planned 19 
billion rupiah. In 1962, most of the 40 billion rupiah needed to finance the 
plan had to be financed through the national budget because the projects 
yielded a measly 4,2 billion rupiahs. The B-projects yielded 5 million dollars 
or 225 million rupiah from the Pan-American Oil Company and 20 million 
rupiah from tourism out of the projected 225 million rupiah annual revenue. 
The projected yield from forestry of 295 million rupiah, fishery 70 million 
rupiah, copra 427 million rupiah, and rubber around 1.800 million rupiah 
did not materialize due to lack of investment or the inability to control the 
export market. Tin export actually went down.62
The 1962 Regrouping
The shift during 1962 was significant. It resulted in placing national planning 
and many other institutes under the office of the President, in a way similar 
to the centralized structure during the Parliamentary Democracy period.63 
Economic deterioration and the failure of the Eight Year Overall Development 
Plan had forced these changes and given rise to a more significant role for 
experts within the government. A.H. Nasution, Sukarnos’s biggest rival, was 
effectively demoted by ‘kicking him upward’ to a technically higher post but 
with less authority.64 The appointment of Ahmad Yani as head of the army 
put, in the eyes of many, the army more fully under the President’s control. 
Roeslan Abdulgani was out of the Cabinet, which was to many a surprise. 
60 Masalah pembiajaan pembangunan semesta, rentjana Depernas, S. Dipokusumo, 2 
September 1960, S.1417/9/60 in ANRI, Jakarta: BAPEKAN, no. 5. 
61 Guy Pauker, “Indonesia’s eight year development plan”, p. 115.
62 R. Soerjadi, “Sistim Ekonomi Terpimpin dibidang Moneter”, speech given at the HSI 
Economic Seminar, 20 July 1963, p.19-23.
63 By the end of Guided Democracy, institutions under the Presidential Office would number 
132, including 68 departmental committees.
64 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi panggilan tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan masa Orde Lama, p. 26 and 
C.L.M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, p. 140.
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Djuanda kept his post but by this time, he was somewhat incapacitated by 
illness, having checked in for heart problems in August 1961. Sukarno had 
also banished Sjahrir and his inner circle to East Java.65 On 17 October 1962, 
Mohammad Yamin died and was buried in West Sumatra. On 7 November 
1963, Djuanda would follow, after being sick for a number of years. 
Roeslan Abdulgani, in a speech he gave in 1967 entitled The Death of 
Djuanda: the turning point, put emphasis on the changes to government after 
this period. According to Awaloeddin Djamin, the failure of the economic 
rehabilitation (Dekon) was attributed to the absence of Djuanda, as influence 
passed to Soebandrio.66 This may be too simplistic an interpretation, because 
Soebandrio was instrumental in getting the nascent technocrats on board 
the rehabilitation program. It was also uncertain whether Sukarno himself 
would have listened to Djuanda’s council and stopped the drift toward 
foreign adventure in 1963. In any case, Sukarno was taking in the reins of 
power. Nasution, for instance, wanted greater control and authority for his 
Ministry of Defence and thought the Soviet system was a good choice. He 
had collected papers on Soviet defence integration and gave it to Djuanda’s 
Committee of Six.67 Instead the result of the reorganization was to provide 
greater control for the President through the KOTI or the Indonesian High 
Command (Komando Tertinggi Indonesia), eliminating the authority of the 
Ministry of Defence. Sukarno also placed the intelligence agency (BPI) within 
his office under the authority of Soebandrio’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.68
The centralization of power under the Presidential office gave way to 
a restructuring of the national planning that opened the door for greater 
expert participation. This included continued foreign expert participation. 
For instance, since the early 1960 up till 1964, the Indonesian government 
used the services of the American consultant Griffenhagen-Kroeger Inc. 
to study and recommend the re-organization of the budgetary system, 
as a continuation of the reports made by Karakachev, Kirkor and other 
Indonesian experts.69 As part of retooling, the budgetary responsibility 
had been moved from the Ministry of Finance to the Presidential Office 
65 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 123-127 and 128-130.
66 Awaloeddin Djamin (ed.), Pahlawan Nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda. Negarawan, Administrator 
dan Teknokrat Ttama, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), p. xii-xvii.
67 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, p. 218-221.
68 Ibid.
69 Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, “Perkembangan ilmu administrasi negara di Indonesia”, p. 38.
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at Djuanda’s First Minister’s Office. A major reason for placing it under 
the First Minister was because of the concentration of experts at the Finek 
Bureau. This allowed for effective fiscal control to be in the hands of the 
First Minister. The report from Griffenhagen-Kroeger concluded that the 
placement of the budget office under the First Minister would provide greater 
cooperation among the various government agencies and the executive at 
the Presidential Office.70
The period 1962-1965 saw even more the expansion of the executive 
authority in various new state bodies. Sukarno was able to take over the 
function of institutions that A.H. Nasution had created during his position 
as head of the army. By 1965, there were various bodies and institutions 
situated directly under the President. As head of state, he commanded seven 
institutions, including the State Secretariat, the Cabinet and other functions. 
As Leader of the Revolution (Pemimpin Besar Revolusi) he headed 13 bodies.71 
As mandate holder of Parliament (Mandataris MPRS) he headed another 23 
bodies.72 Other state bodies directly under the Presidential office included 
the State Administrative Academy (LAN), the Statistics Bureau (BPS), the 
Office of Government Employee (KPU) and the Intelligence Office (BPI). 
Semi private-government bodies such as the Bamunas and MIPI were also 
under the President as were international organizations headquartered in 
Indonesia like the Ganefo (Games of the New Emerging Forces) Secretariat. 
Lastly, the President headed 68 bodies and inter-departmental committees, 
including the Economic and Development Council (DEP) and the Council 
for Economy and Finance (BEK). In total, there were around 132 higher 
executive bodies by the end of the Guided Democracy.73
70 A Modern Budget System for Indonesia. Part A: Budget Organization, (Jakarta: n.a.:, 1963), 
p. 1-5.
71 Including the Front National, the KOTRAR, KOTARI (Komando Operasi Berdikasi), 
KOGAM (Komando Ganjang Malaysia), Kopedasan (Komando Pembangunan Daerah2 
Perbatasan), Lembaga Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa, Komite Nasional Ganefo, Lemhanas etc.
72 Including the Conefo, the committee for National Monumen and Istiqlal Mosque, the 
national television, Jagorawi Highway authority and others.
73 Bintoro Tjokramidjojo, “Masaalah jang perlu dipikirkan tentang herordening aparatur 
Negara ditingkat pusat” in Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, Tulisan-tulisan Administrasi 
Pembangunan, 1966-1968, (Jakarta: Bappenas, 1971), p. 1-17.
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The Rise of a New Generation
The creation of the Indonesian Science Council (MIPI)74 in 1956 was 
important for providing sanctuary for experts from the hostile political 
environment of the day. Research was alleged to be important to the 
Depernas, at least within its official publications,75 but it was only in 1962 
that the government created the Department for National Research Affair 
(Departemen Urusan Research Nasional), whose duty was “to coordinate, 
stimulate and conduct research for the purpose of national development.”76 
The institutional environment for researchers and experts thus grew 
significantly. Aside from the Leknas and universities, other large economic 
organizations like Bank Indonesia, Bank Negara Indonesia, General 
Management Boards and so forth also came to conduct their own research.77
The university was another important institution, which expanded the 
influence of the expert. Higher education received significant attention by 
both Depernas’s Eight Year Overall Development Plan and the government in 
general. The Plan requires the establishment of a separate Higher Education 
Ministry from the more general of Ministry of Education and Culture, which 
was achieved in 1961.The creation of the Department of Higher Education 
and Science on April 1961 and the regulation on universities (UU Perguruan 
Tinggi) tried to integrate the universities as part of the development and 
revolution of Guided Democracy. The universities produced an ethical 
oath called the Tri Dharma or three purposes of higher education, whose 
third purpose specifically endorsed its role in societal development. This 
was interpreted as greater state intervention, especially in such matters as 
the curriculum. The Conference of Similar Faculties was held for 12 types 
of faculties teaching in the country, which resulted in the formation of the 
Expert Committee on Similar Faculties. These committees would help the 
74 Madjelis Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia or the Science Council.
75 M. Makagiansar and Widjojo Nitisastro (eds.), Research di Indonesia, p. 13.
76 M. Makagiansar and Widjojo Nitisastro (eds.), Research di Indonesia, p. 14. “…
untuk mengkoordinir, menstimulir dan mengadakan research untuk kepentingan dan 
pembangunan Negara, baik dibidang ilmu-ilmu pengetahuan semesta alam, maupun 
dibidang ilmu-ilmu pengetahuan social dan kemanusiaan dengan memberikan prioritas 
kepada research dibidang produksi.”
77 Mohammad Sadli, “20 Tahun Perkembangan Ilmu Ekonomi di Indonesia” in M. 
Makagiansar and Widjojo Nitisastro (eds.), Research di Indonesia, p. 188
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Department to evaluate the results of the conferences in order to streamline 
the curriculum of faculties throughout the nation.78
The government was committed to the formation of a state higher 
education institute in each province and to strengthening the science and 
technology sector in the quest for industrialization.79 In 1962, a series of 
inter-university and inter-faculty meetings was conducted in order to discuss 
the creation of a uniform national curriculum and teaching methods. The 
Expert Committee on Uniform Faculty, which met on 20-22 December 
1963, created a Ministry Ruling Concept on the curriculum faculty of all 
sciences, to be composed in a Government Regulation at a later date. Many 
facets of the student’s university learning experience were regulated within 
government decisions. The number of hours per semester, the percentage 
to be devoted to laboratory work (praktikum), the number of classes per 
semester and so forth.80
The designation of feeder universities, whose duty was to provide teaching 
staffs or training to faculty members of other universities, aimed to provide 
uniformity. All feeder faculties came from either the University of Indonesia 
or Gadjah Mada University.81 All feeder faculties had university affiliations 
with American universities. What was significant here was the fact that 
American affiliation continued into the Guided Democracy period. Also 
continuing the elitist nature of the development was the fact that a survey of 
Gadjah Mada University students in 1960 showed that 84 percent of students 
came from urban high schools and 60 percent from only three major cities.82
In November 1962, the Conference of Economics Faculty (Konperensi 
Antar Fakultas Ekonomi) was held to develop the economic curriculum 
on Indonesian socialism. In order to determine what exactly counted as 
Indonesian socialist economy, especially in relation to the contents to be 
78 Barli Halim, “Ilmu Ekonomi Perusahaan”, p. 220-222.
79 Kenneth Lee Neff, Educational Planning in a National Development Context: Indonesia, a 
Case Study, p. 180.
80 Bachtiar Rifai, Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi, p. 64.
81 Faculty of Medicine, University of Indonesia, Institute of Agriculture Bogor, Institute 
of Technology Bandung, Faculty of Agriculture and Forrestry, Gadjah Mada University, 
Faculty of Social and Political Science, Gadjah Mada University, Faculty of Law, Gadjah 
Mada University and lastly, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia. Bachtiar Rifai, 
Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi, p. 68.
82 Joseph Fischer, “Indonesia” in James S. Coleman, Education and Political Development, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 95. 
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included in the curriculum, a series of conferences were held. The Third 
Congress of the Indonesian Economic Scholars Community (Ikatan Sardjana 
Ekonomi Indonesia) was held at Cipayung in December 1960, followed by 
the First Seminar on Agricultural Marketing in Bogor in December 1962, 
the Second MIPI Congress in Jakarta in October 1962 and the Grand 
Congress (Musjawarah Besar) of Economic Scholars and Experts in Jakarta 
in April 1964.83 There was an effort to introduce new economic literatures 
from socialist countries, for instance the books written by Polish planning 
specialist Oscar Lange or socialist economists from the West like Paul Baran. 
The articles were made to form the core of a new ‘Indonesianized’ 
economics content, while taxes on academic books were waived. There was 
thus an effort to try to develop an Indonesian science as opposed to merely 
importing American and socialist books and ideas. It underscored both the 
increasingly pervasive nature of state intervention and the support for the 
development of an Indonesianized economics and other social sciences. 
MIPI had decided in 1960 to expand research through the creation of 
seven research institutes, among them the National Economic and Social 
Research Institute or Lembaga Ekonomi dan Social Nasional (Leknas). 
In March 1962, MIPI appointed an advisory committee headed by law 
expert Soediman Kartohadiprodjo, with anthropologist Koentjaraningrat, 
economist Muhammad Sadli, sociologist Selo Soemardjan, international 
politics and law expert M. Makagiansar and agricultural specialist Kampto 
Utomo.84 In March 1963, Leknas was created. Immediately, Ford Foundation 
provided Harvard advisers for the Leknas.85 Another important research 
organization directly under the FEUI program was the Economic and Social 
Research Institute. Prior to the formation of Leknas, this institute in fact 
played a greater role in economic research. Planning authorities were thus 
exposed to both foreign and Indonesian economists. For instance, in October 
83 Barli Halim, “Ilmu Ekonomi Perusahaan”, p. 221
84 Sadarjoen Siswomartojo, A Tentative Statement about the Set-up, Nature and Purpose of the 
National Institute for Economic and Social Research of the Council for Sciences of Indonesia, 
(Jakarta: Leknas, 1963), p. 4.
85 Joseph J. Stern, “Indonesia-Harvard University: Lessons from a long-term Technical 
Assistance Project” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 36, no. 3, December 
2000, p. 113-125.
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1964, foreign experts from ECAFE in Bangkok were invited to teach at an 
upgrading course in the field of planning engineering and methods.86
As older, Dutch-trained experts lost their positions, were made redundant 
or died, the field was opened for greater participation by American-trained 
experts. Older economists or managers, like Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, 
Mohammad Hatta, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara or Jusuf Wibisono, had 
by now been effectively sidelined. People like Djuanda Kartawidjaja or 
Mohammad Yamin passed away in the early part of the 1960s.87 The 
Communists attack on Western-trained experts and followers of Sumitro 
delineated the significant position they had within the government. They 
had initially sought political protection from First Minister Djuanda and 
elites like Mohammad Hatta or Sjahrir.88 Later on, their position became 
more entrenched within the bureaucracy. “Because most economic graduates 
were still relatively young, starting from the year 1963 some of them had 
reached strategic, influential or honourable functions, for instance, as aids to 
ministers, heads of directorates or offices, presidential directors or members 
of corporate directions, heads of mass organizations, private organizations, 
professors, deans and vice rectors in universities. The rise to the position of 
ministers or university rectors by economists became a phenomenon only 
by 1964 and 1965. In general, these last years formed the start of the rise 
of the economists in higher levels of the society and bureaucracy.”89 Even 
so, competent experts and technocrats were “dispersed throughout several 
departments and isolated from any central point of authority.”90
86 Soeharto, “Pidato penutup” in Hasil Konferensi Kerjda Bappenas/Baperdep-Bakopda, (Jakarta: 
Bappenas, 1964), p. 147.
87 Juanda died November 1963 and Mohammad Yamin in October 1962. 
88 Herbert Feith, Soekarno-Militer dalam Demokrasi Terpimpin, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar 
Harapan: 1995), p. 103.
89 Mohammad Sadli, “20 tahun perkembangan ilmu ekonomi di Indonesia”, p. 184. “…oleh 
karena kebanjakan sardjana ekonomi relatip masih muda maka baru sedjak tahun 1963 
beberapa diantara mereka mulai menduduki fungsi2 jang strategis, berpengaruh atau jang 
terhormat, seperti misalnja pembantu2 menteri, kepala2 direktorat atau djawatan, presiden 
direktur atau anggauta direksi perusahaan besar, anggauta pimpinan ormas2, organisasi 
swasta, guru besar, dekan dan pembantu2 rektor universitas. Dipegangnja beberapa 
kedudukan menteri dan rector universitas oleh sardjana ekonomi baru mendjadi gedjala 
tahun 1964 dan 1965. Pada umumnja, tahun2 jang achir ini baru menundjukkan permulaan 
dari muntjulnja kaum sardjana ekonomi ditingkat2 atas masjarakat dan birokrasi.” 
90 Human Resource Development. Problems, Policies, Programs, p. 13.
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The rise of this technically competent generation was, according to 
Feith, significant in understanding the continued promotion of revolution 
by the older generation. “If the government were to speak less and less of 
the need for revolution and instead to declare economic development as the 
principle of challenge of the present period”, the top political leaders and 
head of government enterprises “would soon have their positions contested 
in the name of government’s ideology by others who could claim greater 
technical competence.”91 The contenders to these posts were either the old, 
administrators who had lost their job or the up-and-coming university 
graduates with their formal education and bitter experience of having their 
career paths blocked by the current elite.92 The Communists in turn attacked 
economists by using revolutionary rhetoric. According to Aidit, these experts 
were not showing their true colours, but secretly undermining the revolution. 
“These cynics apparently obtain their wind and inspiration from the 
poisonous materials in the bulletins and periodical stencils spread by Sumitro 
and his agents within government offices and other parts of our government 
and economic apparatuses.”93 The absence of Communists within this 
structure was a significant factor. The party had its own educational system 
based on the Universitas Rakjat and the Ali Archam institute, but “the paucity 
of Marxist knowledge and of the scholarly output of its leaders”94 further 
marginalized their position as outsiders to this institutional development. 
The most serious attack on the entrenched position of the ‘Sumitro 
followers’ occurred in 1961, when Sukarno appointed Iwa Kusumasumantri, 
a radical nationalist with close ties to the Murba and PKI, as Minister 
of Higher Education and Science (Menteri Pendidikan Tinggi dan Ilmu 
Pengetahuan or PTIP). Previously, higher education was under the Ministry 
of Education and Culture, which assumed responsibility for all education 
in the country. It was headed by Minister Prijono, a Murba-member who 
91 Quoted in J.A.C. Mackie, Problems of the Indonesian Inflation, p. 52.
92 Herbert Feith, Sukarno-Militer dalam Demokrasi Terpimpin, p. 102-103.
93 D.N. Aidit, Dekon dalam Udjian, (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1963), p. 7. “Kaum sinis 
ini ternjata pula mendapat angin dan inspirasi dari bahan-bahan ratjun berbentuk buletin-
buletin atau stensilan-stensilan periodic jang pada saat ini diedarkan oleh pengchianat 
Sumitro dan agen-agennja dikalangan-kalangan pegawai perusahaan-perusahaan negara, 
kantor-kantor pemerintahan dan lain-lain bagian daripada aparatur pemerintahan dan 
ekonomi negeri kita.” 
94 M.A. Jaspan, Aspects of Indonesian Political Sociology in the late Sukarno Era, (Nedlands: 
Centre for Asian Studies, 1967), p. 20-21.
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had received the Soviet peace prize.95 Iwa Kusumasumantri made several 
important changes to the curriculum and textbooks, especially in the field 
of social sciences. His approval was made necessary to allow students to 
study abroad, which resulted in a stop on sending Indonesian students to 
the United States, and he asked students to report on signs of the teaching 
of liberalism in the universities.96 His high-handed dealings with faculties 
and members and his effort to introduce political goals created many 
enemies within the university and outside it. In the cabinet reorganization of 
March 1962, Tojib Hadiwidjaja, a non-party and army approved candidate, 
replaced him, commencing the long-term army control of the universities 
and campus in much of twentieth century Indonesia. As was the case with 
the production of technocrats or army specialists, the left was never able to 
take hold of higher education.97
Research organizations, such as Leknas, were institutionally connected 
with leading universities, in particular the University of Indonesia. Leknas 
was not able to send its staff to the United States until 1963 and had to rely 
for much of its research on graduates from FEUI. A look into the activities 
of Leknas in 1963 would give a glimpse of the kind of community and 
relations in existence in the middle of the Guided Democracy period. Leknas 
did not have a ready expert staff of its own in its early years. As a matter of 
fact, its managing committee came from Indonesia’s newest and brightest 
social scientists fresh from a postgraduate education in the United States; 
these included the economists Widjojo Nitisastro and Sarbini Sumawinata, 
the anthropologist Koentjaraningrat and the sociologist Selo Soemardjan. 
They represented the ‘Indonesian godfathers’ of their respective sciences. 
Leknas also employed consultants like economist Mohammad Sadli, Everet 
Hawkins and Kurt Martin, among others, and counterpart consultants like 
Ali Wardhana and Harun Zain. In June 1963 Leknas signed a consultancy 
agreement with the Harvard Development Advisory Service. 
95 John Bresnan, At Home Abroad, p. 42.
96 Herbert Feith, Sukarno-Militer dalam Demokrasi Terpimpin, p. 84.
97 For more on the Army-Communist struggle over higher education see Thomas R. Murray, 
“Indonesian Education: Communist Strategies (1950-1965) and Government Counter-
Strategies (1966-1980)” in Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 3, March 1981, p. 369-392. Also Agus 
Suwignyo, The Breach in the Dike: Regime change and the standardization of public primary-
school teacher training in Indonesia (1893-1969), (PhD Dissertation Leiden University, 
2012), p. 399-406.
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Leknas began sending their employees abroad to pursue postgraduate 
studies in the same year. Thee Kian Wie, Julian Luthan and Lukman Siahaan 
were sent to do a masters study of economics at Wisconsin and Indiana 
University, T.S.S. Sutanto studied administration science at Pittsburgh, while 
Tan Giok Lan and Harsja Bachtiar studied sociology at the University of 
California in Berkeley and Harvard respectively and D.M. Wattimena also 
studied social psychology at the University of California in Berkeley. Since 
October 1963, a regular weekly seminar was held at Leknas, together with 
the Indonesian Science Council and the Department of National Research. 
Initially, the seniors, consultants and counterpart consultants would give a 
talk on actual and theoretical issues. The ‘juniors’ would later contribute to 
the talks as well. The first workshop was held in April 1963; it dealt with the 
issue of taxation and was headed by economist Prof. Sarbini Sumawinata. 
A second workshop, on the issue of managerial de-concentration in 
government-owned enterprises headed by Mohammad Sadli, was held in July 
1963. Both these themes were raised in support of the Deklarasi Ekonomi 
program that was announced in March of the same year. In September 1963, 
Kurt Martin headed a seminar entitled ‘Inflation and economic growth.’
The relationship with Universitas Indonesia was intimate indeed, but 
Leknas also reached out to other institutions. Everett Hawkins and Harun 
Zain conducted discussions and concluded agreements with Universitas 
Gadjah Mada and Universitas Padjadjaran as well as cooperation with 
government departments, including the Department of Basic Industry 
and Mining. Much of the foreign relationships were with American or UN 
institutions like the Harvard Development Advisory Service, the Center for 
Research on Economic Development at Michigan University, UNESCO’s 
Research Centre on Social and Economic Development in Southern Asia 
in New Delhi and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in 
Bangkok. But in concordance with a shift in emphasis in the curriculum to 
better reflect Indonesia’s socialist economy, there also were efforts to contact 
socialist social scientists including two Russian economists on the problems 
of Indonesian economic growth in August 1963.
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Bappenas
Efforts to recentralize planning resulted in the formation of the dichotomous 
Bappenas-Muppenas structure, which was inaugurated in December 1963. 
This was part of the changes related to the Deklarasi Ekonomi policy and, in 
fact, the Bappenas was mentioned initially within the Ambeg Parama Arta 
speech in Parliament on 15 May 1963. In accordance with the Presidential 
Decision no. 12 1963, the body wielded wide authority. 
“For the purpose of perfecting the National Overall Development Plan and 
the need to create detailed and derivative continuation, and in the effort to 
strengthen the integration of all government apparatuses, the Depernas in 
its former form and position is integrated into the executive government 
apparatus or body, by changing its structure and composition in accordance 
to the present development needs. After the Depernas completes its duties 
to create a Development Conception in accordance to our development 
principles laid down within the Presidential Development Address in written 
and oral forms, we then need a more technical Development Planning and 
Supervision Apparatus within the level of growth of our Revolutionary 
Development. For this reason, the reforms and changes of the Depernas 
are focused on the creation of the National Development Planning Body 
or Bappenas, which would perfect the Executive Body in executing the 
planning and supervision of development throughout the country under the 
leadership of the First Minister assisted by a technical Minister. The Staff of 
the Bappenas will be composed of TECHNICAL EXPERTS in planning 
and development whose duty is to create detailed plans, in the form of yearly 
and long-term plans, as a perfection and continued implementation of our 
Development Conception.”98
If the Depernas was a political organization that created national 
planning, the Bappenas-Muppenas acknowledged expert participation within 
the Bappenas, while giving a voice to the political and social organizations. 
“Our Development Planning apparatus has recently made significant strides. 
This is the culmination of historical development and experience in the last 
98 Quoted in R. Soerjadi, “Sistim Ekonomi Terpimpin dibidang Moneter”, speech given at 
the HSI Economic Seminar, 20 July 1963, p. 31-32. ANRI, RoeslanAbdulgani, inv. Nr. 
1082. Capitalization according to the original.
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10 years, from the BPN to Depernas and lastly to Bappenas.”99 The realization 
of the need for the creation of a good apparatus was apparent in many of the 
reports of Muppenas/Bappenas. “We know with clarity that our economic 
difficulties cannot be handled purely through formulating economic plans. As 
regards the gist of the recent Presidential Political Address (Amanat Politik), 
however good an economic plan, its success is determined by the conditions 
of its apparatus.”100
Although at the time the Bappenas was not fully under the control of 
the technocrats, as opposed to its role as a technocratic body par excellence 
for the New Order state, it was part of the rise of the new technocratic elites 
into various policy-making and expert-producing positions and represented 
an iconic change signifying the possible transition toward technocracy. The 
Bappenas had as its duty not only the creation of a national plan, but also 
its surveillance and implementation. No doubt, the Bappenas opened doors 
for greater technocratic participation as Sukarno repeated in his speech; “the 
staff of the National Development Planning Board will be composed of 
technical experts in planning and development, whose duty is to write up 
detailed planning, on an annual and long-term basis, as a form of perfecting 
and implementing further our Development Conception.”101
Three lessons had been learned from the failure of the Depernas. First, 
the lack of reliable data on important economic figures underscored the need 
to have credible research centres on economic data-especially statistical data 
concerning population growth, gross domestic product and domestic capital 
99 Soeharto, Pidato Pembukaan oleh J.M. Menko Urusan Perentjanaan Pembangunan 
Nasional” in Hasil Konferensi Kerjda Bappenas/Baperdep-Bakopda, (Jakarta: Bappenas, 
1964), p. 3. “Aparatur perentjanaan pembangunan kita telah mengalami kemadjuan jang 
pesat pada waktu achir2 ini. Hal ini adalah hasil perkembangan sedjarah dan pengalaman 
dalam pembangunan selama 10 tahun, dari Biro Perantjang Negara ke Depernas dan kini 
ke Bappenas.”
100 Kesimpulan-kesimpulan dan KertasKedja. Musjawarah Muppenas ke III, p. 6, “Kita mengetahui 
dengan djelas bahwa kesulitan2 ekonomi tidak bisa kita atasi hanja dengan perumusan2 tentang 
rentjana2 pembangunan ekonomi jang baik. Sebab sesuai dengan tjanang P.J.M. Presiden 
dalam Amanat Politik beliau jangbaru lalu maka bagaimanapun baiknja suatu rentjana 
ekonomi pelaksanaannja tergantung pada keadaan aparatur.”
101 Soekarno, Ambeg Parama Arta. Berwatak Pandai Mendahulukan Urusan jang Penting, 
(Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1963), p. 30. “Staf Badan Perentjanaan Pembangunan 
Nasional itu akan terdiri atas AHLI-AHLI TEHNIS perentjanaan dan pembangunan, jang 
bertugas membuat rentjana-rentjana terperintji, baik rentjana-tahunan maupun rentjana-
djangka-pandjang, sebagai penjempurnaan dan pelaksanaan lebih landjut daripada Konsepsi 
Pembangunan kita”
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for investment.102 Second, the failure spelled-out the need to put the available 
expertise within the country to better use. Third, it highlighted the failure of 
corporatist planning and stressed the need to‘re-centralize’ economic policy-
making within a highly competent environment. The lack of oversight and 
implementation was also a major problem, which the Bappenas-Baperdep-
Bakopda structure was to solve.103 The number of economic research bodies 
was expanded during the period. One of the most pertinent had been the 
Central Statistical Board (BPS),104 a one-time colonial body, which by then 
lacked the capability to formulate economic data, including the national 
income index. Since 1955, economist Sarbini Sumawinata, who had been 
trained by Nathan Keyfitz, had headed the BPS.105 Economic research 
on Indonesia was forthcoming through the Faculty of Economics of the 
University of Indonesia. Steady cooperation with American universities and 
support from the Ford Foundation allowed more Indonesians to study in 
US universities.
The Bappenas was created in December 1963 by a Presidential Decision, 
which integrated Depernas with the Bappenas while at the same time 
reducing it to a body under the office of the President, rendering him 
yet another title as coordinator of the Minister for the Coordination of 
Development and day-to-day supervisor of the Minister for the Matter of 
National Development Planning (UPPENAS).106 This reintegration under 
the executive was reiterated in Sukarno’s May 1963 Ambeg Parama Arta 
speech in which he outlined the country’s economic policy (deklarasi ekonomi/
dekon), a terminology that, according to Lance Castles,107 was influenced 
by management science. Thus, the planning body was downgraded from a 
102 Sutikno Slamet, “Uraian mengenai pembiajaan pembangunan nasional, pengawasan dan 
penilaian” in Hasil Konferensi Kerdja Bappenas/Baperdep-Bakopda, (Jakarta: Bappenas, 
1964), p. 97. 
103 Hasil konferensi Bappenas-Baperdep, (Jakarta: Bappenas, 1964), p. 19-20.
104 Badan Pusat Statistik
105 David Webster, Fire and the Full Moon. Canada and Indonesia in a decolonizing world, p. 88 
and Sarbini Sumawinata, “Recollections of my career” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, August 1992, p. 45-48. The development was slow, but the first 
post-colonial population census was published in 1960.
106 Urusan Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional. For more on structure of Bappenas see 
Hamzah Nasution, “The Organization of the Planning Agency” in Bappenas News Bulletin, 
No. 1, Vol. 1, 1964, p. 30-35.
107 Lance Castles, Bureaucracy and Society in Indonesia: Paper for Discussion, (S.n.: s.n., no date). 
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high government body to an adjunct of the Presidential office, similar to the 
position of the BPN within the Prime Minister’s office. The cabinet was also 
reorganized within a New Style Work Cabinet.108
The main thrust of the Bappenas plan was to integrate the regions and 
the centre within one organizational authority. This was made possible when 
by the early 1960s the regional rebellions had been suppressed.109 By 1962, 
Sumatra was back under control of the central government. The rehabilitation 
process became part of the discussion on the aplication of socialist models 
for institutionalized development. For instance, surveys of various planning 
agencies in Communist countries were made by Panglaykim and Hazil.110 
Special interest was shown in the Soviet Planning model introduced by 
Premier Khrushchev in the country’s sixth five year plan (1956-1960) because 
of its decentralized and regional character. The Soviet’s central-regional 
or Gosplan-Sovnarkhoze planning caught the fancy of the Indonesian 
government. The Gosplan or the Soviet state planning commission was quite 
similar to the Depernas/Bappenas, while the 107 established Sovnarkhozies 
were regional economic councils that were introduced in the sixth five-year 
plan (1956-1960) as part of Khrushchev’s decentralization plan. Krushchev 
called for an overall plan with the focus on creating greater efficiency and 
managerial leadership in order to provide greater responsibility to the 
republics, the ministries and the administrators of productive enterprises. 
Ideas in developing a central-regional planning body that could 
function independently and serve to fine-tune the planning process were 
increasingly accepted. Earlier plans for regional planning bodies were seen 
as contradictory to the corporatist form that centralized everyone within a 
unified and centralized body. It was argued that the regions were given plenty 
of representation within the Depernas, and so, regional planning bodies 
were not deemed necessary: “The government is of the opinion that there 
are already enough members sitting in the National Planning Council in the 
capital of Jakarta who are able to bring forward the development problems 
108 Kabinet Kerdja Gaja Baru. Sukarno, Amanat PJM Presiden Republik Indonesia pada 
siding pleno terachir Depernas in Badan Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas). 
Peraturan-Peraturan, (Jakarta: Bappenas, 1964), p. 4-7.
109 Guy Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, p. vi.
110 Panglaykim and Hazil, Struktur Management dan Organisasi dalam beberapa Negara Sosialis. 
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of first level regions of local autonomy.”111 The government was possibly 
more assured now of the docility of the regions after Jakarta’s successful 
clampdown and thus more willing to provide regions with institutions that 
were previously seen as increasing the degree of independence from the 
centre.
An Economic and Social Research Institute survey conducted between 
October 1961 and February 1962 affirmed major problems of coordination. 
J.E. Ismael wrote “for instance, the Public Works and Power Service of some 
regions does not know whether the road repairs executed are part of the 
routine plan of their department or whether they are now included as one of 
the projects of the Plan. Thus it becomes obvious that there is no coordination 
and communication both between the Departments and Local Governments 
and between the Departments at the Centre and the Services in the region.”112 
He implied that few of the coordination issues that haunted the 1950s had 
ever been resolved. It was within this spirit of creating true coordination 
that the necessity for a regional approach was seen as essential. What was 
envisioned was an integrated regional development plan, as a more perfect 
alternative to the national overall development plan. Its implementation 
was to realize the old dream of integrating Indonesia’s central and regional 
governments as one organization for the purpose of development.
Structure and Organization
Bappenas was controlled by a secretariat composed of deputies from the 
Ministries of General Affairs, Planning and Evaluation.113At a lower level 
eight bureaus were assigned to plan, supervise and evaluate projects in 
their respective fields,114 whose functions resembled both the BPN and the 
FINEK office. The reports of the bureaus would then be used as progress 
reports by the President to Parliament (MRPS). Aside from the Bappenas, 
111 J.E. Ismael, “Some institutional aspects in national and regional development” in Ekonomi 
dan Keuangan Indonesia, Vol. 16, No. 4, October/November/December, 1963, p. 25.
112 J.E. Ismael, “Some institutional aspects in national and regional development” in Ekonomi 
dan Keuangan Indonesia, Vol. 16, No. 4, October/November/December, 1963, p. 25.
113 Wakil Menteri Urusan Umum, Wakil Menteri Urusan Perentjanaan and Wakil Menteri 
Urusan Penilaian.
114 The bureaus were: management of the revolutionary soul, finance, development, distribution, 
domestic and legal affair, defence and security, welfare and international organization and 
relations. 
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there were also six Permanent Committees on rules and regulations,115 
statistics,116 development surveillance and evaluation,117 natural resources,118 
on development funding,119 on manpower planning120 and on standardization 
and normalization.121 Committee members were composed of experts from 
within and outside Bappenas and from the government and private sectors. 
These expert committees provided memoranda, consultation and ideas to the 
Minister of National Planning (UPPENAS), which oversaw the Bappenas. 
The last organization was the Muppenas, headed by Vice Head of Bappenas 
and Regular Head (Pimpinan Harian) of Bappenas. It was composed of 
members of the Assistance Body to Head of Parliament (Badan Pembantu 
Pimpinan MPRS) and Governors. The Muppenas was an advisory body 
meant to provide advice and ideas in planning and development. What the 
Bappenas envisioned was thus an executive body with expertise committees 
from Permanent Committees and parliamentary and regional oversight 
through Muppenas. This represented the central planning structure of the 
Republic. This central body was related to both regional and departmental 
planning.122
The planning of Bappenas would be as follows: it designed development 
policy, which would then be given hearing by the Muppenas. After consulting 
the Muppenas, the plan would then be proposed to the President. The 
formation of the plan required the help of two organizations: the Baperdep 
and Bamunas. The Baperdep collected ideas and proposals from their 
respective departments and, through their Minister, conveyed them to 
the Bappenas. The Bamunas also conduct the same process within the 
115 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia no. 6 tahun 1964 tentang Panitia Negara Bappenas 
Urusan Tatatjara dan Peraturan.
116 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia no. 7 tahun 1964 tentang Panitia Negara Bappenas 
Urusan Statistik.
117 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia no. 8 tahun 1964 tentang Penawasan dan Penilaian 
Pembangunan.
118 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia no. 9 tahun 1964 tentang Panitia Negara Bappenas 
Urusan Sumber-sumber Alam.
119 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia no. 10 tahun 1964 tentangPanitia Negara 
BappenasUrusanSumber-sumber Pembiajaan.
120 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia no. 11 tahun 1964 tentangPanitia Negara Bappenas 
Urusan Perentjanaan Tenaga Pembangunan.
121 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia no. 12 tahun 1964 tentangPanitia Negara 
BappenasUrusanStandardisasi dan Normalisasi.
122 Hasil Konferensi Kedja Bappenas-Baperdep, (Jakarta: Bappenas, 1964), p. 21-23.
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private sector. In connection to budgetary matters, a team composed of the 
Indonesian Development Bank (Bapindo), Department of Budget and Bank 
Indonesia provided help in creating the budget.123 Bappenas and Bapindo 
would then be assigned to oversee budget implementation. Bappenas would 
also evaluate the implementation of projects and write a development 
overview (ichtisar pelaksanaan pembangunan). The Baperdep and the Bakopda 
were obligated to provide their annual plan to the Bappenas. In order to 
create a better working environment and coordination, various conferences 
were held between Bappenas and the other bodies in order to synchronize 
their views on the matter.124 Bappenas also provided planning courses, 
for instance, in November 1964 with the Asian Institute for Economic 
Development Planning.125
Baperdep
The Baperdep or Badan Perencanaan dan Penelitian Departemen 
(Departemental Planning and Research Body) was designed to provide 
help for the coordination and smooth running of government ministries 
and departments. Created by a Government Decision in February 1964, 
it functioned to generate annual and long-term development plans and to 
conduct research for the purpose of planning. The Baperdep consisted of an 
office in each department with seven to ten experts taken from within and 
outside the department and headed by a Deputy Minister.126 Its position 
in the ministries was as aid to respective ministers with the task to provide 
proposals. Its decisions and documents had to be signed by the head of 
the respective departments. It was also instructed to conduct research and 
investigations for the purpose of development planning with detailed plans, 
organizational schemes and surveillance systems. It was also instructed to 
keep close contact with the National Research Department and other research 
123 Bank Pembangunan Indonesia (Bapindo), Departemen P3 UrusanAnggaran and Bank 
Indonesia.
124 For instance, the Bappenas/Baperdep-Bakopda work conference held in September 1964. 
Hasil Konferensi Kerda Bappenas/Baperdep-Bakopda tanggal 22 s/d 24 September 1964, 
(Jakarta: Bappenas, 1964).
125 Hasil Konferensi Kedja Bappenas-Baperdep, (Jakarta: Bappenas, 1964), p. 25.
126 M. Hutasoit, “Uraian mengenai pokok-pokok perentjanaan, organisasi perentjanaan 
dan hubungan kerdja”  in Hasil Konferensi Kerdja Bappenas/Baperdep-Bakopda, (Jakarta: 
Bappenas, 1964), p. 58.
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bodies.127 In order to integrate university life with the greater revolutionary 
fervor, especially in provisioning experts to the ‘exploding demand’ of 
revolution, the Baperdep was instructed to integrate departmental or 
university planning with greater planning from other departments or state 
institutions. 
Bakopda
The Bakopda functioned alongside the Tjatur/Pantja Tunggal, in which 
the Provincial Military Government headed a four-headed committee 
composed of the Governor, Chief Prosecutor and Police Chief. Formed 
by a Presidential Act in 1961, the shift toward Bakopda was intended to 
maintain structural continuity after the ending of martial law in 1963.128 
But it was also influential in integrating regional government, including 
military government, within the Bappenas planning structure. In 1964, 
the position of the Bakopda was readjusted with the new Bappenas body. 
Regional Governors became the head of the agency with the task of creating a 
complementary development plan to the national overall development plan. 
The Governor as head of Bakopda had the duty to propose complementary 
development plans to the national overall plan of the Bappenas. He also 
had to create a regional development plan approved by the Bappenas and, 
lastly, to coordinate and supervise the implementation of regional projects.129 
During the New Order, the Pantja Tunggal would arise in the form of the 
Muspida, in which the military continue to hold the highest authority and 
with it, the Bakopda would be renamed as the Bapemda.130
The integration of governors within the Bappenas planning scheme 
meant that the delineation between the Department of Internal Affairs and 
the planning body was obscured. One third of the Bakopda members hailed 
127 Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia no. 20 tahun 1964 tentang Badan Perentjanan dan 
Penelitian Departemen in Badan Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas). Peraturan-
peraturan. (Jakarta: Bappenas, 1964), p. 35-36.
128 David Reeve, The Golkar of Indonesia. An alternative to the party system, p. 190.
129 Sumarno Sosroatmodjo, “Peranan Departemen Dalam Negeri dan Pemerintah Daerah 
dalam melaksanakan pembangunan nasional semesta berentjana tahap pertama” in Hasil 
Konferensi Kerdja Bappenas/Baperdep-Bakopda, (Jakarta: Bappenas, 1964), p. 22-23.
130 Grant Ronald Minaden, Administration in the Province of West Java: Patterns of Integration 
and Problems of Coordination, (PhD Dissertation Northern Illinois University, 1975), p. 84 
and 97. Bappemda: Badan Perentjana Pembangunan Daerah.
Economic Planning during the Guided Democracy 253
from karya organizations with members appointed by the Governor as part 
of its social control. The Governor was not only automatically appointed as 
head of Bakopda, he also chaired the regional Bamunas. Presidential Decision 
no. 12/1962 has also placed the Bakopda in the planning, overview and 
evaluation of village development as well as the wider regional development.131 
This shift in authority toward regional government and heads was part of the 
decentralization drive in the later part of Guided Democracy. Aside from 
planning, government-owned companies were also transferred to regional 
government. The Bakopda also proposed suggestions to the Bappenas and was 
helped by a secretariat of experts. Experts required a certain level of expertise 
on one or more development sectors aside from regional development. Even 
so, the shift toward the Pantja Tunggal in 1964, which included the National 
Front as member of the committee increased the role of the PKI, because 
many of the National Front organizations in the regions were in their hands.132 
Thus, the Bakopda included both military managers and an increasingly 
participative Communist movement in the executive. 
The Bakopda had the additional task of raising ‘funds and forces’ for 
national and regional development; by working together with private business 
elements and regional development banks that acted as a regional version 
of the Bapindo. Money for regional development was to be composed of 
funds from the central government, but also from regional state-owned 
companies, which were hoped to provide around a third of the necessary 
funds. Regional Development Banks created in 1962 would also provide 
funding. The collection of private funds for regional development in effect 
meant double taxation. Considering that the Bamunas also had the same 
duty, there seemed to be an increase in rent opportunities for officials at 
various levels of government. 
Bamunas
The root of Bamunas came from the various Indonesian business chambers 
that appeared after independence, including the KENSI, MII, MPP, MUVI 
131 Ukar Bratakusumah, “Uraian mengenai rentjana pembangunan nasional semesta 8 tahun 
dan pelaksanaanja serta rentjana pembangunan daerah” in Hasil Konferensi Kerdja Bappenas/
Baperdep-Bakopda, (Jakarta: Bappenas, 1964), p. 84 
132 William Redferns, Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and the Takeovers of Foreign Companies in 
Indonesia in 1960s, (PhD Dissertation University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2010), p. 52.
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and others. They were reorganized following the creation of Depernas and 
especially after the Dekon all private companies were to be coordinated 
within one body.133 This was the Bamunas, which was inaugurated by 
Sukarno on 20 February 1964 at the Bappenas building in Jakarta. Attended 
by Second Vice Premier J. Leimena, Third Vice Premier ChairulSaleh and 
the Minister for National Planning (Uppenas) Suharto and the Minister for 
the Affair of Funds and Forces. Its first congress was held in February 1965. 
The congress saw the need for a greater integration of the private sector, 
public sector and cooperatives planning to complement overall national 
development. The national private corporate world was required to keep in 
line with the ethics code of the state-created Ikrar Panca Bakti.134 A Private 
Corporate Honour Committee (Dewan Kehormatan Swasta) was set up 
to give necessary punishments for companies failing to follow the ethics 
code and root out reactionary and contra-revolutionary businessmen. As 
Soebandrio, First Vice Prime Minister, said “the function of national private 
business in a capitalist society was inherently different from the function 
of national private business within the Indonesian revolution toward the 
creation of a Socialist Indonesian society.”135
The purpose of Bamunas was to collect the funds and forces of the 
private sector for revolution, in terms of money, experience and expertise. 
It was composed of representatives of OPS or Organization of Similar 
Companies (Organisasi Perusahaan Sedjenis), which meant in practice all 
private companies.136 The OPS was part of the restructuring of the Indonesian 
economy in the early 1960s, which required all companies to be integrated 
within state-led chambers of industries or commerce. Funds from private 
companies were to be expropriated by the Movement for the Registration and 
Signs of Loyalty to the Revolution or Gekerev (Gerakan Kebangkitan Swasta 
133 Sedjarah Perkembangan Pembangunan Daerah Djawa Barat tahun 1946-1965, (Bandung: 
Bakopda Djawa Barat, 1965), p. 230-231.
134 The Five Service Oaths, which became associated with the Golkar Party, is an oath of service 
to the nation. 
135 BAMUNAS. Musyawarah Pusat Bamunas ke-I, 19-20 Februari 1965, (Jakarta: Bamunas, 
1965).
136 Notohamiprodjo, “Peranan pengusaha nasional swasta dalam Revolusi Indonesia” in Moh. 
Djambek (ed.), Doktrin Ekonomi Terpimpin dan Pembangunan, (Jakarta: Serbaguna, 1964), 
p. 180-181.
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untuk Revolusi).137 Private businessmen had agreed to invest in capital to the 
state at both the central and regional government within a one-year target.138
In this sense, the financing of the Big Push was to be transferred 
from national savings or foreign direct investments toward the remaining 
free money in the economy. Trust in the Indonesian rupiah had fallen 
dramatically low since the early 1950s and this extended to mistrust of the 
banking system as a whole, because the government effectively robbed the 
private sector through inflationary measures. Expropriation through banking 
channels was difficult as few were foolish enough to keep their savings in 
banks. In his speech at the meeting, Chaerul Saleh lamented on the need 
for the people to sacrifice for the revolution and tried to convince what 
must have been sceptical businessmen that the government was “done with 
revolutionary discussion” and would focus on the practical application of 
economic growth.139 As was typical of Guided Democracy institutional logic, 
the answer to a dysfunctional tax-collecting agency was a dysfunctional Ad 
Hoc non-tax collecting agency. 
The aim was to collect 100 billion rupiahs for the Central Bamunas and 
126 billion rupiahs from the 17 Regional Bamunas. The Regional Bamunas 
working closely with the Pantja Tunggal (Regional Government) was to 
monitor the inflow of funds. The collection of funds was also designed as 
a measure to reduce inflation. By March 1964, the money supply in the 
economy was estimated to be around 288 billion rupiahs. It was hoped 
that half of the money supply could be swept up for development purposes. 
In an all-Indonesia Pantja-Tunggal conference in March 1964, Regional 
Governments along with Bamunas were to play a pivotal role in reducing 
‘hot money’ from the system.140 They also conducted activities at the regional 
level. In 1964, the Bamunas provided voluntary workers for the Djatiluhur 
project from 60 West Java OPS. The West Java Bamunas also planned a civil 
137 Gerakan Pendaftaran dan Tanda Kebaktian Pengusaha Swasta terhadap Revolusi
138 Notohamiprodjo, “Peranan pengusaha nasional swasta dalam Revolusi Indonesia” in Moh. 
Djambek (ed.), Doktrin Ekonomi Terpimpin dan Pembangunan, (Jakarta: Serbaguna, 1964), 
p. 181.
139 Chaerul Saleh, “Amanat JM Wkl Perdana Menteri III, Dr. Chairul Saleh pada Musjawarah 
Pusat Bamunas ke I” in Musjawarah Pusat Bamunas ke I, 19-20 Februari 1965, (Jakarta: 
Bamunas, 1965).
140 Notohamiprodjo, “Peranan pengusaha nasional swasta dalam Revolusi Indonesia” in Moh. 
Djambek (ed.), Doktrin Ekonomi Terpimpin dan Pembangunan, (Jakarta: Serbaguna, 1964), 
p. 185.
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defence to be operational by May 1965.141 The Bamunas was symbolic of the 
chaos and hypocrisy that permeated the latter part of the Guided Democracy 
(1962/3-1965). Disguising itself as a revolutionary movement, it was to a 
large extent nothing more than an extra-tax method for extracting revenues 
from the last remaining source of funds within the archipelago, the private 
businessmen.
The BPN’s Five-Year Development Plan and Depernas’s Eight-Year 
Overall Development Plan required some form of foreign aid or foreign 
direct investment. Future developments were to require more direct domestic 
taxation in a move euphemistically called the collection of funds and 
forces for development. These included the production sharing-contracts 
with Western oil companies, incidentally the only real source of domestic 
development funding during the last years of Guided Democracy.142 During 
the colonial period, taxation represented 64% of government receipt and 
increased to 77% by 1939. In the post-colonial period, taxation climbed up to 
90% of non-loan government receipt, while government-owned companies 
contributed a miniscule amount.143 The shift toward non-tax extraction of 
remaining liquidity painted a picture of government desperation.  
What was created was a series of organizations that aimed to 
institutionalize coordination for development. Thus, the Bappenas had the 
task of creating a development policy, which would then be proposed to the 
President after a thorough hearing within the Mupennas. The Baperdep, 
Bakopda and Bamunas had an active role within the policy creation by 
providing materials and suggestions to the Bappenas. The Bappenas was also 
entrusted with creating a draft annual plan that was then submitted to the 
government. The Baperdep’s duty in this was to develop a departmental plan 
proposal to be given to the Bappenas through each respective minister. Private 
sector planning was to be created with the cooperation of the Bamunas 
and private organizations. For the development plan budget, the Bapindo,144 
141 Sedjarah Perkembangan Pembangunan daerah Djawa Barat tahun 1946-1965, (Bandung: 
Bakopda Djawa Barat:, 1965), p. 232.
142 A bonus of 5 million dollars paid by the Pan-American Oil Company. See Soerjadi, “Sistim 
Ekonomi Terpimpin di bidang Moneter” in Untuk Pelaksanaan Dekon. Hasil2 Seminar 
Ekonomi HSI, (Jakarta: Departemen Urusan Research Nasional, 1964), p. 127.
143 Douglas Paauw, Financing Economic Development. The Indonesian Case, (Glencoe: The Free 
Press, 1960), 169-170.
144 Bank Pembangunan Indonesia or Indonesian Development Bank
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Department P3 and the Budgetary Office and the Bank Indonesia worked 
along with the Bappenas to propose a development budget to the head of the 
Bappenas. General monitoring of development plans would be conducted 
by both Bapennas and Bapindo. Evaluation would be conducted by the 
ministries dealing with the economy, the Departments/Baperdep, Bapindo, 
the Statistics Bureau (BPS), while the private sector evaluation would be 
conducted by the Bamunas. 
In order for this massive institutional coordination to take place, 
departments and regions were compelled by law to provide annual plans 
to Bappenas, which would then evaluate and correct them in the light of 
the national plan. The task of formulating the annual Presidential progress 
report was given to Bappenas. It was thus also a plan for the decentralization 
of national planning, a move that was, in many ways, the result of the 
studies conducted in East European countries during the period. A series 
of conferences between Bappenas, Baperdep and Bakopda was conducted 
in 1964 and 1965145 in order to ascertain the borders of authorities and 
relationships between each organization. Another important difference 
was the way in which Bappenas restored the foreign relations and aid that 
BPN once enjoyed as Indonesia’s planning body. Lectures held by foreign 
experts became a regular occurrence and help from the Asian Institute for 
Economic Development Planning in Bangkok heralded the re-start of 
foreign institutional relations. The gathering of expertise could be seen in the 
Baperdep’s national research group, which included various ministers that 
dealt with government research and Prof. Sadarjoen Siswomartojo, head of 
Leknas.146 The spread of experts within these bodies and the linkages to the 
Ministry of National Research and the Leknas was a significant development 
cementing expert relationships within the bureaucracy. Bappenas was 
also expected to help the Coordinating Committee on Foreign Aid and 
145 First from 9 July – 11 July 1964 at the Bappenas building in Jakarta, a second one was a 
Bappenas-Baperdep-Bakopda conference in 22 – 24 September 1964. 
146 Bapedep’s National Research group were composed of, among others, Sudjono D. 
Pusponegoro, Minister of National Research, Sarwono Prawirohardjo, Assistant Minister 
on Policy Issue, Sadarjoen Siswomartojo, head of Leknas, S. Th. Brotosajogjo, Head 
of the Bureau of General Administration of the Department of National Research, 
HuseinKartasasmita, member of Parliament, S.H. Thaher, member of Front Nasional, 
Sedijatmo, Department of Public Works and M. Tangkilisan, Vice Governor of Jakarta. 
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Committee on Production Sharing.147 The door to foreign aid, especially in 
education, remained in the hands of technocrats. Bappenas’s relationship to 
this cemented its role as an important technocratic hub. 
KOTOE and Konfrontasi
The Komisi Tinggi Operasi Ekonomi (KOTOE) or High Command for 
Economic Operations was created on 29 April 1962 in relation to the 
return of West Papua into Indonesian hands. It thus assumed an integrated 
military and economics approach by seeing the economic problems as part 
of a wider military problem. Headed by President Sukarno, Djuanda was 
named Vice Commander with staffs including Sumarno, Soebandrio and 
Leimena. The elite civilians were thus clothed in military rank. The goals of 
KOTOE were so obscure that experts outside it could only speculate about 
them. Many mid-level officers were assigned to administrative jobs, thus 
pointing to further militarization of the economic operations. After it was 
created, the KOTOE formed two committees. A Yamin Committee headed 
by Depernas head Mohammad Yamin would discuss the foundation of the 
Guided Economy, and the Suharto Committee discussed issues related to 
the economy, bureaucracy, corruption and other problems, that held back 
economic growth.148
The militarization of management would have closed the loop in the 
expansion of military into the economy. The failure of the Eight-Year Overal 
Development Plan meant that the installment of KOTOE was a desperate 
measure for reforms through centralization. One of the most pressing 
problems was the provision of foodstuffs. The government had already 
designed a rice self-sufficiency program in 1959 to be headed by the KOGM 
in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture and the Depernas. The 
program was integrated by the Depernas into the Overall Development Plan 
147 Marnixius Hutasoit, “Uraian mengenai pokok-pokok perentjanaan, organisasi perentjanaan 
dan hubungan kerdja” in Hasil Konferensi Kerdja Bappenas/Baperdep-Bakopda, (Jakarta: 
Bappenas, 1964), p. 67.
148 Omas Tusin, “Beberapa titik strategi untuk didjadian pusat perhatian oleh Komando 
Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi” in Fortuna, Vol. 4, No. 27, (June, 1962), p. 133-138.
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and Indonesia was to achieve self-sufficiency by 1962. This obviously did 
not happen, so the main program of KOTOE was in foodstuff production.149
On 28 July 1964, the KOTOE published the Economic and Financial 
Policies in order to Overcome Present and Near Term Conditions, billed as an 
austerity program to be conducted within the context of the Malaysian 
confrontation. The bill gave priority for distribution apparatuses, 
coordination with foreign aid relations, taxation policies that gave preferential 
treatment to rehabilitate production, fiscal pardon and tax holidays and the 
creation of a National Marketing Board. It was quite similar to the Dekon 
program that was espoused in 1963, but unfortunately, like its predecessor, 
its implementation was hampered by “a lack of economische denken by our 
own policy makers and the pull of vested interests within the government 
and in outside bodies in society.”150 In September 1964, Sukarno issued the 
economic instruction no. 9/1964, which shifted its policy from austerity 
toward confrontation. It tried to stifle trade with Malaysia and annulled 
shipping contracts with companies from Singapore and Hong Kong while 
focusing on increasing food production.151 Military operations were the 
standard operating procedure of the KOTOE Thunder Operation I, II and 
III with the navy and police to disrupt smuggling to Singapore, Lantjar 
Operation to help the flow of goods in Tanjung Priok and the Gulung 
Operation I, II and III conducted by the police in order to clear the problems 
with the train network. 
The KOTOE placed the military under the command of Sukarno to 
implement his economic policies. Like the Tri Ubaya Cakti doctrine, the 
military here was seen to be an extension of executive power in conducting 
its policy of confrontation. The focus was set to apply various measures in 
order to isolate Singapore. Unlike the Territorial Command and the Army’s 
Civic Action program, the military and police personnel worked under the 
command of the executive. The fact that a comprehensive economic policy 
was being divided between a foreign interventionist drive of KOTOE and 
149 “Garis-garis Besar Pimpinan Ekonomi Nasional 1962. Mendjelang Pembebasan Irian Barat” 
in Fortuna, Vol. 3, No. 27, (June, 1962), p. 138-141. It was headed by the Minister of Trade 
Suharto, different from General Suharto who would later become President. 
150 Laporan Tahunan Staf Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi tahun 1964, (Jakarta: KOTOE, 
1964), p. 2.
151 Laporan Tahunan Staf Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi tahun 1964, (Jakarta: KOTOE, 
1964), p. 3.
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the rehabilitation drive of the Bappenas signalled the inherent incapability 
of the Guided Democracy state to focus on an economic plan. The KOTOE 
and Bamunas thus represented the latest stage of economic management of 
the Guided Democracy state. Prior to this, there had been a genuine effort at 
rehabilitation that was dependent on American aid; the Deklarasi Ekonomi 
or Dekon. It is important to understand why this effort failed. 
Conclusion 
The implementation of national planning had initially been predicated on a 
naïve and optimistic view which saw the possibility of ‘non-experts’ designing 
and implementing national planning. The failure of this plan and economic 
deterioration had resulted in a significant revamping of the executive in 1962. 
At the same time, newly trained experts began to stream into Indonesia, 
especially from American higher education. Their position in various 
departments and higher learning/research institutes began to be significant 
by 1963. The reforms initiated by Sukarno expanded the executive. The 
failure of the Depernas called for greater participation of a new generation 
of experts. Thus, on a national planning and bureaucratic level, there was 
a process of technocratic development. As we will see in Chapter IX, the 
rise of this new generation would be contested by the concurrently rising 
Communists. The creation of the Bappenas was a significant development, 
for this body would play an important role during the New Order. There 
were obvious differences with the New Order Bappenas, which had become 
a highly technocratic body, but the structural shift represented an important 
institutional development that was one of the foundations for the rise of the 
technocracy.
In the early 1960s, there was an effort to try to use social science, 
especially scientific management, to understand the problems of Indonesian 
bureaucracy and to implement measures in order to create more efficient 
managers and bureaucrats. This was the implementation on what I have 
termed the ‘micro-level,’ as opposed to the ‘macro-level’ of national planning. 
The expansion of management education and the implementation of 
retooling and indoctrination courses was an effort to significantly deal with 
these problems. The next chapter will go into this process and see the extent 
toward which the effort to implement social science affected the bureaucracy.
CHAPTER VI
The Managers of  Social Engineering
This chapter discusses the implementation of both scientific management 
and the disciplinary efforts of the Guided Democracy. The aims of this effort 
were to eradicate the problems associated with corruption in the 1950s. The 
policy-makers at the national level assumed that the problem of corruption 
in Indonesia was the Indonesian Man himself because he was in their eyes 
incapable, inefficient, and corrupt. The best way to deal with this was guided 
corporatism, which assumed the restructuring of society within lines of state 
authority. To allow greater action at the local, decentralized level would be to 
acknowledge the relevance of liberalism. Instead, effort was made to discipline 
the bureaucracy through disciplining the regions by the application of the 
Bappenas-Bakopda-Baperdep planning structure.
The focus on control and discipline inevitably concerned the military. 
The expansion of a bureaucratic and business managerial class allowed the 
military to join the elite. ‘Leadership’ capabilities, the spatial structure of the 
offices and homes, and the very behaviour of managers were to be designed 
through time-motion studies and other scientifically managed planning. 
The management would in turn impose discipline on the lower levels of 
productive society. The ‘Training Within Industry’ program would teach 
mid-level managers to control the labour force.1 None of these efforts bore 
1 ANRI, Jakarta. Mohammad Bondan, inv. nr. 692, 734, 735 and 736.
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fruit. Nasution’s attempt to apply managerial ideas across the wider society 
was quite problematic; Indonesians successfully dodged its implementation.
Typical of twentieth century ideas on the state, the Guided Democracy 
policy makers believed they could enforce and discipline Indonesian society 
through state institutions. Even as this disciplining was applied in the 1960s, 
doubt existed about the success of the exercise. The Guided Democracy 
state professed that Indonesian society, history and culture formed the 
foundation for the new society. Instead, culture was manipulated; people 
were disciplined by social engineering in an effort to push through a state-
centred modernization project. Social science was used a mechanism for 
both legitimating that process while at the same time providing the tools to 
enforce changes.
The Cultural Pathology of Indonesian Manager
National Planning would supposedly dispense the problem of weak 
government coordination. Yet that only represented half of the issue. The 
other half was to recreate the civil service in an efficient and effective manner. 
The 1950s’ bureaucracy was, to a large extent, assumed to be bifurcated 
with a small but effective centre where the experts congregated, and a large, 
inefficient, politically active periphery. The recreation of an efficient periphery 
was a daunting task, but the aim was at least to expand the expertise to a larger 
area of the government. Yet, management was not confined to the creation 
of effective bureaucrats, but also embraced the training of effective managers 
for both state-owned and private companies. Importantly, the rise of Guided 
Democracy coincided with the expropriation of Dutch-owned enterprises, 
which triggered a sudden demand for indigenous managers. Managerial 
positions now also opened up for aspiring army members.
The implementation of modern, scientific management must be seen 
in tandem with the implementation of the ideals of Guided Democracy. 
Like the failed corporatist national planning project of the Depernas, the 
introduction of scientific management sprouted forth from the ideal of 
creating a new and modern Indonesian person. The roots of these efforts 
were firmly planted in the disappointing failure of the Indonesian character 
during the previous laissez-faire period. This was to a large extent related 
to the ‘crisis of leadership’ and culture that pervaded the gloom of the 
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Parliamentary Democracy period.2 Writing in 1955, Soedjatmoko said this 
about the Indonesian inability for development:
“The crisis in which we find ourselves is clearly a crisis of leadership… Herein 
lies the failure of the old leadership which has guided us to the gateway of 
independence but which has been unable to disengage us from the mental 
outlook which brought the first phase to a successful end but does not have 
the ability to adjust itself to the demands of the second.”3
Soedjatmoko titled his article in de Nieuwe Stem as “The crisis in the 
Indonesian culture”, stressing the cultural theme of the failure of Indonesian 
development. The profound doubt in the capability of the Indonesian 
to modernize had been a long-standing belief amongst the colonialists. 
The idea of plural society was predicated in a perspective that saw a deep 
chasm between traditional Indonesian society and modern Western society, 
where the twain never shall meet. This can be seen, for instance, in Boeke’s 
theory of dualism, which stressed that the Indonesian traditional cultural 
characteristics were not compatible with the rational maximization drive of 
the Westerners.4 In the 1950s, Indonesian labour productivity was said to be 
one of the lowest in the world,5 pushed on by an organized labour tradition 
that to many outsiders seemed illogical in its self-destructive capacity. This 
seemed to confirm a cultural bias in Indonesian underdevelopment. 
The Guided Democracy’s policy toward this cultural impediment was 
to home in on what it considered the underlying problem: the authority 
of the civil service. The inability of the Indonesian managers to give orders 
to subordinates was a puzzling aspect noted by many Western experts in 
2 Especially related to this the effect of the doctrine ‘revolutionary nationalism’ and the effect 
of Indonesia’s pre-colonial culture on the economy. See Justus M. van der Kroef, “Economic 
development in Indonesia: some social and cultural impediments” in Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, Vol. 4, No. 2 (January, 1956), p. 116-133.
3 Soedjatmoko, “De Crisis in de Indonesische Cultuur”, De Nieuwe Stem, Vol. 10, (1955), 
p. 328-329. 
4 J.H. Boeke, Economics and economic policy of dual societies. As exemplified by Indonesia, 
(Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1953), p. 10-20 and 209-229. Boeke stressed 
on the differences between pre-capitalist village economy and the industrial capitalism of 
the West. He stressed on the necessity to tailor different policies for different economic and 
population sectors (the dual societies), a position that is anathema to the nationalist notion 
of the ability of the Indonesian to become modern. 
5 Edgar McVoy, “Some aspects of labor and economic development in Indonesia”, in 
EkonomidanKeuangan Indonesia, Vol. 7 (1954), p. 804.
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Indonesia. This, more than anything else, resulted in the breakdown of 
various organizations. Donald Fagg contended that the Javanese notion of 
authority required the creation of a useful fiction of unanimous support 
for a particular person in office. That his authority was weak and the 
clique structure limited his ability to implement action stemming from his 
authority was beside the point.6 That a superior’s command could, without 
much consequence, be disobeyed was an important indication of the crisis 
of authority, even more so when the superior himself for various reasons was 
hesitant in using his authority. Theories on the failure of vertical authority of 
the period mostly link it with the failure of Javanese culture.7 The problem 
was thus perceived to be an indigenous cultural flaw. 
Of course, the problem with this total approach was that scientific 
management, as a relatively new, American-developed science and perhaps 
the largest intellectual export of the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, 
was not capable of changing the culture. It basically exported ‘tools’ to help 
the administrator conduct work more efficiently. In fact, much of the effort 
to instil authority was to be found in the series of surveillance, indoctrination 
and ‘retooling’-based state organizations that focused on creating discipline 
and instilling the correct attitude to the civil servants on an individual level, 
as will be discussed below. 
The revolutionary character of Guided Democracy was exactly its 
emphasis on recreating the individual. Sukarno stated in a mass meeting 
in Medan in 1962, “our revolution is a cultural revolution, a historical 
revolution, a national revolution, a military revolution, yes a revolution ‘to 
create a new Indonesian man.’”8 What was significant was the extent toward 
which both Guided Democracy as an ideology and scientific management 
coincided in their views on cultural and behavioural change. Garth N. Jones, 
one of the experts sent to work with the LAN in the early 1960s, thought 
that “…innovations and modifications, in a system of public administration, 
6 Donald Fagg, Authority and Social Structure. A Study of Javanese Bureaucracy, (PhD 
Dissertation Harvard University, Cambridge, 1959), p.565-568.
7 Harry Benda insisted that the roots of Indonesian corruption came from pre-colonial Java, 
see Harry Benda, “Decolonization in Indonesia: the problem of continuity and change” in 
The American Historical Review, vol. 70, No. 4, (July, 1965), p. 1058-1073. This may also 
partly have been the result of the fact that many of the most distinguished “Indologist’ of 
the period; Benedict Anderson, Clifford Geertz, etc, were anthropologists, thus the tendency 
to look into the cultural roots of the Indonesian problem.
8 R.M. Soeparto, “Djiwa Pahlawan” in Bulletin Lembaga Administrasi Negara, No. 9, 1962.
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are usually possible only if large numbers of people, inside and outside of 
government circles, change and adapt important aspects of their whole 
cultural complex of believing, behaving, acting and doing. Significant 
development and improvements generally occur only with cultural changes.”9 
Leon Mears termed the process “re-management” to emphasize the rather 
‘revolutionary’ character of a process of rebuilding a radically different 
management from the one before.10
The problem of authority was a problem of control, both of the civil 
services in its entirety and the devolvement of capabilities of control 
throughout the vertical line of command that represented the ultimate 
source of authority: the ‘mythical’ Indonesian people. As we have seen in 
the discussion on national planning, the interesting aspect of control was its 
pan-ideological characteristic. 
Although practically all expertise in the field of management came 
from American universities, there was a decidedly state-control bias toward 
the studies and recommendations of both planning and management. The 
market and ‘competition’ stayed outside the equation. The change was to be 
conducted with a top-to-bottom approach, by the steady and capable hands 
of the experts. Post-war views about the role of the state were an important 
component. This modernist perspective placed too much trust on the efficacy 
of the social sciences. Yet, it was a perspective shared by both the capitalist 
and Communist world of the period. Thus, the fact that American social 
scientists conducted much of the research it did not reduce its top-down, 
state and expert-based control. It was actually reinforced. Even so, there were 
calls for the creation of a specifically Indonesian form of management. “It is 
apparent that our management experts should start researching, unearthing 
and looking for a management that is in line with our Indonesian socialism.”11
By the 1960s, the experiences of technical assistance have become a study 
in its own right. The ‘tools of cooperation’ were already well institutionalized 
allowing for the transfer of knowledge. These ‘tools’ included general surveys, 
advisory missions, operating missions, service offices, university contracts, 
9 Garth N. Jones, “Some critical areas concerning assistance in Public Administration for 
Indonesia” in Bulletin Lembaga Administrasi Negara, No. 1, 1961, p. 3.
10 Mohammad Sadli, “Masalah perusahaan negara di Indonesia. Laporan symposium pada 
latihan pembangunan ketatalaksanaan” in Madjallah Perusahaan Negara, Vol. 2, No. 18, 
(June, 1962), p. 7.
11 D. H. Assegaff, “Aspek management dalam Pembangunan Semesta Berentjana”, p. 275.
266 CHAPTER VI
private contracts, visiting professors, seminars, conferences and workshops, 
training centres and fellowships for studying and training abroad.12
There were two interconnected but different developments during 
the period. On the one hand was the expansion of business management 
institutions that provided courses for people who were to take over business 
positions. On the other hand there was an expansion of public management 
institutions, most of which offered courses, consultancy and research 
concerning public administration. As in the case of economists, the early 
1960s constituted a propitious transitional moment. A study by Caldwell 
and Timms in 1958 found that there were two kinds of officials in Indonesia: 
the Dutch-trained ones who were highly dogmatic and resistant to new 
administrative ideas, and the new Indonesians who had not yet properly 
developed their own administrative capabilities and thus were not ready to 
replace the older group.13 In their view, the civil servants were either old-
fashioned or inexperienced.14
The Discovery of Corporative Village Values
Indonesian social scientists began to study the Indonesian persona and analyse 
his potentiality as a modern person and as a good manager. Anthropologists, 
sociologists and political scientists started studying Indonesia’s political and 
social culture in order to understand the weaknesses of the Indonesian man. 
Koentjaraningrat studied the village concept gotong rojong or communal 
cooperation in the early 1960s.15 The sociologists Selo Soemardjan studied 
the changes and development of the civil service in the feudal heartland of 
Yogyakarta.16 There was a concerted effort to dig out Indonesian cultural 
values that could be used to build up an Indonesian managerial class.
12 Philip M. Glick, The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas, (Chicago: 
the University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 99-100.
13 Panglaykim, “Pembahasan laporan memperkembang sumber2 manajerial di Indonesia” in 
Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Vol. 12, No. 4, (April, 1959), p. 112-136.
14 Caldwell and Timms, Developing the managerial resources of Indonesia. A report to the 
Biro Perantjang Negara, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1958, p. 9-10. ANRI Jakarta, 
Mohammad Bondan, Inv. nr. 699. 
15 Koentjaraningrat, Some Social-Anthropological Observations of Gotongrojong in Two Villages 
of Central Java, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961).
16 Selo Soemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).
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Soegito Reksodihardjo, a disciple of the management expert Harold 
Koontz, appraised Indonesia’s managerial development by posing the 
question “Is the Indonesian fit to become a manager?” He answered in the 
affirmative, but in order to clinch his argument, he had to deal with Boeke’s 
Economic Dualism. According to Soegito, Boeke’s “dissertation was an 
attack on the traditional method of dealing with the economic problems of 
Indonesia, which was still based on the deductive approach and very much 
influenced by the juridical background of the economic curricula in the 
universities of that period.”17 Boeke adhered cultural values to economic 
growth, or even spiritual drive, called the economic motive. The Indonesian 
lacked this value because his social environment produced cultural values 
on social motives. Soegito criticized Boeke’s understanding of the economic 
motive and argued that the Indonesian farmer made decisions based on 
sound rational principles. 
Yet despite the criticism, Soegito still continued to support a cultural 
interpretation of the lack of Indonesia’s economic growth. “With the increase 
in the general level of education it is to be expected that rationality will 
gain in importance among the broader stratum of ‘the common people.’ 
When such is the case, it will also be less difficult to make them aware of the 
importance of such terms as ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency,’ and a ‘rational’ 
or ‘business-like’ attitude can be eventually mastered. As long as the average 
educational levels are very low, emotional, traditional and/or social views are 
more dominant, and although not impossible, it nevertheless will require 
considerably more effort to implement a rational or systematic idea.”18 
The main difference between Boeke’s and Reksodihardjo’s idea of cultural 
impediments to growth was its temporal character, at least seen within 
Reksodihardjo’s interpretation of Boeke’s theory. The problem of Indonesia’s 
culture was a temporal one that was to be answered through the expansion 
of education, and thus the expansion of rational thought that would support 
the modern value of efficiency.
By portraying the Indonesian masses as chronically irrational, 
Reksodihardjo opened the way toward the application of knowledge 
17 Soegito Reksodihardjo, Skills investment in a developing country: an appraisal of 
management development for Indonesia, (PhD Dissertation University of California, Los 
Angeles, 1963), p. 170.
18 Soegito Reksodihardjo, Skills investment in a developing country: an appraisal of 
management development for Indonesia, p. 154-155.
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obtained from studies in the United States and other places. He also put the 
managerial class in a secure position as rational leaders. “If the economy were 
left to the masses, the result would probably be that either the subsistence 
level would persist or that the economy would collapse quickly. First of all, 
the very low level of education does not permit the people to know much 
about other needs beside those which are very basic, and with which they 
are already familiar by tradition. In the second place, even if they are fully 
aware of their wants, it is still a question whether or not they can do much 
to alleviate the shortcomings, since the general low level of income does not 
allow any significant capital accumulation. Third, even the small proportion 
of the middle class cannot be entrusted with the task of becoming agents 
for progress.”19
This tension between modernity and tradition was even more explicitly 
expressed in the discussion of the ‘traditional value’ of gotong rojong or 
communal cooperation. M. Widojoko Notoatmodjo’s dissertation entitled 
Gotong Rojong in Indonesian administration, a concept of human relations, 
defended at Indiana University in 1962, sought to understand how the 
traditional value of gotong rojong could be applied to solve Indonesia’s 
managerial woes. He discussed three case studies in order to analyse the 
situation in which gotong rojong was used effectively. He found several 
factors which determined the effectiveness of gotong rojong: environmental 
background, i.e. whether someone was from a rural, semi-urban or urban 
background, togetherness, i.e. communality of the person’s environment, 
cultural background, education, profession or social status, the understanding 
of gotong rojong, degree of practice of gotong rojong, degree of rationality, i.e. 
whether a person is more inclined to be emotional or rational or both and 
tendency toward collectivism.20
Like Reksodihardjo’s analysis, Notoatmodjo focused mainly on the 
division between traditional and modern cultural traits. Gotong rojong “as 
a social institution has been known and practiced throughout Indonesia 
for more than four thousand years, from the time of the population 
19 Soegito Reksodihardjo, Skills investment in a developing country: an appraisal of 
management development for Indonesia, p. 216.
20 M.W. Notoatmodjo, Gotong rojong in Indonesian administration, a concept of human 
relations, (PhD Dissertation Indiana University, Bloomington, 1962), p. 196.
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immigration from the mainland of Asia about 2000 BC.”21 But its 
application in the modern period was effective only when the individual 
was not yet westernized. “The domain of gotong rojong is any original and 
untouched village community in Indonesia, the kind of village community 
in which traditional adat law is a guiding principle for every member of the 
community, and where Western influence has not yet been felt in the way 
of life of the members of that community.”22 Notoatmodjo believed that 
gotong rojong could only work with people who had not been tainted by the 
competitive spirit of the Westerners, whose individualist tendency would 
lead to the disintegration of its efficacy. Notoatmodjo saw gotong rojong as 
a compromise of the type of modernity that Indonesia chose. Instead of 
implementing full Westernization, the elites of Indonesia wanted to maintain 
a modernized Indonesian culture. Thus the modern idea of gotong rojong was, 
according to Notoatmodjo, a new creation by Indonesian intellectuals who 
had enjoyed Western education and training.23
The dichotomy between modern and traditional thus was reinterpreted 
within the Indonesian context. The reinterpretation of gotong rojong as 
modern was made through the reinterpretation of ancient values.24 Instead 
of individualism and competition, the new Indonesian man was to work 
together within a highly corporative social system. This was at least imagined 
to be the case. Yet, the push toward the incorporation of ‘traditional values’ 
strengthened the idea of the dangers of the masses; they were not yet ready 
and thus had to be led by those rational persons who were ready to do so. 
These rational persons were the managers. In other words, a tension existed 
between the assumption of the pathological nature of the Indonesian persons 
and the efficacy of the new Indonesian managers. There was thus a ready 
acceptance to receive values, both modern and traditional, which helped the 
managerial class achieve control, despite the fact that such values kept the 
Indonesian man at a traditional position. 
21 M.W. Notoatmodjo, Gotong rojong in Indonesian administration, a concept of human 
relations, p. 205.
22 M.W. Notoatmodjo, Gotong rojong in Indonesian administration, a concept of human 
relations, p. 205-206.
23 M.W. Notoatmodjo, Gotongrojong in Indonesian administration, a concept of human 
relations, p. 218.
24 In fact, research has pointed its creation as recent. Javanese farmers themselves first heard the term 
around the mid-1950s. John R. Bowen, “On the Political Construction of Tradition: Gotong 
Royong in Indonesia” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 45, no. 3, (May, 1986), p. 545-561.
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Business Management
The Management Week (Pekan Management) was the first government-
sponsored short-term managerial course conducted in 1959. In January, 
the Planning Body (BPN), in answer to the November 1958 Lynton and 
Caldwell report, called for a meeting attended by several ministries, the 
LAN and FEUI. The meeting created a work-committee whose membership 
included Dr. Subroto, Dr. Sadli, Drs. Panglaykim, Arifin Abdurachman from 
LAN and Achmad Ali from the BPN. After consulting with the Industrial 
Management Board (BAPPIT) and the Trading Companies Management 
Board (BUD), the Pekan Management was agreed upon. It was also decided 
that head company managers were to be sent to Advanced Management 
Programmes like the ones in Baguio, the Philippines.25 On 20 February 1959, 
the Working Committee concluded that the development of managerial 
manpower should be divided into three groups-a long-term one which 
involved five years of academic training, a middle term involving 2 to 3 years 
of semi-academic training and a short term of two to three years company 
management training.26
As a continuation of the Management Week, FEUI created the 
Development Administrator Course (Latihan Pembangunan Ketatalaksanaan 
or LPK) in cooperation with the Ford Foundation and the University 
of California. The programme was initially devised by the alumni of the 
Advanced Management Program Baguio, a Harvard-based programme 
providing business management training for Asian managers. With Ford 
Foundation money, they approached FEUI to start a local programme.27 The 
programme focused first on collecting business case methods and business 
cases, sending Dr. Rossal J. Johnson from Northwestern University and 
Dale L. McKeen from San Francisco State College to direct the collection 
for two years.28 The programme accepted high-level managers proposed by 
their company or office, who would work and live together for a period of 
25 Ali Budiardjo, “Sambutan Mr. Ali Budiardjo berkenaan dengan Pekan Management,” in 
Madjalah Ekonomi, Vol. 1, no. 2/3, June/September 1959, p. 163-164.
26 Ali Budiardjo, “SambutanMr. Ali Budiardjo berkenaan dengan Pekan Management,” in 
Madjalah Ekonomi, Vol. 1, no. 2/3, June/September 1959, p. 164.
27 Panglaykim, Report on Business Management Training in Indonesia, (Jakarta: s.n., 1959), p. 
10-12.
28 Barli Halim, “Latihan Pembangunan Ketatalaksanaan I” in Fortuna, Year II, no. 14, May 
1961, p. 85-89.
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six weeks at a hotel in the highlands of Puncak near Jakarta. The first class of 
the LPK had 58 persons, 13 from state-owned companies, 35 from private 
companies and 10 army officers. They discussed 14 Indonesian business 
cases along with 53 foreign business cases. There were 15 teachers, two 
professors from Gadjah Mada University and the rest from UI, most of them 
were American professors teaching under a Ford Foundation-University 
of California program. Nine assistants were lent to help the students with 
their study. Each participant was given 10 books with titles varying from 
accounting to personnel management. The program had a small library 
containing 87 books, many of them used for reading assignments. The classes 
were usually divided into two groups, which were changed every two weeks.29 
Business management courses had been on offer in Indonesia at the FEUI 
since early in the 1950s and followed the Dutch patterns, which integrated 
it into various departments instead of constituting a separate faculty. In the 
early 1950s, the faculty members were mostly composed of Dutch professors. 
With the deteriorating relationship with the Netherlands, numbers 
tapered off in 1954. This was compensated for by an agreement between 
the University of California, the Ford Foundation and the University of 
Indonesia in the provision of teachers and sending faculty members to finish 
off their education at Berkeley and other places in the United States. Until 
1963, around 20 American professors assisted the teaching in the Faculty, 
whereas 50-60 Indonesians were trained in various American universities. 
The same case could also be seen in Gadjah Mada University (UGM) and 
its ties with the University of Wisconsin, by which UGM was able to send 
faculty members to Madison for education. Research cooperation with Yale 
University was also established with UGM. Aside from the United States, 
the Colombo Plan provided opportunities for education in Australia, Great 
Britain and other countries.30
ITB in Bandung created Business Management Training in cooperation 
with the West Java Council of Trade and Company, and later on Bamunas 
West Java. By 1962, there were four classes with a total of 323 students.31 
29 Barli Halim, “Latihan Pembangunan Ketatalaksanaan II” in Fortuna, Year II, no. 15, June 
1961, p. 162-166.
30 Herman Johannes, Laporan Tahunan Universitas Gadjah Mada tahun pengadjaran 
1962/1963, (Yogyakarta: UGM, 1963), p. 5, 15-17.
31 “Pendidikan Manager di Indonesia” in Fortuna, Year III, no. 26, May 1962, p. 81-83.
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Between 1959 and 1965, at least 600 businessmen had taken the two-year 
course.32
The Ministry of Development held a Seminar on Industrial Management 
and Business Administration, dubbed the SIMBA, focusing on industrial 
management. SIMBA cooperated with the BAPPIT.33 These state-based 
courses sometimes cooperated with universities, and constituted a major 
effort by the state from the 1950s to increase efficiency; witness the TWI 
programme and its Guided Democracy incarnation, the Productivity 
Institute.34 Aside from TWI programmes, the Institute also conducted 
productivity seminars with the Academy of Company Heads35 and other 
state institutes like the Train Office36 with methods engineering and work 
study courses. The Productivity Institute also provided a six-week Training 
Program for Master Trainers. The cost to go on it was not covered by the 
government but had to be provided by the companies themselves.37
Aside from these university-based courses, some private corporations 
were also active in providing managerial and technical training to Indonesian 
staff. In fact, by the Finec agreement of the Round Table Conference Dutch 
companies were committed to provide greater participation for Indonesian 
employees at the managerial level, although no targets were specified nor 
were time tables drawn up.38
Yet, from early on, American corporations dominated these corporate 
training programs. The first was the oil company Stanvac, which sent 
Indonesian employees to follow courses designed to enable them to assume 
managerial and supervisory positions. The first scholarship program, 
effectively confined to middle management, was held in 1954, when an 
accountant was sent to Cornell University and a manager to the Graduate 
School of Business Administration at Harvard. Employees were also sent to 
32 Sedjarah perkembangan pembangunan daerah Djawa Barat tahun 1946-1965, (Bandung: 
Bakopda Djawa Barat, 1965), p. 232.
33 “Pendidikan Manager di Indonesia” in Fortuna, Year III, no. 26, May 1962, p. 83.
34 Lembaga Produktiviteit
35 Akademi Pimpinan Perusahaan, a semi-academic course on a high-school level hosted in 
Jakarta and meant to develop the capability of youngster as candidate for company heads. 
In the school year 1961/1962, they had 650 pupils with 24 graduates.  
36 Djawatan Kereta Api
37 “Program latihan pembina/dosen azas2 management” in Fortuna, Year III, no. 28, July 
1962, p. 12.
38 J. Thomas Lindblad, Bridges to New Business, p. 150.
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study business administration at the American University in Beirut, Lebanon 
and Stanford University, California. Legal specialists were also sent abroad to 
Leiden University, the Netherlands, among others.39 By 1959, Stanvac had 
sent 59 employees abroad. The United States also provided direct assistance 
to Indonesian companies. The ICA worked with the College of Business 
Administration of Syracuse University to provide a 12-month program 
for Indonesians in order to learn about principles of scientific industrial 
management and get specialized training. In total, 15 Indonesian attended 
the program. The alumni of the program consequently developed their own 
management training in Indonesia, working with the Indonesian Chamber 
of Industries to set up a one-month management course in 1959.40
It became clear that corporate-sponsored management courses produced 
better managers than the university system. The reason for this was that 
business programs usually had a clear aim, a strong sponsorship for trainees, 
carefully worked-out schedules and good follow-up support once the trainees 
returned back home. This was just not possible for various reasons for 
academic and government-sponsored institutions.41 
The Banas and other government-owned companies with significant 
army presence conducted specialized courses for military personnel. In 
May 1959, the central Bappitt held its first management course, catering to 
professional soldiers who had taken on the role of administrator. In the same 
months, the Indonesian Chamber of Industries (Kamar Industri Indonesia) 
held a management seminar with participants representing various private 
industries. In July, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (Kamar Dagang 
Indonesia) held a business management training course, while the Siliwangi 
Division held an Army Middle Management Training Program, sponsored by 
the Bappitt East Java with six month duration.42 If we look at the course given 
by the BUD between October-December 1960 for the management of state-
owned corporations, we can see the extent of the relationship between the 
various government organizations, the universities and what was becoming 
the most prominent part of the Indonesian industrial section of the economy. 
Relationship between FEUI, FINEK, various departments like that of labour, 
39 United States business performance abroad. The case study of Stanvac in Indonesia, (S.n.: 
National Planning Association, 1957), p. 76.
40 Panglaykim, Report on Business Management Training in Indonesia, p. 13-14.
41 Panglaykim, Report on Business Management Training in Indonesia, p. 15.
42 Panglaykim, Report on Business Management Training in Indonesia, p. 17-19.
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the tax office and the Banas indicate that a community of policy makers and 
experts were coalescing within these groups which traversed the economic 
sector, the military, the bureaucracy and the universities. 
It is also important to understand that management science provided a 
language that was elitist and professional. It was a language that promoted 
both the magic of efficiency and effectiveness, coupling a feeling both of 
communal solidarity and a sense of superiority. It was one dominated by 
an Anglicized and scientific culture that determined a specific and elitist 
white-collar worldview; management, labour relations, leadership, control 
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The rise of military and state managers blurred the lines between the 
private and public sector. The private sector had been in steep decline since 
the start of Guided Democracy. The disastrous monetary reforms of August 
1959 were an effective attack on both foreign and domestic capital. Many 
policy makers thought little of Indonesian entrepreneurs, considering them 
to be speculators and ‘black marketeers.’44 The expansion in management 
occurred in the public sector. As ‘decentralization’ and territorial management 
resulted in relationships between the military and civilian businessmen, 
the managerial expansion also replicated the process. By the early 1960s, 
Nasution could claim that the military had many people with experience 
in management and that these people needed to be distributed within the 
field of development.45
Image A
Group discussion within the UI’s managerial course conducted in Puncak, West Java. Taken 
from Latihan Pembangunan Ketatalaksanaanke II, 1961, (Jakarta: FEUI, 1961), p. 12.
44 Benjamin Higgins, “Introduction,” in Benjamin Higgins (ed.), Entrepreneurship and labor skills 
in Indonesian economic development, (New Haven: Southeast Asian Studies, 1961), p. 35.
45 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, p. 206.
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Public Management 
As was discussed briefly in the previous chapter, the idea for the formation 
of an organization that would train administrators and conduct research on 
public management was realized early on. The ideas of Edward Litchfeld and 
Alan C. Rankin, which were published in 1954, were implemented as part 
of the rise of Guided Democracy. Public management saw administration 
as an engineering problem, to be solved through the application of sound 
logical principles. The idea of a ‘scientific’ technocracy went hand-in-hand 
with the ideas colouring much of Guided Democracy’s thinking about the 
civil service. Public management was an obvious and logical extension of 
the supervision and retooling. Just as public administration was part of a 
larger administrative science that included business administration, so the 
Lembaga Administrasi Negara or LAN was also part of a larger institutional 
development meant to create better public administration. This policy 
included UGM and its Department of Public Administration, Padjadjaran 
State University, which in 1962 founded a Faculty of Administration teaching 
Public Administration, Business Administration and Accountancy, and 
finally ministerial-run educational institutes, such as the Interior Ministry’s 
Academy for Interior Governance46 in Malang.
Throughout the 1950s, the affairs surrounding the civil service fell 
into two main government agencies. The first was the Personnel Affairs 
Board (Dewan Urusan Pegawai), established in 1950 and comprising senior 
members of the cabinet and chaired by the Prime Minister.47 The board’s 
primary task was to consider and review policies on the Civil Service and 
advise and propose solutions to problems surrounding the Civil Service. The 
second agency was the Central Personnel Office (Kantor Urusan Pegawai), 
which was to deal with all aspects of personnel administration at central 
and local government levels. This included keeping in touch with all public 
officials on personnel matters, giving advice to all public agencies, obtaining 
information, drafting rules, regulation, bills, ordinances and edicts affecting 
the Civil Service, overseeing the application of rules and laws in order to 
46 Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri
47 Sondang Paian Siagian, The Development and Problems of Indigenous Bureaucratic Leadership 
in Indonesia, (PhD Dissertation Indiana University, Bloomington, 1965), p. 84.
The Managers of Social Engineering 277
prevent violation and controlling the import of foreign workers/experts.48 
The rise of the LAN was complementary to the institutional set up above, 
although as Sondang Siagian pointed out an array of function was duplicated 
in both bodies. According to him it would have been more fruitful to 
amalgamate the two agencies.49 This was never done.  
Lembaga Administrasi Negara (LAN)
LAN was based on Government Regulation no. 30/1957 under the Djuanda 
Cabinet. Although it had its roots in the Litchfeld and Rankin report, LAN 
prided itself on its ‘indigenous’ character. A committee was set up in July 
1954, consisting of Vice President Mohammad Hatta, the head of the BPN, 
Djuanda, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Culture and Education, 
M. Hutasoit and the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior, 
Sumarman. This committee agreed that an Indonesian program for public 
administration should be created under the guidance of Indonesians and 
that public and business administration science should be grouped within a 
unified faculty. The conclusion of the committee was slow in materializing 
itself, but did solidify a consensus on the need to form an institute that was 
to develop Indonesian public administration science and train administrators. 
In 1956, M. Hutasoit, Sumarman and Ali Budiardjo conducted a series 
of meetings and presented their findings to the Secretary General. A new 
preparatory committee was created consisting of the secretaries general of 
the Ministry of Education and Culture, Interior, Finance, Laboras well as the 
Vice Director of the BPN and the Head of the Office of Personnel Affair.50 
This committee reported to the then Minister of Education and Culture, 
Sarino Mangoenpranoto, and at the Ministerial Board meeting in early 1957, 
Minister Mangoenpranoto presented the findings. It was finally agreed that 
the public administration institute needed to be formed.
Minister Sarino in early February created the Committee for the 
Planning and Formation of the State Administration Institute51 headed 
48 Sondang Siagian, The Development and Problems of Indigenous Bureaucratic Leadership in 
Indonesia, p. 99-105.
49 Sondang Siagian, The Development and Problems of Indigenous Bureaucratic Leadership in 
Indonesia, p.106-110.
50 Kantor Urusan Pegawai
51 Panitya Perentjana Pembentukan Lembaga Administrasi Negara 
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by Kosim Adisaputra of the Ministry of the Interior, a specialist in public 
administration. In early June 1957, the committee wrapped up their work 
by proposing two legislative measures: a Government Regulation on the 
creation of the State Administration Institute and a Prime Ministerial 
Decision on the structure and function of the organization. The committee 
also recommended candidates to head the institute, conducted discussions 
with the Institute of Public Administration in Manila and held seminars on 
the subject. Based on the recommendation of the committee, a Government 
Regulation no. 30/1957 was issued, followed by the Prime Ministerial 
Decision no. 283/1957.52 
On August 1957, Karnandi Wargasasmita, Sumarman and M. Ulfah 
Santoso went on a study mission to several countries, including the US. At the 
same time a delegation from the Institute of Public Administration in Manila 
headed by Carlos N. Ramos came to Indonesia. Thus, while being faithful 
to the idea that it was an Indonesian owned and operated program, LAN 
remained well connected to the wider international public administration 
networks. At the regional conference on public administration held in 
Manila in July 1958, Prajudi Atmosudirdjo and Arifin Abdulrachman, both 
of whom obtained top positions in the LAN, represented Indonesia, along 
with Marsoro and Z.A. Samil. The conference created the Eastern Regional 
Organization for Public Administration or Eropa, an umbrella institution 
that would coordinate the many national public administration institutions 
that were created during this period. With its headquarters in Manila, it 
signalled the importance of American influence in its implementation. As a 
follow up by the ICA to the Litchfeld and Rankin report Joseph L. Sutton, 
an advisor to the state administration institute in Thammasat University, 
Bangkok, was sent to Jakarta. The ICA focused on two things: importing 
literature on state administration to Indonesia and sending young Indonesian 
to study about the science in the United States.53
On 5 May 1958, Prajudi Atmosudirdjo was appointed head of the LAN. 
He had worked as senior officer at the Department of Industry, Ministry of 
52 Imam Buchari, Buku Peringatan Pantjawarsa Lembaga Administrasi Negara, (Jakarta: 
Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1963), p. 3-4.
53 Imam Buchari, Buku Peringatan Pantjawarsa Lembaga Administrasi Negara, (Jakarta: 
Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1963), p. 46-54.
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Economic Affairs54 and had been a lecturer at the management faculty of 
Dwipajana University in Jakarta, writing a book on public management in 
1956. Like the BPN, the LAN was an organization located under the office of 
the Prime Minister and aimed at training civil servants in the arts of modern 
public administration. The main goals of the institute were: to provide 
training and supervision of the education of civil servants and/or candidate 
civil servants, to conduct investigation in the field of public administration, 
to provide services in order to improve and perfect government administrative 
apparatuses and, lastly, to develop further the science of Indonesian public 
administration.
In 1959, LAN set up its first foreign cooperation with Indiana University 
within the “Indonesian Public Administration Project”, a five-year program 
that allowed 71 Indonesian officials to train in the United States.55 The US 
provided funds to the tune of $ 586,000 for the LAN-Indiana University 
project.56 Aside from the US, LAN also had cooperation with the UN, West 
Germany, the Colombo Plan and Japan. From 1959-1962, LAN sent 89 
persons to study abroad; 70 people went to the US, 14 to the Philippines, 
three to Japan and one each to West Germany and Australia.57 Staffing 
remained a problem, experienced managers were hard to pry from their 
cushy jobs, and young people were reluctant to join because of the low pay.58 
The main activity of the organization was to conduct management-training 
courses for middle and upper managers of the state. Aside from Indiana 
University, there were also relations with international organizations such 
as the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and the Eastern 
Regional Organization for Public Administration.59 There were seven 
management-type courses on offer: archive, transportation, personnel, 
54 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (ed.), The Government’s Program on Industries, (Jakarta: Lembaga 
Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat, 1954), p. 1.
55 Sondang Siagian, The Development and Problems of Indigenous Bureaucratic Leadership in 
Indonesia, p. 245.
56 Usha Mahajani, Soviet and American Aid to Indonesia, (Athens: Ohio University Center for 
International Studies, 1970), p. 13
57 Imam Buchari, Buku Peringatan Pantjawarsa Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1958-1963, 
(Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1963), p. 28.
58 Imam Buchari, Buku Peringatan Pantjawarsa Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1958-1963, 
(Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1963), p. 12.
59 Sondang Siagian, The development and problems of indigenous bureaucratic leadership in 
Indonesia, p. 97-98.
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finance, leadership, planning and public relations. In 1960, 392 civil servants 
took the course and 259 passed it.
The LAN-Indiana University cooperation program was the most 
important international relationship the organization had. Most of the 
institute’s employees sent abroad for higher education were sent to Indiana 
University, although some were sent to other universities in the US. The 
vast majority of LAN’s books and manuals on administration, audio-visual 
equipment, printing presses and other equipment were given by Indiana 
University with the financial help of the Ford Foundation or were purchased 
with the Indiana University courses in mind. Aside from Indiana University 
professors, LAN also regularly invited foreign professors to give talks. They 
included, in 1960, Harold Koontz, a famous management professor from 
the University of California and J.R. Hicks, the economist from Oxford 
University. Conversely, LAN also sent people to attend conferences or give 
talks abroad, including a visit by Arifin Abdurrachman vice head of LAN, and 
Prajudi Atmosudirdjo, head of LAN, to the US and to an IIAS (International 
Institute for Administrative Science) conference in Lisbon and an EROPA 
conference in Tokyo.60
The focus on LAN inevitably gravitated toward education under the 
principle ‘When Indonesian leaders, political, community and civil servants, 
clearly understand what is meant by the subject of public administration, it 
will be possible to carry out successfully extensive administrative-management 
improvements projects.’61 Various short courses were run in cooperation 
with other state institutions, such as Depernas and individual departments. 
It also conducted courses for lower-rung managers, including a course for 
the 145 lurahs in Jakarta in cooperation with the municipality. On average, 
200-500 people attended the annual courses. The scope of education was 
significantly widened when on 7 November 1960; the University for State 
Public Administration Service (Perguruan Tinggi Dinas Ilmu Administrasi 
Negara) was founded. It had the best library on public administration in 
Indonesia numbering around 11,000 volumes62 and containing the latest 
60 Imam Buchari, Buku Peringatan Pantjawarsa Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1958-1963, 
(Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1963), p. 46-53.
61 Garth N. Jones, Some critical areas concerning technical assistance, (Jakarta: Lembaga 
Administrasi Negara, 1960), p. 13. 
62 Sondang Siagian, The Development and Problems of Indigenous Bureaucratic Leadership in 
Indonesia, p. 97.
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American books on the subject. By 1963, there were over 14,000 books 
and the university had produced 17 master theses. By the same year, LAN 
had conducted various efficiency surveys in many departments, produced 
manuals on management, form design, supervision and reporting, and 
sent out consultation teams to various institutions such as banks, the army 
headquarter, the department of justice, offices of prisons and the air force 
headquarter.
The idea of LAN as the coordinator for civil service administration 
was an essential component to unite the fragmented corps. Political party 
infiltration, which had been highly corrosive since the 1950s, was to be 
revamped through re-education of proper scientific management courses. 
Unfortunately, Prajudi Atmosudirdjo failed to provide the necessary 
leadership to allow for the proper educational restructuring to occur. This 
failure was very much the result of the lack of authority the director had 
amongst the ministries involved. That the executive, including Djuanda 
Kartawidjaja, failed to support the LAN in the issue of education did not help 
either. Later in 1971, when the LAN director was replaced with Awaloeddin 
Djamin, a more successful attempt to unite public administration education 
was conducted, thanks to his personal relationship with technocrat Emil 
Salim as State Minister for Administrative Reform.63
Nonetheless, the LAN failed to convince the universities to back up 
the program and there occurred competition between the organization 
and the universities in providing public administration courses. Although 
the LAN attempted to reorganize the curriculum and structure during the 
1961 conference on the teaching of public and business administration at 
the universities, institutions of higher education and academies, it failed 
to do so. The Ministry of Higher Education and Research saw the LAN 
merely as an in-service training organ. Even more significant, the in-service 
training that was given by the various ministries continued on. “As a result, 
the bureaucracy, which was already fragmented because of its historical 
development, was further fragmented by the fact that the pre- and in-service 
training conducted by each department emphasized only departmental needs 
and departmental loyalty rather than the bureaucracy as a whole.”64
63 Djuna Hadisumarto, The Indonesian Civil Service and its Reform Movement, (PhD 
Dissertation Indiana University, Bloomington, 1974), p. 182-183.
64 Djuna Hadisumarto, The Indonesian Civil Service and its Reform Movement, p. 182-183.
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Both Indonesians and American experts recognized the problem of 
creating a formidable public administration. Joseph M. Waldman was 
confronted with these problems in the Indiana University project while aiding 
the LAN in establishing a national training centre for office administration. 
He quoted several Western experts on the problems concerning authority: 
“I’m sure we’ve reported to you on several occasions that Mr. Mintorogo 
(deputy director) and others are very reluctant to make those decisions 
which involve the fact that they have to face up to someone and say “no”, 
or administer correction, or deprive them of what they want to do.” Further, 
“on occasions, when some operational or procedural problem had come 
up and we’ve asked that he (deputy director) clear this with the LAN and 
provide us a pattern for action, he then pleaded that I (chief of party) or 
Joe should take the matter up with the officials involved, because we were 
foreigners and that they would listen to us but would pay no attention to 
him.”65 Reluctance to cooperate with foreign experts was noted from the 
early 1950s. “Indonesian officials display a touchiness about prerogatives, 
prestige, self-esteem that is a hyper-reaction against the former authority of 
foreigners, heightened by a frequent sense of insecurity arising from feelings 
of personal inadequacy for the jobs held.”66
Many of the publications and conferences on public administration 
focused on the problems of leadership and decision-making of the civil 
service, i.e. the problem of authority. There were three general themes in the 
discussion of public management either in the LAN or in other places like 
the Academy of Interior Government67 or FEUI management courses. One 
focused on the behavioural capabilities, decision-making and the devolution 
of authority. Sondang Siagian proposed changes in order to create a more 
active civil service: a better system of recruitment with entrance exams, a 
better valuation for classification of positions, rating of efficiency, better 
career planning and a greater flow of transference of civil servants from one 
agency/department to another, better compensation schemes and, lastly, 
65 Joseph M. Waldman, Administration Problem Encountered in the Establishment of the National 
Center for Office Administration in Djakarta, Indonesia, (PhD Dissertation Indiana University, 
Bloomington, 1966), p. 119-120. 
66 “Foreign Technical Assistance in Economic Development In a Newly Independent Country: 
some observations in Indonesia” in Economic and Cultural Change, Vol. 1, No. 1, (March, 
1952), p. 78.
67 Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri
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an improved retirement system.68 None of these pragmatic solutions to the 
problems were ever implemented. Instead, discussion increasingly zoomed 
in on cultural and political behaviour and changes through indoctrination. 
As in the case cited by Waldman’s study, the problem of authority was 
seen as being much deeper than a question of inadequate remuneration, 
although this was to some extent blamed too. Another prominent social 
science that often figured in such discussions was that of psychology. Books 
on the psychological basis, offering quick remedies, were available as early 
as the 1950s. Many ideas on leadership rallied around the slogan ‘the right 
man in the right place’, which was a slightly tacit statement on the difficulty 
of actually drilling and coaching a ‘wrong man’ into a good manager, despite 
the advances in the field of psychology. Even so, the notion of coaching a 
person into excellence in administration was nursed throughout.
A second theme was related to technical matters of efficiency, especially 
concerning the office. Many books and articles released by the LAN or 
the Interior Government Academy focused on expounding technical 
developments concerning both work behaviour and office forms. Motion 
studies, for instance, developed by the American engineer Frank B. Gilberth 
and his wife Lillian M. Gilberth in the late nineteenth century, technically 
dissected the movement of a person working in the office. Seventeen 
movements were identified and the extent to which they spent energy was 
counted. This was then joined together with time studies, which created the 
time-motion studies.69 This and other ‘tools’ like the “critical path method” 
which was meant to evaluate and estimate schedule, costs and resource 
allocation for a particular project70 were all being taught to government 
officials through these managerial courses. The extent to which such studies 
affected true office work was probably very slight. Yet, the efforts were not just 
limited to studying the motion of workers, but also the forms of the office, 
68 Sondang P. Siagian, The Development and Problems of Indigenous Bureaucratic Leadership in 
Indonesia, p. 206-234.
69 A prominent Gadjah Mada social scientists Drs. The Liang Gie, was quite adamant in 
promoting these studies. See his article on limiting necessary motions at the office. The Liang 
Gie, “Penghematan gerak dalam pekerdjaan” in Buletin Lembaga Administrasi Negara, No. 
3, 1963, p. 23 and The Liang Gie, Tjara Bekerdja Efisien, (Yogyakarta: Pertjetakan Republik 
Indonesia, 1962).
70 Julianto Moeliodihardjo, “Perentjanaan dan pengawasan dengan “critical path method”” 
in Latihan Pembangunan Ketatalaksanaan. Pemikiran Pendahuluan Mengenai Management 
Berdikari 1965, (Jakarta: Fakultas Ekonomi UI, 1965).
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of the table and so forth. Like time-motion studies, Americans prominently 
dominated these works. Tan Hwieliong, Kosim Adisapoetra and Henry C. 
Bush, an expert sent by the ICA, wrote one major book on the subject. 
This particular book was rich in pictures, provided by the Communications 
Media Division of the Agency of International Development, United 
States Operating Mission in Jakarta. While efforts were made to localize 
the contents, it is clear that the dominant theme of the pictures depicted 
an essentially American office environment, instead of an Indonesian one. 
Image B
Source: Tan Hweiliong, KosimAdisapoetra, Henry C. Bush, Organisasi dan Tata 
Pimpinan Kantor, (Malang: Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, 1962), p. 8
Both the images here represented ‘scientific approaches’ toward a more 
logical design of offices and office space. The ILCOB design above was made 
to allow for government offices to be expanded by requirements in what was 
said to be a logically consistent manner. Image C represents efforts to design 
more efficient and logical office movements and spaces. The caption signified 
the need to scientifically investigate office spaces. The last of the series of 
images shows a board of internship schedules of the APDN. Significantly, 
the image demonstrates heavy usage of English as a primary language in these 
exercises. Various other images showed Western looking men and women at 
the office, and some Indonesian-looking men and women wearing traditional 
Indonesian clothing or the peci. 
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Image C
Source: Tan Hweiliong, Kosim Adisapoetra, Henry C. Bush, Organisasi dan Tata 
Pimpinan Kantor, (Malang: Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, 1962), p. 25.
Image D
Source: Tan Hweiliong, Kosim Adisapoetra, Henry C. Bush, Organisasi dan Tata 
Pimpinan Kantor, (Malang: Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, 1962), p. 124.
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Political Indoctrination
Political indoctrination, such as the various Manipol Usdek indoctrination 
classes provided by the LAN and many other related management courses, 
will be discussed in greater detail below. In all aspects of modern scientific 
management, political indoctrination focused on the aspect of control. How 
this aspect was implemented in the Guided Democracy and by which type 
of organization, forms the topic of our next discussion.
The effect of public and business management on Indonesia’s, or even 
the New Order’s, economic success is difficult to ascertain. Corruption 
and the lack of bureaucratic initiative remained a problem throughout 
the history of the Republic. State-owned corporations, until very recently, 
seemed to function as cash cows for resourceful officials. Yet this is not 
the most important point. As in the case of national planning, scientific 
management promoted state-society relations that elevated the ‘experts’ 
within society as natural leaders. These experts were to occupy positions of 
importance in several organizations and kept close contacts with each other 
and, importantly, with persons in the military. The rise of military managers 
or what Utrecht labelled “military entrepreneurs”71 within the nationalized 
companies, resulted in a large number of army personnel as managers of 
relatively sophisticated companies. In the newly created structures of Bappit 
and the BUD, military men would come to study with university professors, 
while some would continue their study or conduct further active research, 
especially in socialist countries, in order to figure out an Indonesian version of 
the socialist economy. Their training in foreign management courses, much of 
which were provided by the United States, was another point in the exercise. 
Importantly, two organizations were set up by A.H. Nasution to 
deal with the problems of mismanagement. These were the Bapekan and 
Paran organizations created during the early 1960s. He had some measure 
of success, but Sukarno had managed to chip it away by 1964. The 
relationship between the management sciences developed above and these 
two organizations was not clearly related, but as a prominent and celebrated 
member within the managerial community, Nasution must have had an 
important effect in promoting or realizing the ideas behind it. Let us discuss 
71 Ernst Utrecht, “The Military Elite” in Malcolm Caldwell (ed.), Ten Years Military Terror in 
Indonesia, (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975), p. 41-58. 
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now how to understand the problems related to mismanagement and the 
inherent problem of individual control by the state. 
Managerial Problems and the Kapitalis Birokrat
The ‘professional’ managerial class composed of military officers, employees of 
state-owned enterprises and newly graduated university students in business 
management was significantly strengthened as a result of the expansion of 
available positions in the expanding state-owned sectors by the end of the 
1950s. This development continued unhindered by the corporatist approach 
in formulating the Eight-Year National Plan. Major attacks against this 
class emanated from the Communist Party, although before 1960, it was 
in principle supportive of nationalization and a heavy industrialization 
approach that relied on state-owned enterprises. The PKI’s stance differed to 
some extent with the position taken by the military and Guided Democracy 
policy makers. According to McVey, the party supported Chinese businesses 
because of the Marxist ideology of non-racism and internationalism.72 It also 
supported greater decentralization of the regions, finding the continued rule 
of the feudal pamongpradja to be distasteful. Rex Mortimer has noted that 
Aidit has ‘liberal tendencies’ regarding small-scale enterprises or what he 
termed ‘national capitalism’.73
The shift toward hostility happened in 1960 as a result of increasing 
management-worker conflicts, especially in connection with the abolition 
of holiday bonuses. The Communist was wary of company managers who 
were supporting the Labour Minister’s plan to create an all-embracing labour 
front to rival the Communists’ SOBSI union.74 For the first time, the term 
Capitalist Bureaucrat was used to denigrate managers, who were increasingly 
seen as creating a ‘new rich dynasty’. The resentment of this managerial class 
was exacerbated by the impressions of many observers that a growing gap 
between rich and poor had developed, especially in the scale of conspicuous 
consumption. For instance, the import of passenger cars had increased by 
70% between the years 1959 and 1965, despite the decline in per capita 
72 Ruth T. McVey, ‘Indonesian Communism and China’ in Bingdi He, Tang Tsou, Charles U. 
Daly (eds.), China in Crisis, (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 361-362.
73 Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno. Ideology and politics, 1959-1965, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 259.
74 Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, p. 257-258.
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income.75 Mirroring the corporatist policy of the early Guided Democracy 
state, the Communists supported expanding participation through the 
application of open management, social control and the institution of the 
company councils (dewan perusahaan) inaugurated in 1960, but hardly 
implemented by the managements. Aidit said, “There are some people who 
have no faith in the people’s ability to develop a national economy and 
place the blame for our economic failures on the fact that the people are not 
sufficiently educated, many are still illiterate, they do not have the managerial 
know-how, they work badly, they are superstitious, etc.”76
By 1964-1965, the combined attack of the PKI and effective loss of 
control of the economy by the government resulted in the Communist 
campaign against this managerial class. “In some cases, the PKI was able to 
place trained economists and administrators sympathetic to it in middle-level 
posts in government departments and other bureaucratic positions.”77 At this 
late stage, there was little to be done to actually correct the problems. Aidit’s 
economic program shifted from supporting heavy industry to light industry 
by 1962. In 1964, the shift was toward agriculture and the estates, mirroring 
the shift in policy of the Chinese Communist Party. Assured of his belief that 
Indonesia could not collapse because of mounting economic problems, Aidit’s 
remedy was to ‘liberate the productive forces’ of the countryside through 
peasant and the industries through worker participation. These participatory 
ideas were anathema to the basic rules of scientific management, which 
required the expert calculation of management. 
Guided Democracy Management
Both the Litchfeld and Rankin and the Caldwell and Timms reports 
approached the institutions of Indonesia’s state and education system with 
an almost naïve lack of political perspective. Obviously, they only met 
with the most technocratic elements of the Indonesian state. Litchfeld and 
Rankin came under the behest of the University of Indonesia and Caldwell 
75 Lance Castles, “Socialism and private business: the last phase” in the Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, no. 1, vol. 1, p. 39-40.
76 D.N. Aidit, “Socialisme Indonesia dan sjarat-sjarat pelaksanaannja” quoted in Rex Mortimer, 
Indonesian Communism under Sukarno. Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1974), p. 262.
77 Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, p. 268.
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and Timms of the Planning Bureau. The Guided Democracy changed all 
that because of the political nature of much of the formerly less politicized, 
decision-making institution. The most significant change was the effective 
reorganization of the Central Bank from an independent organ into a part 
of the President’s ministries.78 Another difference between the periods of 
the 1950s and that of the 1960s within administration science was the 
development of a distinct type called the development administration. The 
reason for this development was that both public and business administration 
were developed for the American political economy and its application to the 
Third World had resulted in the contextualization of the science. Another 
reason was the awareness that administrators and the science it brought forth 
would have to work within an elite system that was different from the West 
and that lacked a strong state where the rule of law operated.
The roots of development administration were found in the evolution 
of a comparative approach during the early 1960s. Motored by a cadre 
of American public administration specialists within a group called the 
Comparative Administration Group or CAG, they were integral to the 
emergence of development administration altogether. In Asia, the CAG 
formed the Asia Committee, which allowed many of the pioneers of 
comparative administration science to try to apply their ideas to real world 
problems. Milton Esman of the University of Pittsburgh for instance worked 
in the Development Administration Unit of the Malaysian Prime Minister’s 
Office. Within the EROPA, the creation of a Development Administration 
Group section in 1966 signalled its expansion in the relatively tight-knit 
community of experts, composed of seven members, including Dr.Sondang 
Siagian of the LAN.79
As part of the reorganization of the Guided Democracy in the early 
1960s, which allowed for greater participation of expertise within the 
decision-making process, a series of congresses (musjawarah) were held 
in practically all the sciences. These meetings were meant to integrate the 
sciences within the development plans of the nation. On 1-2 December the 
Department of Higher Education and Science held a congress in cooperation 
78 Radius Prawiro, Indonesia’s struggle for economic development. Pragmatism in action, (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 3.
79 Sondang Paian Siagian, Administrasi Pembangunan dalam rangka Nation Building, (Jakarta: 
Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1968), p. 2-4.
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with the Balai Pembinaan Administrasi, Gadjah Mada University80 and 
the LAN, in order to discuss the influence of higher education on public 
administration and business management within the universities. This was 
the first time that the two management sciences came to generalize their 
respective fields. The seminar was biased toward public administration, 
although several business management specialists, such as Barli Halim and 
Soebroto from FEUI, attended.81
In an article on development administration written after the fall of 
Guided Democracy, Sondang Siagian reiterated the four elites: the power 
elites or political elite, the task elites or top administrators, the captains of 
industries and the intellectuals. Following the lines adopted by Barli Halim 
in his papers during the rise of the New Order, he stated that development 
administration should focus on pioneering changes. “It is a total development 
that is at the same time integrated into the political, cultural, social and 
economic development.”82
The premise of Guided Democracy as a managerial revolution was voiced 
throughout the period. Achmad Sanusi in his book pointed to the need to 
couple Sukarno’s Revolusi and the administrative sciences. “There should 
be created a group of leaders (tokoh) that could push members of society 
toward a more productive and efficient way of working and that could avoid 
speculation and corruption.”83 Public administration specialists needed to 
develop an administrative model that could be used by the Indonesian 
government in order to complete its administrative revolution. Sanusi 
80 The Balai Pembinaan Administrasi conducted courses with over 2000 students in various 
topics such as general managerial knowledge, company administration and efficiency course 
to various government bureaucracy and companies. They also conduct consultancy service 
and research for various firms and government agencies in the Central Java area. Pantja 
Warsa Balai Pembinaan Administrasi Universitas Gadjah Mada, (Yogyakarta: Balai Pembinaan 
Administrasi-UGM, 1965), p. 31-37.
81 Laporan Musjawarah Ilmu Administrasi Negara dan Niaga, (Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi 
Negara, 1962), p. 65 and 69.
82 Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, Administrasi Pembangunan dan Aspek Administrasi dalam 
Pelaksanaan Pembangunan, p. 2. “Pioneering dan changes ini menjangkut djuga bidang2 
politik, kulturil, sosial, ekonomidan lain2. Djadi satu pembangunan jang merupakan 
totalitas jang terintegrasi daripada pembangunan dibidang politik, kulturil, social dan 
ekonomi.”
83 Achmad Sanusi, Masalah Administrative Leadership, (Bandung: Universitas Bandung, 1964), 
p. 22-23. “Hendaknja terbentuk satu barisan tokoh2 jang mendorong anggauta2 masjarakat 
kearah bekerdja lebih produktif dan efisien, dan menghindarkan praktek2 jang menjerupai 
spekulasi dan korupsi.” 
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proposed two types of approach. First of all traditional Indonesian forms of 
leadership should be studied, such as the gotong royong element of village life 
and bapakisme culture. Improving upon them would allow the development 
of an effective administrative system using models that were already at hand 
within Indonesian society. The second approach should be a comparison of 
Eastern (Russian, Chinese, Yugoslavian, Polish, etc), Western (American, 
English, French, Norwegian, etc) and non-Bloc (Cuban, Brazilian, Indian, 
etc) administrative systems in order to find one that would be suitable for 
Indonesian use.84
Public and business administration specialists conducted comparative 
studies that were increasingly focused on Communist countries as a way 
to maintain a level of relevance in society. A religious background did not 
prevent Achmad Sanusi from exploring Communist societies, including 
writing articles with titles like “The administrative system of Russia: a 
comparison between the Tsar and the Stalin-Kruschev’s period”, “An analysis 
on the five-year development plan of Hungary”, “Foreign trade between 
Yugoslavia and the US”, “The Yugoslavian Workers Council” and so on. 
Comparison with the American managerial system and its focus on business 
management science contrasted with the Russian focus on engineers and 
engineering as the basis for managerial science. 
Soehardiman, a military manager during the Guided Democracy period, 
wrote at the end of the 1960s: “From the time when the community was 
still in a traditional state to its development to become a modern state, the 
national development administration has a role as a creator of dynamism, 
stability, acceleration and modernity; it is even the key to change, create and 
move toward a modern society in accordance with the development of science 
and technology.”85 The American modernization ideology had come full force 
by the time the New Order started. Socialism and its implied participatory 
actions had moved far away from the remaining public discourse; instead, the 
idea of capable managerial leadership became the mainstay of the Indonesian 
84 Achmad Sanusi, Masalah Administrative Leadership, p. 25-26.
85 Soehardiman, Kupersembahkan kepada pengadilan sejarah. Otobiografi Soehardiman, (Jakarta: 
Yayasan Bina Produktivitas, 1993), p. 238. “Dari semendjak keadaan masyarakat masih 
dalam taraf yang tradisional hingga perkembangannya pada taraf modern sekarang ini, 
administrasi pembangunan nasional mempunyai peranan sebagai dinamisator, stabilisator, 
akselerator, dan modernisator, bahkan merupakan kunci serta daya penggerak untuk 
merubah, membangun dan mengembangkan kearah modernisasi masyarakat sesuai dengan 
kemajuan ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi.”
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discourse of modernity. Soehardiman along with many others, considered 
Suharto’s success to lie in his brilliant management skills and strategic 
capabilities. A collection of articles from 17 Suharto ministers extolling his 
managerial capability was published in 1996, a year before the financial crisis 
brought down the Indonesian economy.86
Surveillance and Retooling. 
The last effort to control the civil service lay in the creation of institutions 
enforcing surveillance, indoctrination and retooling. These efforts were a 
different side of the same public control measures that brought in scientific 
management. It entailed Sukarno’s dream of creating a New Indonesian Man 
and in many ways, sat at the very heart of the Guided Democracy experiment, 
since it represented, at least in its ideal form, a massive revolutionary change 
in the behaviour, forms and selection of people that occupied the seats of 
authority. In his famous and important independence-day speech of 1959, 
Sukarno said that  ‘In order to overcome all the problems associated with 
our near-term and long-term goals, it is obvious that we cannot use the 
present systems and tools. We must rid ourself of liberalism; in exchange we 
must replace it with guided democracy and guided economy. The inefficient 
arrangement of apparatuses must be taken apart. New forms (ordening) and 
reforms (herordening) must be conducted, so that both guided democracy 
and guided economy can be achieved. This is what I meant when I said about 
‘retooling for the future.’87
Mirrored by the anti-corruption drive of the 1950s, the approach toward 
the eradication of corruption and bad management embraced both a ‘civilian’ 
and a ‘military’ effort. Initially, the organization that was to handle the 
problems of surveillance was contained in Bapekan. A. H. Nasution created a 
86 Riant Nugroho Dwidjowijoto, Manajemen Presiden Suharto (Penuturan 17 Menteri), (Jakarta: 
Yayasan Bina Generasi Bangsa, 1996).
87 Maka untuk menanggulangi segala mas’alah2 berhubung dengan tudjuan2 djangkapendek 
dan djangka pandjangt ersebut, njatalah kita ta’ dapat mempergunakan sistim jang sudah2 
dan alat2 (tools) jang sudah2. Sistim liberalisme harus kita buang djauh2, demokrasi 
terpimpin dan ekonomi terpimpin harus kita tempatkan sebagai gantinja. Susunan peralatan 
jang ternjata ta’ effisien dulu itu, harus kita bongkar, kita ganti dengan susunan peralatan 
jang baru. Ordening baru dan herordening baru harus kita adakan, agar demokrasi terpimpin 
dan ekonomi terpimpin dapat berdjalan. Inilah arti dan isiperkataanku mengenai “retooling 
for the future”
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retooling committee called the Paran (Committee for the Retooling of State 
Apparatus).88 It points to military alacrity to participate in the process. The 
retooling committee would design what they considered a more thorough 
reform process within the civil service through moral coaching, organizational 
improvements and dismissing those considered not politically compatible 
with the regime and its revolutionary efforts. 
Indoctrination
The rise of both the Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara by A.H. Nasution 
and the Panitia Pembina Djiwa Revolusi by Roeslan Abdulgani signified 
the importance that indoctrination had on the effort to discipline the civil 
service. Opening the indoctrination coaching at high level government office, 
Djuanda proclaimed that “retooling and indoctrination will not only be held 
on the lower levels of government, but through all state apparatuses from the 
lowest to the highest, including the Ministers. Retooling and indoctrination 
is needed for the whole of society in order to create a just and prosperous 
society. Our retooling and indoctrination effort will also crack down on 
private and state-owned companies, which would be reorganized so as to 
work in a better and more perfect manner. Not all the leaders/directors of 
these companies can do their work perfectly. As a result there needs to be 
a reorganization and screening within these companies.”89 From Djuanda’s 
statement, it is clear that retooling and indoctrination had a deeper and more 
invasive meaning. It imagined the disciplining of the body politic on an 
individual level; breaking down former societal relationships and realigning 
them within an individual relationship with the state. For the first time, the 
state apparatus could determine a person’s ability and fitness for a position 
within the wider economy, not just the civil service. This pervasive power 
was a control mechanism that worked on the individual level.
At the same time, indoctrination had developed a relationship with 
administrative science, as the Paran courses would show. Books on 
military administration, for instance, were derivatives of general scientific 
administration, discussing the theories of Henry Fayol, James Burnham, 
88 Panitya Retooling Aparatur Negara
89 I.O. Nanulaita, “Ir. H. Djuanda Kartawidjaja” in Awaloeddin Djamin (ed.), Pahlawan 
Nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda Kartawidjaja. Negarawan, Administrator dan Teknokrat Utama, 
(Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), p. 148-149. 
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the PODSCORB approach and many of the latest ideas that had emanated 
from America. “Those (administrative) regulations and procedures above, 
after been practiced and perfected through the development of the army’s 
organization and procedures, were then published in book form by the 
DITADJ in the form of a general-administration guide book (first published 
in 1961). The content of the book will be discussed fully in the next classes. 
By ‘indoctrinating’ the officers, the army’s new-style administration can be 
implemented correctly.”90
The role of the military in this reorganization stemmed from Nasution’s 
anti-corruption effort that had allowed greater military participation into the 
political power of society during the second half of the 1950s. It was thus 
also related to the question of efficiency and how the state had taken on the 
responsibility to re-manage the productive members of society, especially 
those within the administration and the business world. This projected 
expansion of the state’s managerial power at the grass-root level determined a 
more pervasive state-society relation, at least in its ideal incarnation. This did 
not stop at the public and business administration, but spread throughout 
other professional parts of society. Thus, by the end of Guided Democracy, 
journalists were busy signing themselves up for these indoctrination classes 
because to not have a certificate in them would jeopardize one’s journalist 
license.91
The role of the universities and other government institutions were also 
significant.92 The LAN provided a platform for people to write about the 
problems of indoctrination, including a piece written in its journal in 1961: 
“Indoctrination is a part of the pattern of civilization of large countries like 
the United States and the Soviet Union; it is only proper and required if in 
90 Herlan, Administrasi Umum dalam Angkatan Darat kita; Indoktrinasi Administrasi pada tg. 1 
April 1963, (Jakarta: Departemen Angkatan Darat, 1963), p. 8. “Ketentuan2 dan prosedur2 
diatas, setelah mengalami ‘praktek’ beberapa tahun dan disesuaikan dengan perkembangan2 
dalam organisasi dan tata-tjara dalam staf AD kita, kemudian dibukukan dan dikeluarkan 
oleh DITADJ dalam bentuk Buku Petundjuk dalam Administrasi Umum (tjetakan pertama 
dalam tahun 1961). Isi dari buku tersebut akan diuraikan lebih mendalam dalam kuliah2 
berikutnja. Maka melalui para pedjabat2 jang telah “ge-indoctrineerd” nanti diharapkan 
administrasi AD dengan ‘gajabaru’ itu dapat dilaksanakan dengan sebaik-baiknja.”  
91 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno-Tentara-PKI, p. 102.
92 University lecturers were required to go through indoctrination coaching and between 500 
lecturers had undergone such coaching between 1962-1965. Bachtiar Rifai, Perkembangan 
Perguruan Tinggi di Indonesia, p 43.
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Indonesia indoctrination is run on the basis of the social philosophy of the 
Pancasila. The problem now lay in its implementation in which most of the 
indoctrinators themselves have unwittingly become unpaid propagandists 
for the philosophy of social liberalism as a result of their long exposure to the 
education based on this philosophy. It is fortunate that the basic civilizational 
pattern of Indonesia is being pioneered by the Universitas Gadjah Mada 
through their Studium Generale, while the Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam 
Negeri in Malang has already put the course on Pancasila within the 
1959/1960 study year with satisfying results.”93 For the first time, the state 
ideology became an important component of university curriculums. 
Retooling also facilitated the spread of the military into various nooks 
and crannies of society. “There is no field where the karya military force isn’t 
participating. All this shows that the APRI has succeeded in conducting 
retooling.”94 A series of professional oaths were created: Panca Setia for 
the civil service, Sapta Marga for the military, Tri Brata for the police, 
Panca Wardana for the youths and so forth, signalling a loss of individual 
responsibility and its replacement by responsibility to the state. 
Let us now discuss the series of institutions that was created by A. H. 
Nasution in his quest to bring some semblance of order and reduce the 
problems of corruption, an issue that had been central for institutional 
change since the mid-fifties. The first organization was the Bapekan, which 
functioned as an ad-hoc police unit with investigative capabilities but no 
rights to incarcerate or bring to justice. The second was the Paran, which 
focused indoctrination but also on managerial improvement. While the 
capability to conduct managerial improvement vanished, its indoctrinative 
93 Ruspana, “Quo Vadis Peradaban Indonesia” in Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1961, p. 42, 
“Dengan penelitain adanja indoktrinasi sebagai realisasi dasar pola peradaban di negeri2 besar 
Amerika Serikat dan SovietUni, wadjar dan keharusan serta wadjibllah kalau di Indonesia 
didjalankan indoktrinasi sebagai realisasi dasar pola peradaban filsafat social Pantja Sila. 
Akan tetapi sekarang kesulitannja jaitu dalam bidang pelaksanaan dimana sebagian besar 
pelaksana2 sendiri dengan setjara tidak disasari mereka mendjadi propagandis tanpa bajaran 
dari filsafat social liberalisme, karena memang sudah sekian tahun mendapat pendidikan 
berdasarkan bersumberkan filsafat tersebut diatas. Sjukurlah dasar2 pola peradaban 
Indonesia ini sudah dirintis oleh Universitas Gadjah Mada dengan diadakannja Studium 
Generale, sedang di Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri di Malang filsafat Pantja Sila 
telah dimasukkan didalam Curriculum tahun pengadjaran 1959/60 dan ternjata hasilnja 
memuaskan.” 
94 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, p. 208.
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function became a principal basis of civil service relations within the state. 
Its New Order variant, the P4, had strong resemblance to the Paran.
Bapekan
Bapekan, the brainchild of General Nasution,95 was created along with the 
Depernas on 17 August 1959, based on the Presidential Regulation no. 
1/1959. It was a small and centralized organization, consisting of only a 
limited number of individuals, without regional officers or representations. 
Yet it had large, ambitious goals. Its duty was to conduct surveillance and 
research into the working of state apparatuses.96 There were basically two 
forms of work: the passive/routine type and active work. The active work 
consisted of investigations carried out upon the initiative of Presidential order 
or Bapekan itself. It also worked through complaints sent from the regions.97 
The head of the Bapekan was the Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, former 
Minister of Defence. Widely regarded as an outstanding figure, the Sultan 
was an important symbol of idealism, which the body wanted to present 
to an already sceptical Indonesian public. His secretary, sociologist Selo 
Soemardjan, joined him.98 He was interested in administrative change and 
function in revolutionary societies. Other members included Semaun,99 a 
95 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, p. 256.
96 Nasution claimed that initially Sukarno wanted to give the Bapekan to politicians, but he 
relented so as to maintain the technical nature of the organization, instead of becoming 
highly politicized.  A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde 
Lama, p. 256.
97 ANRI, Jakarta, Bapekan, inv. nr. 6.
98 Selo Soemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta. 
99 Semaun was an old Communist who was banished by the Netherlands Indies government 
in 1923 for his role in the Union of Railway and Tramway Personnel (VSTP) strikes. 
Initially, he lived in the Netherlands and was active in the Anti-Imperialist League and 
the Perhimpunan Indonesia, rubbing shoulders with Mohammad Hatta and many other 
Indonesian nationalists before leaving for the Soviet Union in the 1930s. He reputedly 
studied at Tashkent University, Uzbekistan, before moving to the Institute of Far East Studies 
in Moscow in 1931, where he studied Soviet rationalization in action at the Train Office 
of Baku in the Caucasus, today’s Azerbaijan. He was also reputed to have worked for the 
planning board of the Soviet Republic of Tajikistan. It was partially based on this experience 
that he was given a Doctor Honoris Causa by Prof. Dr. Prajudi Atmosudirdjo, aside from 
being the head of the LAN, was also Dean of Padjadjaran University. He arrived back in 
Indonesia in December 1956 with much fanfare and open arms from the nationalist and 
communist elites of the country, including President Sukarno himself. He himself meanwhile 
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Communist of anti-colonial fame, Samadikoen, a former Governor of East 
Java (1949-1958) and Colonel Soedirgo, a military man. Sukarno pushed for 
the inclusion of Semaun in order to realize his Nasakom ideals.100 Nasution 
thought that while the composition of Bapekan was politically strong, it 
was technically weak.101 The selection of its members was certainly not 
based solely on political considerations. Each of them had experiences with 
the administration, although none was trained specifically in the American 
science of public administration. Between January 1959 and July 1959, 
Bapekan received 902 cases, of which 402 were reportedly ‘solved’, while 
the rest remained in process. The President ordered the investigation of the 
problems of Tanjung Priok Port in Jakarta, the workshops of the Train Office 
(DKA) and the national shipping company PELNI and Djakarta Lloyd. 
To get a better sense of what the organization actually did, let us briefly 
focus on its problem-solving work. One of the first presidential orders for 
the body was to solve the difficulties surrounding the important port of 
Tanjung Priok. The issue was a classic one of Indonesia’s dysfunctional and 
fragmented administration system. There were two main problems with the 
port: congestion that slowed down operations and criminality involving 
smuggling. It became a national scandal in 1959 and several big names in the 
army were implicated. At issue was a conflict of authority, between civilian 
officers such as: the harbour master, the director of the port and the head of 
the customs office, between the army and navy officers with some authority 
over the region and, lastly, with the unions. Here was a microcosm of the 
political trouble of the post-independence Indonesian bureaucracy: a turf 
war between the civilian apparatus with the military and the leftist unions.102 
An incident occurred when one importer complained to the head of the 
customs office about a customs officer who had been stealing parts from the 
had by his return to Indonesia effectively renounced Communism, whose Stalinist excesses 
he witnessed personally during his stay in the Soviet Union. Upatjara pemberian gelar 
Doctor Honoris Causa dalam Ilmu Ekonomi kepada Sdr. Semaun pada hari senin tanggal 
31 Djuli tahun 1961, djam 20.00 bertempat di Aula Universitas Padjadjaran djalan Dipati 
Ukur no. 37, Bandung in ANRI in Jakarta, BAPEKAN, no.5.
100 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, p. 257 and 
Harian Rakjat, 16 August 1959.
101 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, p. 257.
102 ANRI, Jakarta, Bapekan, inv. nr. 81.
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cargoes.103 The head of the customs conducted secret surveillance after which 
he apprehended the officer for illegal pilfering. The affair was reported to 
the police and the courts. The officer in question appealed but was given a 
tougher sentence in the High Court. In anger, the indicted officer gathered 
several supporters and harassed the head of the custom office. This was also 
reported to the courts. The officer and others accused sent a letter of apology 
to the President and asked to be allowed to retain their old positions in the 
office. According to the report, informal sources reported that the President 
accepted their apology and this resulted in unease amongst the custom 
officers. Complicating the matter was the fact that the officer accused was 
a former revolutionary fighter and the head of the customs was a ‘Dutch 
collaborator.’ Guided Democracy and its insistence on revolutionary 
credentials made it even less certain that professionals would have the law on 
their side. Government intervention often resulted in greater uncertainty. The 
merit of professionalism, which should have been the backbone of managerial 
thrust of the state, was highly deficient on the ground. 
The Bapekan report issued several recommendations. The authority of 
the port should be an exclusively civilian affair. The Naval Command104 of 
the Tanjong Priok territory should be given the task of surveillance and 
investigation of the civil agency and also the right to provide help and 
protection to these agencies whenever required, the civilian and military 
officers should be given extra allowance, the number of storage companies 
(veem) should be reduced, there should be extra precautions against 
smuggling, there should be a specific and clear delineation of jurisdictional 
authority between the army and the navy and, on a long-term basis, all the 
offices, houses and military facilities within the port area should be moved 
outside. A series of Presidential regulations was drafted by Bapekan in 
response to its investigation of the port, which would have made it illegal 
for both military and civil servants of the D to F ranks (higher echelon) to 
work at the port for more than 12 months at a time and for those working 
in the port to receive an additional 500 rupiah allowance.105 Whether 
these recommendations were carried out is highly doubtful. As we have 
seen, the period was coloured by an increasing hue of army involvement in 
103 Notulen rapat Bapekan pada hari Senen tanggal 2 November 1959 bertempat di Gedung 
Bapekan, ANRI, Jakarta, Bapekan, inv. nr. 143 and 81.
104 Penguasa Laut
105 Bahan Rapat Bapekan tgl. 2 Nov. 1959. ANRI, Jakarta, Bapekan, inv. Nr. 81.
The Managers of Social Engineering 299
civilian affairs. Such recommendations that would have clearly delineated 
the jurisdictional authorities between civilian and military state agencies 
would have been against the spirit of the period. In any case, Bapekan 
recommendations were non-binding. 
Bapekan was a rather odd organization. It had a total of around only 40 
staff members yet was constantly receiving wide-ranging cases to investigate 
and make problem-solving recommendations. It would participate in 
studying the problems surrounding decentralization and even bigger 
problems surrounding the judiciary. It sent its core members Semaun or 
Samadikoen to review the arrangements of the Asian Games in 1962, the 
petroleum industry in Sumatra and the Rice Centre in Java.106 No doubt, 
many recommendations were based on a rather superficial analysis. For 
instance, the recommendation for Tanjung Priok failed to address the core 
issue in any meaningful way. One of the weaknesses of Bapekan was that 
it functioned merely as an investigating and recommending organ without 
power to enforce any of its findings. The non-binding recommendations 
would then be sent to the Presidential office or other departments, but there 
was no way to ensure that it would be made to stick.107 Later on, Paran would 
suggest that Bapekan be made into a high government organ on the same 
level as Depernas, the courts or Parliament.
Paran
The National State Apparatus Retooling Committee (Panitia Retooling 
Aparatur Nasional) became the other side of the control mechanism of the 
civil service. If the Bapekan functioned as a research and surveillance body to 
understand problems related to mismanagement, Paran had the active duty 
to fix those problems through the authority of retooling.108 Nasution was 
named the head of Paran and Roeslan Abdulgani as Vice Head. The Paran 
106 Notulen Rapat Bapekan. ANRI in Jakarta, Menteri Negara Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Industri 
(Menneg Ekuin), inv. Nr. 390.
107 Peraturan-peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia no. 1 tahun 1959 tentang pembentukan 
Badan Pengawas Kegiatan Aparatur Negara, (Jakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1959), p. 1-10.
108 Retooling was supported by management specialist when it conformed to the dictates of 
scientific management. Public officials were especially needed because of their function as 
corporate managers. Leon Mears, “Some Management Problems in Indonesia” in Rossal 
J. Johnson, Mohammad Sadli and Subroto (eds), Teachings in Business Administration and 
Economics, (Jakarta: Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat, 1961), p. 28-30.
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was the brainchild of Nasution, Mohammad Yamin and Roeslan Abdulgani. 
As a result, it incorporated the diverse ideas that the three men had about 
retooling. The presence of Roeslan Abdulgani as Sukarno’s ideological right-
hand man strengthened the President’s ideas about Paran as an indoctrination 
organ for the wider civil service. As Nasution said; “the President will deal 
with the mental-ideological retooling, but what I am dealing with is related 
to organizational order, work order and personnel problems.”109 Nasution 
thus dealt with the more mundane and important problems surrounding 
mismanagement.
The first act of Paran was a continuation of the military anti-corruption 
policy when in December 1960, all ministers of the government had to 
hand over information about their wealth. Forms were sent to people in 
key positions of the civil service in order to determine their loyalty to the 
state, especially whether they had sympathies with the various rebellions110 
or had been loyal to the Dutch. This was extended to all civil servants at 
the F/IV echelon or above by March 1961. Nasution was concurrently the 
Minister of National Security. Meetings were held at army headquarters. 
The Paran created the new Pantja Satia oath of civil service loyalty, legalized 
through Presidential regulation no. 3/1961 and which provided guidelines 
for retooling. A law was then proposed following the basic principles of 
government employment (pokok kepegawaian).
Initially, Bapekan saw the rise of Paran in a negative light. It sent a 
protest note when the plans of Paran to indoctrinate Bapekan members 
came to light.111 There was no doubt that Paran saw Bapekan as an important 
component in general retooling. Nasution reiterated the temporal and ad hoc 
nature of the Paran, saying that it was part of the government’s short-term 
program in line with the other Tri-Program112 of the cabinet. He envisaged 
109 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, p. 256. 
“Presiden menggarap retuling mental-ideologis, tapi yang saya garap ialah terutama 
ketertiban organisasi, tatakerja dan personal.”
110 DI/TII, PRRI, Permesta, Madiun Affair, etc, comprising representatives of various ideological 
positions in Indonesia, including Islamist, social democrats, Communists and so forth.
111 Rapat Bapekan ke XIV, 19 September 1960. ANRI in Jakarta, Menteri Negara Ekonomi, 
Keuangan dan Industri (Menneg Ekuin), inv. Nr. 390.
112 The Tri-Programs were: provision of foodstuff, support a secure environment and continue 
on the fight against imperialism and colonialism. 
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the Paran’s transformation into a more permanent body called the Body to 
Manage the Efficiency of State Apparatus.113
Compared to Bapekan, which had merely a surveillance and advisory 
nature, Paran had a greater power to oversee and change what it saw fit 
for the creation of what it considered to be a good government apparatus. 
The idea of retooling was obviously central to Paran, but it was also highly 
central to the ideology of Guided Democracy itself. ‘Retooling meant the 
dismantling of inefficient arrangement of the apparatus and its replacement 
with a new arrangement. This is a planning and rearranging with the long-
term goal of achieving our revolution.’114 Etymologically, the term was used 
in scientific management as a reorganization of the factory floor, i.e. industrial 
reorganization. Within society: the mobilization of material and spiritual 
forces and its recreation into a ‘strijdvaardig’ and ‘strijdwaardig’ force. Within 
the government: reordering in both the legislative, executive and other fields 
of government. An official definition had it as “the effort to renovate in the 
soul, arrangement, work procedures, and personnel of all State organization 
in the legislative, executive and other fields at the Centre and the Regions 
so as to conform to the Political Manifesto and USDEK115and to efficiently 
reach the goals of the State in the short and long term.”116
Following the ‘revolutionary’ principle of Guided Democracy, there 
was a spirit of reinvention and experimentation. Retooling was political in 
nature. It was to root out part of the apparatus that was anti-revolutionary 
and correct those whose ideas did not conform the guidelines and values of 
Guided Democracy. This was because many of the elite, including Sukarno, 
saw no clear dividing-line between political and administrative issues. The 
civil service was to be shaped into an efficient bureaucracy by the application 
of modern management, political education and purges. A civil servant had 
113 Badan Pembina effisiensi apparatur Negara
114 “Retooling adalah pembongkaran susunan peralatan jang tidak efisien dengan penggantian 
susunan peralatan jang baru. Ini adalah “ordening” baru dan herordening baru, dengan 
maksud agar tudjuan djangka pandjang dari revolusi kita dapat tertjapai.” Laporan Panitia 
Retooling Aparatur Negara, S.1396/9/60, A.H. Nasution, in ANRI, BAPEKAN, no. 5.
115 The main guide posts of the Indonesian revolution, USDEK (Undang-UndangDasar 1945, 
Sosialisme Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimipin and Karakter Indonesia) 
is an acronym of the following: The Constitution of 1945, Indonesian Socialism, Guided 
Democracy, Guided Economy, Indonesian Character. 
116 Laporan Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara. ANRI, Jakarta, Bapekan, inv. nr. 345.
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to be pro-Manipol and USDEK, pro-revolution and should have the capacity 
to use the spirit of gotong royong. 
Understood within this logic, retooling seems to have been a natural 
extension of the managerial reforms discussed above. While management 
science provided both tools and coaching for the creation of better 
administrators, retooling was to actively pursue the effort to put the right 
man in the right place. In a major way, the cultural impediments toward 
both authority and initiative were to be circumvented through the active 
selection and deletion of those already within the service. Although the logic 
of the recreation of a ‘perfect’ civil service through political indoctrination 
and the weeding out of suspected ‘anti-revolutionaries’ seemed sound within 
its own logical reasoning, it required capabilities that were just beyond that 
of the state. 
Instead of professionalizing, the politicization of the civil service damaged 
it even further. The screening of potentially non-loyal civil servants became 
a major drive to oust people without the backing of political groups. Instead 
of looking at people based on their inherent merits, their political stance and 
personal history became a terrifying prospect for some. For instance, the 
loyalty question was highly damaging for those people who had historically 
sided or worked with the Dutch during the revolutionary period. As 
was the case with the head of customs in the port of Tanjung Priok, his 
professionalism and capability came second to his past political loyalty. 
Because Indonesia still had a large number of ‘collaborators’, i.e. former 
officials of the colonial regime, working for the government at that time, 
such a policy had disastrous consequences for the efficacy of the civil service.117
There were three sub-committees under Paran: the ‘mental’, personnel 
and organizational sub-committees. The ‘mental’ sub-committee designed a 
uniform and intensified an indoctrination campaign at a central and regional 
level, working under the supervision of the Committee of the Management 
of the Revolutionary Soul118, headed by Ruslan Abdulgani. The Committee 
published the Seven Major Indoctrination Doctrines in 1961 to standardize 
the process, as Sukarno had instructed earlier, on February 27 1960 in 
117 ANRI, Jakarta, Bapekan, inv. nr. 81
118 Panitya pembinaan djiwa revolusi
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order to intensify indoctrination and quicken the retooling efforts.119 This 
included documents on the birth of the national ideology, Pancasila, the 
Constitution of 1945, the Political Manifesto (Manipol) which embodied 
the principles of Guided Democracy, Sukarno’s main speeches: the Road 
to Our Revolution (Djalannja Revolusi Kita or Djarek) and Creating the 
World Anew (Membangun Dunia Kembali), the President’s article on the 
explanation to both Manipol and USDEK, and lastly the President’s address 
on the Overall Development Plan.120 Contained within these documents is 
a dizzying array of ideas representing Guided Democracy. The committee 
conducted its first coaching session on May 1961 for a period of 5-7 days. 
There were general coaching sessions for both first (provincial) and second 
(regency) level regional governments. 
The organizational sub-committee collected ideas from departments 
and sent queries to each department, conducted on-the-spot surveys, sought 
expert advice on designing blueprints for organizational/procedural work 
and, lastly, technical retooling advice for the departments in question. This 
sub-committee was under the leadership of Nasution.121 The sub-committee 
members classified positions as political, top level (teras), vital, technical 
and so forth. They cooperated with the personnel sub-committee in order 
to root out unnecessary individuals. The sub-committee also worked with 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Special Autonomy to design a vertical 
organization of government. On an ideal level, this sub-committee had a 
daunting task of fulfilling Sukarno’s commitment to leave behind the Western 
separation of power of triaspolitica (executive, legislative and judiciary) in 
favour of his brand of corporatist unity under the united karya groups.
Several changes at various levels within the government were proposed. 
For the central government, arrangements of departments should be based on 
their tasks, function, authority and responsibility, streamlining, simplifying 
and regulating the arrangements so as to eliminate double functions, 
bureaucratic maze and uneconomic and inefficient work and so on. For the 
regional government, the sub-committee proposed to review the allocation 
of authority between the central and regional governments, so that the sub-
119 Seno Soesanto, Manipol Usdek. Bahan Batjaan bagi para Peserta Latihan-latihan Djabatan/
Kursus-kursus pada Lembaga Administrasi Negara, (Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 
1962), p. 2.
120 Tudjuh Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi, (Jakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1961).
121 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan masa Orde Lama, p. 259.
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district head122 should be the lowest representative of the government. Vertical 
services should stop at the second level of regional governments.  
The personnel sub-committee studied materials sent by the departments, 
asked for the Office of Personnel Affairs (KUP) about the formation and 
total number of civil servants, and inquired into the property of civil 
servants below that of the F/IV rank. Each minister was also asked to state 
his involvement in the revolution after 1945. The committee should also 
survey the personnel regulations. The sub-committee should create a list of 
provision and experience in the regions with regard to retooling. It was in 
this sub-committee that the Pantja Satia code of conduct was created, aside 
from designing a new Basic Personnel Law (UU Pokok Kepegawaian) on 14 
April 1961. Lastly, the sub-committee designed remuneration and severance 
packages for those that were ‘retooled’ out of their position in government 
service.123 
There were two general criteria for determining the acceptability of civil 
servants: positive and negative norms. The positive norms looked at universal 
criteria, such as technical capabilities, general capabilities, morality, character 
and loyalty. The negative norms looked at the political acceptability of the 
civil servant within the revolutionary period. This necessitated an inquiry 
into the personal history of civil servants. It was important that people 
were not tainted with a historical involvement that could question their 
loyalty to the Republican government, including supporting the various 
post-independence rebellions against the central government or having 
worked as a Dutch collaborator during the revolutionary war. Three absolute 
characteristics had to be presented: pro-Manipol and USDEK, revolutionary 
rather than counter-revolutionary, by criteria based on Sukarno’s 1960 
independence day speech; and lastly, to be able to combine all revolutionary 
forces within the spirit of mutual cooperation (gotong royong). Civil servants 
were to be weeded out and put into four possible negative categories: anti-
Manipol USDEK who silently opposed Indonesian socialism, anti-Manipol 
USDEK who openly opposed Indonesian socialism, as a person who, because 
of lack of knowledge, opposed Indonesian socialism, and lastly, as a person 
who lacked knowledge of Manipol but did not oppose it. 
122 Camat
123 ANRI, Jakarta, Bapekan, inv. nr. 345.
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This political labelling and classification of people was, to say the least, 
damaging for the formation of an esprit de corps within the bureaucracy. This, 
and the fact that continued deficit spending through printing more money 
destroyed the purchasing power of stable incomes, led to a massive loss of 
efficiency and clogging of the bureaucratic machinery as Guided Democracy 
entered the second half of its existence. Instead of promoting the right man 
in the right place, it placed a premium on political connections in a way 
that toppled the kinds of nepotism that was prevalent in the 1950s. The 
arbitrariness of the process decreased the assurance of the authority of the 
civil servants. 
This political pebble in the Guided Democracy shoe was a practice that 
was not promoted under the developmentalist aid of the United States. It 
required no aid structure, university locus or visiting professors and those 
engaged in these machinations did not offer studies of comparison to other 
countries with their own forms of retooling strategies. The indigenousness of 
the Guided Democracy was an important component of the indoctrination 
campaign. Instead of announcing it as some sort of international social 
science experiment, the Indonesian government stressed the ancient and 
traditional nature of the values behind the teachings that Sukarno bestowed 
upon the nation. Thus, the concept of Sosialisme à la Indonesia was not to 
be found in capitalist and liberal Europe, but was “in fact…very old in 
Indonesia. Besides the picture conveying this concept in the Wayang Master’s 
description of the past – for instance, the Javanese concept of “Ratu Adil”, 
the Goddess of Justice, for again it is social justice which is meant here, not 
merely the implementation of laws, regulations and other social codes.”124 
Guided Democracy was in fact “only a new statement of something very old 
in Indonesia. Since ancient times, democracy in Indonesia has been what 
we now call Guided Democracy. Since ancient times, Indonesian society has 
been averse both to dictatorship and to the individualism of liberalism. The 
old system of government was based upon musjawarah and mufakat with the 
leadership of a single central authority in the hands of a “sesepuh” or elder, 
who did not dictate, but led and protected.”125 The theme of centralization 
124 Manipol-Usdek in Questions and Answers, (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1961), p. 
36.
125 Manipol-Usdek in Questions and Answers, p. 40.
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within the command of the Presidential office was thus paramount within 
the Guided Democracy thought and iconography. 
Although the regime claimed indigenous roots for its ideology, one could 
without much hesitation, support the idea that retooling, indoctrination 
and the elimination of counter-revolutionaries within the government was 
in line with the demands of management science. Sukarno’s promotion 
of the re-creation of a new Indonesian man was merely a contextualized 
implementation of the effort to forge better bureaucrats. The structural 
and ‘mental’ sub-committee basically rehashed the rhetoric of the more 
‘scientific’ managerial and economic experts, focusing on ‘work procedures’ 
and ‘organizational efficiency’. The important exception to this was the 
political nature of the whole exercise. It came initially to function as a 
purging mechanism to embed loyalty, but if we go back to the Bapekan case 
concerning Tanjung Priok, loyalty to the state and civil service capabilities 
was sometimes directly in conflict with one another. 
Nasution’s ambitious goals for Paran fell flat. Only Roeslan Abdulgani’s 
sub-committee on the development of the revolutionary soul had some 
success. “Even the effort to regulate the structure of departments was 
unsuccessful. The Ministers maintained their own personal power and 
obtained their authority directly from the President. I also tried to introduce 
regional Paran. Governors close to me immediately formed them, but 
governors close to other people in the centre hesitated to do so.”126
The result of these exercises was the decidedly military garb that the 
civil service took on, complete with military-style ceremonies, trainings and 
indoctrination campaigns. That it ended in acomplete failure is beside the 
point. In all one can argue that the implementation of managerial science 
amounted to a failure. Practically no Indonesian state-owned companies 
ever rose to become an important regional or multinational corporation, 
with perhaps the exception of the state oil company, the highly corrupt 
Pertamina, which would end up on the verge of bankruptcy in 1975 due to 
massive mismanagement. Corruption was prevalent throughout the century, 
126 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, p. 259. 
“Untuk penyamaan struktur departemen-departemen saja pun kami tak berhasil. Para 
menteri telah berkuasa sendiri-sendiri dan langsung meminta pengesahan dari Presiden. 
Saya usahakan pula adanya Paran di propinsi-propinsi. Gubernur-gubernur yang dekat 
kepada saya segera membentuknya, tapi gubernur-gubernur yang agak berkiblat kepada 
tokoh-tokoh lain di pusat, enggan melaksanakannya.”
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although the New Order government was initially able to subdue the civil 
service owing to its absolute rule over a meek bureaucracy and a civil society 
frightened by the evaporated legitimacy of the left and the killings and 
incarcerations of its members. 
Budhi Operation
The Budhi Operation was one of the last anti-corruption drives held during 
the Guided Democracy. It was to investigate massive mismanagement and 
corruption within state-owned companies. It was also one of Nasution’s 
last attempts to rein in control. Businessman A.M Dasaad said at least 14 
billion rupiah were swindled during the 1960s.127 The attack which the PKI 
launched in 1963 against what it called bureaucratic capitalists and corruptors 
within the management of state-owned enterprises was an attack against 
military managers. According to Soehardiman, the head director of PN 
Djaja Bhakti (formerly USINDO) and creator of the SOKSI labour union 
(a military-controlled labour union meant to compete with the Communist 
SOBSI) the operation were under the control of two assistants of General 
Sutoyo, who according to him were communist sympathizers.128
Nasution claimed that within three months, the operation saved the 
state Rp. 11 billion of state funds despite the fact that only one-seventh of 
the total investigation had been carried out.129 A work committee composed 
of the police, prosecutors, judges, and experts in agriculture, banking, 
trade, taxation, customs and treasury, created a 100-point questionnaire 
that would determine the degree of corruption or mismanagement. These 
questions included company policies, products, money, foreign exchange, 
purchasing and sale transactions and production services. Another 
questionnaire was made about wealth: houses, transport, personal foreign 
exchange, jewelleries and other luxuries and so forth. Nasution employed 200 
students and trainees to conduct the investigation.130 The expert committee 
then determined whether there had been criminal or administrative fault. 
Criminal offence was handed over to the courts and the respective ministries 
127 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 284-287.
128 Soehardiman, Kupersembahkan kepada Pengadilan Sejarah. Otobiografi Soehardiman, p. 
142-151.
129 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, p. 262. 
130 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama, p. 262. 
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dealt with administrative offence. These questionnaires concerning policies 
and ownership of state-owned company directors represented a further 
development of the anti-corruption effort conducted by Nasution and the 
CPM in the late 1950s.131 What was interesting was the use of experts and 
students. It wasn’t the only time Nasution tried to form concrete institutional 
relationship with students. 
The Minister of Production, General Suprajogi, who had run the 
Nationalization Body (Badan Nasionalisasi) and thus had engineered the 
integration of military officers in the state-owned companies, together with 
First Minister Djuanda, invited managers from state-owned companies 
to take the oath of Ikrar Panca Setia. Nasution’s attempt to control the 
military managers heightened the tension between the group surrounding 
general Ahmad Yani, which included people like Soehardiman, and those 
of Nasution. His effort to control mismanagement within state-owned 
companies and discipline the military managers was probably related to the 
President’s effort to reduce Nasution’s capacity to meddle with the internal 
situation of the state. Sukarno’s successful attempt to wrest control of Paran 
from Nasution’s hands through the guise of the Kotrar was part of that.
Inherent Tension of Guided Democracy Control
For most observers, the indoctrination effort of the Guided Democracy was 
a big farce. Retooling meant purging the civil service of unwanted persons. 
People queued to go on indoctrination courses because they feared trouble if 
they had not taken the courses. Most teaching materials in the courses were 
dreary and uninteresting, a laundry list of readings on the state ideology. This 
in turn became standard fare for the New Order state to impose on to rest of 
society. In 1966, a series of indoctrination classes to purge out Communism 
began to be held. Again, the materials presented were less important than 
the reinforcement the idea of state control over one’s body and behaviour. 
The centrality of the state as the enforcer of correct behaviour was a powerful 
force for conformity. 
By early 1964, Sukarno had successfully wrested control of the Paran 
by recreating another body to replace it, the Komando Tertinggi Retooling 
Alat Revolusi or the Highest Command for the Retooling of Revolutionary 
131 ANRI, Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Inv. Nr. 518.
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Tools (Kotrar).132 He viewed Paran as a threat to his capability to bestow 
lucrative sinecures as a means to support his authority.133 Many military 
officers also saw it as a threat to their position in the economy.134 The Kotrar 
was headed by Subandrio, with General Ahmad Yani as Chief of Staff 
and Air Commodore Wiriadinata as Vice Chief of Staff. This represented 
the end of Nasution’s effort to implement managerial sciences within the 
state structure. As was the case in national planning, Sukarno’s politics 
obstructed the effort to try and implement the honest application of some 
sort of rational approach toward disciplining state apparatuses. Although 
Nasution’s effort in Bapekan, Paran and the Budhi Operation was not 
institutionally related to the development of managerial science outlined 
above, the usage of experts in many of these institutions signified at least 
some personal connection to the effort. It is unclear who the agricultural, 
banking, trade and taxation experts working under him during the Budhi 
Operation, but it is clear that his relations with those in the universities had, 
by 1964, developed as a result of the various changes throughout the period. 
The idea of social control, social support and social participation was a 
central concept in Sukarno’s idea of incorporation. It was apparent within the 
national planning of the Depernas, as it was also apparent in the Muppenas 
structure that accompanied the rise of Bappenas. Social control was meant 
to “democratize the political and economic centres of society.” Within 
government-owned companies, the rise of the Company Board (Dewan 
Perusahaan), for instance, was an expression of the intention to create an 
economy based on an open management system, one in which the managerial 
policies of the company would be in the hands of the management in tandem 
with the workers. There was thus a strong focus on participation within the 
idea of Guided Democracy. Social control would lead to a successful state 
exactly because of the support of people within society. In connection to 
the problems of corruption and what Benedict Anderson has termed the 
movement of “society into the state,”135 the answer was participation as a 
132 Within Kotrar, the Communists were represented much to the dismay of the military. David 
Mozinga, Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-1967, (Singapore: Equinox, 2007), p. 222. 
133 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, p. 170.
134 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 40.
135 As was understood in Benedict Anderson, “Old state, new society: Indonesia’s New Order 
in comparative historical perspectives” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3 (May, 
1983), p. 477-496.
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mechanism to strengthen the legitimacy of the revolutionary leadership. 
The similarity of social ideals and social goals between the managers and the 
workers, between the experts and the people, would allow for a total support 
by the people. This was the ideal of the Guided Democracy state. 
From the beginning there was considerable tension between the ideals 
promoted by modernization theory based on a top-down, managerial 
approach, and that of Indonesian socialism, where the control and support 
of the state apparatus and companies by the people was achieved through 
corporatist forms. This represented a deep inherent division within what was 
considered to be a unified ideology. It was one in which the managers and the 
experts ultimately won the day because of their relationship with the military. 
Conclusion
Social science analysis has pointed to a dichotomy in understanding 
problematized Indonesian Man and the “gotong rojong” culture. In the 
first place, there were inherent problems concerning decision-making and 
leadership capabilities. The traditional cultural values of Indonesia were 
considered to be the foundation for the modern Indonesian people, leader, 
bureaucrats and managers. These cultural values were strongest among 
the traditional-thinking people. The New Indonesian Man had to be 
both traditional and modern at the same time. He had to have values that 
transcended the traditional value system, but rooted in it all the same. The 
effort to discipline Indonesians through indoctrination and retooling was a 
modern, rational effort to create efficiency while simultaneously upholding 
traditional values that legitimized them both as leaders and revolutionaries. 
At the same time, there was a genuine effort to improve the managerial 
capability of the bureaucracy through the Bapekan and Paran. Both bodies 
tried to implement some measure to increase efficiency, which included 
problems of the political nature. Like that of national planning, the early 
Guided Democracy state was earnest in trying to create positive changes. 
Its failure represented the inability of experts in understanding the effect of 
the logical actions of scientific management. Perhaps, the most significant 
heritage of the Guided Democracy movement was its controlling devices 
and mechanisms, which would continue during the New Order regime.
CHAPTER VII
Economic Policy-Making in the 
Guided Democracy (1962-1965)
Economic policy-making showed inherent tensions between participatory 
ideas and the need for societal control to carry through harsh and necessary 
policies. Both positions stemmed from two different philosophical ideas, 
which often times seemed to contradict the assumed ideological position of 
‘Marxist’ versus ‘liberal’ economists. Both parties agreed, more or less, that 
the control of the economy by the state, especially its inefficient bureaucracy, 
was doing more harm than good. 
Yet, the answer each side gave was decidedly different. The communist 
idea of the production policy called for greater participation of farmers 
and labourers in the economy as agents, as opposed to the expert-led 
economy, which increasingly pushed the Western-educated economists into 
a cooperative position with military managers. Institutions like the Dewan 
Perusahaan, would allow unions into the managerial boards of state-owned 
enterprises in an effort to allow greater participation in the decision-making 
process of the economy. This production policy assumed an active agency of 
the farmers and labourers as producers and capitalists themselves. One might 
say that the difference between a state-centered versus a society-centered 
development was quite slim. In fact, Communist support for decentralization 
and de-concentration of management had a rather weird liberal air about 
it. The Communists questioned whether Guided Democracy was a semi-
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fascist political and economic system that was even worse than the liberal 
democratic system it replaced.1
Western-educated economists also supported de-concentration and the 
gradual introduction of the market mechanism into the economy, but they 
saw this process within the confines of state control over market forces. 
They wanted to introduce incentives and competition into the state-owned 
enterprises; authority was to be given to the managerial level, not to individual 
farmers and labourers. The economic rehabilitation program was predicated 
on the control by the expert, as the discussion on the new generation of 
economists in Chapter One has shown. The effort to implement economic 
rehabilitation since 1963 provided a glimpse into the increasing tension 
between these two economic models and showed how the Communists 
succesfully implement their nationalistic economic ideas, especially when 
the state took over much of the Communist lexicon during the Berdikari 
(berdiri diatas kaki sendiri – standing on one’s own feet) policy period.2
The Deklarasi Ekonomi (Dekon) started off as a rehabilitation policy 
under the guidance of the IMF, but the influence of nationalists and 
Communists within its various committees had resulted in the change in 
its wording to accommodate ideas that were supportive of the nationalist 
and communist stance in the economy. As a result, Dekon was used by the 
Communists as a legal foundation to push forward their ideas, including 
attacking the May rehabilitation regulations and policies which had been the 
result of the work between Indonesian economists and the IMF. The failure 
of the rehabilitation program and the use of Dekon as a legal and moral 
foundation allowed for a continued Communist push into the policy-making 
process in the government. 
1 Herbert Feith, Sukarno-Militer dalam Demokrasi Terpimpin, p. 48. The Communist distrust 
of the bureaucracy and the military shaped this somewhat non-state centered view of the 
economy and society.
2 This autarkic confidence stemmed from the notion’s of the productive capability of the 
Indonesian farmers and workers and also from the belief that despite economic problems, 
Indonesian society would soldier on. Both Sukarno and the PKI believed this condition and 
the thought that Indonesian society breaking down was something that was not entertained 
by many within these circles. On the other hand, Western economists were equally befuddled 
by the seeming capability of the Indonesian to make do within a constantly deteriorating 
situation.
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Economic Deterioration and Rehabilitation
There was a widespread acknowledgement that the economic situation 
by 1962 had become dire indeed. Indonesia had started reaching out for 
international help, in fact, in 1961 when the Humphrey mission evaluated 
its economic condition. An IMF loan was procured in August 1961 to 
the tune of 41 million dollars to help the country’s balance of payment. 
However, Indonesia was refused a loan from the World Bank because it was 
still required to pay indemnities to the nationalized Dutch enterprises. Dekon 
was considered to be a good rehabilitation strategy. Mohammad Sadli said 
about the program that “now our price policies are based on more rational 
principles.”3 The Dekon effort produced two quite different documents; 
the Deklarasi Ekonomi announced on 28 March 1963 and one month 
later, the May Regulations announced on 26 May 1963. The Deklarasi was 
a philosophical tract concerning the goal of the national revolution. While 
the May Regulations were policies on austerity measures and the effort 
to relieve the economy from the inflationary spiral. The regulations were 
supposedly the logical extension of Dekon, but because of Dekon’s vague 
wording, it failed to provide legitimacy to the regulations. This divergence 
was put to good use by the Communists, while attacking the legitimacy of 
the rehabilitation effort. 
Indonesia has had a strong inflation since 1952, increasing since 1957 
and lurching toward an uncontrollable level by 1961.4 The collection of 
‘funds and forces’ of the revolution were not central to the Dekon’s approach 
for economic rehabilitation, because its successful negotiation with the IMF 
and the DAC (Development Assistance Committee) nations allowed some 
monetary reprieve through foreign loans. Later on, when Indonesia became 
increasingly isolated, the focus would be on gathering the last pools of money 
available in the Republic-for instance by targeting the Chinese-Indonesian 
businessmen, living in Jakarta’s Pintu Ketjil Chinatown. Production had 
slowed considerably as productivity levels dropped and infrastructural woes 
increased costs and created congestion, resulting in lower exports. The 14 
regulations published in May were focused on rehabilitating the production 
3 Mohammad Sadli, “Stabilisasi ekonomi sebagai sjarat untuk pembangunan ekonomi jang 
effektief” in Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, no. 33, year 3, September 1963, p. 8.
4 J.A.C. Mackie, Problems of the Indonesian inflation, p. 2-3.
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sector, increasing state income and improving strategic sectors.5 The main 
focus of the plan was to limit inflation to a manageable level and then to 
increase production. The problem was how to create a big production drive 
while introducing anti-inflationary measures. 
A significant part of the economic woes was due to the reduced 
efficiency of large segments of the state-owned companies that had 
previously been under foreign management. Between 1957/1958 and 
1960, Dutch nationalized companies were under a variety of government 
supervisory bodies, grouped according to their industrial field; the BUD 
for commercial enterprises, Bappit for industry and mining, PPN-Baru 
for industrial estates. These bodies were to be government-owned but 
privately managed along sound business lines.6 The Presidential Regulation 
(PP) no. 19/1960 integrated all government- and non-government owned 
companies within managerial bodies controlled by the state. The PP also 
required companies to provide 55% of their profits as contribution to the 
government’s revolutionary funds. It dissolved the supervisory bodies and 
“ambitiously codified the behaviour of all state enterprises and rigidly laid 
down rules governing the relationships between them in different sectors 
of the economy.”7 Government-owned companies were to be integrated 
according to types of industry within what were called General Managerial 
Boards or BPUs (Badan Pelaksana Umum). The boards oversaw a contingent 
of government-owned companies in an effort to create economies of scale. 
The BPUs themselves were placed under various government ministries. 
This meant that government-owned companies had at least three levels of 
management: the ministry, the BPU and the company management. This 
often caused problems resulting from conflicting rules and policies. Coupled 
with a lack of infrastructure and traffic congestion, uncertainty in regulations, 
an increasingly complex and unwieldy bureaucracy and, most important of 
all, uncontrolled inflation, it was no wonder that much of the state-owned 
sector effectively became bankrupt. 
During the colonial period, government-owned companies provided 
quite a large share of total government revenue. In 1929, they contributed 
5 Production, prices, credits, budgets and administration or procedures. 
6 J. Panglaykim and Ingrid Palmer, State trading corporations in developing countries. With 
special reference to Indonesia and selected Asian countries, (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University 
Press, 1969), p. 7-8 and 16.
7 J. Panglaykim and Ingrid Palmer, State trading corporations in developing countries. p. 17.
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up to 28% but in 1939, this had decreased to only 14%. By 1955, the total 
share of government revenue contributed by government-owned companies 
had reached only 8%. In comparison, taxes climbed from 65% of the total 
revenue from 1929 to over 90% by 1951.8 It was thus quite weird for the 
government to expect increased revenues from the profits of state-owned 
companies. In fact, government-owned company contributions to state 
coffers dipped below the state’s credit commitments given through state banks 
since 1960. The state was in effect subsidizing the companies. Contributions 
declined from a level just even to government credit to a whopping 1/102th 
of the credit by 1965, when government credit grew to Rp. 527,106,000,000 
with a measly Rp. 5,130,000,000 of return contributions.9 Government-
owned companies grew to become a huge liability for the government 
and became a subsidized system for the various Indonesian managers and 
employees.
Another principal reason for the deterioration of the economy has been 
attributed to the reduction of the Central Bank as an independent body 
capable of determining monetary policies and thus fine-tuning the economy. 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the noted head of Bank Indonesia, had resigned in 
February 1958 and would join the PRRI rebels soon enough. By 1960, the 
Bank stopped publishing its weekly, quarterly and annual financial reports, 
plunging the public into the dark concerning the monetary condition of the 
country. In 1961, the naming of Jusuf Muda Dalam, a PNI Sukarnoist, as 
Minister for Central Bank Affairs and Governor of the Bank of Indonesia 
spelled the end of its role as independent monetary policy maker. Instead, the 
Bank was there to support Sukarno’s revolutionary plan.10 The combination 
of the loss of discipline of the fiscal policy and the loss of a monetary policy 
body significantly reduced the government’s capability in dealing with 
macroeconomic problems especially the looming inflation, which by the end 
of the Guided Democracy would rise to become a full-blown stagflation, i.e. 
high inflation with a stagnant economy. 
8 Douglas Paauw, Financing Economic Development. The Indonesian Case, (Glencoe: The Free 
Press, 1960), p. 169-170.
9 Laporan Penelitian tentang Effisiensi Pembelandjaan Perusahaan2 Negara Periode 1960-1966, 
(Yogyakarta: Biro Penelitian Ekonomi FE-UGM, 1968), p. 3.
10 Radius Prawiro, Indonesia’s Struggle for Economic Development. Pragmatism in Action, (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 3-4.
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A comparison between 1961 and 1965 gives a vivid picture of the 
deteriorating conditions. GDP (constant price 1960) increased from 
Rp.390.5 billion in 1960 to Rp.429.7 billion in 1965 with an annual growth 
of 2,2% and an annual population growth of 2,8%. GDP per-capita was on 
an annual negative growth of 0,6%. Exports had gone from $620 million in 
1960 to $462.7 million in 1965, down 30%. With an increase in population 
of about 30%11 throughout the same period, foreign exchange per capita 
had decreased by a whopping 60%. Foreign debt grew from around $900 
million in 1961 to about $250 million by 1966, an increase of 250%. For 
the year 1966, the total amount of debt payment, including interests, equaled 
to around $530 million dollars because some of the long-term debts had 
matured. This amount was larger than the entire national export. Even more 
uncontrollable was the problem of deficit. The money flow increased from 
Rp. 47,8 million in 1960 to 11,418.2 million by July 1966, an increase 
of 23,887%. Government deficit grew from Rp. 6,9 million in 1960 to 
Rp. 5,237.7 million by the same period. Throughout the later part of the 
Guided Democracy, inflation was always above 100 percent annually. This 
hurt consumers badly as food prices between 1961-1966 increased by forty 
times, in fact eight times in the year 1965 alone.12 Massive inefficiency and 
the lack of foreign exchange reserve plus an escalating food price coupled with 
bad harvest resulted in outbreaks of famine in many parts of central Java.
DEKON: Deklarasi Ekonomi
At its heart, the Dekon was a rehabilitation measure meant to deal with 
inflation. Thus, monetary policy, i.e. Keynesian fine-tuning of the economy, 
was the main thrust for rehabilitation and its main policy was austerity. It 
was vaguely based on a Yugoslavian political economy model,13 although to 
what extent this was the result of the studies by Indonesian economists is 
undetermined. Economists stressed the importance of austerity: “As long as 
11 This was based on Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo calculations. Population growth rates of 2.8% 
would have increased total population in five years of just around 11 percent. Because of 
lack of accurate data, it is uncertain which numbers were more representative of reality. 
12 Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, “Perkembangan dan Evaluasi Tahap Penjelamatan Bidang Ekonomi 
dan Keuangan” in Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, Tulisan-tulisan Administrasi Pembangunan, 
1966-1968, p. 1-7. 
13 J.A.C. Mackie, Problem of Indonesian Inflation, p. 38.
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the government fails to rein in this strong inflation, then first, social efficiency 
will never be met and, second, the targets of the national planning will never 
be achieved.”14
Yet, the resultant Dekon had to accommodate various views that blurred 
this monetary focus. Sukarno himself said that “the present dire circumstances 
cannot be solved as a stand-alone problem; it certainly cannot be solved 
purely through conventional monetary actions alone.”15 This blurring of the 
rehabilitation program allowed for a sustained attack, by the Communists 
and by the end of 1964, their influence became quite significant, resulting 
in a shift of emphasis toward expanding worker participation. The drive 
toward what was termed ‘social support’ grew significantly in the later years 
of Guided Democracy. But the Dekon showed just to what extent economists 
were willing to integrate their views on market mechanism, competition and 
other forms of ‘Western’ economies with the socialist system. 
By late 1962, the worsening economic condition was worrying Sukarno’s 
inner circle. In November, Djuanda approached American ambassador 
Howard Jones to ask for American aid. At the same time, the Soviet Union 
delegation met with Soebandrio to discuss a trade credit for Indonesia worth 
100 million dollars.16 Foreign Minister Soebandrio, also approached the 
intellectual Soedjatmoko for help in formulating an economic program for 
Indonesia.17 Soedjatmoko was part of a group of Indonesian intellectuals 
who met regularly to discuss the problems facing the country. According to 
Sarbini Sumawinata, he and others saw it as an important opportunity to 
draw Sukarno closer toward the technocratic group.18
Economists like Sarbini Sumawinata and others like Mohammad Sadli 
and Widjojo Nitisastro19 no doubt contributed to the development of the 
14 Mohammad Sadli, “Effisiensi perusahaan dan effisiensi perusahaan negara dewasa ini” in 
Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, no. 28, year 3, April, 1963, p. 22. “Selama pemerintah tidak 
dapat mentjegah inflasi jang keras maka, pertama, effisiensi sosial tak akan pernah tertjapai, 
dan kedua, target2 penanaman Rentjana Nasional djuga tak pernah akan tertjapai.”
15 Sukarno, “Deklarasi Ekonomi” in Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, no. 28, year 3, (April, 
1963), p. 5. 
16 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 189-190.
17 Soebandrio later disowned this claim and stressed that the Dekon was equally affected by 
Communists like Aidit. Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 233.
18 Sarbini Sumawinata, “Recollections of my carreer” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economics 
Studies, Vol. 28, no. 2, August, 1992, p. 49.
19 Thee Kian Wie, Recollections. The Indonesian Economy, 1950s-1990s, p. 229.
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Dekon and its regulations. This effort to reduce the role of the state and 
allow for the implementation of market forces seemed to be a challenge 
to the socialist experiment of the Guided Democracy. That Soebandrio, a 
senior member of the Guided Democracy elite, now requested the help of 
the economists was a sobering indictment of the failure of the early Guided 
Democracy experiment. Soebandrio was competing with Djuanda to come 
up with an acceptable stabilization plan.20 The Dekon was launched on 
28 March 1963 and by May, a series of economic and fiscal reforms was 
announced, price controls were removed and government subsidies reduced. 
Sukarno’s projects were halted and the government focused henceforth on 
agricultural and industrial production.21
By late 1962, the AID mission ramped up their consultation with the 
economists in Djuanda’s entourage. On February 14, 1963, an Indonesian 
delegation headed by Sutikno Slamet,22 went to the United States for three 
weeks to hammer out an agreement and discuss debt rescheduling and 
loans to Indonesia to the tune of 350 million dollars. They succeeded in 
convincing the authorities there of the sincerity of the Indonesian efforts 
at economic reforms and acceded to stringent qualifications. In March, the 
IMF sent its Indonesian executive director, Mr. Sumanang, a former member 
of the Wilopo cabinet, to reassure Indonesia on the economic rehabilitation 
program.23 In November, Indonesia requested an IMF mission to advise 
on stabilization measures.24A team of 10 experts was sent to draft technical 
details with their Indonesian counterparts. The report was said to have 
contributed heavily to the May stabilization regulations. 25 The Kennedy 
Administration was hopeful that the core economic managers and technocrats 
around Djuanda would be able to wade through the political muck.26 Debt 
rescheduling was an important component of the economic reforms being 
proposed. In April, Indonesia discussed the issue with the Soviet Union. On 
20 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 223-224.
21 John H. Sullivan, The United States and the New Order, (PhD Dissertation American 
University, Washington DC, 1969), p. 42-43.
22 Eric Chetwynd Jr. “The Indonesian Stabilization Attempt of May 1963,” p. 41. He was a 
former director of the IMF and former financial advisor to President Sukarno.
23 Duta Masyarakat, 26 March 1963.
24 Frederic Philip Bunnell, The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963, p. 214.
25 Eric Chetwynd Jr. “The Indonesian Stabilization Attempt of May 1963,” p. 41-42.
26 Frederic Philip Bunnell, The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963, p. 75.
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9 December, the United States proposed debt rescheduling for Indonesia to 
the Development Assistance Council, a group of lender nations within the 
US orbit of influence, and discussed the possibility of creating a coordinating 
group for Indonesia.27 This was precursor to the later Inter-Governmental 
Group on Indonesia in 1967. Sukarno was convinced that he could get 600 
million out of America relatively easy.28 After a favourable report by the IMF, 
the government hoped to obtain up to 400 million dollars from the US, the 
World Bank, the IMF and other DAC members, like the UK, France, West 
Germany and Japan. 
Between February when Indonesia contacted the IMF and March 
when the Dekon was announced, three separate committees were created 
in order to design and implement the economic program. The first, a 
Committee of Five, was formed in February 6, 1963, and was headed by 
First Minister Djuanda, Finance Minister Notohamiprodjo, Foreign Minister 
Dr. Subandrio, Minister of Central Bank Affairs Sumarno and Minister for 
Basic Industries and Mining Chaerul Saleh. The Committee published a 
report that was heavily influenced by Djuanda drafted with the help of his 
AID-funded advisor, Bernard Bell, a private economic consultant. His staff 
was successful because he knew many of the Indonesians working at the First 
Minister’s office and there was a degree of trust.29 Yet, according to Rosihan 
Anwar, the President rejected Djuanda’s plan on 27 February.
In early March, a Committee of Thirteen was created, chaired again by 
Djuanda, and drafted the basic strategic principle for future policy guidelines. 
This committee included more ‘political’ representation, including D.N. 
Aidit and M.H. Lukman of the PKI, Ali Sastroamidjojo of the National 
Front, Idham Chalid of NU and various other political appointments. It 
was within the Committee of Thirteen that Soebandrio approached the 
economists and produced what was called the Economic Manifest (Manifes 
Ekonomi). It was also in this committee that the Communist involvement 
became significant and this allowed them to claim that Dekon supported 
their economic policies. At a later date, the President named the last 
committee, the Committee of Seven, to outline the government’s economic 
27 Frederic Philip Bunnell, The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963, p. 215.
28 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 218.
29 World Bank Archives, Bernard Bell personal archives, Conversations about George Wood 
and the World Bank, S.5583 Oral History Transcript. 
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policy. It was chaired by Dr. Johannes Leimena and was dominated by 
political figures.30 The Committee of Seven saw Djuanda’s further erosion 
from his position, as he was not included in the committee.31 Djuanda’s 
gradual loss of influence was paralleled Soebandrio’s rise.32 Unlike Djuanda’s 
plan, Soebandrio’s FEUI-written plan was approved. 
The rehabilitation program was abandoned several months later after 
receiving little public support, even from the government and decreasing 
international support as Western governments gradually lost faith in 
Indonesia’s sincerity in dealing with the problem. The 26 May regulations, 
which were part of the IMF-endorsed stabilization programme had 
dismantled price controls, resulting in increased fares for public transport 
and other austerity measures. The role of Djuanda in coordinating the 
regulation was central. Other key figures included Finance Minister 
Notohamiprodojo, Central Bank Affairs Minister Sumarno, State Budget 
Minister Arifin Harahap and the Executive Governor of the World Bank 
and former Bank Indonesia Governor, Sutikno Slamet, a good selection 
of Indonesian professional experts.33 Prices of the postal service, transport 
and electricity rose by 400% to 600%, but salaries and allowances of civil 
servants were doubled. A new set of foreign exchange regulations were 
introduced, 40 million dollars worth of foreign exchange was released as part 
of the ‘crash program’ to import spare parts and raw materials to support 
industrial production and the program envisaged the halving of 1963 deficit 
and complete elimination by 1964.34 Reaction from the political class was 
decidedly negative. 
The PKI focused its attack on Djuanda and his heinous crime of ‘liberalism’. 
By September 7, Sukarno had issued a statement for the retraction of the 
rehabilitation measures.35 US Ambassador Howard Jones announced that 
30 Eric Chetwynd Jr. “The Indonesian Stabilization Attempt of May 1963,” p. 42-45.
31 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 232-233.
32 According to Rosihan Anwar Djuanda was sullen about this and did not attend a state 
meeting on Dekon. Rosihan Anwar “Pelopor Teknokrat. Non-stop jadi Menteri” in 
Awaloeddin Djamin (ed.), Pahlawan Nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda Kartawidjaja. Negarawan, 
Administrator dan Teknokrat Utama, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), p. 216.
33 Eric Chetwynd Jr. “The Indonesian Stabilization Attempt of May 1963,” p. 39. 
34 J.A.C. Mackie, Problems of Indonesian Inflation, p. 39.
35 Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno. Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 266-267. 
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if Indonesia created a new cabinet of which the Communist were a part, 
or if Indonesia escalated its Konfrontasi, the IMF deal would be off.36 This 
despite the fact that, since early 1963, the Russians had been pushing for a 
cabinet that included the PKI as part of the debt rescheduling negotiation.37 
Even so, because of the vague wording of the Dekon itself, its symbolic use 
was to continue throughout the period and a variety of people claimed to 
have been the main actor in its inception.38 It was obvious that at the last 
instance, the Dekon document accommodated the wishes of both the PKI 
and the military, rendering it rather useless as the legal foundation for the 
legitimacy of the rehabilitation program. It was, according to Sjahrir, a ruse 
by Sukarno.39
On 15 May 1963, Sukarno’s Ambeg Parama Arta speech, meaning ‘to 
prioritize essential matters’, declared further changes in government policy-
making. In the speech, Sukarno declared a series of sweeping changes within 
the Guided Democracy state. It was a declaration of the failure of the 
corporative project of the early Guided Democracy state with its mascot, the 
corporative Depernas body. Sukarno announced that the Depernas was to 
be incorporated within the executive government and to be put under the 
office of the President, similar to the function of the BPN during the 1950s. 
Sukarno’s position on experts seemed to have changed, at least briefly 
during this period. Although he still loathed economists40 and proclaimed to 
have no knowledge of the economy in a speech he gave at the FEUI in 1964,41 
he warned members of Parliament that they had no constitutional right to 
36 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 234.
37 J.A.C. Mackie, Problems of Indonesian Inflation, p. 37.
38 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 236. The communists consider the Dekon to 
be the work of M.H. Lukman, a staf of BI claimed that it was Djuanda’s staff, an Indian 
military attaché claimed to have inside information that Prajudi Atmosudirdjo, the then 
former head of LAN was involved. As Prajudi was a follower of Sumitro, it was claimed 
that it was PSI involved.
39 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 237.
40 For instance, Emil Salim was surprised when he returned to Indonesia in 1964 after finishing 
his doctorate degree to find that Sukarno has disallowed the reading of Western economic 
textbooks. Emil Salim, “Emil Salim” in Thee Kian Wie (ed.), Recollections, p. 197-198.
41 Selo Soemardjan, “Public and Private Enterprise in Indonesian Economic Development” in 
Yip Yat Hoong (ed.), Role of Universities in Management Education for National Development 
in Southeast Asia, p. 81. 
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tamper with details and “stuff I consider too complex.”42 He warned them to 
stay away from discussing about ‘numbers’ and other technical stuff. “Let that 
stuff be in the hands of a specialized apparatus, made exactly for the purpose, 
in order for the job to be conducted in a perfect manner, because this work 
requires expertise and a long work hours.”43 In March 1964, Sukarno asked 
for Hatta’s help in solving the worsening economic situation, especially the 
provision of rice. Hatta, meanwhile, asked for the help of Sarbini, Saroso 
Wirodihardjo and Soedjatmoko in this quest.44
The Deklarasi Ekonomi envisioned a series of policy changes to bring 
about a turn around. Although the focus was primarily on the reduction 
of inflation, the choices was made for a decentralized and de-concentrated 
economy, the de-bureaucratization of the economic structure and the 
allowance of greater market forces to work for price mechanism. 
Austerity Measures
Austerity measures imposed on the government and the economy in order 
to control inflation through reduced government spending constituted the 
most important part of Dekon. The elimination of various price controls and 
government subsidies and a significant rise in the bus and rail transportation 
and other mounting prices hit hard the urban section of the population with 
fixed wages.45 These measures were necessarily imposed by the IMF and the 
DAC in return for emergency aid. It was also the weakest part of the Dekon 
measures as such policies were open to Communist attack. It became, in 
fact, a political struggle between monetarists and production policy makers. 
Those of the future technocracy saw inflation as the most significant problem 
while the Communist economists identified the problem as one rooted in the 
system’s non-participatory nature and the absence of the people’s productive 
capacity within the economy.
42 Soekarno, Ambeg Parama Arta. p. 31. 
43 Soekarno, Ambeg Parama Arta. p. 32. “Biarlah hal itu dikerdjakan oleh suatu Aparatur 
chusus, jang ditugaskan untuk keperluan itu, agar pekerdjaan dapat diselenggarakan dengan 
lebih sempurna, karena untuk keperluan itu diperlukan keahlian dan waktu-kerdja jang 
tjukup lama.” 
44 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 282-282. Saroso Wirodihardjo was an economist 
and uncle of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo.
45 Frederick Phillip Bunnell, The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963, p. 381-382.
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The austerity measures required strong will-power from President 
Sukarno, but it became obvious by many people that this was not possible. 
For instance, sometime after the announcement of Dekon, Garuda Indonesia 
imported several brand-new planes on credit. This weakness at the very heart 
of the state doomed the Dekon program from the start. It is no coincidence 
that the measures of the Dekon were practically the same as the measures 
undertaken by Widjojo Nitisastro in 1966 when Indonesia announced its 
rehabilitation measures.46 This is not wholly surprising; the Dekon was itself 
written by the same FEUI economist-IMF group.
Shift toward Production
Increased production was essential because inflation hit both the productive 
sector and agriculture. Export had decreased from Rp. 19 billion to Rp. 12,8 
billion between 1960 and 1962, the lowest in a decade.47 The government 
acknowledged the economic difficulties and promised to focus on the 
economy, after spending 80% of the national budget on security issues 
and the West Irian effort in 1960-1962.48 A major problem had been the 
constraints on the managerial independence at the company level, for 
example, the application of the PP no. 19/1960, which integrated all state-
owned companies within managerial boards (Badan Perusahaan Umum or 
General Management Board). The BPUs were, in turn, under the authority 
of specific ministries. The BPU and the ministries pushed their ideas and 
plans on the company managements and this affected their efficiency. The 
BPUs were to be reduced in organization and authority. Mohammad Sadli 
suggested that BPUs should become a watchdog, part of the social control 
that would allow for the increase in the social efficiency of the economy.49
46 Widjojo Nitisastro, The Indonesian Development Experience, (Singapore: Institute of South 
East Asian Studies, 2011), p. xiv. “In the short term, a stabilization programme to control 
inflation and a rehabilitation programme to build infrastructure were given particular 
priority.”
47 C. Siahaan, “Pelaksanaan Dekon” in Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, no. 31, year, 3, July, 
1963, p. 14-15.
48 Djuanda Kartawidjaja, “Sambutan Menteri Pertama pada Seminar Perusahaan Negara tgl. 
30 Maret 1963 di Djakarta” in Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, no. 28, year 3, April, 1963, 
p. 11-12.
49 Mohammad Sadli, “Effisiensi perusahaan dan effisiensi perusahaan negara dewasa ini” in 
Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, no. 28, year 3, April, 1963, p. 18.
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De-concentration and De-control
The Dekon allowed greater independence for companies to determine 
levels of production, pricing, profit making, marketing and so forth.50 
Companies were free to work according to a business mind-frame within a 
free environment without being hampered by regulations of the Department 
and the General Management Boards or regional officials.51 At the same time, 
the General Management Boards should provide economies of scale, as their 
coordinating authority would allow various companies to work together 
within common goals. The PP no. 19/1960 also earmarked state-owned 
companies as cash cows, requiring them to fork up 55% of their profits to 
the state as part of the Overall Development Fund. Although profits were 
on the increase, they also encountered increasing levels of state taxation.52 A 
gradual de-control of the economy away from the hands of state bureaucrats 
was envisioned. Government Regulation no. 7/1963 was one of the follow 
up measures, which gave full autonomy to state trading corporations.53 
Setting the price mechanism within the productive and service sector was 
left to company management. The shift toward an export drive was part of 
the stepping up of production. A limit on the increase in prices of rice and 
textiles was also introduced in order to stem inflation. 
Increased managerial independence from the central government, 
the BPUs and the regional government heralded an effort for greater de-
concentration. The central government’s role in the economy was to be 
gradually reduced. This meant greater managerial independence and also 
greater regional autonomy. Import and export administration were to be 
devolved from central to regional offices.54 This devolvement would result in 
the reintroduction of competition, not a free-market one, but a socialist one. 
50 C. Siahaan, “Pelaksanaan Dekon”, p. 14-15.
51 Soenarto Soedibroto, “Aktivitas PDN2 dalam rangka Dekon” in Madjalah Perusahaan 
Negara, no. 34, year 3, October, 1963, p. 13-15. 
52 In 1960, the profit of state-owned trading companies was at Rp. 1.926,9 billion and in 
1961 at 1.425,1 billion. Profits that were given to the Overall Development Funds were 
Rp. 503,9 million and Rp. 648,3 million. “Kolonel Soehardiman dihadapan wartawan2 
ekonomi ibukota tentang fungsi BPU-PDN dan PDN2 dalam rangka Perpres no.7, 1963” 
in Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, no. 32, year 3, August, 1963, p. 10-13. By 1965, however, 
most of the companies have become unprofitable.
53 J. Panglaykim and Inggrid Palmer, State Trading Corporations in Developing Countries, p. 70
54 Sukarno, “Deklarasi Ekonomi” in Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, no. 28, year 3, April, 1963, 
p. 8.
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Competition was considered essential in order to raise productivity and as a 
corrective mechanism for market conditions. It was not called a free-market 
competition, but an efficiency competition. 
Market Mechanism
Mechanisms that worked within free-market economies were introduced 
as part of the effort to increase efficiency and increase productivity within 
objective measurements. For instance, competitions based on goals between 
state trading companies and amongst employees working within the same 
companies were introduced. “Obviously, the price mechanism which is used 
in the interest of planning must not be left on its own; price mechanisms 
should be used in a guided manner! That is why the nature of competition is 
also limited, it is a guided competition!”55 It really was a socialist competition. 
Many of the reasons being put forward to legitimate such actions were taken 
from the studies conducted by economists in Eastern European countries, 
which also faced a lack of incentives in the economy and the need to 
reintroduce forms of market mechanisms.  
The idea of incentives was not merely to introduce market mechanisms, 
but to reach overall efficiency. Within a socialist economy, efficiency lay not 
within a particular company, but within the overall economy. This was what 
Sadli termed to be ‘social efficiency.’ It was the job of the managerial body 
of each company to respond to the social efficiency, not purely to company 
efficiency. The state was to provide incentives and disincentives toward the 
companies as a means of control toward the desired goals of society, such as 
through import and export policies, credit policies and taxation. 
Foreign Participation
Both production-sharing and joint venture programmes were introduced 
as means to allow forms of foreign direct investment within the country. 
Development financing had become a major problem, only made worse by 
inflation. Inaugurated in 1962, it was hoped to act as a funnel for foreign 
investment in the extractive sectors of mining and oil. The funds committed 
55 Mohammad Sadli, “Effisiensi perusahaan dan effisiensi perusahaan negara dewasa ini” in 
Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, no. 28, year 3, April, 1963, p. 22.
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were rather limited; 72 million dollars for the period of 1962-1966, a 
small fraction in comparison to the foreign borrowings Indonesia accrued. 
The biggest investment came from the Japanese at over 44 million dollars. 
Western Europe provided some 15.5 million and Eastern Europe over 12 
million dollars. Aside from foreign exchange, foreign direct investment was 
also expected to import foreign managerial and technical experts. Six million 
dollars were spent on paying for foreign experts in a wide range of extractive 
industries including tin mines, palm and coconut oil plantations.56
Social Control
As part of the corporative strategy of the Guided Democracy model, the idea 
of social control, social support and social participation became an essential 
component of the reform process. Yet, the failure of the Depernas project 
and its incorporative forms in national planning, did not lessen Sukarno’s 
support of some form of participation that should be extended into the wider 
economy. If national planning had to be retraced within the central governing 
bodies of the Bappenas-Muppenas, at the company level, participation of 
social organizations should be achieved through the provision of access 
toward the managerial level of companies. These ideas of social control were 
to be implemented under the auspices of the National Front. 
The creation of the Company Board (Dewan Perusahaan) which allowed 
for participation of trade union organizations within the policy making 
body of companies represented significant expansion of participation at the 
grass-roots level of the economy. It was an effort to democratize company 
managerial relations. The Dewan Perusahaan was incorporated into law no. 
45/1960 as part of the economic reorganization of that year. It was meant 
as an answer to the problems plaguing labour-management relationship and 
the low levels of productivity of Indonesian industry. The relationships were 
strengthened in the Dekon Chapter 11. The Dewan Perusahaan assumed 
to replace labour-management relationship from one of employment to a 
human and social relationship in order to increase the quality of production.57 
56 Joyce Gibson, “Production sharing: part II” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, no. 
2, year 4, 1966, p. 75-100.
57 Nurdjaman, “Dewan Perusahaan sebagai Alat Revolusi dalam kerangka tata susunan 
perusahaan Indonesia” in Kumpulan Kertas Karya Musyawarah Besar Sardjana Ekonomi. 
Djakarta, 15 Djuli 1964. Jilid I, (Jakarta: Jajasan Badan Penerbit, 1964).
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Like many other aspects of Guided Democracy, economists had studied 
various forms of company boards in the Soviet Union, Poland and Yugoslavia, 
obtaining a varying range of institutional applications within their respective 
contexts. 
A financial plan was drawn up which included the need to reach a 
balanced budget and a reduction of expenditures by stopping new projects, 
rescheduling foreign credit payment and gradual and selective elimination 
of subsidies. State income was to be increased through intensification of 
taxation and customs, increasing taxes on domestic transaction, private 
wealth, land, external signs of wealth, the profits of state-owned companies 
and introducing new land-reform taxes such as an absentee and sharecropping 
tax on landowners. Foreign exchange policy was focused on import of raw 
materials and spare-parts in order to reach the pre-Guided Democracy 
production capacity (1955-1957). 
Increase in exports was to be achieved by reducing bottlenecks and 
increasing flexibility in the export system, the rescheduling of foreign credit 
payment and obtaining new credit facilities at the same time. A credit plan 
was worked out in which credits would be selectively given only to quick-
yielding ventures. Consumption credits were to be stopped and credits were 
to be structured in accordance with import plans. Price policy should be 
in-line to support production target output. Selective price control would 
be conducted as stimulus to increase production. State subsidies would be 
decreased and rationing would be selected for strategic products. Some 
subsidies would be maintained, for instance for oil and gas, in order to 
dampen inflation. Salary and wage policies were designed to reduce inflation. 
Increases in wages and salaries were allowed in some sectors as a stimulus 
to increase production and a reorganization and rationalization of the state 
apparatus was to be conducted in order to increase efficiency. It was hoped 
this would effectively reduce the bloated numbers of civil servants.58
Regulations and facilities for state-owned and private-owned companies 
should be equalized in order to push for more efficient organization and 
management capabilities. The focus on economic growth was to increase 
production and infrastructure, especially in transportation and distribution. 
The role of private-owned companies was acknowledged especially in 
58 Laporan Tahunan Staf Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi tahun 1964, (Jakarta: KOTOE, 
1964), p. 29-37.
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manufacturing industries. Tax holidays, fiscal pardon and depreciation 
policies and other incentives were given. Market rationale through incentives 
and stimulus was replacing state-controlled decisions. The focus was not 
on proposing new projects, but on rehabilitating old ones. Nonetheless, 
government control over the various aspects of this austerity plan was very 
limited. For instance, over 70% of Indonesian credit was produced through 
the non-banking system.59
Deferment of foreign credit payment required cooperation with foreign 
creditors. The Soviet Union had already stopped extending large-scale credit 
to Indonesia by 1963.60 The IMF and DAC remained willing to provide 
350-400 million dollars of credit as a stopgap financial measure, but these 
required Indonesia’s commitment to focus on its economic recovery. 
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Frederick Philip Bunnell, The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963 (Thesis 
Presented at Cornell University, 1969) p. 388.
Criticism of the PKI
The failure of the Dekon was understood to be the result of the inability of 
Sukarno’s government to maintain discipline. The opening of Konfrontasi 
59Laporan Tahunan Staf Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi tahun 1964, (Jakarta: KOTOE, 
1964), p. 48.
60 In 1964, there had been agreement to increase military aid in relation to the confrontation 
with Malaysia, but not as large as the Soviet support for the Irian confrontation. In fact, 
the Soviet were less certain of their support for Indonesia in the Konfrontasi. 90% of Soviet 
aid was for military purposes. Usha Mahajani, Soviet and American aid to Indonesia. 1949-
1968, (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1970), p. 28-29, Nadia 
Derkach, “The Soviet policy towards Indonesia in the West Irian and Malaysian dispute” 
in Asian Survey, vol. 5, no. 11, November 1965, p. 566-571, Ragna Boden, “Cold War 
economics: Soviet aid to Indonesia” in Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 10, no. 3, Summer 
2008, p. 110-128.
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with Malaysia and Singapore shifted the political focus, while austerity 
measures were not kept. Popular support for the rehabilitation remained low. 
Bunnell has suggested that the reason for this was that the business sector 
represented only a small percentage of the Indonesian urban population. 
The vast majority of Indonesians were farmers on whom the monetary 
sector of the urban economy has less effect on their lives. At the same time, 
the bureaucracy and the military were protected from inflation through a 
combination of government subsidies and corruption.61 The support from 
urban wage earners was understandable considering the fact that wages lagged 
behind price increases, due to the easing of price control and the removal of 
some government subsidies.62
The PKI immediately launched opposition to the May Regulation. Front 
Pemuda said that it benefitted only the capitalist bureaucrats, compradors 
and corruptors.63 Carmel Budiardjo attacked its Western economic credential 
for failing to link the problem of inflation with the problems of production.64 
The production approach was meant to “concretely free the productive forces 
which would push the basic strategy of the Indonesian economy.”65 The 
Communists championed this shift from monetary policy to production 
policy for it would provide them with access to the derogatorily called 
bureaucratic capitalist productive economy, which was in the hands of the 
military.66 De-concentration was also attacked. The Communist wanted 
more government intervention, not less. “The corruptors, who had to be 
eliminated through changing the price policies then, by eliminating price 
controls and letting the price of government-owned companies conform to 
market prices, were not eliminated. In fact, they grew because their actions 
were no longer supervised by the government.”67
61 Frederick Phillip Bunnell, The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963, p. 411-412.
62 Frederick Phillip Bunnell, The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963, p. 381.
63 “Mengobarkan gerakan anti-korupsi dan menatasi krisis sandang-pangan. Memorandum 
Front Pemuda” in Perekonomian Nasional, No. 47, year IV, December 1964, p. 21-23.
64 Carmel Budiardjo, “Melaksanakan Dekon dengan konsekwen. Kesulitan ekonomi dewasa 
ini dapat diatasi” in Perekonomian Nasional, No. 47, year IV, December 1964, p. 9-11. 
65 Carmel Budiardjo, “Melaksanakan Dekon dengan konsekwen. Kesulitan ekonomi dewasa 
ini dapat diatasi” p. 9-11.
66 Kabir: kapitalis birokrat. 
67 Carmel Budiardjo, “Melaksanakan Dekon dengan konsekwen. Kesulitan ekonomi dewasa 
ini dapat diatasi” in Perekonomian Nasional, No. 47, year IV, December 1964, p. 11. 
“Tukang2 tjatut jg mau dibasmi dengan mengubah politik harga ketika itu, jaitu menghapus 
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In other words, according to the Communists, the floating of the 
currency and the reintroduction of market mechanisms had no effect on 
eliminating inflation. Carmel Budiardjo argued that the only way inflation 
could be handled was through a structural incorporation of the working class 
within the economy: to allow for participation in the management of the 
companies and the economy. This was what the Communists understood 
by the idea of social control: a control of the economy by ‘society’. These 
views clashed very deeply with the expert-managerial and military control 
that placed ‘society’ on the receiving end. Aidit’s definition of social control 
was thus to “mobilize the masses and get them to participate through labour 
union representatives in the management and surveillance of state-owned 
companies” and this was essential in what he termed Manipolis management.68 
The success of the effort was shown through the introduction of the 17 April 
1964 regulation, which, in principle, reinstated price controls, although the 
floating rate was maintained. 
Guided Democracy and Economists 
The earliest economists who played a significant role within the Guided 
Democracy state had finished their bachelor’s degree sometime in the middle 
of the 1950s, as the first and most important faculty of economics opened 
its doors at UI in 1951. The middle of the 1950s was a propitious time for 
newly graduated economists because of the availability of scholarship in 
the various old and newly minted foreign academic institutions. The first 
generation economists, like Mohammad Sadli, Sarbini Sumawinata and 
Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, started finding their way home to Indonesia by 
the late 1950s, but it was only from 1962 that there were a significant and 
increasing number of economists and other social scientists coming back to 
Indonesia from the United States.
Many of these new economists had good revolutionary credentials. 
During the independence struggle Suhadi Mangkusuwondo fought in 
sisteem pengendalian harga dan membiarkan harga2 pendjualan badan2 milik pemerintah 
menjesuaikan diri dengan harga pasar, bukannja dibasmi, tetapi lebih bekemban karena 
kegiatan2nja sudah tidak diawasi lagi.”
68 D.N. Aidit, “Management Manipolis. Dekon menolak monetary approach tapi 
mengutamakan production-approach” in Perekonomian Nasional, no. 50, year V, March 
1965, p. 9-10. 
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the same student army company as Widjojo Nitisastro.69 When the older 
generation of economists faded away, the new generation was able to take up 
official positions in the state. None of them advocated a direct application 
of a market-based approach toward economic policy-making and, especially 
during the Guided Democracy, they were quite supportive of the idea of 
a state-led economy that gave a prominent role to state-owned companies. 
“During the period of Guided Democracy and Guided Economy in the 
early 1960s, our attention was focused on the question of how to operate 
a planned economy based on socialist principles, in which state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) were to occupy the ‘commanding heights of the economy’ 
and to be its driving force. As economists, we were concerned that the market 
mechanism be allowed to operate in a planned economy based on socialist 
principles. Hence, Oscar Lange’s views on a socialist market economy 
became the model for our own views on how to run Indonesia’s Guided 
Economy.”70 This Polish economist was famous for introducing a model of 
market socialism. Keynesianism had to be worded differently so that it could 
conform to the Revolusi ideology. By early April 1960, Parliament banned 
continued university affiliation with Western counterparts in the social 
sciences, although affiliation in natural sciences was deemed permissible. 
Sukarno would no longer allow the teachings of Keynes in Indonesian 
universities.71
R. Soerjadi, who had worked in the Central Bank as Director for 
Economic Planning and Statistics presented a paper at an HSI meeting in 
August 1963, which provided the basic philosophical stance of that period. 
He focused much on the perceived similarity between the extremes of 
Communist and capitalist society and in which socialism existed within 
the entire continuum of these extremes. The assumption lay in the fact that 
neoliberal economists like Von Mises, Ropke, Hayek and Simons all assumed 
government intervention admissable in the economy to control the market. 
Reading the socialist economist A.P. Lerner’s The Economics of Control, he 
argued with Lerner’s conclusion on the concept of pragmatic collectivism: 
“Pragmatic as contracted with domestic collectivism is very close to the 
69 Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, “Recollection of my Career” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, April, 1996, p. 34.
70 Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, “Recollection of my Career” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, April, 1996, p. 36.
71 Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, PKI, p. 15. 
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point of view of the liberal capitalist, who is in favour of state activity, where 
ever the liberal capitalist ideal of perfect competition cannot be made to 
work.”72 He then proceeded quote the Dutch economist J. Zijlstra in his 
book Economische Orde en Economische Politiek: “If the thoughts of Simons, 
Hayek and Ropke, who call for government intervention in the economy is 
acceeded, then the thoughts of Hayek and Ropke will reach the conclusion 
that the Government must intervene in the matters of ‘work opportunity, 
monopoly and the allocation of national income, which are the three subject 
that according to Lerner require attention within a ‘controlled economy.’”73
Soerjadi’s paper meant to show that economic system was not 
automatically tied to an ideology. The overlapping thoughts evinced by 
socialists and neoliberalists showed the fragility of this fallacy. “As a result, 
it can be said that a society can have more than one characteristic. This 
means that for instance liberal societies cannot be identified using just one 
characteristic, for instance ‘an economically free society’ and a Communist 
society cannot be identified by using just one characteristic, for instance ‘a 
Guided Economy society” …“On the contrary, one cannot say that a Guided 
Economic society is not identical with Communism. In other words, the 
guided economic system can be combined with other characteristics that 
do not exist in Russia. This is the case in Indonesia, when the implemented 
economic system is a guided economic system. But its ideology is that 
of Pantjasila in a society that is familiar with musjawarah, gotong rojong, 
ownership rights with social functions, etc.”74
72 Quoted by R. Soerjadi, “Sistim Ekonomi Terpimpin dibidang Moneter”, speech given at 
the HSI Economic Seminar, 20 July 1963, p. 6. ANRI, Roeslan Abdulgani, Inv. Nr. 1082.
73 Quoted by R. Soerjadi, “Sistim Ekonomi Terpimpin dibidang Moneter”, p. 6.
74 Quoted by R. Soerjadi, “Sistim Ekonomi Terpimpin dibidang Moneter”, p. 9. “Dengan 
demikian dapat dikatakan, bahwa suatu masjarakat itu mempunjai lebih dari satu tjiri 
sadja. Ini berarti, bahwa mialnja masjarakat Liberal itu, tidak dapat kita beri identifikasi, 
dengan menjebut satu tjiri sadja dari padanja, umpamanja: “masjarakat ekonomi bebas, dan 
masjarakat Komunis itu tidak dapat kita beri identifikasi dengan menjebut satu tjiri sadja 
daripadanja, misalnja “masjarakat ekonomi terpimpin.” And “Sebaliknja dapat dikatakan, 
bahwa sistim ekonomi terpimpin itu tidak identik dengan komunisme. Dengan pertakaan 
lain, sistim ekonomi terpimpin itu dapat dikombinasikan dengan lapangan2 lain jang sifatnja 
berlainan dengan jang terdapat di Rusia. Demikianlah, di Indonesia telah ditetapkan, bahwa 
sistim ekonomi jang hendak didjalankan, ialah sistim ekonomi terpimpin, dasar negara 
ialah Pantjasila, masjarakat jang mengenal musjawarah dan gotong-rojong, hak milik jang 
mempunjai fungsi sosial, dsb.”
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Since no Indonesian economist ever claimed belief in a purely neo-
liberal market approach to Indonesian development, including the foreign 
economists working for Indonesia during the 1950s, there were never any real 
contradictionsin the research and paper they presented, when they focused 
on a state-centered economic development similar to the approach taken by 
Communist and Third World countries everywhere. 
The Study of Socialist Economies 
From 1960 onwards, economists in various universities started researching 
state-led models in Eastern Europe and China and tried to develop strategies 
for the Guided Democracy state. The LPEM and other research institutions 
started conducting surveys in various countries abroad and conducted research 
visits to far-flung parts of the archipelago to obtain the knowledge necessary 
to develop an Indonesianized-version of a mixed economy. The edited volume 
titled “Indonesian Socialist Economic System” was perhaps one of the most 
important; in it economists from UI compared and analyzed the economic 
system of Indonesia and its East European equivalent.75 Other works include 
Widjojo Nitisastro, who conducted a series interviews with Polish planning 
elites and found that their consumption pattern projections were based on 
West German consumption patterns.76 Panglaykim’s book broadly discuss 
various managerial approaches in a variety of Eastern European countries and 
the People’s Republic of China,77 Wahju Sukotjo wrote about Yugoslavia’s 
worker’s management council and socialist democracy in the magazine 
Ekonomi, while Mohammad Sadli and Subroto wrote about Yugoslavia’s 
socialist economic system in the same magazine. R. Sardju Ismunandar and 
Soehardiman went on a study-trip to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland 
and wrote about the economic structure and state enterprises of the three 
countries in the magazine Perusahaan Negara in May 1961.78
75 Suhadi Mangkusuwondo (ed.), Tata Perekonomian Sosialis Indonesia, (Jakarta: LPEM, 1962).
76 Mohammad Sadli, “Masalah Penentuan Produksi dan Masalah Bentuk Perusahaan dalam 
Sistim Sosialisme Indonesia” in Suhadi Mangkusuwondo (ed.), Tata Perekonomian Sosialis 
Indonesia, (Jakarta: LPEM, 1962), p. 107-108.
77 Panglaykim, “Beberapa Aspek Struktur Management/Organisasi pada Beberapa Negara 
Sosialis” in Suhadi Mangkusuwondo (ed.), Tata Perekonomian Sosialis Indonesia, (Jakarta: 
LPEM, 1962), p. 126-296. 
78 Sardju Ismunandar and Soehardiman, “Struktur Ekonomi dan Perusahan Negara di Jugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia and Polandia” in Perusahaan Negara, no. 5, Year I, May 1960, p. 2-6.
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Panglaykim’s studies showed that even socialist states entertained 
possibilities for such capitalist forms as private enterprise. His study on 
Chinese and East German state capitalism explained it as a transitional 
phase that compromised its socialist ideals through the formation of public 
and private ownership of government companies. His discussion on the 
Soviet model of national planning occurred at a period after Khrushchev’s 
proclamation of its sixth five-year plan (1956-1960), which focused on 
efficiency and the deference of greater managerial independence to regional 
bodies and companies.79 Widjojo Nitisastro suggested an active import of 
Western ideas within the prism of socialism, by looking at what other socialist 
countries imported, such as input-output analysis and various programming 
techniques. “For the analysis of the problems of income distribution, the 
development of a variety of economic systems, and others, the direction is 
for the development of an economic science as a political economy, which 
can only be approached as an inter-disciplinary study amongst the present 
social sciences.”80 The Keynesian Harrod-Domar model of development 
which focused on savings and foreign investment as central to the push for 
economic growth was also studied.81
Papers written by some of the most important technocrats of the 
New Order showed their effort to integrate Western theories and socialist 
institutions into a harmonious system. Although Sadli claimed that the 
prime importance of the market was realized later on,82 there were efforts 
to understand how other socialist countries used the market. The study of 
socialist institutions showed how socialist societies came to terms with the 
problems of distribution, pricing and incentives in ways that allowed them 
to mix Western models. For instance, the Polish use of the West German 
79 Panglaykim, “Beberapa Aspek Struktur Management/Organisasi pada beberapa Negara 
Sosialis”, p. 125-182.
80 Widjojo Nitisastro, “Beberapa Persoalan Harga”, p. 102. “Untuk penelahaan persoalan 
pembagian pendapatan, perkembangan berbagai matjam sistim2 ekonomi dsb., arah jang 
ditempuh kiranja ialah pertumbuhan suatu ilmu ekonomi dalam arti political economy, jang 
hanja dapat disusun sebagai suatu usaha inter-disciplinary study diantara ilmu2 pengetahuan 
sosial jang ada.” 
81 Kaptin Adisumarto, “Scope and Limits of the Harrod-Domar Equilibrium Formula with 
respects to various Economic Models and their policy implications” in Laporan Kongres 
Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia Kedua, 1962, Djilid ke-sembilan, Seksi E-3 (Ekonomi), (Bogor: 
Archipel, 1962), p. 209-232. The focus on domestic savings and foreign investment was 
central to the 1956-1960 Development Plan of the Planning Body (BPN).
82 Mohammad Sadli, “Recollection of My Career”, p. 27.
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consumption model showed that even within a relatively developed socialist 
economy, “markets and price mechanics still work and determine production 
volume.”83 Sadli and Soebroto attended a seminar on Marxism and Socialist 
Development in Belgrade from 5 to 22 September 1960 and commented 
on the Yugoslavian socialist system; “in the 1950s the basic policy of a state-
led nationalist economy was changed. The Russian model was left behind 
because it was considered inefficient and unfit for Yugoslavian characteristics. 
Market and price-based stimuli were reintroduced.”84
The role of private enterprises in various Communist countries was also 
discussed; in Russia “private enterprise is allowed to exist only in branches 
of production which can be operated as one-man industries.”85  Whereas 
in Poland, private enterprise “is given the widest latitude in the field of 
production to augment the available consumption goods, to open new fields 
of production which have never been developed before, to give employment 
to more people and to increase the prosperity of the country.”86 What were 
perhaps the most characteristics in the trope used by FEUI economists was 
the assumption that the Communist and capitalist world represented a 
difference in degree and not in kind and that the Communist world itself 
was composed of different countries with varying degrees of the institutional 
application of socialism within their economy. A better understanding of 
socialist societies helped to demystify their image and made way for less 
drastic action and more rational approaches, using Communist countries 
as examples. 
The focus on studying East European socialism was encouraged by 
Mohammad Sadli and indicated the need for experts on the subject. Batara 
Simatupang, an assistant lecturer at the FEUI, was part of the second batch 
83 Mohammad Sadli, “Masalah Penentuan Produksi dan Masalah Bentuk Perusahaan dalam 
Sistim Sosialisme Indonesia” in Suhadi Mangkusuwondo (ed.), Tata Perekonomian Sosialis 
Indonesia, (Jakarta: LPEM, 1962), p. 110.
84 Mohammad Sadli and Soebroto, “Tata Ekonomi Sosialis Jugoslavia” in Ekonomi, p. 84. 
“Dalam tahun 1950 dasar kebidjaksanaan negara untuk mengusahakan ekonomi nasional 
diubah. Model Russia ditinggalkan sebab dipandang tidak effisien dan tidak tjotjok dengan 
keadaan2 jang terdapat di Jugoslavia setjara chas. Sistim perangsang dikembalikan dengan 
pengunaan sistim pasar dan harga (bebas).”
85 Subroto, “The role of private enterprise in the framework of Indonesian socialism” in Johnson 
J. Rossel, Mohammad Sadli and Subroto (eds.), Teachings in Business Administration and 
Economics, (Jakarta: LPEM, 1961), p. 26.
86 Ibid.
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of economics students from UI who, along with Emil Salim, was sent to 
study in the United States. Studying in Stanford under, among others, Paul 
Baran, Simatupang studied neo-Marxist ideas that were precursors to the 
dependency theory of the 1970s. There was thus recognition within the 
FEUI that socialist ideas on economic planning and development should 
be studied. Simatupang was then sent to Yugoslavia where he studied the 
country’s Planning Board. Thereupon he went to Poland to pursue a PhD.87
Regional Development and the Military 
The problems related to regional development were apparent to those 
researching on the integration of former rebel areas in places like Northern 
Sumatra. J.E. Ismael’s visit to the area between October 1961 to February 
1962 highlighted the enormous problems related to integrating national 
development planning with regional government capabilities. “In Indonesia 
the National Overall Development Plan has become a reality. Various projects 
will be built throughout the regions, some are not yet explicitly detailed, 
others will be built complementary to other projects. As a result the National 
Overall Development Plan functions as an index in the initial phase similar 
to Russia’s Gosplan development plan, all of which in the end will form 
an ‘integrated regional development plan’.”88 Mohammad Sadli said that 
“regional development was an ‘ideological commitment’ of socialism, at least 
within the socialism that was practiced in countries ruled by Communists.”89
87 Batara Simatupang, Otobiografi DR. Batara Simatupang, (Jakarta: Del, 2012), p. 63-76. 
After the fall of the Guided Democracy, Simatupang was not allowed to return to Indonesia 
and immigrated to West Germany instead.
88 J.E. Ismael, “Beberapa Aspek Institusionil dalam Pembangunan Nasional dan Daerah” in 
Laporan Kongres Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia Kedua, 1962, Djilid ke-sembilan, Seksi E-3 
(Ekonomi), (Bogor: Archipel, 1962), p. 130. “Di Indonesia sekarang ini PPNSB sudah 
mendjadi kenjataan. Projek2 jang akan dibangun tersebar didaerah2, ada jang belum 
lengkap terperintji, dan ada pula jang perlu dikomplemenkan. Dengan demikian maka: 
PPNSB mendjalankan fungsi sebagai index dalam permulaan proses penjusunan rentjana 
pembangunan oleh Gosplan di Sovjet Rusia, atas dasar dan sekitar mana daerah menjusun 
rentjana pembangunannja, jang kesemuanja achirnja harus berwudjud mendjadi suatu 
“integrated regional development plan.”
89 Mohammad Sadli, “Beberapa Segi Masalah Pembangunan Daerah di Indonesia” in Laporan 
Kongres Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia Kedua, 1962, Djilid ke-sembilan, Seksi E-3 (Ekonomi), 
(Bogor: Archipel, 1962), p. 97. Pembangunan daerah djuga merupakan suatu “ideological 
commitment” dari sosialisme, setidak2nja sosialisme seperti jang diamalkan dalam negeri2 
jang dewasa ini diperintah oleh kaum komunis.”
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There was a deep realization that economic problems in socialist society 
were a political-economy problem. The problem of justification within the 
acuteness of economic rationality of the economic model had to be solved. 
Mohammad Sadli asked the question: “to an economic expert the problem 
is a question of conscience (gewetensvraag), meaning does he need to find a 
‘justification’ to all the deviation from resource allocation in accordance to 
pure economic consideration in a way that the decisions can be accounted 
for by an economic perspective? Or should he consider these deviations as an 
unwarranted but unavoidable aspect of his economy, as part of the social cost 
of economic development, as a necessary waste?”90 The answer, according to 
Sadli, lay in the creation of a development leadership. Yet, instead of pointing 
the finger to the nascent managers, he pointed out the obvious leaders of the 
regions during the period: the military.91
“The military men of the present have power over a wide area. Although 
they admit to the importance of regional development, they are often 
unable to collect the funds and forces needed to start this development. 
Even so, because they are the most powerful group at the present, their 
potential to play a role in development leadership is great. Of course, the 
mental capabilities and understanding, the tools and will-power must be 
attended to. At the moment and as was the case in the last couple of years, 
they occupy a dubious position. They are in charge of security but not in 
direct charge of welfare. But increasingly there has been greater awareness 
90 Mohammad Sadli, “Beberapa Segi Masalah Pembangunan Daerah di Indonesia”, p. 94. 
“Bagi seorang sardjana ekonomi masalah demikian merupakan suatu “gewetensvraag”, 
artinja haruskah ia mentjari suatu “justification” untuk penjimpangan2 dari resource 
allocation menurut pertimbangan2 ekonomi jang murni sedemikian rupa sehingga 
achirnja keputusan2 ini dapat dipertanggung-djawabkan djuga dari segi ekonomi? 
Ataukah ia harus bersikap bahwa penjimpangan2 ini sebetulnja tidak dapat diharapkan 
kefaedahan ekonominja tetapi harus diterima sebagai bagian dari “social costs of economic 
development”, jakni jang bersifat “waste” (tetapi “necessary waste”).”
91 According to Mrazek, the year 1959 was an annus mirabilis whereby the military began 
to enter into the politics of various young states and, more importantly, when the 
academic community began to entertain the possibility of supporting military managers as 
modernizers. Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian military, p. 14. Peter Dale 
Scott put the year 1958 as an important year when new mandarins like Edward Lansdale 
and Guy Pauker started selling the military as a possible candidate for modernizers. Peter 
Dale Scott, “Exporting military-development”, p. 210. Bradley Simpson put the year 1963 
when military modernization theory became widely accepted in policy-making circles in 
Washington. Bradley Simpson, Economists with guns, p. 71-72.
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amongst them that regional security cannot be separated from the welfare of 
the people and that this cannot be separated from economic development. 
Thus, lately they have been more responsible for the welfare and wealth of 
the region. Security is a complex issue and is not purely a military or police 
problem. If the problem of security has become such a complex issue then 
everyone is responsible for the general welfare; even in time of military law 
(SOB), it is not purely the responsibility of the military, as it is not purely 
the responsibility of civilian during peacetime. It requires a collective sense 
of responsibility, at least between the military and civilian groups on the 
matter of security, welfare and economic development. Does that mean 
that the military and civilian, the green and white shirts become pioneers 
of regional development? The concept of such leadership is autocratic and 
may not be effective in the long run, but such an autocratic approach may 
be strong enough to create a momentum to kick-start development.92”
The argument that military autocracy was necessary to regulate the 
immediate problems of the political economy was one that was openly 
expressed by economists during the period. Sadli’s views were congenial to 
92 Mohammad Sadli, “Beberapa Segi Masalah Pembangunan Daerah di Indonesia”, p. 118-
119. “Kaum militer dewasa ini sering mempunjai kekuasaan jang tersebar didaerah. Biarpun 
mereka ini mengakui pentingnja pembangunan daerah, namun sering merekapun merasa 
tidak mampu untuk menghimpun „funds and forces“untuk memelopori pembangunan 
ini. Biarpun demikian, djustru oleh karena golongan ini dewasa ini adalah jang paling 
berkuasa, maka potentiil merekalah jang paling mampu untuk memainkan peranan 
development leadership ini. Sudah tentu mentale instellingen, begripnja, peralatannja dan 
kemauannja harus dipupuk terus. Pada saat ini, serta djuga dibelakang hari, posisi mereka 
agak dubieus. Mereka bertanggung djawab atas keamanan, tetapi tidak langsung atas 
kemakmuran. Akan tetapi, lambat laun telah timbul suatu keinsjafan dikalangan mereka 
bahwa keamanan daerah tidak dapat dilepaskan dari kesedjahteraan rakjatnja, dan ini 
tidak dapat dipisahkan dari pembangunan ekonomi. Maka achir2nja merekapun merasa 
bertanggung djawab atas kesedjahteraan dan kemakmuran ini. Akan tetapi, dengan demikian 
maka soal keamanan mendjadi masalah jang komplex, tidak hanja berupa masalah militer 
atau polisionil. Kalau masalah keamanan mendjadi demikian komplexnja maka sebetulnja 
semua fihak bertanggung djawab terhadap masalah kesedjahteraan pada umumnja; dalam 
masa SOB-pun bukan fihak militer sadja, dan dalam masa damai bukan fihak sipil sadja. 
Ini memerlukan rasa tanggung-djawab kolektip, setidak2nja antara kaum militer dan kaum 
sipil terhadap masalah keamanan, kesedjahteraan dan pembangunan ekonomi. Apakah lalu 
kaum militer dan sipil ini, kaum badju hidjau dan badju putih bersama2 dapat mendjadi 
pelopor dalam pembangunan daerah? Konsep pimpinan demikian masih tetap otokratis dan 
mungkin tidak akan effektip untuk masa jang pandjang. Akan tetapi approach jang serba 
otokratis ini mungin tjukup kuat untuk menimbulkan suatu momentum untuk permulaan 
pembangunan.”
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the military elite; enough for Colonel Soewarto of the Seskoad, an old friend 
of Sadli from his Yogyakarta days, to invite him and his economic friends at 
FEUI to teach there.93 They saw this as a rational answer to an intractable 
societal problem. Economic planning and military leadership, or at least 
military participation, had assumed large importance within the Guided 
Democracy state. It was not certain whether the extent of the contribution 
to corruption by military involvement was understood amongst economists. 
The reports of the Bapekan, for instance, may not have been public amongst 
intellectuals.
Importantly, the idea was not purely of military rule, but a rule between 
the green and white shirts. In connection to the earlier chapter on elite 
authority, what was assumed here was an extension of military authority 
to protect the managerial elite, at least in the initial phase in kick-starting 
economic development. Thus the regulation of regional planning by 
presidential decree no. 655/1961 recreated regional governance within a 
Tjatur Tunggal system that put the military regional commander on the 
pedestal of power, at least for the duration of the military emergency. The idea 
of civic action and development was thus very much intertwined. Ibrahim 
Adjie said this about the army’s connection to development: “war is not the 
goal of the military, the goal of the military is to uphold the welfare and 
honour of the nation so as to be at level with the most advanced nations in 
the world.”94
Where were the managers in this picture, then? Was there such a deep 
distrust in the capability of Indonesian management that some economists 
like Mohammad Sadli put their trust in the military men? Panglaykim’s study 
of the Soviet system puts management in the hands of an eventual leadership. 
Although he refrained from speaking about the Indonesian condition, his 
discussion on the managerial societies pointed to a real understanding of the 
discussion on managerial power as was first described by James Burnham 
in The Managerial Revolution.95 In discussing the Soviet managerial elite, 
Panglaykim noted two distinct generations, a politicized managerial elite-
what Joseph Berliner called the “Red Directors”, who obtained their position 
through their political affiliation and role during the revolution and a new, 
93 Mohammad Sadli, “Mohammad Sadli” in Recollections, p. 125
94 Ibrahim Adjie, “TNI dan Civic Mission” in Manager, Year IV, no. 37, April 1963, p. 13
95 James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution.
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educated elite who were products of the new education system and had a 
professional attitude toward management. “In my viewpoint, the executives 
that were trained during the revolution and those that have obtained 
formal education are very different. Those that obtained formal education 
are educated to put their energy and mind in the interest of the state and 
are interested in creating the largest industrial nation on earth. With an 
education, this is a very worthwhile corps.”96
Communist Views 
The international context of the Cold War was understood clearly by 
both military-leaning and PKI-leaning economists and intellectuals. PKI 
sympathizers like Carmel Budiardjo and J.B.A.F. Major Polak, a former PSI-
member politician, discussed openly the Cold War front and the dangers 
of Kennedy’s shift of emphasis on politicized foreign aid and his obsession 
with guerilla warfare as explained by Stewart Alsop.97 The threat of the 
Bretton Woods institutions and the Alliance for Progress was voiced after 
the IMF-influenced Deklarasi Ekonomi in 1963. Aidit warned about the 
dangers of American neo-colonialism through aid and pointed to the case 
of Brazil.98 In an article in the Communist newspaper, Harian Rakjat, he 
commented on the statement “the philosophy of imperialism is pragmatism”, 
that “Pragmatism is always praised as a ‘practical’ philosophy and that the 
‘practicality’ of pragmatism has an evil but practical role for the imperialist.”99 
96 Panglaykim, “Beberapa Aspek Struktur Management/Organisasi pada beberapa Negara 
Sosialis”, p. 173. “Menurut pandangan kami memang berbeda sekali para eksekutif jang 
telah dilatih pada masa revolusi dan mereka jang telah memperoleh pendidikan (172) formil. 
Mereka jang memperoleh pendidikan formil memang terdidik untuk mentjurahkan tenaga 
dan fikiran bagi kepentingan negara dan berkehendak mentjiptakan suatu negara industri 
jang terbesar didunia. Dengan modal pendidikan, mereka merupakan suatu corps jang 
berharga sekali.”
97 J.B.A.F. Major Polak, “Pembahasan Atas Prasaran ke-II”, in Untuk Pelaksanaan Dekon. 
Hasil-hasil Seminar Ekonomi jang diselenggarakan oleh Lembaga Ilmu Ekonomi HSI, (Jakarta: 
Departemen Urusan Research Nasional, 1964), p. 174-192. 
98 Harian Rakjat, 29 January 1963.
99 Harian Rakjat, 27 March 1963. “Filsafat imperialis adalah pragmatisme, jaitu filsafat jg 
mengukur segala sesuatu dari sudut apakah akan membawa keuntungan2 bagi saja atau 
tidak.” Pragmatisme selalu dipudji2  sebagai suatu filsafat jang ‘praktis’ dan ternjata bahwa 
sifat ‘kepraktisan’ dari pragmatisme memang mempunjai peranan jang djahat tetapi praktis 
benar bagi kaum imperialis sendiri.”
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This was an attack against what he saw as Indonesia’s appeasement toward 
the IMF and its rehabilitation program.
The shift toward experts during the late-period Guided Democracy 
highlighted a period of intellectual feuding between American-trained 
economists and PKI-affiliated economists. Mohammad Sadli commented, 
“Within FEUI there was a political struggle with Carmel Budiardjo and 
other leftwingers in the Faculty.”100 The Himpunan Sardjana Indonesia (HSI) 
or Indonesian Intellectual Community became a contender for the LPEM, 
publishing works which focused on the dangers of American intervention 
and included intellectuals like F. Runturambi from Sobsi, Professor Ernst 
Utrecht and Drs. Soerjadi, Minister for Budget Affairs. 
An examination of Aidit’s speeches and paper on the Dekon and the 
economy in general provides a picture of the position of Communist ideas 
vis-à-vis those of the experts who were trained in the US. It was all about 
the application of what they termed a production policy against monetary 
stabilization advocated by FEUI economists.101 There was no doubt an intense 
dislike of these expert economists by the Communists. “It has occurred for a 
long while that Indonesian economics experts took on a position of ignorance 
toward political issues and tried to present the problems of the economy as 
merely a technical matter, with laws that ‘are assumed to apply for all ages’, 
stemming from a subjective viewpoint and ignore the objective reality that 
exists within society.”102 The criticism of the assumption of objectivity was 
meant to support the viewpoint that economic policy-making should be 
derivative of the political process and the national goal of Revolusi. “The 
viewpoint that socialism can be implemented without first dealing with the 
100 Mohammad Sadli, “Recollection of my Career” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
Vol. 29, No. 1, April, 1993, p. 38-39.
101 According to CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhausen, Abdul Haris Nasution, p. 164, “the PKI 
had nothing to gain from an improvement of the living conditions of the masses; it would 
have diminished its opportunity to mobilize them for its purposes and, moreover, would 
have brought back the “PSI-leaning” technocrats into positions of economic power.” Even if 
it were so, it would seem too hasty to dismiss communist ideas on economic development. 
102 D.N. Aidit, Pemetjahan masalah ekonomi dan ilmu ekonomi Indonesia dewasa ini, (Jakarta: 
Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), p. 4. “Sudah terlalu lama kaum sardjana ekonomi Indonesia pada 
umumnja mengambil sikap masa-bodoh terhadap masalah politik dan berusaha membahas 
masalah ekonomi sebagai masalah jang bersifat teknis melulu, dengan hukum-hukum 
‘jang berlaku untuk semua zaman’ jang bertolak dari pandangan-pandangan subjektif dan 
mengabaikan kenjataan objektif jang hidup didalam masjarakat.”
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national-democratic effort, i.e. the ending of the residues of imperialism and 
feudalism, is intolerable.”103
The ending of imperialism and feudalism was propounded in the support 
of the Communists for two laws introduced in 1960: the Regulation on 
the Agremeent of Joint Sharing (Undang-undang Perdjandjian Bagi Hasil 
– UUPBH) and the Regulation on Basic Agrarian Principles (Undang-
undang Peraturan Dasar Pokok Agraria – UUPA). According to Communist 
interpretation, the UUPBH would disallow direct foreign investments by 
diverting it to joint sharing projects. This was a victory against imperialism 
by limiting the roles of foreign enterprises in the country. The continued 
nationalization of British and American-owned enterprises during the period 
1963-1965 was also part of this anti-imperial strategy. The UUPA would 
destroy what was called the landlord class of the agricultural community 
though the redistribution of land. Land-reform was the anti-feudal strategy.
The clash of ‘Western’ versus Communist economists lay in these 
strategies. Aidit accused Sumitro of siding with imperialists and feudalists 
by blaming Indonesian poverty on the lack of savings by the population. 
This was part of the reigning Harrod-Domar model which saw the root of 
the cycle of poverty as a result of the subsistent nature of the economy and 
the lack of reinvestment to increase production, i.e. growth occurs when the 
rate of savings is greater than the capital output ratio and the growth of the 
labour force.104 The answer they propounded was through an injection of 
capital by direct foreign investment or loans and the provision of incentives 
for Indonesians to start saving their income. 
It was an analysis that according to Communists lacked a social 
component and misunderstood the nature of Indonesian rural society. 
According to them the reason for the lack of savings lay not in the lack of 
propensity to save by the Indonesian farmers and labourers, but the result of 
the rent-seeking activities of bureaucratic capitalists, foreign enterprise owners 
and landlords in the villages. The main criticism against Western-educated 
103 D.N. Aidit, Pemetjahan masalah ekonomi dan ilmu ekonomi Indonesia dewasa ini, (Jakarta: 
Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), p. 6. “tidak dapat ditolerir lagi pendapat bahwa sosialisme bias 
diselenggarakan tanpa menjelesaikan lebih dahulu perdjuangan nasional-demokratis, jaitu 
tanpa menghabis-tamatkan lebih dahulu sisa-sisa imperialisme dan feodalisme.”
104 Robert M. Solow, “Growth theory and after” in The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, 
No. 3 (Jun., 1988), p. 307-317. Solow’s work contributed to the theory by putting in 
technology as a factor that pushes productivity growth in a work he published in 1957.
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economists was that they harboured non-political assumptions. “The most 
significant contributor to this evil analysis is Sumitro, a person who is famous 
and well known to be rebellious and traitorous to the Republic, but whose 
equally traitorous and heinous economic theories have not yet been properly 
disrobed and are given an important place in our universities and still colour 
the thinking of the officers that man our economic policy apparatuses.”105
The PKI always had an ambiguous position in relation to experts and 
intellectuals. In many Communist movements outside of Indonesia, the 
intellectuals represented a major part of the Communist movement, yet in 
Indonesia this was not the case. The lack of expertise in the nation meant 
that the vast majority of university graduates had an almost assured position 
in government jobs and there was no pool of unemployed intellectuals.106 
In the early 1950s, the Communists still regarded intellectuals as an 
important part of the movement, but aside from Lekra-an artist and writer’s 
organization-there was no prominent intellectual organization within the 
PKI. The attack on intellectuals was accentuated by the conservative nature 
and ‘reactionary’ position taken by non-political Indonesian economists. 
As a result, the PKI supported a non-expert, participatory approach toward 
economic problems. The failure of the rehabilitation program known as the 
May Regulation supported this idea “… this signified the triumph of the 
Indonesian people, because for the first time our people can directly and 
actively determine government policy on economic matters, a field that has 
for long been considered to be beyond the ken of the people, a field that was 
said can only be thought and discussed by certain experts, whose expertise 
has failed us in dealing with the economic and monetary issues at hand.”107
105 D.N. Aidit, Pemetjahan masalah ekonomi dan ilmu ekonomi Indonesia dewasa ini, (Jakarta: 
Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), p. 12. “jang paling ‘berdjasa’ dalam menjebarkan analisa jang 
djahat ini jalah Sumitro, seseorang jang sudah terkenal dan sudah telandjang bulat sebagai 
pemberontak dan pengchianat terhadap Republik, tetapi jang teori-teori ekonominja jang 
sama chianat dan sama djahatnja belum tjukup ditelandjangi, masih mendapat tempat 
dalam perguruan-perguruan tinggi kita dan masih mendjiwai pegawai-pegawai tinggi dalam 
aparatur ekonomi kita.”
106 Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1961, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1964), p. 183-184.
107 D.N. Aidit, Dekon dalam udjian, (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1963), p. 8. “…ini 
menggambarkan suatu kemenangan bagi Rakjat Indonesia, karena dengan ini berarti 
bahwa untuk pertama kalinja Rakjat kita setjara langsung dan aktif ikut menjusun politik 
Pemerintah dibidang ekonomi, jaitu sudatu bidang jang selama ini dianggap sebagai 
bidang terlarang untuk Rakjat, suatu bidang jang katanja hanja dapat difikirkan dan 
344 CHAPTER VII
 Aidit conducted studies on the rural condition of Indonesia and attacked 
Western-trained economists for their misunderstanding of the real conditions 
of the rural areas. 250 local Communist leaders and mass organizations 
put into the field 3000 ‘researchers’ (petugas) between the months of 
February and May 1964 to conduct research on the rural condition in 124 
districts (kecamatan) in Java. The research came up with seven archetypes 
of rural class enemies, the so-called seven village devils (setan desa).108 They 
included landlords and money-lenders, but also local notables and capitalist 
bureaucrats. The research group saw a feudal rural structure composed of 
notables and bureaucrats and proposed a thorough application of retooling 
in order to rid the bureaucracy of ‘evil elements’ and the implementation 
of land redistribution, which until then had been sabotaged through the 
machination of landlords in cooperation with officials. Social scientists who 
obtained the research material of the Communists after the destruction of 
the PKI in 1965 were amazed at the sophistication of the social research of 
the party.109
The PKI was quite supportive of the local capitalist class and was 
especially protective of the Chinese business community.110 Aidit has stressed 
that support for national capitalists had always been an important component 
of Communist policies, starting from the Sixth National Congress in 1959.111 
Aside from their support of national capitalist, they also supported private 
ownership of the land. Thus, hostility for the Indonesian entrepreneurship did 
not come from the PKI.112 Instead of focusing on control, some Communist 
economists, like Runturambi, called for an expansion of participation. Even 
diperbintjangkan oleh tenaga-tenaga ahli tertentu jang sudah terbukti sama sekali tidak 
berhasil mengatasi kesulitan-kesulitan ekonomi dan keuangan selama ini.”
108 Tuan tanah, lintah darat, tukang idjon, tengkulak djahat, kapitalis birokrat, penguasa djahat 
and village bandits. The Communist’s rural offensive started in 1963 contributed to serious 
conflict that was important to understand the scale of violence inflicted upon their members 
during the 1965-1966 Communist killings. John Bresnan, Managing Indonesia, p. 19-20, 
Guy Pauker, “Political Consequences of Rural Development Programs in Indonesia” in 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 41, no. 3, Autumn, 1968, p. 386-402.
109 Ruth McVey, “Teaching modernity. The PKI as an educational institution” in Indonesia, no. 
50, Oct. 1999, p. 5-27. For more on the research, read D.N. Aidit, Kaum Tani Mengganjang 
Setan2 Desa, (Jakarta: Pembaroean, 1964).
110 D.N. Aidit, Kibarkan Tinggi Pandji Revolusi, (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), p. 22-23.
111 D.N. Aidit, Dekon dalam udjian, (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembangunan, 1963), p. 24-28.
112 Benjamin Higgins, “Introduction” in Benjamin Higgins (ed.), Entrepreneurship and Labor 
Skills in Indonesian Economic Development: a Symposium, p. 35.
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population control was considered a bad thing. “Neo-Malthusian officials 
and theoreticians who always blame the people for having too many children, 
so as not to allow enough production of food stuff, need to understand the 
basic economic strategy according Dekon”.113
The idea of production policy thus belittles the problems of inflation and 
the monetary approach. Keynesianism was the target of recrimination for 
both Sukarno and the Communists. Yet, the attacks on Western-educated 
experts like Sumitro Djojohadikusumo had a strawman quality. Carmel 
Budiardjo’s idea on fair practices for small agricultural producers and 
better access to capital and foreign-markets,114 was not received particularly 
harshly by people like Widjojo Nitisastro, who had also focused much on 
small agricultural producers.115 As Runturambi of the Communist-affiliated 
labour union organization116 said “… the believers in these economic 
theories ruminate night and day to find a ‘new theory’ that is not Russian, 
not Chinese, not totalitarian and with the formulas commonly used by anti-
Communist and Anti-Nasakom lecturers within and outside the country. 
When they find it too hard to call their theories socialist, they use the 
American term “people’s capitalism.”117 That economic policy means nothing 
113 Runturambi, “Potensi Ekonomi dan Kekuatan Politik sebagai Landasan Pelaksanaan 
Deklarasi Ekonomi” in Untuk Pelaksanaan Dekon. Hasil-hasil Seminar Ekonomi jang 
diselenggarakan oleh Lembaga Ilmu Ekonomi HSI, p. 40. “Pedjabat2 atau teoritikus2 neo-
Malthusianis jang selalu menjalahkan Rakjat jang katanja terlalu banjak melahirkan anak 
sehingga produksi sandang pangan tidak tjukup untuk memenuhi kebutuhan Rakjat, perlu 
menjadari akan strategi dasar ekonomi menurut Dekon.”
114 Carmel Budiardjo, “Perdagangan Luar Negeri: Segi Dalam Negeri (Produksi dan 
Marketing) dan Segi Luar Negeri (Neratja Pembajaran)” in Untuk Pelaksanaan Dekon. 
Hasil-hasil Seminar Ekonomi jang diselenggarakan oleh Lembaga Ilmu Ekonomi HSI, (Jakarta: 
Departemen Urusan Research Nasional, 1964), p. 71-101.
115 What is now termed as “pro-poor” policy focused much on rural agricultural development, 
an important component for the success of New Order development. Jan Kees van Donge, 
David Henley and Peter Lewis, “Tracking development in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa: the primacy of policy” in Development Policy Review, vol. 30, s.1, February 2012, p. 
12-16.
116 SOBSI
117 Runturambi, “Potensi Ekonomi dan Kekuatan Politik Sebagai Landasan Pelaksanaan 
Deklarasi Ekonomi”, p. 29. “Apalagi kalau penganu teori ekonomi itu seperti siang dan 
malam hanja berfikir bagiamana bisa menemukan ‘teori baru’ jang bukan Rusia, bukan 
RRT, bukan totaliter dan matjam2 rumus jang lazim digunakan oleh lektur anti komunis 
dan anti Nasakom didalam dan diluar negeri. Malahan kalau sudah terlalu sulit memalsu 
sosialisme dan terpaksa harus menggunakan istilah kapitalisme dipilihlah istilah ‘kapitalisme 
kerakjatan’ model Amerika Serikat.”
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without political control was understood by both sides; Runturambi’s article 
was titled “Economic potential and political power as the foundation for 
the implementation of the Dekon.” Along with the belief in an agricultural 
approach to development it represented ideas that were held across the board. 
The struggle was mainly a political struggle of authority and legitimacy rather 
than that of basic economic theory.
The major difference of opinion was related to the idea of the ‘people.’ 
The Communists were very much attuned to see the people as an important 
component in development. It was, of course, much easier for Communists 
to hype the people’s participation when the Comunists had no real power. 
One might wonder how long such sentiments would have lasted once the 
Communist had gained control of the managerial component of government. 
Attacking ‘theoreticians’ and their ‘reactionary Malthusian beliefs’ signaled 
however strong disagreement on some points. Population was thus conjoined 
to national power and so was the quasi-attack against ‘mismanagement’, 
another toverwoord (magic word) this time used to attack the other side. 
It is of interest that not much Communist writing actually engaged with 
national planning and other aspects of Communist governments of Eastern 
Europe or China. The relationship with the outside world was much more 
confined to the fear of an American hegemony fraught with the dangers of 
empire. This duality between the masses and manager figured large in the 
period in which Wertheim has called a period of evolution and revolution, 
between control and emancipation.118 The idea of participation required a 
deep faith in the ability of emancipated people to work with one another, 
as deep as the economists’ the faith in the market. 
There is a problem of what one may term nowadays as moral hazard 
in the state-society ideas of both Communist and ‘Western-educated’ 
economists and this was quite apparent in the taxation system. The system 
had not gone through significant revamp since the early 1950s. The largest 
component of taxation during the period was levied initially on export (43% 
of total tax revenue in 1952) and after the Korean War boom, on imports 
(up to 51% in 1956 when export tax shrank to just 3%). Since the colonial 
period, the economic sector was divided between the capital intensive and 
the labour-intensive sectors, which traditionally denoted racial ownership. 
118 Wertheim, W.F., Evolution and Revolution. The Rising Waves of Emancipation, (Harmonsworth: 
Penguin, 1974), p. 35-60.
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During the colonial period, the labour-intensive sector contributed to 43% 
of total taxation in 1929 just before the Great Depression and it went down 
to 40% by 1939 and further to just 36% by 1952. Because of structural 
retrogression, the labour-intensive sector of the economy had grown from 
68% of total gross product in 1939 to 76% in 1952. Yet in the same year, 
the capital-intensive sector, which made up to 24% of the total gross product 
provided 64% of the total tax revenue. If export taxes were included, taxation 
pumped out 22% of income in the capital-intensive sector in comparison to 
only 4% in the labour-intensive sector. According to Paauw’s analysis, the 
average take-home pay of worker in the urban capital-intensive sector got 
less than that of the rural labour-intensive sector.119
No doubt, part of the answer lay in the difficulty of taxing the informal 
sector especially in rural areas, a phenomenon that continues today. One 
of the most significant tax policies of the colonial period, the land tax, was 
discontinued because of its association with colonial oppression.120 The 
deterioration of bureaucratic capability also contributed, but during the 
entire period, there had been almost no voice that placed greater taxation 
on the common people, the rakyat. 
In Sukarno’s paternalistic view, the people would be guided and sustained 
by the state. Although the slogan of Guided Democracy included together 
the ‘funds and forces’ of the people, there had been few efforts to actually 
collect them other than the Bamunas’s attempt to pilfer from the nascent 
‘capitalist class.’  Like the absence of decentralization in the bureaucracy, 
the protection of the people from taxation constituted a moral hazard that 
reduced the incentive of the wider society to support the success of the system. 
The Communists’ effort to bring expanded participation did not provide 
incentive to create a personal sense of participation. In the meantime, the 
‘Western-educated’ economists adopted a paternalistic attitude that saw the 
masses as an almost inanimate object to be guided by the wisdom of the 
technocrats. In that sense, it could be argued that both approaches took on 
a paternalistic attitude that saw the people as peons instead of legitimate, 
participating individuals.
119 Douglas Paauw, Financing Economic Development, p. 200-227.
120 Sa Myung Park, The State, Revolution and Development: A Comparative Study of the 
Transformation of the State in Indonesia and the Philippines, (PhD Dissertation State 
University of New York, Buffalo, 1988), p. 133.
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Conclusion
The series of institutional reforms that was conducted throughout the 
Guided Democracy state resulted in several significant developments. First, 
the failure of corporatism to conduct national planning as exemplified by 
the Depernas pushed for the inclusion of experts and managers with the 
authority of managing national and regional policies. Second, Bappenas-
Baperdep-Bakopda structure allowed for the potential of greater centralized 
control. The Bakopda conforming to the Tjatur Tunggal structure meant that 
regional government was finally recreated within the authority of regional 
planning agencies in which the managers; military and civilian were able to 
take part. Instead of decentralization, the New Order state did away with 
regional democracy and regional government. It instituted a form of national 
and regional military control with the cooperation of both the pamongpradja 
and managers. 
 From the early 1960s, Western-trained economists put their sights 
into studying and understanding the institutional development of socialist 
institutions in Communist countries. Their goal was to create a socialist 
model by using the examples available in various Communist countries that 
would allow for some inclusion of market mechanisms, market incentives, 
decentralization, de-concentration and the general reduction of state 
intervention in the economy. The PKI attacked their focus on the problems 
of inflation and the usage of monetary and fiscal policies as being part of a 
larger Western conspiracy to derail the Revolution. The monetary policy was 
considered to merely support the corruption of the capitalist bureaucrats, 
the term used to attack managers, especially military managers. Instead, the 
Communists advocated greater inclusion of workers in what they called a 
production policy. 
Kees van Donge, Henley and Lewis proposed that the success of the 
Southeast Asian economic policy during the second half of the twentieth 
century lay in macro-economic stabilization, pro-poor policies on the 
rural poor and economic liberalization.121 Two of these policies at least 
were promoted by the two approaches of the FEUI economists and the 
Communists. The difference between the two approaches lay in the 
121 Jan Kees van Donge, David Henley and Peter Lewis, “Tracking development in Southeast 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa: the primacy of policy” in Development Policy Review, Vol. 30, 
No. 1, (February, 2012), p. 5-24.
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matter of authority and participation. Western-trained economists saw the 
importance in reducing the participation of the ‘people’ and handing over 
authority toward the experts, especially the military managers of the country. 
Communists believed that the problems of the country could only be solved 
if workers, farmers and other parts of the people could be pushed to work 
through expanding their participation and authority to all sorts of productive 
units. These institutional and theoretical developments during this period 
were seminal for the New Order state but led to great confusion. 

Conclusion
According to Benedict Anderson’s seminal article, ‘Old State-New Society’, 
the roots of the New Order regime should be located in the modern colonial 
state that emerged in the nineteenth century. Anderson argues that after 
the demise of the colonial state in 1942, a process occurred that he terms 
‘society entering into the state’. This dilution of the greater society into the 
state resulted in the fragmentation of bureaucracy and weakening of the 
state’s efficacy. The rise of the New Order in the 1960s was predicated on the 
need for the state to reconstitute its efficacy and to regain control from and, 
indeed, over society at large. Anderson puts the burden for the recreation 
of the state on the army and the military regime that came to prop up the 
New Order state. As discussed in this study, the binary of state and society 
may well be compared with that of professionals versus non-professionals. 
While Anderson emphasizes the continuity of the colonial state, I argue 
that contextual changes such as the emergence of new ideologies and a new 
international institutional framework played an even more important role 
in the reinstitution of the state.1
This thesis argues that the New Order state originated from the relatively 
interconnected, coherent, and global institutional framework that emerged 
in the postwar era. This framework allowed for the reinstitution of the state 
and was supported by both parties involved in the Cold War, because the 
post-colonial world order was fashioned on a platform of relationships among 
sovereign states. The fall of the colonial regimes and their bureaucratic order 
1 Benedict Anderson, “Old State, New Society: Indonesia’s New Order in Comparative 
Perspectives” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 42, no. 3, (May, 1983), pp. 477-496. 
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raised the problem of legitimacy of the successor state and its more or less 
refashioned bureaucratic apparatus. How were these new states—successors 
to old colonial entities whose authority had completely collapsed—to 
reconstitute their legitimacy and authority? While Anderson assigns the 
praetorian army the leading part in this process, I argue that the legitimacy 
of the New Order state, as a praetorian order, was predicated as well on a 
combination of institutional and ideological developments outside of the 
military sphere. If we seek to understand the rise of the New Order, it is 
important to understand what institutions and ideologies sustained it. This 
thesis argues that the roots of the New Order regime should be sought in 
the 1950s and early 1960s, rather than in the discredited colonial state. Over 
the years, an institutional order was created that allowed for the creation of 
a new state elite legitimated by the ideologies and discourses on efficiency, 
development and modernity, which offered new ways for mass control by 
both military means and social engineering while seeking to create society in 
its image. It is important to realize the extent of complicity between Sukarno 
and the Guided Democracy regime. In a way, these politicians (that is, the 
leaders of society) paved the way to their own destruction.
Chapter one discusses the rise of two ideologies of state-society relations: 
that of Sukarno, whose Nasakom ideas embodied the opening up of the state 
to society, and that those of the managers, who emphasized the control of 
the masses as model for an efficient state. Sukarno’s ideas were corporatist 
and entailed the participation of various groups in society. In order to put 
his ideology into practice, he had to discredit the remnants of the colonial 
state as well as the legitimacy of policy-makers whose authority was based 
on the technical capabilities of the so-called experts. This was made easier 
both by the lack of Indonesian experts and the fact that the policy making 
bodies—especially the national planning agency—often were under control 
of foreigners, technical experts who were sent and paid for by American 
aid agencies or the United Nations. Sukarno’s criticism of Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo, one of the few professional Indonesian economists 
responsible for importing foreign experts, was basically an attack against what 
he called liberalism. Ironically, most of these experts were Fabian socialists 
and Keynesians who saw the state as the principle actor in the process of 
development. Against Sukarno’s fulminations, the economists and other 
social scientists developed a counter-discourse based on the idea of control 
of the population. They regarded the masses as a wild river that had to be 
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channelled to be harnessed. Various means of control were discussed in 
seminars and these strategies would eventually be tried on the population 
during the New Order. The hostility of Sukarno and other political power 
groups such as the PKI, forced the social scientists to gravitate toward the 
army. In the 1950s, Sumitro and other economists did not yet see the army as 
a significant agent of development, but by the end of the Guided Democracy 
era their focus had changed completely and social scientists viewed the army 
as having a central role.
The rise of the army from a fragmented, ideologically diverse group 
into a praetorian support for the state constitutes the main theme of the 
second chapter. The discussion focuses on two issues: the development of 
officer education and the development of the army doctrine of dual function 
(dwifungsi). As said, officer education was quite dependent on foreign aid, 
Dutch, initially, but soon American. Numerous Indonesian officers were sent 
to the United States for military training and were exposed to modernization 
ideas that were on offer as part of the curriculum there. Modernization 
theory put forth the proposition that the armed forces were the natural and 
rational choice to play a prominent role in economic development and in 
the transition from traditional to modern society. 
By the end of the 1950s, the Seskoad copied Fort Leavenworth’s 
curriculum, with its heavy emphasis on social science. Within Seskoad’s 
various doctrinal seminars, the territorial doctrine and the civic action 
doctrine were discussed and eventually implemented. Both doctrines 
supported army control of the rural areas by becoming part of the regional 
government and conducting local economic development. The experiences 
of the Siliwangi Division in civic action as part of the counterinsurgency 
strategy to deal with separatists functioned to link development with security 
strategies. US assistance in civic action strengthened the appeal by providing 
assistance to the military for rural control. Without doubt this basic blueprint 
for the control of the rural or regional areas by military commanders during 
the New Order was developed under the Guided Democracy regime. 
Meanwhile, American support for training counterinsurgency units at 
the end of the 1950s and early 1960s divided the army officers. The rise 
of various strike forces within the military provided the state a means to 
strike simultaneously at distant places in Indonesia’s vast territory. Both the 
territorial and strike forces represented different ways by which the state was 
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able to maintain the unity and structure of the state. What was significant 
was the level of attention given to control. In various army discussions, the 
enemies of the state seemed to figure at every level in society. This implied that 
the army should develop for itself the necessary institutional and doctrinaire 
legitimacy to put both the regions and rural areas under its control. Society 
was divided into sections that asked for different strategies of control. It was 
a meticulously developed process that seems to have anticipated the needs 
of the New Order state that was to come.
As the army honed its capabilities, the development of the civilian side of 
the state during the 1950s was no less important. These issues are discussed 
in chapters three and four of the thesis. Both chapters show the connection 
between the ideologies of modernization and managerialism,2 with the 
institutions of national planning, higher education, the production of expert 
elites or managers, and the creation of a new ideological state-society relation 
embodied in the socialist or developmental state. This new ideology made 
short shrift of the liberal state with its emphasis on individual rights, the 
separation of powers, and respect for the rule of law. 
Chapter three discusses two issues. The first is the problem of expert 
or managerial production during the early 1950s. At the outset this was 
conducted through importing expertise. The effort to import European 
expertise through the PUTABA scheme failed miserably. The selection of 
experts as policy-makers in the State Planning Bureau and various financial 
institutions was conducted with the assistance of the UNTAA. Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo went himself to New York to call in this assistance. The 
home-grown production of experts was ensured by the expansion of the 
national university network. Many of the foreign experts sent to Indonesia 
were also asked to give lectures in the main universities. The now rapidly 
developing Indonesian universities cooperated with American universities 
through programmes that invited American lecturers to teach in Indonesian 
universities and sent Indonesian lecturers to American universities to obtain 
postgraduate education. A curricular transformation was obtained as Dutch 
academic practices were replaced with American ones and English replaced 
Dutch as the primary foreign language for educational purposes.
2 Willards Enteman, Managerialism. The Emergence of a New Ideology (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1993). 
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The import of policy-making experts created what one of them, Benjamin 
Higgins, called a community of scholars. Anglo-Saxon scholars in major 
American universities studied the Indonesian problem, contributed to the 
first Five Year Plan published in 1956, and actively wrote economic and 
developmental regulations. The influx of these experts into the State Planning 
Bureau and the universities was important for several reasons. First of all, 
Sukarno was appalled by their perceived power and saw them as agents of 
neocolonialism, in other words they posed a threat to his policies. Second, 
they provided opportunities for young Indonesian scholars to study abroad 
in the United States and thus played a seminal role for the production of 
Indonesia’s technocracy. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, an institutional builder 
par-excellence figured large in all this. Not surprisingly, Sukarno vilified him 
as a typical representative of the hated liberalism. Yet, what the community 
of scholars achieved was the import of the ideas on American modernization. 
Aside from army officers, the experts and their technical and managerial 
capability embodied the rational spirit needed to push Indonesian society 
towards modernity.
Aside from experts, the rise of the managers was also an important 
development of the 1950s. This is the main topic of the fourth chapter. The 
failure of the first industrialization plan refocused the problem on increasing 
the managerial capability of the Indonesian bureaucracy and the wider 
economy. This was conducted through the import of public administration 
and business management from America. In 1954, funded by the Ford 
Foundation, the Cornell public administration specialists Edward Litchfeld 
and Alan C. Rankin went on a study trip to Indonesia at the invitation 
of the prime minister. As a result of their report, a series of development 
programmes was implemented in order to develop the production of public 
administration specialists. In 1958, the Harvard business management 
specialists Lynton Caldwell and Howard Timms were sent to Indonesia to 
assess the condition of both business and public management. When by the 
end of 1959 practically all Dutch-owned companies had been nationalized, 
there arose a sudden demand for managerial jobs in the now government-
owned companies. This consequently resulted in a dramatic expansion of 
business management courses for prospective Indonesian managers. The 
wave of Indonesian and translated management literature that appeared in 
this period bears witness to these stormy developments.
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The rise of managers and management as leading forces in society 
clashed with the state institutions that were based on liberal principles of the 
separation of powers and the rule of law. Ernst Utrecht’s criticism of scientific 
management at the time throws light on the latent conflict that existed 
between the legal approach and the managerial approach. Sukarno’s Guided 
Democracy stated that it was doing away with the triaspolitica. Although 
all this was done out of intense dislike of individualism and as a criticism of 
Western liberal values, if not through Marxist criticism of inherent class bias 
in the law, it did not really conflict with the ideological framework being 
developed by the experts during this period.
Modernization theory and scientific management turned the expert/
manager into a rational leader focused on development and brought about a 
shift away from liberal forms of state-society relations. Although the Guided 
Democracy experimented with corporatist forms, its modern outlook was 
consistent with modernization and managerialist theories. It appealed to 
rationality, planning and, later on, expertise. The dual nature of the Guided 
Democracy regime therefore resulted in increasing friction between what 
can be termed a participatory corporatism and the managerialist approach.
The last three chapters of the thesis discuss the friction between these 
two approaches during the era of Guided Democracy. Chapter five discusses 
the effort to implement a non-professional approach to national planning, 
its failure and the creation of an alternative, centralized planning apparatus 
with a reach much greater than the State Planning Bureau of the 1950s. The 
National Planning Board, or Depernas, was composed of representatives of 
various work or karya organizations. With almost no professional economists, 
the Depernas created an Eight Year Overall Development Plan. The plan 
covered not only economic, but also social, cultural, and political issues. The 
failure of the Eight Year Plan spelled doom for the participatory approach. 
Efforts to open up the state to participation had failed and, by 1962, there 
was a move back toward centralization. The replacement of the Depernas 
with the Bappenas in 1963 symbolized this move. The organizational set 
up for the Bappenas envisioned a stronger and more centralized planning 
bureaucracy tied with regional military and civilian government and various 
government ministries. Integration occurred thus within state bureaucracy 
under the authority of the planners. 
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At the same time, the efforts to expand Indonesian expertise during the 
1950s began to bear fruit in the early 1960s as many economists and social 
scientists began to return from their higher education abroad. By 1963, not a 
few had already obtained important positions in government and academia. 
The control of the military over the higher education sector and the takeover 
by experts of important national research bodies such as the Leknas at the 
MIPI opened up channels of communication between educated army 
officers and returning social scientists. Efforts by the Communists to obtain a 
foothold in higher education showed how highly they also valued the control 
of the universities and their function as an elite generating institutions for 
the state. Sadly for them, this participatory approach misfired.
Chapter six discusses the further implementation of control through 
strategies developed within the social sciences imported since the 1950s. 
The general strategy split into the effort to control the masses through a 
social engineering strategy tied to the nation-building project and the effort 
to gain control of the civil service through indoctrination and retooling. 
The emphasis laid by contemporary social scientists in general, and public 
administration specialists in particular, on the core traditional values of 
Indonesian society bore witness to both the nation-building needs of 
Indonesia and the need of the state to recreate the ideal type of the Indonesian 
man who would support development. The reification of these supposed core 
village values meant putting a check on the modernity of the managers and 
imposing communal, corporatist, and traditional cultural norms on the rest 
of the population. It divided the Indonesian population into two camps of 
modern and rational versus traditional and conservative attitudes. Modern 
man was inherently individualist and both the politicians and the managers 
rejected such attitudes.
At the same time, Indonesia witnessed a dramatic expansion of managerial 
positions in both the bureaucracy and state enterprises. A proliferation of 
managerial courses could only partly provide for management of the 
nationalized, formerly Dutch-owned companies, and therefore many army 
officers were recruited as managers of the new state-owned companies. A 
manager culture developed in the courses and newly established professional 
magazines. Army-published magazines, like Territorial, ran managerial 
articles, while professional management magazines often published articles 
written by army managers, including the generals A. H. Nasution and 
358 THE RISE OF THE MANAGERIAL STATE IN INDONESIA
Ibrahim Adjie. Thus both civilian and army managers often shared the 
same office, took the same courses and read and contributed to the same 
professional magazines. Many army officers sought to widen and upgrade 
their education in economics, management sciences, or social sciences. Some 
of them even published their ideas on state-society relations, ideas that in 
many respects mirrored those of the managerial state.
The expansion and consolidation of managers of the state and the state-
owned economy strengthened the duality between the state and society. 
The last chapter discusses the rise of the new generation of economists, the 
intellectual heirs to Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. The authority and legitimacy 
of this new elite was founded on the modern discourse of management and 
development; but at the same time, its members faced the challenge to come 
to terms with the problems of ‘liberalism’, market forces, and the opening 
of the Indonesian economy. Many of these economists would continue to 
play a significant role in the New Order as part of a technocratic group that 
determined the economic and social policies of the state. Working alongside 
IMF economists in 1963, some of them would try to develop a credible 
recovery plan for the first time, focusing on inflation control. From 1962 
onwards, the economy of Indonesia was hit by a succession of severe crises. 
Inflation ran wild and state revenue grew increasingly dependent on taxation 
and foreign credit, something very different from the colonial state, which 
had depended on the mining and plantation economy. Nationalization 
and the failure to curb inflation devastated profits. In such a dire situation, 
Indonesia looked to the IMF and the United States for aid. Soebandrio 
approached Soedjatmoko in order to get help from Indonesian economists 
such as Widjojo Nitisastro and Mohammad Sadli. The Dekon plan focused 
on controlling inflation through belt-tightening measures. The Dekon 
would also allow market mechanism to play a greater role and give greater 
managerial independence to state-owned companies.
Following Sukarno’s advice, Indonesian economists who trained in the 
West studied socialist economic models such as those in eastern Europe 
rather than the liberal economics scorned by Sukarno. In fact, there never 
were any liberal economists in Indonesia. Nonetheless, their study of strictly 
regulated East European socialist societies convinced them of the importance 
of competition and a free-market system. They ultimately agreed that the 
state was a central component in society. People like Mohammad Sadli saw 
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the importance of modernizing the leadership and saw the praetorian army 
as the rational choice for this. The clash in ideas between Western-trained 
economists and Communists lay not in socialism as such, which saw the state 
as the main actor, but in the relationship between state and society within 
the economy. Although Western-trained economists studied socialist models 
as implemented in various Communist countries, Indonesian Communists 
viewed them with suspicion. The Communist type of production policy 
focused on understanding rent-seeking rural structures and sought to abolish 
them in order to allow for a greater participation in the economy. It saw 
economic development in terms of class warfare and deemed Keynesian and 
other ‘Western-based’ economic models as reinforcing class divisions. It is 
interesting that the main target of the Communists was the ‘state-controlling’ 
class, or in Anderson’s terminology the state. 
This dissertation argues that in its view of the relationship between state 
and society the newly risen elite generation was inherently conservative in 
that it would eventually renege on the revolutionary promise for participation 
in the state and society. The state as a conservative institution required 
submission and control of the masses. This was the prime requirement for 
achieving efficiency and the ability to coordinate the various institutions of 
the state for implementing national planning. A national plan was needed in 
order to create development and thus fulfil the goals of independence. The 
state was inherently conservative in this regard, because the new elite saw it 
as their task to usher in development. This was made possible both because 
the army began to be more assertive in the executive sector and because of 
the rise of a specific type of ideology that was state-centred, developmental, 
and rational driven. This is essential to understand the importance of the 
New Order state. David Henley has shown that the New Order was so 
successful because it focused on pro-poor, rural development policies.3 He 
has argued that institutions may have been less important than the particular 
individuals behind those institutions. With someone less brilliant than 
Widjojo Nitisastro at the helm, the New Order may not have overseen such 
a successful development strategy. 
Even if Widjojo Nitisastro had the ability to implement sound 
development strategies, however, we still need to grasp how the institutions 
3 David Henley, “The Agrarian Roots of Industrial Growth: Rural Development in South-East 
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa” in Development Policy Review, Vol. 30, no. 1, p. 25-47.
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of national planning could have had such a significant impact on the remotest 
rural parts of the country. The focus on rural development was part of the 
developmental strategy discussed by both the military and economists and 
was part of the counterinsurgency strategy that saw the rural area as vital 
for controlling and limiting the spread of Communism. The rise of the 
Bappenas and its regional civil/military structures such as the Bakopda/
Tjatur Tunggal point to the development of institutional matrices of control 
that became among the most important cornerstones of the New Order 
state. The rationale for the new regime was also very clear. The New Order 
was a social contract based on the threat of violence and the promise of 
development. Development was an essential component for the legitimacy 
of the managerial regime. It was only when development faltered at the end 
of the 1990s that the New Order state collapsed. 
The rise of an institutional environment of control and an associated 
ideology that legitimized its control was perhaps one of the most successful 
developments of state power over society in the twentieth century. Leaving 
the legacy of the New Order behind to create a democratic and more liberal 
society is at present the challenge that the Indonesian state and society face. 
A thorough understanding of the rise of the New Order and what it meant 
institutionally and ideologically is an essential part of the creation of a 
democratic and participatory Indonesia.  
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Samenvatting
Deze dissertatie positioneert de opkomst van de Indonesische 
ontwikkelingsstaat in de periode van de de zogenaamde Orde Lama (Oude 
Orde) van President Sukarno. Gesteld wordt dat de wortels van de militaire 
technocratie van de Orde Baru (Nieuwe Orde) van President Suharto moeten 
worden gezocht in instituties en ideeën die in de jaren vijftig en begin 
jaren zestig ontwikkeld werden. De opkomst van het managerialisme, zo 
kenmerkend voor de Orde Baru, wordt direct gerelateerd aan de internationale 
hulpverleningsstructuur die na de Tweede Wereldoorlog opgeld deed. 
Het eerste hoofdstuk behandelt de opkomst in de jaren vijftig van een 
nieuwe ‘kennis-elite’. Deze elite verschilde van de politieke elite die aan 
de macht was gekomen tijdens de revolutionaire periode (1945-1949). 
De nieuwe elite ontleende zijn gezag aan zijn technische en sociaal-
wetenschappelijke vaardigheden. Hoewel de eerste generatie van de nieuwe 
elite pas begin jaren zestig een rol van betekenis ging spelen, beheerste 
daarvoor al een klein aantal personen dat hoger onderwijs had genoten tijdens 
de koloniale periode, de beleidsmakende organen van de staat. Sukarno’s 
inspanningen om zich te bevrijden van de macht van deze experts vormen 
het centrale thema van dit hoofdstuk.
De tegenbeweging die Sukarno en angehauchte politici zoals Roeslan 
Abdoelgani in gang zetten om het op kennis gebaseerde debat te bestrijden, 
werd de ideologische basis van de Geleide Democratiestaat. Tegelijkertijd 
ontwikkelde de nieuwe kenniselite, met name zij die begin jaren zestig na 
het voltooien van hun proefschrift in de Verenigde Staten naar Indonesië 
terugkeerden, een eigen tegenbeweging die zich richtte op het beheersen van 
396 THE RISE OF THE MANAGERIAL STATE IN INDONESIA
de massa en de inzet van het leger als middelen van het noodzakelijk geachte 
ontwikkelingsproces.
Het tweede hoofdstuk behandelt intellectuele ontwikkelingen binnen 
het leger, rondom stafchef Abdul Haris Nasution, de legerleiding en de 
commando-opleiding, Seskoad. Het hoofdstuk gaat in op Nasutions ideeën 
over de rol van het leger, en meer in het bijzonder de ontwikkeling van de Dwi-
Fungsi doctrine. Het bestudeert de ontwikkeling van de officiersopleiding 
voor het leger en hoe deze nieuw gecreëerde onderwijsinstelling de weg 
vrijmaakte voor het invoeren van nieuwe ideeën uit de Verenigde Staten en 
andere delen van de wereld.
Seskoad nam een belangrijke plaats in bij de ontwikkeling van de 
doctrines van territoriale en burgerlijke actie van het leger, die beide gericht 
waren op de controle van de massa of het volk. De territoriale doctrine 
legitimeerde de opkomst van het territoriale korps, dat met zijn macht over 
de regio’s en de rurale gebieden een permanente militaire aanwezigheid in het 
binnenland van Indonesië bewerkstelligde. De burgeractie-doctrine was een 
ontwikkelingsdoctrine die het leger opvatte als een essentieel onderdeel voor 
de nationale ontwikkeling, in het bijzonder op ruraal gebied. Beide doctrines 
maakten deel uit van de counterinsurgency/anti-oproerstrategie die het leger 
in staat stelde de landelijke gebieden te beheersen. De toename van militaire 
hulp van de Verenigde Staten leidde ook tot het opzetten van een nieuwe 
aanvalstroepenelite. De legerelite werd dus zelf opgedeeld in territoriale en 
aanvalsmachten. Deze ontwikkeling was belangrijk voor de plaats die het 
leger in de Nieuwe Orde periode ging innemen.
Het derde hoofdstuk gaat dieper in op de ontwikkeling van de 
kenniselite. Allereerst wordt het acute tekort aan expertise aan de kaak 
gesteld toen de Indonesische staat eind 1949 zijn onafhankelijkheid 
verwierf. De staat probeerde dit probleem op twee manieren op te lossen: 
door het importeren van kennis en door het ontwikkelen van het hoger 
onderwijssysteem. Het importeren van kennis gebeurde op twee manieren: 
allereerst door het creëren in 1951van Putaba, een instituut dat Europese 
kennis naar Indonesië trachtte te halen. De Putaba-experts zouden moeten 
opgaan in het ambtelijke apparaat. Daarnaast werden buitenlandse experts 
geworven voor beleidsmakers- posities in het Nationale Plan Bureau en de 
verschillende financiële instituties. 
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De tweede manier om te voorzien in het tekort aan kennis was het 
ontwikkelen van het hoger onderwijssysteem. Uitbreiding van onderwijs 
vond op fenomenale schaal plaats en had als doel afscheid te nemen van de 
resten van het koloniale onderwijssysteem. De politieke beslissing om van 
het Nederlands naar het Engels over te stappen bracht ook een overstap van 
Nederlandse naar Amerikaanse teksten met zich mee. De introductie van het 
Amerikaanse Guided Study systeem was een onderdeel van deze verschuiving 
van het Nederlandse naar het Amerikaans geïnspireerde onderwijs. De rol 
van de buitenlandse experts werd belangrijker naar mate hun aantal steeg. De 
econoom Sumitro Djojohadikusomo wist steun te winnen van de UNTAA 
om financiering te verkrijgen en experts te sturen. Djojohadikusomo legde 
in zijn verschillende functies als minister van Financiën en decaan van de 
Economische Faculteit van de Universiteit van Indonesië contacten met 
verschillende experts, die betaald werden door de Ford Foundation, de VN en 
andere buitenlandse organen. Zo verkreeg hij invloed bij het creëren van het 
nationale plan en het vaststellen van een groot aantal wettelijke maatregelen 
die bedoeld waren om een levensvatbare ontwikkelingseconomie te creëren.
De rol van de MIT-CENIS en de import van Amerikaanse 
moderniseringstheorie volgden dezelfde weg. De macht van de buitenlandse 
experts, in het bijzonder de Canadees Benjamin Higgins, speelde een 
instrumentale rol in de opstelling van het 1956 Nationale Ontwikkelingsplan, 
was aanzienlijk. Dit was waarschijnlijk ook de reden waarom Sukarno de 
experts links liet liggen en bijna geobsedeerd werd door het gedrag van 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. De opkomst en macht van de buitenlandse 
experts was in Sukarno’s ogen niets anders dan een manifestatie van het 
neokolonialisme.
Het vierde hoofdstuk laat zien hoe een andere belangrijke ideologie uit de 
Verenigde Staten, die van wetenschappelijk management, voet aan de grond 
kreeg door de introductie van twee nieuwe wetenschappen: bedrijfskunde 
en bestuurskunde. Hoewel men zich van begin af aan bewust was van een 
tekort aan kennis, werd pas bij het falen van het 1951 Noodplan, of Sumitro 
Plan, de noodzaak duidelijk om management capaciteiten te scheppen in 
de overheidsbedrijvensector en de bureaucratie. In 1954 maakten Edward 
Litchfeld en Alan C. Rankin, bestuurskundigen van Cornell University, een 
studiereis naar Indonesië op uitnodiging van de premier en met financiële 
steun van de Ford Foundation. 
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Op basis van hun rapport werd een reeks van maatregelingen 
geïmplementeerd om een nieuwe garde van bestuurskundige specialisten 
aan te kweken. In 1958 werden bedrijfsmanagementspecialisten Caldwell 
en Timms (beiden Harvard docenten) naar Indonesië gezonden om de staat 
van zowel het bedrijfs- als het overheidsmanagement te peilen. In 1958 
waren praktisch alle Nederlandse bedrijven genationaliseerd, wat resulteerde 
in een golf van opengevallen bestuurlijke functies in nieuw opgerichte 
overheidsbedrijven. De plotselinge vraag naar Indonesische managers leidde 
tot een toename van het aantal bedrijfskundeopleidingen. Dit kwam ook tot 
uiting in het toenemende aantal publicaties op het gebied van management, 
zowel in het Indonesisch als in vertalingen.
De uitbreiding van managerial training education en het verheffen van 
de manager tot een elitecategorie was een slag in het gezicht van de zittende 
politieke elite die werd gedomineerd door(nog vaak Nederlands gevormde) 
juristen. Een en ander resulteerde in een verschuiving van nadruk op 
juridisch perspectief, naar bestuurlijk perspectief. Dit leidde onvermijdelijk 
tot conflicten tussen de juristen en de bestuurskundigen, zoals verwoord in 
de scherpe kritiek van Ernst Utrecht op speeches van bestuurskundigen als 
Prajul Atmosudirdjo en Tjia Kok Tjiang. Van belang is dat de uitbreiding 
van wetenschappelijk bestuur bijdroeg tot de grondwettelijke veranderingen 
die tijdens de Geleide Democratie plaatsvonden. Het op het tweede plan 
zetten van het recht en de scheiding van machten leek te stroken met de 
doelstellingen van de corporatieve staat onder bestuurlijke controle. Het 
loslaten van juridische bescherming van het individu kenmerkte in zekere 
zin de veranderingen die plaatsvonden in de verhouding tussen staat en 
maatschappij.
Betroffen het derde en vierde hoofdstuk de ontwikkeling van kennis 
en managers en de daaraan gerelateerde ideologische scheiding van de 
geesten bij de instelling van de Geleide Democratie in de late jaren vijftig, 
het vijfde hoofdstuk concentreert zich op de ontwikkeling van de nationale 
planning tijdens de periode van Geleide Democratie. Het bespreekt Sukarno’s 
pogingen om zijn corporatieve ideeën te effectueren door grotere participatie 
toe te staan in de nationale economie, vooral in de pas genationaliseerde 
overheidsindustrie. Hiertoe werd het nieuwe Depernas  planningsinstituut 
opgericht. In tegenstelling tot de door buitenlandse experts gedomineerde 
planningslichamen, zou Depernas een non-expert of non-professioneel 
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planningsinstituut belichamen: een instituut waarin de rol en participatie 
van het volk een hoofdrol zouden spelen.
Het falen van Depernas en het mislukken van de pogingen om de 
economie open te stellen voor grotere deelname creëerde onvermijdelijk 
een tweedeling tussen de communisten en de managers. Terugkerende 
Indonesische studenten die hun doctoraat hadden behaald in diverse sociale 
wetenschappen kregen langzaam aan belangrijke functies binnen de overheid. 
LIPI-LEKNAS en andere professionele organisaties naast de universiteiten 
werden kennisvijvers van nieuwe professionals na hun terugkeer in Indonesië. 
Het falen van Depernas leidde tot de oprichting van Bappenas, dat ongeveer 
zoals het centrale planningslichaam uit de jaren vijftig opereerde, al hoewel 
met meer invloed in de regio’s en zoals gezegd veel sterker geïntegreerd in 
het militaire territoriale bestuur. Na het falen van de corporatistische aanpak 
stuurde het presidentiële kabinet vanaf 1962 aan op centralisering. Zo werd 
in veel opzichten de structuur van de Nieuwe Orde al in de periode 1962-
1965 geïmplementeerd.
Het zesde hoofdstuk bespreekt de implementatie van managerialistische 
wetenschappen in de vorm van verschillende social engineering projecten die 
gericht waren op de overheidsdienst en de grote massa. Social engineering 
was een belangrijk onderdeel van de Geleide Democratie en was een 
onmisbaar element in de revolutionaire doelstellingen. Het hervormen van de 
Indonesiër was onderdeel van het nationale streven. Dat zowel managers als 
staatsideologen rondom Sukarno social engineering steunden, toont wederom 
de verenigbaarheid aan van de Geleide Democratie met de Managerial State.
Social engineering werd uitgeoefend via tal van organisaties. Ten eerste 
via het Nationale Bestuursinstituut, dat naast vele andere administratieve 
organisaties ook managers opleidde. Ten tweede werd een aantal organisaties 
aangewezen om het overheidsapparaat te observeren, te indoctrineren en van 
nieuwe middelen te voorzien. De Bapekan voerde observaties en onderzoek 
uit om problemen van inefficiëntie en slechte organisatie te analyseren. 
De Paran werd belast met indoctrinatie en mediatie. De ontwikkeling van 
indoctrinatiecursussen en de omvorming van het overheidsapparaat strookten 
met de idealen die werden omhelsd door managementspecialisten die in 
Indonesië werkten. 
Indoctrinatie van traditionele waarden als gotong royong werden in feite 
gelegitimeerd door studies die waren uitgevoerd door managementspecialisten 
400 THE RISE OF THE MANAGERIAL STATE IN INDONESIA
die in de Verenigde Staten hadden gestudeerd. De herontdekking van 
traditionele waarden werd dus geïncorporeerd in de indoctrinatiestrategie 
van managementspecialisten en andere sociale wetenschappers. Belangrijk 
is dat veel van deze technieken en waarden later werden gebruikt door de 
Nieuwe Orde.
Het zevende en laatste hoofdstuk bespreekt de ontwikkeling van 
economisch denken in de laatste jaren van de Geleide Democratie. Het toont 
het groeiende conflict tussen de ‘productiebenadering’ van de communisten 
tegen de monetaire benadering van westers-getrainde economen. In 1962 
leidde het falen van de economische planning en mismanagement tot 
financiële problemen geleid met als resultaat toenemende inflatie, wat weer 
een feitelijk faillissement van een groot deel van de economische sectoren in 
overheidshanden tot gevolg had.
De droevige economische positie dwong de regering voor hulp aan te 
kloppen bij het IMF en de westerse wereld. Een herstelprogramma genaamd 
Deklarasi Ekonomi, of Dekon, werd aangekondigd. In dit programma 
werkten westers getrainde Indonesische economen samen met hun westerse 
tegenhangers om een programma te ontwikkelen om inflatie te verminderen, 
het overheidstekort te verminderen, en westerse leningen te ontvangen via 
westerse financieringsorganisaties.
Het falen van Dekon was de uitkomst van zowel de afkeer van Sukarno 
van elke vorm van de impopulaire versoberingmaatregelen die een essentieel 
onderdeel vormden van het plan, als de afkeer van communisten van elke 
vorm van monetaire of Keynesiaanse benaderingen. Tegelijkertijd probeerde 
de communisten hun ‘productiebeleid’ door te duwen waarin rentezoekende 
structuren worden geanalyseerd in de rurale gebieden en waarin renteverlaging 
wordt gezocht door retooling. Dit hield herstructurering in van de rurale 
gebieden ten nadele van het leger, de bureaucratie en andere traditionele 
vormen van autoriteit. Deze benadering leidde tot een scherp conflict tussen 
de communisten en de meer traditionele krachten naast de militaire en 
burgerlijke bestuurdersklasse. Tegelijkertijd begonnen veel westers getrainde 
economen die socialistische economieën in Oost-Europa(Joegoslavië en 
Hongarije) te bestuderen waar ruimte gemaakt werd voor incorporatie van de 
marktvormen en analyse. Deze hybride vorm zou voortgezet worden onder 
de Nieuwe Orde met behoud van de traditionele vormen van autoriteit. De 
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uitroeiing van de communisten in 1965 betekende in feite het einde van 
deze productiebenadering.
Deze studie toont aan dat er een positieve correlatie bestaat tussen 
de Geleide Democratie staat en de Nieuwe Orde staat, met name in de 
ontwikkeling van militaire en burgerlijke kenniselites, de opkomst van ideeën 
over wetenschappelijk bestuur en modernisatietheorie, het voortbrengen 
van managers en de opkomst van een managerial staat die met gebruik 
van social engineering het overheidsapparaat en de brede bevolking stevig 
in de greep hield. De ontwikkeling in de sociale wetenschappen van een 
machtsstrategie wijst op de genealogische eenheid in de ideologie van de 




Tesis ini membahas kenaikan dari negara pembangunan Indonesia pada 
zaman Demokrasi Terpimpin. Argumen utamanya adalah bahwa akar 
dari teknokrasi-militer Orde Baru dapat ditemukan dalam beragam 
perkembangan kelembagaan dan ide-ide semasa tahun 1950an dan 
pertengahan awal dari tahun 1960an. Tesis ini juga berargumen bahwa 
kenaikan ideologi managerialisme sangat penting untuk dapat memahami 
mengapa lembaga-lembaga dan ide-ide tertentu dapat berkembang dan 
seberapa penting peranan dari struktur bantuan internasional yang terbina 
setelah Perang Dunia Kedua.
Bab pertama membahas kemunculan dari elit baru tahun 1950an yang 
disebut sebagai elit ‘ahli’. Elit ini berbeda daripada elit politik yang telah 
mengambil alih kekuasaan pada zaman revolusi (1945-1949). Elit baru ini 
memperoleh otoritas mereka dari keahlian teknis dan ilmu sosial mereka. 
Walaupun generasi pertama dari elit itu baru dapat peranan yang lebih 
penting hanya pada awal tahun 1960an, penguasaan dari orang-orang yang 
mendapatkan pendidikan tinggi pada masa kolonial terhadap badan-badan 
pembuat kebijakan negara itu penting. Usaha Sukarno untuk merebut 
kontrol dari kaum ahli adalah tajuk utama bab ini.
Cara Sukarno dan politisi lainnya seperti Roeslan Abdulgani membangun 
wacana tandingan dari wacana yang dibangun oleh ahli digunakan sebagai 
pondasi bagi negara Demokrasi Terpimpin. Sebagai tandingan, ahli-ahli 
baru, khususnya ekonom-ekonomi yang baru balik ke Indonesia setelah 
mendapatkan gelar doktor mereka di Amerika Serikat pada tahun 1960an 
membangun wacana tandingan pula yang fokus pada pengontrolan massa 
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dan memberi peran serta yang besar kepada angkatan darat dalam proses 
pembangunan.
Bab kedua membahas perkembangan angkatan darat pada masa ini, 
khususnya dalam klik intelektual Kasad Abdul Haris Nasution dan Sekolah 
Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat atau Seskoad. Bab ini membahas 
perkembangan ide-ide Nasution mengenai peranan angkatan darat, 
khususnya dalam hubungannya dengan doktrin dwi-fungsi. Bab ini juga 
melihat perkembangan pendidikan perwira angkatan darat dan bagaimana 
lembaga-lembaga pendidikan baru ini membuka jalan untuk pengimporan 
ide-ide baru dari Amerika Serikat dan bagian lain dunia. 
Seskoad adalah situs penting bagi pengembangan doktrin territorial dan 
doktrin civic action angkatan darat, yang keduanya fokus pada isu kontrol 
populasi. Doktrin territorial melegitimasi kemunculan korps territorial yang 
mana otoritasnya atas daerah-daerah dan pedesaan mengekalkan keberadaan 
tentara pada wilayah pedalaman Indonesia. Doktrin civic action merupakan 
doktrin pembangunan yang menempatkan tentara sebagai komponen inti 
dalam pembangunan bangsa, khususnya pada tingkatan pedesaan. Kedua 
doktrin ini adalah bagian dari strategi counter-insurgency atau strategi 
penumpasan pemberontakan yang memungkinkan penguasaan tentara 
terhadap daerah pedesaan. Bantuan dari Amerika Serikat berperan dalam 
pembentukan pasukan-pasukan gerak cepat. Elit tentara akhirnya terpecah 
dalam dua bagian: elit territorial dan elit gerak cepat. Perkembangan ini 
penting untuk memahami peranserta tentara dalam masa Orde Baru.
Bab ketiga membahas lebih dalam lagi perkembangan elit ahli. Pertama-
tama, bab ini fokus pada permasalahan keterbatasan jumlah ahli yang parah 
pada saat Indonesia mendapatkan kedaulatannya pada akhir tahun 1949. Bab 
ini melihat dua cara negara berusaha menjawab tantangan. Pertama adalah 
penciptaan lembaga yang mengimpor ahli-ahli Eropa ke Indonesia bernama 
Putaba atau Pusat Tenaga Bangsa Asing pada tahun 1951. Ahli-ahli Putaba 
di-integrasikan dalam korps PNS. Kedua adalah impor ahli khusus untuk 
jabatan-jabatan dalam Badan Perantjang Nasional dan lembaga-lembaga 
keuangan Indonesia.
Jawaban kedua terhadap permasalahan kurangnya tenaga ahli adalah 
lewat pengembangan sistem pendidikan tingkat tinggi nasional. Ekspansi 
pendidikan tinggi nasional amat mencengangkan dengan semangat utama 
meninggalkan sistem pendidikan kolonial. Pergeseran dalam penggunaan 
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buku teks Belanda menuju Amerika menandakan pergeseran bahasa 
pendidikan dari bahasa Belanda ke Inggeris. Perkenalan sistem studi 
terbimbing atau guided study dari Amerika Serikat adalah bagian dari 
pergeseran pengaruh sistem pendidikan dari Belanda ke Amerika Serikat. 
Peran serta ahli asing tumbuh seiring dengan usaha negara mengimpor 
mereka. Ekonom Sumitro Djojohadikusumo memperoleh dukungan 
UNTAA atau Badan Pembantu Administrasi PBB dalam hal pendanaan 
dan pengiriman ahli ke Indonesia. Dalam fungsinya sebagai Menteri 
Keuangan maupun sebagai Dekan Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia, 
Djojohadikusumo membuka jalan bagi beragam ahli-ahli asing yang dibayar 
oleh Ford Foundation, PBB ataupun badan-badan asing lainnya guna 
mendapatkan otoritas dalam perancangan rencana nasional dan dalam 
merancang beragam peraturan guna menciptakan pertumbuhan ekonomi 
yang berkelanjutan. Peran serta MIT-CENIS dan pengimporan teori-teori 
modernisasi dari Amerika Serikat masuk lewat jalur ini. Menguatnya ahli-ahli 
asing, seperti terlihat dalam kasus ahli dari Kanada Benjamin Higgins dan 
peran-sertanya dalam pembentukkan Rencana Lima Tahun Nasional pertama 
tahun 1956 sangat penting. Ini kemungkinan adalah alasan utama mengapa 
Sukarno menjadi curiga terhadap ahli-ahli dan menjelaskan ketidak-sukaan 
yang ditujukannya terhadap sosok Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. Bagi 
Sukarno, kemunculan dari ahli asing yang berotoritas penuh, tampak seperti 
manifestasi dari neokolonialisme.
Bab keempat membahas pengimporan ideologi penting lainnya dari 
Amerika Serikat: scientific management. Impor ideologi ini ditandai oleh 
masuknya dua ilmu baru: manajemen bisnis dan administrasi publik. 
Walaupun sudah ada kesadaran akan keterbatasan keahlian sejak awal 
kemerdekaan, kegagalan dari Rencana Sumitro atau Rencana Urgency 
tahun 1951 menekankan pentingnya pembangunan kemampuan manajerial 
baik dalam usaha milik pemerintah maupun dalam birokrasi. Pada tahun 
1954, ahli ilmu pemerintahan Edward Litchfeld dan Alan C. Rankin dari 
Cornell melakukan perjalanan studi ke Indonesia atas dasar undangan 
Perdana Menteri dan dengan bantuan keuangan dari Ford Foundation. 
Setelah laporan mereka keluar, serangkaian perkembangan dilakukan guna 
membangun sistem produksi ahli-ahli ilmu administrasi. Pada tahun 1958, 
ahli manajemen bisnis Lynton K. Caldwell dan Harold L. Timms dikirim 
ke Indonesia guna melihat kondisi manajemen bisnis dan negara. Sampai 
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tahun 1958, hampir semua perusahaan milik Belanda telah dinasionalisasi 
yang mengakibatkan peluberan jumlah pekerjaan manajerial dalam 
perusahaan-perusahaan milik negara yang baru itu. Ekspansi jumlah manajer 
Indonesia mengakibatkan ekspansi pula kursus-kursus manajemen bisnis. 
Ini juga terlihat dalam peningkatan jumlah publikasi bahasa Indonesia dan 
terjemahan dalam bidang ilmu manajemen.
Ekspansi pendidikan manajerial dan kaum manager sebagai salah 
satu kategori elit menjadi bagian dari ancaman terhadap elit politik yang 
didominasi oleh lulusan jurusan hukum. Ekspansi scientific management 
juga mengakibatkan pergeseran penekanan dari sudut pandang legal menuju 
sudut pandang manajerial. Ini mengakibatkan konflik antara ahli hukum dan 
kaum manajerialis, sebagaimana tergambarkan dalam kritikan Ernst Utrecht 
terhadap pidato ahli administrasi negara Prajudi Atmosudirdjo dan Tjia Kok 
Tjiang. Sama pentingnya, ekspansi  scientific management itu mendukung 
perubahan konstitusional yang dilakukan dalam Demokrasi Terpimpin. 
Pergeseran menjauhi supremasi hukum (rule of law) dan pembagian fungsi 
kekuasaan (spearationof power) tidak berkonflik dengan tujuan-tujuan 
negara korporatif dibawah penguasan manajerial. Kemunculan dari ilmu 
yang mendukung pergeseran menjauhi perlindungan hukum pada tingkat 
individu adalah bagian penting dalam perubahan hubungan-hubungan 
masyarakat dan negara. 
Jika bab tiga dan empat fokus pada perkembangan keahlian dan 
manajer dan akibat-akibat ideologis dari perkembangan itu pada masa 
sebelum Demokrasi Terpimpin diakhir tahun 1950an, bab kelima fokus 
pada perkembangan usaha perencanaan nasional semasa zaman Demokrasi 
Terpimpin. Bab ini membahas usaha-usaha Sukarno untuk mengetrapkan 
ide-ide korporatifnya dengan cara membuka partisipasi yang lebih besar 
dalam ekonomi nasional, khususnya dalam industri-industri yang baru 
dinasionalisir dan, khususnya, dalam pembentukkan lembaga perencana 
nasional baru bernama Depernas. Berbeda dengan badan perencana yang lalu 
yang didominasi oleh ahli-ahli asing, Depernas merupakan pengejawantahan 
dari sebuah badan perencana non-ahli atau non-profesional: sebuah lembaga 
dimana peran dan partisipasi rakyat dapat diakomodasi.
Kegagalan daripada Depernas dan kegagalan dari pembukaan 
perekonomian untuk partisipasi lebih besar merujuk pada oposisi yang makin 
kuat antara Komunis dan kaum manajer. Mahasiswa-mahasiswa Indonesia 
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yang balik setelah memperoleh gelar Doktor dalam berbagai ilmu sosial 
mulai mendapatkan posisi-posisi penting dalam pemerintahan. Kenaikan dari 
lembaga LIPI-LEKNAS dan organisasi-organisasi kaum profesional lainnya 
dan universitas-universitas menjadi tempat baru buat ahli-ahli ini. Kegagalan 
Depernas mengakibatkan pembentukkan daripada Bappenas, yang berfungsi 
sebagai badan perancang yang terpusat yang mirip dengan bentuk badan 
perancang negara tahun 1950an, tetapi dengan kekuatan yang lebih besar 
atas daerah dan lebih terintegrasi dengan pemerintahan territorial militer. 
Dipusatkan dibawah kantor kepresidenan semenjak 1962 merupakan salah 
satu jawaban terhadap kegagalan korporatisme. Dalam banyak hal, struktur 
negara Orde Baru sedang dibentuk dalam periode 1962-1965.
Bab ke-enam membahas penerapan daripada ilmu-ilmu manajerial dalam 
bentuk beragam proyek-proyek social engineering yang ditujukan kepada 
pegawai negeri maupun rakyat Indonesia kebanyakan. Social engineering 
merupakan komponen penitng dalam Demokrasi Terpimpin dan merupakan 
bagian inheren dari tujuan-tujuan revolusionernya. Pembentukan ulang 
manusia Indonesia merupakan bagian dari tujuan nasional. Kenyataan 
bahwa baik manajer maupun ideolog negara macam Sukarno mendukung 
social engineering menandakan kecocokkan Demokrasi Terpimpin dengan 
negara manajerial.
Social engineering diterapkan melalui serangkaian organisasi. Pertama, 
Lembaga Administrasi Negara, bersama dengan beberapa organisasi 
administasi lainnya, didirikan guna membentuk kaum manajer. Kedua, 
serangkaian organisasi yang dibentuk guna melakukan pengawasan, 
indoktrinasi dan retooling dalam korps pegawai negeri. Bapekan dibuat 
guna melakukan pengawasan dan investigasi agar dapat menganalisis 
permasalahan seputar ketidak-efisienan dan kegagalan organisasi. Paran 
dibuat untuk melakukan indoktrinasi dan retooling. Pengembangan 
kursus-kursus indoktrinasi dan usaha me-retool PNS sejajar dengan ideal 
dari re-management yang telah diutarakan beragam ahli manajemen yang 
bekerja di Indonesia. Walaupun gagal dalam menciptakan birokrasi yang 
efisien dan, bahkan, memperburuk permasalahan dengan mempolitisir lebih 
lanjut posisi dalam PNS, retooling dan indoktrinasi sejajar dengan semangat 
re-management.
Indoktrinasi nilai-nilai tradisional macam gotong royong dilegitimasi 
oleh studi-studi yang dilakukan oleh ahli-ahli manajemen Indonesia 
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yang belajar di Amerika Serikat. Penemuan kembali nilai-nilai tradisional 
diintegrasikan dalam strategi indoktrinasi yang dirancang oleh ahli-ahli 
manajemen dan ilmuan sosial lainnya. Menariknya, banyak dari teknik dan 
nilai ini yang digunakan oleh Orde Baru.
Bab ketujuh dan terakhir membahas mengenai perkembangan pemikiran 
ekonomi selama tahun-tahun terakhir dalam Demokrasi Terpimpin. Bab ini 
menunjukkan konflik yang makin menjadi antara ‘pendekatan produksi’ 
yang ditawarkan oleh PKI dengan kebijakan moneter yang ditawarkan oleh 
ekonom yang dilatih di Barat. Pada tahun 1962, kegagalan dari perencanaan 
ekonomi dan mismanajemen telah mengakibatkan permasalahan hot money 
yang menjadi-jadi. Pembiayaan defisit lewat pencetakan uang menyebabkan 
peningkatan inflasi yang telah mengakibatkan terjadinya kebangkrutan dalam 
sebagian besar sektor perekonomian yang dikuasai oleh pemerintah. 
Keadaan perekonomian yang parah ini memaksa pemerintah untuk 
mendekati IMF dan dunia Barat untuk mendapatkan bantuan. Sebuah 
program rehabilitasi bernama Deklarasi Ekonomi atau Dekon diumumkan. 
Didalam program ini, ekonom Indonesia beserta ekonom dari Barat 
merancang program guna menangani permasalahan inflasi, mengurangi 
defisit pemerintah dan mendapatkan hutang dari Barat lewat organisasi 
perkumpulan dana Barat.
Kegagalan dari Dekon adalah akibat dari ketidak-sukaan Sukarno 
terhadap bentuk kebijakan uang ketat yang tidak populer dimata rakyat dan 
ketidak-sukaan PKI terhadap bentuk-bentuk kebijakan moneter ataupun 
Keynesian. PKI mendorong ‘kebijakan produksi’ mereka yang berusaha 
menganalisis posisi-posisi rente dalam masyarakan lewat penerapan retooling. 
Proposal ini menginginkan adanya reformasi dalam kawasan pedesaan yang 
merugikan otoritas militer, birokrat ataupun otoritas tradisional lainnya. 
Pendekatan ini mengakibatkan konflik yang menjadi antara kaum Komunis 
dengan kekuatan-kekuatan tradisional lainnya beserta kelas manajerial 
militer/sipil yang baru. Disisi lain, banyak dari ekonom lulusan Barat yang 
mulai meneliti ekonomi-ekonomi sosialis di Eropa Timur tapi dengan cara 
dimana kekuatan pasar dapat diintegrasikan. Ide-ide hibrid ini akan terus 
berlanjut dalam masa Orde Baru, beserta pertahanan dari bentuk-bentuk 
otoritas tradisional lainnya. Kehancuran total dari PKI menyebabkan 
kehilangan legitimasi dari pendekatan produksi.
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Studi ini menunjukkan bahwa ada hubungan positif antara negara 
Demokrasi Terpimpin dan negara Orde Baru, khususnya dalam hubungannya 
dengan pembentukkan elit-elit ahli militer dan sipil, kenaikkan ide-ide 
scientific management dan teori modernisasi, produksi kaum manajer dan 
kenaikkan daripada negara manajerial dan menjauhnya Indonesia dari 
bentuk-bentuk negara liberal serta penggunaan social engineering sebagai 
cara kontrol baik PNS maupun rakyat. Perkembangan dalam ilmu sosial 
beragam strategi kontrol menunjukkan satunya genealogi wacana dan 
ideology perhubungan negara dan masyarakat dalam Demokrasi Terpimpin 
maupun Orde Baru. 
